CON5TITUTIC 
DEVELOPMENT    IN    C! 


HAROLD  M*  VINACKL 


GIFT  OF 


MODERN  CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT  IN  CHINA 


MODERN  CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT  IN  CHINA 


BY 

HAROLD  MONK  VINACKE 

'ASSOCIATE  PROFESSOR  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
IN  MIAMI  UNIVERSITY 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
PRINCETON 

LONDON:  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 
OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1920 


Copyright,  1920,  by 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

Published  1920 
Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


TO  MY  MOTHER 


435509 


PREFACE 

In  the  following  pages  modern  Chinese  history,  from  the 
/constitutional  point  of  view,  is  treated  as  a  continuous  develop- 
ment since  the  inception  of  reform  in  1898  under  the  Emperor 
Kuang  Hsu.  It  was  only  gradually  that  China  was  brought 
to  a  realization  of  the  necessity  for  change  in  her  political 
structure.  During  the  years  prior  to  1898,  it  became  apparent 
to  a  few  in  the  country  that  the  Chinese  house  must  be  re- 
paired if  it  was  to  remain  standing.  The  "Hundred  Days"  of 
reform  in  1898  marked  the  attempt  to  patch  up,  without  seri- 
ously altering,  the  existing  structure.  The  fundamental  na- 
ture of  the  alterations  necessary,  however,  was  not  appreciated 
at  that  time.  With  the  failure  of  the  reform  movement  came 
a  reaction  against  change.  This  reaction  against  the  'new' 
culminated  in  the  Boxer  uprising.  The  disastrous  termination 
of  the  anti-foreign  movement  brought  a  deeper  realization  of 
the  need  for  radical  reforms.  The  reforms  undertaken  in- 
volved the  introduction  of  a  measure  of  representative  gov- 
ernment into  China.  But  although  committed  to  the  idea  of 
change,  the  rulers  of  China  were  not  prepared  to  move  rapidly 
enough  to  satisfy  the  radical  element  in  the  reform  party  and 
revolution  resulted.  The  revolutionary  ideas  marked  a  de- 
cided break  with  the  past.  Since  the  revolution  of  1911,  the 
history  of  China  has  been  the  attempt  to  find  a  middle  ground, 
suited  to  the  needs  of  the  country,  between  the  old  traditional 
life  of  the  State,  and  the  new  conceptions  of  governmental 
relationships  brought  to  the  East  from  the  West.  No  change, 


vn 


viii  Preface 

whether  in  the  nature  of  progression  or  retrogression,  stands 
by  itself,  but  each  links  itself  naturally  with  the  antecedent 
and  the  subsequent  condition.  That  fact  of  itself  justifies  the 
attempt  to  trace  the  threads  of  constitutional  development  in 
modern  China.  The  endeavor  is  further  justified  by  the  out- 
standing importance  to  the  world  of  the  Far  Eastern  question 
which  cannot  be  divorced  from  the  internal  history  of  China. 

The  material  for  the  first  two  chapters  has  been  drawn 
largely  from  such  authoritative  secondary  works  as  H.  B. 
Morse's  "International  Relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire," 
Smith's  "China  in  Convulsion,"  and  "China  under  the  Empress 
Dowager,"  by  Bland  and  Backhouse  (1910  edition).  The 
succeeding  chapters  have  been  written  from  a  study  of  the 
documents,  and  from  knowledge  of  the  situation  gained  dur- 
ing residence  in  China.  Where  the  interpretation  of  a  fact  or 
event  has  been  given  in  the  form  of  a  quotation,  it  has  been 
because  the  words  quoted  have  expressed  the  point  of  view 
of  the  present  writer. 

It  is  impossible  here  to  make  more  than  a  general  acknow- 
ledgment of  the  aid  given  by  friends  both  in  China  and  the 
United  States  in  the  preparation  of  this  study.  Grateful 
acknowledgment  is  due,  however,  to  the  aid  given  and  sug- 
gestions made  by  Professors  W.  W.  Willoughby  and  W.  F. 
Willoughby,  and  Professor  Henry  Jones  Ford,  who  read  and 
criticised  the  entire  manuscript;  to  Dr.  S.  K.  Hornbeck  who 
read  and  gave  valuable  suggestions  as  to  the  first  half  of  the 
book;  and  to  Professor  E.  S.  Corwin.  The  writer  is  under  a 
further  debt  of  gratitude  to  his  wife  for  her  aid  in  the  gather- 
ing of  materials,  in  the  preparation  of  the  manuscript,  and  in 
the  reading  of  the  proofs  of  the  book. 

HAROLD  MONK  VINACKE. 
Oxford,  Ohio,  8  August,  1920. 


CONTENTS 


Chapter  I. 
Chapter  II. 

Chapter  III. 

- 
Chapter  IV. 

Chapter  V. 
Chapter  VI. 
Chapter  VII. 

Chapter  VIII. 
Chapter  IX. 
Chapter  X. 
Chapter  XI. 


The  old  order  and  the  foreign  impact. 
The  K'ang  Yu-wei  reform  movement. 

Constitutional  Development  under  the  Man- 
chus  1900  to  1908.  f  ¥ 

Constitutional  Development  under  the  Man- 
chus.     Second  period  1908  to  1911.      ^  ' 

Constitutional  aspects  of  the  Revolution.       *w   r 
The  Nanking  Constitution.       I'' 

Government  under  the  Constitutional   Com- 
pact.    /  ^  ? 

An  interlude — The  monarchy  movement.     /  7  ? 
The  Republic  after  the  Restoration.       ^  '  *~ 
The  triumph  of  the  "Military  "      2  "33 
Conclusion,    d.  (*  2 


IX 


CHAPTER  I 

For  generations  prior  to  the  end  of  the  nmeteenth_century 
China  had  been  politically  in  a  state  of  suspended  animation. 
Life  had  continued  but  there  had  been  little  growth  and  to  the 
casual  observer,  almost  no  perceptible  decay  in  her  institutions. 
Dynasties  rose  and  fell  without  seriously  affecting  the  politi- 
cal organization  of  the  country.  One  barbarian  rule  after  an- 
other was  imposed  on  the  "sons  of  Han,"  yet,  after  the  con- 
quest, the  conquerors  ruled  according  to  the  accepted  customs 
and  traditions.  Then,  within  a  period  of  Jess  than  twenty 
years,  the  whole  political  _system  was  outwardly  and  rather 
ostentatiously  changed.  The  form  of  a  constitutional  mon- 
archy was  substituted  for  the  paternal  despotism  of  the  past, 
and,  almost  immediately,  the  limited  monarchy  gave  way  to  a 
^republic.  Political  change  does  not  come  unheralded  in  any 
country,  certainly  not  in  a  State  ruled  by  custom  and  tradi- 
tion as  China  had  for  so  long  been.  But  it  is  not  easy  to  show 
why  any  change  comes  in  the  life  of  a  nation,  and  it  is  not 
always  profitable  to  undertake  such  a  task.  In  order  to  fol- 
low the  course  of  modern  constitutional  or  political  develop- 
ment in  China,  however,  it  is  necessary :  ( i )  to  appreciate  the 
conditions  which  created  the  necessity  for  reform  and  change ; 
and  (2)  to  discover  why  those  conditions  led  to  a  change  in 
the  political  structure  instead  of  a  simple  change  of  dynasty. 
This  understanding  can  be  best  gained  by  means  of  a  brief 
description  of  the  organization  of  the  government  under  the 
Manchus,  together  with  a  discussion  of  some  of  the  new  prob- 
lems the  Empire  had  to  face  during  the  last  years  of  Manchu 
rule. 


2  /.'•  :    /Mjnteflni'£otistftidiqnal  Development  in  China 


if: 


At  the  headjof  the  governmental  organization  stood  the 
-  Emperor.  In  theory  he  wielded  the  absolute  power  of  life 
and  death  over  his  subjects.  In  him  were  vested  all  of  the 
prerogatives  of  government :  executive,  legislative,  and  judi- 
cial. The  Imperial  Mandates  had  the  force  of  law;  the  Em- 
peror was  the  highest  court  of  judicial  appeal  in  the  land,  the 
stroke  of  the  "vermillion  pencil"  being  final ;  he  had  the  abso- 
lute power  of  appointment  and  dismissal.  In  short,  he  was 
i  the  typical  despot  of  the  Oriental  Court.  Practically,  how- 
ever, he  was  limited  in  the  use  of  his  powers  by  the  strength 
of  custom  over  the  minds  of  the  people;  by  the  laws  estab- 
lished by  his  predecessors;  and  because  he  could  enforce  his 
will  only  so  far  as  his  agents  were  willing  to  carry  out  his 
commands.  The  Emperor  ruled  as  the  "Son  of  Heaven,"  but 
if  he  was  unable  to  preserve  order  in  the  Empire,  or  if  he 
failed  to  respect  the  customs  of  the  people,  it  was  felt  that 
he  had  exhausted  the  "mandate  of  Heaven,"  and  the  people 
held  themselves  justified  in  deposing  him.  "The  Chinese  con- 
fer on  their  Emperor  absolute  power,  but  argue  that  when 
they  are  oppressed  it  does  not  proceed  from  the  absolute 
power  of  the  Emperor,  but  rather  from  a  want  of  proper  ap- 
preciation of  his  high  duties,  and  that  when  the  Emperor  is 
thus  guilty,  they  are  under  no  obligation  to  countenance  or 
obey  him."1 

Assisting  the  Emperor  in  the  performance  of  his  extensive 
duties  was,  at  first,  thevGr_and[3-ecTetariat  (Nei  Ko) ;  to  which 
was  added  about  1730  the>  Grand_Council  (Kun  Ki-chu).  It 
was  the  duty  of  the  Grand  Secretariat  to  deliberate  on  mat- 
ters connected  with  the  government  of  the  realm;  to  find  out 
the  will  of  the  Emperor  and  to  see  that  it  was  proclaimed 
throughout  the  Empire.  The  Grand  Council,  which  usually 

1  Jernigan,  "China  in  Law  and  Commerce,"  p.  56. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China  3 

consisted  of  five  members,  gradually  displaced  the  Grand  Sec- 
retariat, becoming  the  actual  Privy  Council  of  the  Emperor.2 
Its  duties  also  were  to  deliberate  and  advise  on  the  affairs  of 
the  State  in  the  presence  of  the  Emperor.  While  the  advice  of 
the  Grand  Council  was  always  sought,  it  was  not  always  fol- 
lowed, the  Throne  having  the  final  decision  of  every  question. 
The  actual  administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  nation  was  not, , 
however,  carried  on  by  the  council  but  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  six  Boards  (increased  to  seven  by  the  creation  of  the 
Tsungli  Yamen,3  or  Foreign  Board,  in  1861)  i.e.  the  Boards 
of  Civil  Office,  Revenue,  Rites,  War,  Punishment,  and  Works. 
Before  passing  on  to  the  provincial  system  one  branch  of 
the  central  administration  deserves  especial  mention.  The 
only  body  in  the  Empire  with  the  right  directly  to  criticise 
the  Emperor  was  the  Censorate.  The  duty  of  the  Censors 
was  to  criticise,  and  "this  duty  they  exercised  without  fear, 
though  not  always  without  favor."4  No  question  affecting 
the  interest  of  the  State  was  too  great,  and  none  too  small  for 
their  scrutiny.  The  scope  of  their  work  can  be  judged  from 
the  name,  "The  All  Examining  Court."  Thus  the  Censorate, 
says  Williams-,  had  "the  care  of  manners  and  customs,  the  in- 
vestigation of  all  public  offices  within  and  without  the  capital, 
the  discrimination  between  the  good  and  bad  performance  of 

2  Membership  in   the   Grand   Secretariat  continued   to  be  the 
highest  honor  attainable,  however,  although  in  later  years,  when 
it  had  been  superseded  by  the  Grand  Council,  it  had  come  to  be 
a  mere  Court  of  Archives.     Morse,  Trade  and  Administration, 

PP-  42-43- 

3  The  Tsungli  Yamen  (Foreign  Board),  dealing  with  the  prob- 
lems of  foreign  intercourse,  the  most  pressing  questions  of  the 
day,  was  gradually  increased  in  size  and  power  until,  in  1876, 
its  membership  included  all  of  the  members  of  the  Grand  Coun- 
cil, and  none  who  were  not  at  least  President  or  Vice-president 
of  a  Board.     Morse,  Trade  and  Administration,  p.  42. 

4  Morse,  "Trade  and  Administration  of  China,"  p.  46. 


4  Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

their  business,  and  between  the  depravity  and  uprightness  of 
the  officers  employed  in  them."5  It  was  largely  through  the 
Censors  that  the  Emperor  was  able  to  keep  in  touch  with 
public  sentiment  throughout  his  domains,  and  because  they 
did  give  an  expression,  albeit  imperfect,  to  public  opinion 
they  constituted  one  of  the  few  effective  checks  on  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  Imperial  power.  But  the  effectiveness  of  the 
check  was  greatly  lessened  by  the  fact  that  the  Censorate  did 
not  act  as  an  organic  whole,  but  that  each  member  acted  inde- 
pendently of  the  others.6  Thus  the  censors  lost  the  force  that 
goes  with  united  action.  It  was  also  lessened  by  the  fact 
that  in  the  later  days  of  the  Dynasty,  under  the  Empress  Tzu 
Hsi,  criticism  of  the  Government  was  liable  to  subject  the 
critic  to  severe  punishment  for  his  temerity.  In  spite  of  the 
limitations  of  the  Censorate,  however,  it  is  important  to  note 
that  there  was  a  way  by  which  the  sovereign  could  keep  in- 
formed of  the  actions  of  his  officials  and  could  be  reminded 
of  his  own  obligations  to  the  people. 

While  the  power  of  the  Emperor  was  supreme  its  exercise 
was  delegated  to  his  personal  representatives  throughout  the 
Empire.  For  administrative  purposes  the  provinces  w-ere 
grouped  into  viceroyalties.  In  two  of  the  provinces,  Chihli 

5  Williams,  'The  Middle  Kingdom,"  vol.  I,  p.  430.     In  theory 
and  practice  the  action  of  the  censorate  often  differed.    In  theory 
the  Censors  held  before  the  Emperor  the  ideals  of  government 
set  forth  by  Confucius  and  his  followers.     In  practice  it  was  un- 
fortunately often  true,  as  Weale  says   (Reshaping  of  Far  East, 
p.  220)  that  the  "Censorate  stands,  censoring  those  acts  which 
are  not  acceptable  because  no  bribe  had  been  paid."     But  even 
in  the  last  years  of  the  Manchu  rule  there  were  Censors  who  put 
their  duty  before  even  their  lives.    Men  were  always  to  be  found 
of  the  type  of  Wu  K'o-tu  who  committed  suicide  as  the  highest 
protest  against  the  act  of  Tzu  Hsi   (the  Empress  Dowager)   in 
not  providing  the  proper  heir  for  the  Emperor  T'ung  Chili. 

6  See  Colquhoun,  "China  in  Transformation,"  p.  287. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China  5 

and  Szechuan,  the  Viceroy  had  only  the  administration  of  the 
one  province.  In  all  other  cases  he  had  supervision  over  two 
or  more.  In  addition  to  the  Viceroy  each  province  had  a 
Governor,  except  where  the  Viceroy  himself  exercised  direct 
control.  Both  Viceroy  and  Governor  were  responsible  to  the 
Crown  and  had  the  right  of  directly  petitioning  the  Emperor/ 
Both  were  honorary  members  of  the  Censorate  and  had  the 
right  of  criticism  that  went  with  membership  in  that  body. 

Subject  only  to  the  final  supervision  of  the  Emperor  and 
the  central  administration,  these  highest  provincial  officials  ex- 
ercised as  absolute  a  power  in  the  government  of  their  prov- 
inces as  the  Emperor  did  over  the  whole  country.  As  Morse 
says :  "The  Provinces  are  .ytfrapify  to  the  extent  that  so  long 
as  the  tribute  and  matriculations  are  duly  paid,  and  the  gen- 
eral policy  of  the  central  administration  followed,  they  are 
free  to  administer  their  own  affairs  in  detail  as  may  seem  best 
to  their  own  provincial  authorities."8  From  this  it  follows 
that  the  administration  of  the  laws,  and  the  carrying  out  of 
the  Imperial  orders  varied  from  province  to  province  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  interests  and  the  initiative  of  the  Governor 
or  Viceroy.  This  was  true  as  late  as  1900,  when  Yuan  Shih- 
kai  in  Shantung,  and  Liu  K'un-yi  in  the  Liang-Kiang,  refused 
to  carry  out  the  anti-foreign  policy  of  the  Court,  while  in 
other  parts  of  the  Empire  foreigners  were  being  murdered 
and  their  property  destroyed. 

So  long  as  he  sent  in  his  apportionment  of  the  Imperial 
revenue,  then,  and  did  not  come  openly  into  conflict  with  the 
policy  of  the  central  government,  the  Governor  of  each  prov- 
ince exercised  an  absolute  control  over  the  territory  assigned 
to  him.  His  power  was  limited  only  by  his  fear  of  the  re- 
moval power  of  the  Emperor,  and  by  his  ability  to  have  his  will 

7  In  position  the  Governor  ranked  with,  but  after  the  Viceroy. 
"Trade  and  Administration,"  p.  46. 


6  Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

carried  out  in  the  province.  He  was  directly  responsible  to  the 
Emperor  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  order  in  his  prov- 
ince, and  because  of  this  responsibility,  he  was  careful,  in  most 
cases,  not  to  take  any  action  antagonistic  to  the  desires  and  in- 
terests of  the  people.  In  order  that  he  might  not  be  able  to 
establish  himself  so  firmly  in  his  post  as  to  be  tempted  to  set 
up  an  independent  rule,  a  Governor  or  Viceroy  was  commonly 
appointed  for  a  term  of  three  years,  with  the  possibility  of  one 
renewal,  after  which  he  would  be  transferred  to  another  prov- 
ince. Li  Hung-chang  provided  one  of  the  notable  exceptions 
to  the  rule,  being  maintained  as  Viceroy  of  Chihli  province  for 
over  twenty  years.  A  high  provincial  official  was  never  ap- 
pointed to  a  post  in  his  native  province. 

Assisting  the  Governor  in  the  actual  administration  was  the 

*  provincial  treasurer,  who  was  the  head  of  the  civil  service,  as 
well  as  the  chief  fiscal  agent  of  the  province;  the  provincial 
judge,  who  was  the  final  (provincial)  court  of  appeal;  the 
salt  comptroller;  and  the  grain  intendent.  These  four  officials 
constituted  the  deliberative  and  executive  council  of  the  pro- 
vincial government,  and,  with  the  Governor  and  the  Viceroy, 
formed  the  general  provincial  administration  residing  at  the 

;  capital  of  the  province. 

For  administrative  purposes  each  province  was  divided  into 

rHsien,  Chow  or  T'ing;  several  Hsien  together  formed  a  de- 
partment or  prefecture;  and  two  or  more  Prefectures  would 
be  united  in  a  Circuit.  Thus  the  largest  subdivision  was  the 
Circuit  and  the  smallest  the  Hsien.  "The  unit  for  admin- 
istrative purposes  within  the  province  is  the  Hsien  or  Dis- 
trict;— two  or  three  or  more  (up  to  five  or  six)  Districts  col- 
lectively form  a  Fu  or  Prefecture;  and  two  or  more  Prefec- 

Mures  are  placed  under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Taotai.  .  .  .  The 
Chow  and  the  T'ing  proper  are  a  superior  kind  of  Hsien,  be- 
ing component  parts  of  a  Fu;  the  Chihli-chow  and  Chihli- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China  7 

T'ing  are  an  inferior  kind  of  Fu,  both  having  as  direct  a  re- 
lation to  the  provincial  government  as  a  Fu,  but  the  latter  dis- 
tinguished from  the  Fu  by  having  no  Hsien  subordinated  to 
it."9 

>-All  the  provincial  officials,  down  to  the  Hsien  magistrate,. 
were  appointed  directly  by  the  central  government.  The  Pre- 
fect exercised  the  delegated  authority  of  the  Governor  in  his 
prefecture,  and  was  held  responsible  for  its  share  of  the  reve- 
nue of  the  province,  as  well  as  for  the  maintenance  of  order 
in  his  jurisdiction.  However,  he  dealt  more  with  the  external 
relations  of  his  Fu  than  with  its  internal  administration,  and 
was  rather  a  channel  of  communication  than  an  executive 
officer.  He  acted  as  the  court  of  appeal  from  the  Hsien's 
court. 

The  JHsien,  (district  magistrate)  was  the  foundation  of  the 
administrative  system.  He  was  the  lowest  official  appointed 
by  the  central  government  and  in  many  ways  was  the  most  im-  * 
portant  officer  of  the  administration.  His  work  brought  him 
into  direct  touch  with  the  people  and  thus  he  came  to  personify 
the  power  of  government  to  the  mass  of  the  population.  In 
the  transference  of  responsibility  it  all  came  ultimately  to  the 
Hsien.  Just  as  the  Governor  was  responsible  for  his  prov- 
ince, so  thejnagistrate  was  responsible  for  the  proper  exercise 
of  all  of  the  prerogatives  of  government  in  his  district.  An 
enumeration  of  some  of  his  functions  will  serve  to  show  his 
importance.  He  was  police  magistrate,  deciding  ordinary  po- 
lice cases ;  and  was  court  of  first  instance  in  civil  and  criminal 
cases.  In  addition  to  being  the  agent  of  the  provincial  gov- 
ernment and  the  Imperial  administration  in  collecting  taxes 
and  the  grain  tribute,  he  was  the  registrar  of  land,  the  famine 
commissioner,  and  the  representative  of  the  Board  of  Works 
in  the  oversight  of  public  buildings,  etc.  In  fact  everything 

9  Morse,  p.  52. 


8  Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

pertaining  to  the  conduct  of  government  came  under  his 
charge.10  He  alone  had  no  one  on  whom  he  could  shift  the 
responsibility  for  his  acts. 

This  delegation  of  responsibility  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
specimen  proclamation  given  by  Parker :  "The  magistrate  has 
had  the  honor  to  receive  instructions  from  the  prefect,  who 
cites  the  directions  of  the  Taotai,  moved  by  the  Treasurer  and 
the  Judge,  recipients  of  the  commands  of  their  Excellencies 
the  Viceroy  and  Governor,  acting  at  the  instance  of  the  For- 
eign Board,  who  have  been  honored  with  his  Majesty's  com- 
mands." 

"Politically  the  government  of  China  turns  on  the  recipro- 
cal duty  of  parents  and  children.  The  Emperor  is  the  head 
of  the  government  but  the  family  is  its  base,  and  it  is  not 
from  the  central  head  at  Peking,  but  from  the  family  unit 
that  the  building  of  the  governmental  fabric  proceeds.  In 
the  family  life  may  be  seen  the  larger  life  of  the  Empire,  and 
it  is  the  family  unit  that  gives  the  semblance  of  unity  to  the 
Empire."11  The  family  was  the  social  unit,  just  as  the  Hsien 
V  was  the  administrative  unit  of  the  Empire.  And  the  family 
urbanization  was  based  on  the  custom  and  tradition  of  cen- 
turies. This  being  so,  the  magistrate  was  able  to  perform  his 
duties,  and  carry  out  the  Imperial  commands  only  so  far  as 
they  did  not  come  into  conflict  with  the  custom  and  tradition 
of  his  district.  The  greatest  objection  to  a  new  law  or  tax, 
or  to  any  innovation  was  that  it  had  not  been  in  existence  be- 
fore. "In  the  administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  Empire," 

10  "In  Chinese  official  documents  the  district  magistrate  is  fre- 
quently referred  to  as  the  father  and  mother  of  his  people.  And 
as  the  head  of  a  household  can  make  it  happy  or  unhappy  ac- 
cording to  his  disposition,  so  the  rule  of  a  good  or  bad  magistrate 
promotes  order  or  disorder  among  the  people  of  his  district." 
Jernigan,  p.  35. 

"Jernigan,  p.  34. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China  9 

says  Jerningan,12  "the  principle  is  recognized  that  laws  are 
the  particular  institution  of  the  legislator,  while  customs  are 
the  institution  of  a  nation  in  general,  and  that  nothing  tends 
more  to  produce  a  revolution  than  an  attempt  to  change  a 
custom  by  a  law." 

The  village  itself  was  organized,  entirely  apart  from  the 
general  administration,  on  the  basis  of  the  family.  The  sev- 
eral families  united  in  a  village  organization  selected  one  of 
their  number  to  serve  as  the  village  headman  (Tipao).13  He 
acted  as  the  intermediary  between  the  Hsien  and  the  village. 
Because  of  the  pressure  this  semi-political  organization  could 
bring  to  bear  on  him,  it  was  possible  to  force  the  magistrate 
to  adjust  his  execution  of  the  law  to  the  customs  of  the  lo- 
cality.1* 

12Jernigan,  p.  33. 

13  Morse  says  (Trade  and  Administration,  p.  60),  that  the  head- 
man was  nominated  by  the  magistrate  from  among  the  village 
elders,  "but  dependent  upon  the  good  will  of  his  constituents." 
On  the  other  hand,  Jernigan   (p.  34),  finds  that  the  Tipao  was 
selected  by  the  families,  but  that  "it  is  sometimes  required,  after 
the  headman  of  a  village  has  been  selected,  that  he  receive  the 
confirmation   of   the   district   magistrate."      This   latter   view   is 
more  nearly  correct,  although  the  selection  of  the  Tipao  varied 
in  different  localities. 

14  The  pressure  that  the  Tipao  could  bring  to  bear  on  the 
magistrate  may  be  understood,   when  the  extent  to   which  the 
magistrate  was  forced  to  rely  on  these  extra-official  functionaries 
for  the  administration  of  his  district,  is  considered.    "The  Tipao," 
says  Morse,  "acts  as  constable,  and  is  responsible  for  the  good 
conduct  and  moral  behavior  of  every  one  of  his  constituents ;  he 
is  also  responsible  for  the  due  payment  of  land  tax  and  tribute," 
etc.  (p.  60).     Since  this  village  headman  was  not  known  to  .the 
official  administrative  system  he  could  not  be  fully  controlled  by 
it.    And  since  the  magistrate  could  not  conduct  the  work  of  his 
district  except  through  the  Tipao,  who  represented  the  people,  it 
can  be  seen  how  powerful  an  influence  the  village  could  exert 
on  the  administration. 


io          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Applying  this  to  the  actual  administration  of  the  Empire, 
remembering  that  the  customs  and  traditions  of  one  Hsien 
were  by  no  means  identical  with  those  of  any  other  Hsien  in 
the  Empire,  it  is  clear  that  the  carrying  out  of  the  law  would 
vary  from  province  to  province,  and  from  Hsien  to  Hsien. 
not  only  with  the  personnel  of  the  official  hierarchy,  but  with 
the  difference  in  habits  and  customs. 

More  than  any  other  country,  the  old  China  was  governed 
by  the  class  of  scholars,  the  literati.  Membership  and  prefer- 
ment in  the  official  system  was  based  on  a  series  of  examina- 
tions open  to  all  classes.  Beginning  with  the  district  exami- 
nations, a  candidate  passed  through  the  prefectural  examina- 
tion, and  that  of  the  province,  finally  coming  to  the  Metro- 
politan examination  in  Peking.  Success  in  these  examinations 
gave  admission  to  a  distinct  class  in  the  state,  the  literati,  the 
class  given  the  highest  place  in  the  popular  esteem.  Such 
success  meant  even  more  than  individual  prestige.  It  threw 
its  reflected  light  on  the  whole  village  from  which  the  suc- 
cessful candidate  had  come,  so  that  frequently  the  inhabitants 
of  a  village  would  unite  to  give  a  promising  student  every 
possible  opportunity  to  prepare  himself  for  the  examinations, 
and  his  progress  would  be  watched  with  interest  by  all  the 
villagers.  There  was  no  national  system  of  education,  but  a 
man  who  had  established  himself  in  the  opinion  of  his  fel- 
lows as  a  scholar  would  gather  a  few  disciples  around  him  and 
impart  his  knowledge  to  them.  As  the  whole  plan  of  educa- 
tion was  based  on  the  Confucian  Classics,  it  was  possible  for 
one  teacher  to  conduct  a  student  through  the  entire  curriculum, 
thus  fitting  him  for  examination.  Fortunate  was  the  village 
which  had  an  able  expounder  of  the  Classics! 

This  system  would  seem  to  promise  an  unusually  intelligent 
administration.  But  while  examination  was  the  basis  of  offi- 
cial preferment,  the  practice  of  buying  and  selling  office  had 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          n 

grown  up.  So  that  the  most  successful  candidate  had  to  be 
prepared  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  those  who  had  the  bestowal 
of  patronage,  or  could  influence  its  bestowal,  if  he  could  hope 
to  leave  the  class  of  "expectant"15  officials,  or  to  reach  any 
very  high  place  in  the  government.  Furthermore,  the  educa- 
tion necessary  to  compete  in  the  examinations  was  not  always 
calculated  to  fit  a  man  for  the  actual  duties  and  responsibili- 
ties of  public  administration. 

From  this  brief  review  of  the  administrative  system  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  as  it  existed  under  the  Manchu  regime,  it  will 
be  seen  that  two  principles  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  discussing 
the  reasons  for  the  changes  after  1898:  first,  that  of  responsi^ 
bility,  each  higher  official  holding  his  immediate  inferior  ab- 
solutely responsible  for  the  condition  of  the  territory  under  Y*-^ 
his  jurisdiction;  and,  second,  the  variation  in  the  administra- 
tion due  to  the  differences  in  local  customs,  and  to  the  will- 
ingness and  ability  of  the  men  administering  the  laws. 

While  trade  between  China  and  European  countries  had 
been  carried  on  by  Europeans  for  many  years,  it  was  not  until 
1842  that  China  may  be  said  to  have  been  opened  in  reality 
to  foreign  intercourse.  The  traders,  before  that  year,  had 
been  confined  to  one  port,  Canton,  and  had  not  been  permitted 
to  reside  there  throughout  the  year.  No  official  communica- 
tion was  permitted  between  the  States  of  the  West  because  of 
the  Chinese  conception  of  lordship  over  the  "outer  barba- 
rians." From  1842^  until  the  end  of  the  century,  however, 
step  by  step,  China  was  driven  from  her  position  of  isolation 
and  forceiUnto  the  family  of  nations.  This  meant  also  that 
she  was  forced,  in  practice  if  not  in  theory,  to  recognize  the 

1  "Expectant"  officials  were  those  who  had  passed  the  exami- 
nations, thus  qualifying  for  an  official  post,  but  who  had  not  yet 
received  an  appointment.  In  other  words,  they  constituted  the 
official  "waiting  list." 


12          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

modern  legal  principle  of  the  equality  of  nations  in  their  deal- 
ings with  one  another. 

Back  of  each  step  taken  by  the  European  countries  in  their 
application  of  pressure  to  China  lay  the  desire  at  first  to  de- 
velop trade  and  later  to  exploit  the  "Middle  Kingdom"  as  a 
field  for  investment.  To  accomplish  this  it  was  necessary  to 
establish  direct  diplomatic  relations  so  that  the  western  na- 
tions could  have  a  channel  of  communication  with  Chinese 
officialdom.  The  establishment  of  a  diplomatic  and  consular 
service  in  China  resulted  in  a  constant  pressure  on  the  govern- 
ment and  the  people  to  undertake  or  permit  the  development 
of  new  activities  of  a  commercial  and  financial  as  well  as  of  a 
religious  or  philanthropic  nature. 

The  struggle  for  a  recognition  of  equality  of  relationship, 
Vr  and  the  consequent  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  was 
arried  to  a  successful  conclusion  by  means  of  the  three  so- 
called  Opium  wars.  The  first  was  brought  to  an  end  by  the 
Nanking  treaty  of  1842  between  England  and  China.  The 
commercial  footing  of  foreigners  was  then  recognized  and 
several  ports  opened  to  foreign  trade.  The  right  to  maintain 
X  /diplomatic  establishments  in  Peking  was  not  gained  until  the 
'•Anglo-French  forces  occupied  that  city  in  1860  during  the 
third  war  mentioned. 

The  years  from  1860  to  the  Sino-Japanese  war  of  1894-95 
were  marked  by  the  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  Powers  to 
hold  what  had  been  gained  by  force;  by  the  opening  of  new 
ports  to  trade  and  a  great  expansion  of  commercial  activity; 
by  the  continued  extension  of  the  missionary  propaganda  and 
the  establishment  of  mission  schools  and  hospitals,  and  by  the 
slow  education  of  the  Chinese  to  the  point  of  acceptance  and 
adoption  of  western  mechanical  devices  such  as  the  steam 
engine,  with  the  consequent  development  of  a  system  of  rail- 
way transportation,  the  telegraph,  and  some  of  the  machines 
of  production. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China  13 

During  the  first  period  (up  to  1844)  of  limited  foreign  A-«-Ju 
intercourse  with  China,  that  country  found  little  difficulty  in  j^^ 
regulating  the  trade  by  means  of  the  existing  administrative 
system.  By  putting  it  under  the  supervision  of  one  official  he 
could  be  held  responsible  for  all  matters  concerning  foreigners 
and  foreign  interests.  With  the  British  trade,  by  far  the 
most  important,  in  the  hands  of  the  East  India  Company, 
which  was  interested  solely  in  the  maintenance  of  peaceful 
commercial  relations,  it  was  not  difficult,  by  a  threat  of  stop- 
ping the  trade,  to  enforce  the  regulations  confining  it  to 
Canton,  and  putting  it  in  the  hands  of  the  monopoly  of 
Chinese  merchants  known  as  the  Co-horig._  It  was  also  found 
that  by  holding  the  foreign  superintendent  of  trade  responsi- 
ble for  the  personal  conduct  of  the  foreigners,  it  was  com-  . ..^Ji^ 
paratively  easy  to  keep  them  within  the  limits  prescribed  by 
the  laws  of  the  Empire.  During  this  period  there  was  no 
question  of  the  amenability  of  the  Europeans  to  Chinese  law:  , 
All  dealings  were  with  the  merchants,  not  as  nationals  of 
States  equal  to  the  Chinese  Empire,  but  as  individuals  al- 
lowed to  carry  on  their  trade  as  a  mark  of  the  favor  of  the 
Emperor,  and  not  as  any  matter  of  right.  This  status  was 
constantly  kept  before  them,  and,  during  the  period  of  the 
East  India  Company's  control,  was  accepted  by  the  merchants 
rather  than  risk  the  loss  of  the  trade.  As  long  as  China  was 
the  dictator  of  the  terms  of  intercourse  and  trade,  and  could 
keep  it  confined  to  one  place  far  removed  from  the  capital ;  so 
long  as  there  was  no  desire  to  establish  interstate  relations  with 
China;  and  while  it  was  not  necessary,  in  order  to  satisfy 
foreign  demands,  to  have  a  uniform  administration  of  the 
laws  throughout  the  Empire,  it  was  practicable  to  entrust  the 
entire  oversight  of  the  trade  to  a  commercial  agent  like  the 
Hoppo16  and  hold  him  responsible  for  all  matters  connected 

The  Hoppo  "the  administrator  of  the  Canton  Customs,  is 


14          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

with  the  foreigners.  But  when  the  monopoly  of  the  China 
trade  was  withdrawn  from  the  British  East  India  Company, 
thus  opening  it  to  unrestricted  competition  on  the  part  of 
British  subjects  as  well  as  other  foreigners,17  and  when  a 
representative  of  the  British  Government  was  appointed  to 
deal  with  the  Chinese  government  officials,  the  weakness  of 
the  Chinese  administrative  system  was  exposed. 

Immediately  upon  the  arrival  of  Lord  Napier,  in  1833,  as 
the  first  Superintendent  of  trade  appointed  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, the  Chinese  feeling  of  superiority  which  made  re- 
lations on  a  basis  of  equality  impossible,  was  manifested.  .  .  . 
"He  was  met  at  the  outset  by  a  refusal  to  treat  with  him  as 
the  envoy  of  a  friendly  power,  enjoying  a  position  of  equality 
with  China;  he  was  refused  an  interview  with  the  Viceroy, 
who  required  him  to  formulate  his  demands  through  the  com- 
mittee of  Chinese  merchants  through  whom  the  trade  mo- 
nopoly was  worked;  his  letters  were  not  received,  and  he  was 
required  to  present  his  written  communications  in  the  form 
of  a  humble  petition;  and  coercion  was  applied  to  the  English 
merchants  and  their  trade  to  force  him  to  leave  Canton."18 
Since  Lord  Napier  and  all  succeeding  British  representatives, 
whether  appointed  as  Superintendents  of  trade,  as  Consular 
representatives,  or  as  Plenipotentiaries,  were  instructed  to 

a  direct  representative  of  the  Emperor  and  entirely  outside  the 
provincial  hierarchy,  though,  to  give  him  due  standing  and 
authority,  he  takes  official  rank  with,  but  after  the  Viceroy." 
Morse,  "International  Relations,"  p.  15. 

17  The  American,  French,  Portuguese  and  other  non-British 
traders  had  developed  a  considerable  trade,  and  their  trade  was 
not  in  the  hands  of  monopolistic  companies.    No  consular  officers 
were  maintained  to  conduct  official  intercourse  with  the  Chinese 
government,  and  the  trade  was  dealt  with  largely  through  the 
British  Superintendent,  who  was  purely  a  commercial  agent. 

18  Morse,  "Trade  and  Administration,"  p.  18. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          15 

treat  only  with  the  representatives  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, and  not  to  conduct  their  business  through  the  Hong 
merchants;  and  since  the  very  conception  of  intercourse  with 
foreign  nations  on  a  footing  of  equality  was  unknown  to  the 
Chinese,  it  is  evident  that  a  situation  was  created  which  could 
result  only  in  conflict. 

The  struggle  for  a  recognition  of  the  equality  of  the  Wes- 
tern nations  with  "the  Middle  Kingdom"  was  brought  to 
open  conflict  by  the  questions  arising  out  of  the  opium  trade. 
The  first  Edict  against  the  importation  of  opium  into  China 
was  issued  in  1800,  but  until  twenty  years  later  practically  no 
attention  was  paid  to  it  by  either  Chinese  or  foreigners.  The 
trade  was  carried  on  openly  at  Canton,  the  only  difference  be- 
ing that  after  the  prohibition  the  opium  could  not  be  brought 
to  the  factories,  and  it  was  liable  to  an  irregular  tax,  on  the 
principle  of  making  it  pay  all  that  the  traffic  would  bear.  But, 
finally,  the  trade  became  so  open  that  the  Viceroy  was  forced 
to  take  some  action  limiting  it.  Receiving  ships  were  then 
stationed  by  the  foreign  traders  outside  of  Chinese  jurisdic- 
tion, and  the  trade  was  still  carried  on  at  Canton.  As  the 
restrictions  became  more  rigid  there,  the  traders  began  to 
make  voyages  up  the  coast,  selling  their  opium  for  cash  and 
using  the  money  to  buy  return  cargoes  at  Canton.  Even  dur- 
ing the  most  rigid  enforcement  of  the  prohibitory  Edicts  at 
Canton,  where  trade  was  supposed  to  be  confined,  it  was  pos- 
sible to  bring  opium  into  the  country  through  the  other  sup- 
posedly closed  ports.  This  was  due  to  the  fact,  already  pointed 
out,  that  the  uniform  enforcement  of  an  Imperial  Edict  in 
China  was  a  rare  occurrence,  each  order  being  executed  only 
so  far  as  it  was  to  the  interest  of  each  governor  or  commis- 
sioner to  carry  it  out.  It  is  an  interesting  commentary  on  the 
Chinese  administration  that  while  commissioner  Lin  at  Canton 
was  earnestly  endeavoring  to  carry  out  the  orders  of  the  Em- 


1 6          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  CJiina 

peror  prohibiting  the  opium  trade,  other  high  officials  of  the 
government  were  openly  disregarding  them. 

This  same  lack  of  uniformity  was  apparent  in  the  observ- 
ance of  the  provisions  of  the  treaties  negotiated  with  China 
between  1842-1860.  In  Shanghai,  opened  to  foreign  trade  by 
the  treaty  of  Nanking  (1842),  providing  a  place  of  residence 
for  foreigners  and  the  opening  of  the  trade  was  attended  with 
no  difficulty,  while  at  Canton  the  old  hostility  was  exhibited 
by  officials  and  people  alike;  the  same  attempts  being  made  to 
retain  by  delay  and  negotiation  what  had  been  given  up  as  the 
result  of  the  terms  of  peace.  In  every  case,  the  feelings  of 
the  people  were  alleged  as  the  reason  why  treaty  provisions 
could  not  be  carried  out.  The  officials  claimed  that  they  might 
not  be  able  to  hold  the  people  in  check  if  the  English  insisted 
on  their  right  of  entry  into  the  city  of  Canton,  although  the 
same  right  had  been  given  and  attended  with  no  difficulty  at 
Shanghai.  'The  people  north  of  Canton  found  it  to  their  in- 
terest to  enter  upon  peaceful  trade  relations  with  the  foreign- 
ers, so  that  in  their  case  the  law  harmonized  with  the  inter- 
ests and  the  wishes  of  the  people;  while  at  Canton  it  had  been 
found  profitable  to  hold  the  foreigners  under  strict  control. 
Another  striking  evidence  af  this  predominance  of  local  in- 
terests over  national  policy  was  presented  in  the  request  of 
the  Imperial  officials  for  British  aid  against  the  Taiping  rebels 
at  Shanghai  at  the  time  when  Great  Britain  was  making  ac- 
tive war  on  the  Imperial  Government  at  Peking.19 

Before  the  Powers  forced  a  recognition  of  their  equality 
with  China,  it  had  been  possible  to  limit  the  control  of  the 
Central  Government  to  the  appointment  of  the  officials  of  the 
provincial  administration,  and  the  dictation  of  the  general 

19  These  are  but  a  few  of  the  instances  that  might  be  cited  to 
show  this  lack  of  unity  of  feeling  and  of  administration  through- 
out the  Empire  from  1842  to  1860. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          17 

policy  of  the  government,  leaving  large  discretionary  power 
in  the  hands  of  its  appointees  as  to  the  actual  execution  of 
this  policy.  But  with  the  establishment  of  treaty  relations 
with  outside  States  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  Central 
Government  to  assume  a  more  direct  responsibility  in  the 
conduct  of  affairs.20  In  the  words  of  one  writer:  "When 
pressure  began  to  come  from  without;  when  it  became  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  foreign  nations,  for 
the  government  to  control  the  provinces,  and,  in  order  to  re- 
sist the  aggressions  of  those  same  foreign  nations  to  be  able 
to  marshal  and  unite  the  forces  of  the  Empire;  the  de-central- 
ization, the  lack  of  uniformity,  the  lack  of  a  sense  of  mutual  ' 
interests  and  obligations,  the  habit  of  independence,  and  the 
natural  disinclination  to  subordinate  local  interests  to  the  ne- 
cessities of  the  nation  proved  sources  of  hopeless  weakness."21 
The  Powers  were  not  satisfied  to  see  the  execution  of  the 
treaty  stipulations  left  to  the  individual  initiative  of  each 
governor  of  the  eighteen  provinces,  but  demanded  that  they 
be  enforced  uniformly  throughout  the  whole  Empire.  At  the 
same  time  that  they  insisted  on  the  exact  execution  of  the  ob- 
ligations imposed  on  the  Imperial  Government,  they  took  ad- 
vantage of  this  known  lack  of  centralized  authority  to  impose 
new  penalties  on  the  Chinese  whenever  foreign  interests  were 
injured  as  a  result  of  the  inability  of  the  Central  Government 
to  control  the  provincial  administration.  Thus  in  self-defence 

20  After  the  treaty  of  1842  the  Emperor  still  transferred  re- 
sponsibility for  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  to  the  proper 
provincial   officials.      Official    intercourse    was    rather   with    the 
province  as  a  unit  than  with  the  Central  Government  of  China. 
It  was  only  with  the  residence  of  the  Ministers  at  Peking,  where 
they  could  exert  direct  pressure,  that  any  attempt  at  a  uniform 
administration  of  treaty  provisions  was  secured. 

21  Hornbeck,  "Contemporary  Politics  in  Far  East,"  p.  36. 


1 8          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  Imperial  Government  was  forced  to  a  closer  supervision 
of  the  administration  of  the  provinces. 

In  criticising  the  execution  of  treaty  provisions  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  idea  of  reciprocal  obligations  between 
nations  as  embodied  in  treaties  or  the  principles  of  an  inter- 
s.  national  law  was  entirely  new  to  the  Chinese  Government 
equally  with  the  people  of  the  country.     Before  1842  they 
had  been  accustomed  to  look  upon  all  outside  nations  as  "bar- 
barians," and  inferior  to  the  "Middle  Kingdom."     Ambassa- 
dors came  only  as  bearers  of  tribute,  and  to  learn  the  will  of 
the  Emperor.    The  fact  that  they  had  been  forced  at  the  can- 
non's mouth  to  concede  an  outward  equality  did  not  mean 
that  they  really  recognized  it  as  existing;  forcing  them  to  as- 
sume obligations  did  not  carry  with  it  a  recognition  of  the 
binding  quality  of  those  obligations  if  it  was  possible  to  evade 
them.     It  took  the  entire  period  from  1842  to  IQOI.  with  its 
four  wars  and  the  final  suppression  of  the  Boxer  uprising,  the 
element  of  force  being  constantly  kept  before  the  eyes  of  the 
Government  and  the  people,  and  China's  weakness  being  con- 
sistently brought  to  light,  to  bring  home  to  the  Chinese  a 
realization  of  the  binding  force  of  an  international  agreement. 
A   foreigner,   familiar  with  China,  if  asked  what  is  the 
greatest  deficiency  in  the  Chinese  government,  would  reply 
immediately,  "the  lack  of  a  sense  of  honesty  among  the  officials 
as  a  class."     Yet,  from  the  Chinese  point  of  view,  there  was 
,      C/  nothing  dishonest  in  the  system  of  "squeeze."    It  meant  simply 
xi^-      this.     The  Emperor  notified  each  province  of  its  proportion 
;,         of  the  revenue  needed   for  the  Central  Government.     The 
L  *£*.  Governor  added  to  this  fixed  sum  a  sufficiently  large  com- 
~— .      mission  to  enable  him  to  maintain  his  official  household  prop- 
erly and  to  add  a  reasonable  amount  to  his  own  meager  salary. 
This  increased  sum  was  then  apportioned  to  the  various  pre- 
fectures.    The  Prefect  took  the  sum  assigned  to  his  Depart- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          19 

ment  for  collection  and  added  his  commission.  He  then  dis- 
tributed the  total  amount  among  the  Hsien  under  his  juris- 
diction for  actual  collection.  But  the  Hsien  Magistrate  was 
also  entitled  to  his  commission  to  pay  those  to  whom  he  dele- 
gated the  task  of  collecting  the  taxes,  and  to  bring  his  own 
salary  to  the  level  necessary  to  maintain  the  dignity  of  his 
office.  Therefore  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  revenue  actu- 
ally collected  reached  the  Central  Government.  The  same 
process  was  applied  to  the  collection  of  all  port  duties  and  im- 
posts. This  practice  was  well  known  to  the  people  and  since 
it  was  an  established  custom  no  great  objection  was  made. 
As  long  as  the  Imperial  Government  received  its  quota  it  was 
content  to  pay  the  officials  small  salaries  and  let  them  add  to 
their  incomes  in  any  way  they  could,  provided  they  kept  the 
people  under  their  jurisdiction  contented.)^  Such  a  system 
worked  well  enough  so  long  as  the  expenses  of  the  Govern-  / 
ment  were  only  the  nominal  ones  of  the  Imperial  Household 
and  the  payment  of  small  fees  to  the  officials.  But  when  large 
foreign  indemnities  ,were  added  one  after  another  and  the 
expense  of  foreign  wars  and  the  great  Taiping  rebellion  had 
to  be  met,  the  Emperor  was  forced  to  increase  the  amounts 
demanded  from  the  provinces.  This  increase  meant  that  the 
people  had  to  find  a  way  to  provide  more, — not  that  the  offi- 
cials gave  up  any  of  their  "squeeze"  to  meet  the  additional 
expense.^  At  a  time  when  the  entire  country  had  been  de- 
vastated by  marauding  bands  of  rebels,  even  a  slight  increase 
in  taxes  worked  a  great  hardship,  (The  discontent  growing 
from  this  condition  could  be  utilized  by  the  Government  in 
part  to  keep  alive  a  hatred  of  foreigners  who  had  made  the 
new  burdens  necessary.  But  when  it  was  seen  that  the  Gov- 
ernment was  able  neither  to  protect  the  country  from  the  ag- 
gressions of  the  West,  nor  to  preserve  order  at  home,  this 
restlessness  and  discontent  reacted  directly  on  the  Manchu 


2O          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Government.  If  the  people  had  felt  that  the  Imperial  Court 
was  retrenching  in  every  way,  and  that  the  officials  were  do- 
ing everything  in  their  power  to  help  meet  the  new  burdens, 
it  would  have  helped  enormously  to  keep  them  loyal  supporters 
of  the  established  regime. 

The  contrary,  however,  was  known  to  be  the  case.  It  was 
a  notorious  fact  that  the  actual  power  in  Peking  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  eunuchs.  The  revenues  that  should  have  been 
used  for  the  protection  of  the  country  and  for  repairing  the 
ravages  of  the  Taiping  rebellion  were  being  used  to  enrich  a 
few  servitors  in  the  Palace  who  had  gained  the  ear  of  the 
ruler.  Not  only  were  the  Imperial  revenues  going  that  way, 
but  every  official,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  was  forced 
to  pay  huge  sums  to  these  eunuchs  in  order  to  get  any  official 
preferment,  the  officials  being  expected  to  reimburse  them- 
selves at  the  expense  of  the  people.  The  Manchus  had  recog  • 
nized  from  the  beginning  of  their  rule  in  China  Proper  that 
a  euntich-ridden  Court  meant  a  government  in  a  state  of  de- 
cay. One  of  the  earliest  of  the  dynastic  House-laws  provided 
that  eunuchs  should  never  be  allowed  to  hold  official  position 
of  any  kind,  or  to  advise  on  matters  of  State.22  The  corrup- 
tion of  the  Ming  Court,  due  to  the  ascendency  of  the  eunuchs, 
and  the  consequent  decline  of  the  power  of  the  Ming  Dynasty 
brought  this  fact  vividly  home  to  the  founder  of  the  Great 
Tsing  Dynasty.23  But  while  the  evil  effects  of  the  eunuch  sys- 
tem were  clearly  recognized,  it  was  not  long  until  the  system 
itself  had  become  thoroughly  established  in  the  Manchu  Gov- 
ernment. In  a  despotic  form  of  government  those  closest  to 
the  person  of  the  ruler  inevitably  exercise  the  greatest  influ- 
ence in  the  government  of  the  realm.  In  an  Asiatic  country 

22  Bland  and  Backhouse,  "Annals  and  Memoirs  of  the  Court 
of  Peking,"  p.  232. 

23  Ibid.,  especially  ch.  V  and  ch.  IX. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          21 

it  is  almost  invariably  the  attendents  of  the  harem,  constantly 
in  communication  with  the  Emperor,  who  are  able  to  influence 
him  in  his  determination  of  the  policy  of  the  government. 
But  the  exercise  of  such  an  unofficial  influence,  where  the 
wielder  of  the  real  authority  is  not  accountable  for  his  actions 
to  anyone  except  his  master  who  has  given  him  the  power, 
is  certain  to  lead  to  corruption  and  misgovernment. 

A  ^realization  of  the  futility  of  expecting  protection  from* 
jfoes^  either  without  or  within,  from  the  decentralized  and 
eunuch-contrn]lpr1  Manrhn  Government  was  forced  on  the 
educated  Chinese  by  the  outcome  of  the  war  with  Japan  in 
180,4-0,5.  Money  that  had  been  collected  ostensibly  to  strength- 
en the  defences  of  the  Empire,  and  which,  if  properly  ex- 
pended, would  have  enabled  China  to  make  at  least  a  credit- 
able showing  against  Japan,  had  been  diverted  to  the  build-' 
ing  of  a  summer  palace  for  the  Empress-dowager,  Tzu  Hsi. 
Most  of  the  funds  went  directly  into  the  pocket  of  the  chief- 
eunuch  Li  Lien-ying,  through  the  medium  of  the  contracting 
firm  that  built  the  palace.  Even  such  a  humiliating  defeat  as 
was  inflicted  on  the  Empire  at  that  time  did  not  arouse  the 
people  as  much  as  the  knowledge  that  the  heavy  taxes  imposed 
on  them,  instead  of  being  used  at  least  in  part  for  their  wel-. 
fare,  were  enriching  the  favorites  of  Tzu  Hsi.  Strange  as| 
it  seems  to  the  Western  mind,  a  military  defeat  does  not  servd 
to  lower  the  prestige  of  the  country  in  the  minds  of  they 
Chinese.  They  came  out  of  the  wars  with  England  as  firmly 
convinced  as  before  of  China's  superiority  to  all  other  na- 
tions of  the  world.  This  was  due  to  the  fact  that  in  the. 
Chinese  civilization  the  profession  of  arms  has  always,  until 
recently,  occupied  the  lowest  place  in  the  estimation  of  the 
people.  But  the  defeats  inflicted  by  foreign  Powers  on  the 
'^Celestial  Empire"  did  serve  to  bring  home  vividly  to  the 


22          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Chinese  the  inherent  weaknesses  of  their  system  of  govern- 
ment 

Briefly,  then,  by  1898  the  Chinese  had  been  shown  con- 
clusively the  inability  of  their  government  to  keep  the  foreign- 
ers out  of  the  country  or  to  protect  Chinese  interests  when 
they  were  in  conflict  with  the  interests  of  European  Powers, 
or  even  of  Japan.  I  The  Powers  had  entrenched  themselves  in 
China  on  a  basis  of  equality,  and  in  so  doing  had  imposed  on 
the  country  a  heavy  burden  of  debt  for  indemnity  and  war 
expenses.  Because  of  this  foreign  contact,  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment had  been  forced  to  exert  a  greater  control  over  the 
provincial  governments  in  order  to  secure  the  uniformity  of 
administration  made  necessary  by  the  provisions  of  the  treat- 
ies entered  into  with  the  Powers.  Because  of  the  new  finan- 
cial obligations  of  the  State,  the  Central  Government  had  been 
forced  to  increase  taxes.  This  increase  of  taxes  carried  with 
it  an  increase,  not  a  diminution,  of  the  "squeeze"  of  the  offi- 
cials. The  corruption,  of  the  Court  was  notorious.  The  peo- 
ple were  fast  getting  ready  for  revolt  because  of  their  eco- 
nomic grievances,  and  because  of  the  weakening  of  the  grip 
of  the  government.  On  the  other  hand,  together  with  the  ob- 
ligations imposed  on  the  government,  England,  France  and 
the  United  States  had  been  instrumental  in  carrying  western 
jdeas  and  methods  to  China  and  in  a  small  measure  introduc- 
ing them  to  a  few  of  the  more  open-minded  of  the  Chinese, 
particularly  in  the  South.  So  that  it  was  partly  under  the  in- 
fluence of  Occidental  ideas  that  the  first  attempts  at  reform 
began.  This  influence  made  itself  felt  in  the  entire  field  of 
political  change,  whether  constitutional  or  merely  reformative, 
beginning  with  the  first  period  of  reform  under  the  Emperor 
Kuang  Hsu. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Emperor  of  China  at  the  time  when  the  foreign  impact 
first  became  definitely  felt  was  Tao  Kuang,  who  ruled  from 
1821  until  1850.  Tao  Kuang  was  a  man  of  good  intentions 
but  lacked  the  understanding  and  vision  necessary  to  deal  with 
the  host  of  new  problems  presented  with  the  attempt  of  the 
foreign  governments  to  secure  intercourse  with  China  on  a 
basis  of  equality.  Had  the  treaties  of  1842-44  been  carried 
out  fully  and  their  operation  extended  gradually  there  would 
not  have  occurred  the  later  struggles  that  perplexed  the  reign 
of  his  successors.  But  Tao  Kuang,  safe  in  the  North  from 
immediate  contact  with  the  foreign  problem,  felt  that  it  was 
wise  to  allow  his  officials  to  accede  to  the  demands  made  and 
then  to  defeat  the  foreigner  in  the  application  of  the  terms  of 
settlement. 

Tao  Kuang  dying  in  1850,  one  of  his  seven  sons  succeeded* 
him,  taking  the  reign  title  Hsien  Feng.  During  the  ten  years 
comprising  the  period  of  his  rule,  affairs  in  China  went  stead- 
ily from  bad  to  worse.  Rebellion  and  brigandage  became  the 
rule  rather  than  the  exception.  The  great  Taiping  rebellion 
seemed  for  a  time  to  presage  the  end  of  Manchu  rule  in  China, 
and,  had  the  rebels  secured  the  aid  of  foreigners,  the  last  half 
century  of  Chinese  history  might  have  been  differently  writ- 
ten. Fortunately  or  unfortunately  foreign  advice  and  active 
support  was  given  to  the  Imperial  rather  than  to  the  rebel 
forces,  and  the  Manchu  authority  was  finally  re-established. 
Before  the  Taipings  had  been  brought  under  control,  how- 
ever, the  central  part  of  the  Empire  had  been  terribly  de- 
vastated. 

23 


24          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

While  this  struggle  was  still  going  on  rebellion  broke  out 
in  southwestern  China  in  the  form  of  a  Mohammedan  up- 
rising Here  again  it  needed  time  and  all  of  the  remaining 
Manchu  strength  to  restore  the  authority  of  Peking.  These 
great  rebellions  were  accompanied  by  minor  uprisings  in  other 
parts  of  the  country,  and,  because  of  the  turmoil  and  disturb- 
ance and  the  consequent  relaxation  of  the  hand  of  authority, 
bands  of  brigands  infested  all  parts  of  China.  This  condi- 
tion, in  the  past,  had  always  accompanied  and  predicated  the 
downfall  of  the  Dynasty,  but  the  end  of  the  Manchu  rule  was 
to  be  postponed  for  another  half -century  largely  because,  out 
of  these  major  and  minor  uprisings,  came  no  constructive 
^leadership  capable  of  unifying  the  country  against  the  Manchu 
rule. 

In  the  midst  of  these  internal  troubles  the  problem  of  for- 
eign intercourse  again  became  immediate  and  perplexing. 
Trouble  broke  out  at  Canton  in  1856  over  a  minor  incident. 
This  difficulty  was  later  extended  to  cover  the  question  of  the 
application  of  the  treaty  of  1842,  and  the  British  and  the 
French  united  to  carry  the  struggle  to  the  North.  The  ex- 
pedition was  so  far  successful  as  to  enable  the  plenipotentiaries 
accompanying  the  armed  force  to  negotiate  a  more  favorable 
treaty  than  that  which  China  had  been  forced  to  sign  at  Nan- 
king in  1842.  This  treaty  of  1858,  in  addition  to  reaffirming 
and  extending  the  operation  of  the  principles  of  that  signed 
at  Nanking,  gave  also  the  right  of  residence  at  Peking  to- 
foreign  diplomatic  agents.  But  again  the  Chinese  attempted 
to  retain  by  procrastination  what  had  been  unwillingly  con- 
ceded to  superior  might,  and  another  expedition  to  the  North 
was  necessary  before  the  issue  was  finally  settled.  This  time 
Peking  itself  was  taken,  Hsien  Feng  and  the  Court  fleeing 
north  to  Jehol,  leaving  only  Prince  Kung,  a  brother  of  the 
Emperor,  to  negotiate  with  the  British  and  French. 


Modem  Constitutional  Development  in  China          25 

While  in  exile  from  the  capital,  Hsien  Feng  died.  Just  be- 
fore his  death  a  struggle  had  been  going  on  between  two  fac- 
tions at  the  Court  for  ultimate  control  of  the  child  who  was 
heir  to  the  Throne.  In  the  result  a  joint  regency  was  effected 
of  the  wife  and  the  favorite  concubine  of  the  Emperor,  with 
Prince  Kung  acting  as  their  chief  adviser.  Since  Tzu  Hsi, 
the  mother  of  T'ung  Chih  (the  reign  title  taken  by  the  suc- 
cessor of  Hsien  Feng)  was  not  the  Empress-Consort,  she  had 
at  first  to  share  the  power  with  the  Emperor's  widow,  but 
she  gradually  made  herself  the  dominant  factor  in  the  gov- 
ernment, virtually  ruling  China  from  1861  until  her  death  in 
1908,  with  the  exception  of  the  two  years  of  the  majority  of  ^M 
T'ung  Chih  and  the  nine  years'  rule  of  his  successor  known  as 
Kwang  Hsu. 

It  was  under  the  direction  of  this  remarkable  woman  that' 
the  Taiping  and  Mohammedan  rebellions  were  put  down,  the 
problems  of  foreign  relations  handled  with  a  fair  degree  of 
success,  and  reform  finally  undertaken  by  the  Manchus. 

T'ung  Chih  died  in  1875,  two  years  after  he  had  attained 
his  majority.  The  short  period  of  his  reign  did  not  shed  any 
increased  lustre  on  the  Manchu  rule.  Of  a  licentious  and 
depraved  character,  he  came  under  the  influence  of  his  eunuchs 
who  encouraged  his  tendencies  toward  extravagent  and  im- 
moral living.  "It  became  cause  for  scandal  in  the  Palace  it- 
self that  His  Majesty  would  return  from  his  orgies  long  after 
the  hour  fixed  for  the  morning  audience  with  his  high  officers 
of  State.  He  was  mixed  up  in  many  a  drunken  brawl  and 
consorted  with  the  lowest  dregs  of  the  Chinese  city,  so  that 
it  was  no  matter  for  surprise  when  he  contracted  the  germs  of 
disease  which  speedily  led  to  his  death."1 

1  Bland  and  Backhouse,  "China  Under  the  Empress-Dowager," 
p.  121.  All  references  to  "China  under  the  Empress  Dowager" 
are  to  the  1910  (Lippincott)  unabridged  edition. 


26          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Upon  his  death,  of  small-pox,  Tzu  Hsi  again  took  matters 
into  her  own  hands  and  dictated  his  successor.  Through  her 
influence  the  son  of  Prince  Ch'un,  seventh  son  of  the  Emperor 
Tao  Kuang,  was  chosen  as  the  new  ruler,  and  the  Empress- 
es-dowager were  again  called  to  the  regency.  The  new  "Son 
of  Heaven"  took  the  reign  title  of  Kwang  Hsu,  meaning 
"Glorious  Succession." 

On  reaching  his  majority  in  1898,  Kwang  Hsu  nominally 
took  over  the  reins  of  government  and  the  Empress  Dowager 
went  into  retirement.  But  she  still  continued  to  exercise  a 
supervision  over  his  acts,  leaving  the  young  Emperor  more 
or  less  of  a  puppet.  Naturally  this  was  galling  to  a  man  who 
felt  that  he  was  not  unfitted  himself  to  control  the  policies  of 
the  government  of  which  he  was  the  titular  head.  There 
were  many  others  in  the  realm  who  felt  that  it  was  deplor- 
able for  the  government  to  be  controlled  by  a  woman,  and  the 
Emperor  kept  in  tutelage.  This  feeling  was  stronger  in  the 
South  than  in  the  North,  so  that  it  was  largely  on  the  south- 
erners that  the  Emperor  relied  for  support  when  he  came 
finally  to  make  the  attempt  to  assert  himself.  The  desire  to 
exercise  the  real  power  himself,  later  joined  to  a  feeling  of  the 
need  for  change  in  the  government,  led  to  the  attempts  at 
reform  in  1898. 

That  the  necessity  of  reform  did  not  influence  his  policy 
until  shortly  before  the  reform  edicts  began  to  be  issued  was 
recognized  clearly  by  the  leader  of  the  movement,  K'ang  Yu- 
wei  himself.  "According  to  K'ang's  account  the  relations 
*  |  between  the  Empress-Dowager  and  the  Emperor  have  never 
been  anything  but  strained.  She  has  resented  all  attempts  on 
his  part  to  exercise  real  power,  and  he  has  felt  deeply  the  posi- 
tion of  inferiority  and  subjection  in  which  she  has  until  re- 
cently succeeded  in  keeping  him.  Until  the  Emperor  became 
an  ardent  convert  to  the  cause  of  reform  this  struggle  seems 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          27 

to  have  been  mainly  one  for  power  generally  without  any 
striking  difference  in  the  ends  for  which  power  was  to  be 
used,  and  high  officials  sought  the  favor  of  the  Emperor  or 
Empress  according  to  their  belief  in  the  probability  of  the 
one  or  the  other  obtaining-  or  keeping  the  upper  hand,  the 
opinions  of  these  officials  as  to  the  necessity  of  reform  or 
their  contrary  determination  to  keep  to  the  old  ways,  not 
entering  into  the  question.  It  was  in  short  a  conflict  involv- 
ing no  difference  of  principle."2 

The  feeling  of  an  urgent  need  for  reform  in  the  Chinese 
State  seems  to  have  come  home  to  the  Emperor  Kwang  Hsu 
after  the  humiliating  defeat  of  China  in  the  war  with  Japan. 
It  is  a  generally  accepted  fact  that  the  Emperor  had  been  in- 
terested for  several  years  in  the  ideas  of  the  West.  Western 
mechanical  contrivances  such  as  toy  railways  abounded  in 
the  Imperial  pleasure  grounds;  it  is  reported  that  he  had 
taken  some  lessons  in  English;  and  he  had  actually  manifested 
his  interest  in  western  knowledge  by  sending  for  the  back 
copies  of  the  Review  of  the  Times,  a  magazine  published 
in  Shanghai.  Then  to  this  was  added  the  knowledge  that 
Japan  had  triumphed  over  China  largely  because  she  had 
adopted  western  methods.  The  way  was  prepared  for  the 
Imperial  mind  to  accept  the  ideas  of  the  group  of  reformers 
dominated  by  K'ang  Yu-wei. 

K'ang  Yu-wei.  the  leader  of  the  reform  party  in  1898,  has 
been  extolled  as  the  far-sighted  patriot  and  decried  as  the 
selfish  seeker  after  office,  the  advocate  of  impossible  reforms, 
who  hoped  to  advance  himself  by  arousing  the  spirit  of  change 
in  the  Emperor.  In  reality  he  was  but  the  forerunner,  the 

2  Memorandum  of  Conversation  with  K'ang  Yu-wei  on  Voy- 
age from  Shanghai  to  Hongkong,  Sept.  27-29,  1898.  Correspon- 
dence Respecting  Affairs  of  China  (British),  1899.  Enclosure 
2  in  No.  401. 


28          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

John  the  Baptist,  of  those  who  desired  to  overthrow  the  old 
and  substitute  for  it  the  new,  economically  and  politically. 
Born  in  Kuangtung  province,  the  home  of  most  of  the  promi- 
nent reformers  of  this  and  the  later  period,  K'ang  had  been 
given  the  usual  classical  education.  When  about  twenty-nine 
years  old  he  began  an  extensive  tour  of  China.  In  the  course 
of  his  travels  he  touched  at  Shanghai  and  Hongkong  and  was 
much  impressed  by  the  cleanliness  and  good  order  of  the  for- 
eign settlements.  Upon  his  return  to  Canton  he  began  to 
make  as  great  a  study  of  Western  ideas  as  was  possible  with 
the  limited  number  of  translations  of  foreign  books  at  his 
disposal.  As  a  result  of  his  study  K'ang  founded,  in  1891,  a 
school  of  new  learning.  The  extent  of  his  progress  in  for- 
eign knowledge  may  be  determined  from  the  subjects  taught 
in  his  school :  The  Confucian  Classics;  Buddhistic  Literature; 
Chinese  Philosophy  and  History ;  and  Western  Knowledge.3 

In  spite  of  his  own  limited  knowledge  of  the  civilization  of 
the  West  K'ang  Yu-wei  soon  gathered  around  him  a  group 
of  followers,  many  of  them  scholars  of  good  standing  ac- 
cording to  the  old  standards.  The  most  prominent  of  these 
was  Liang  Ch'i  Ch'ao,  a  man  who  has,  since  1898,  far  sur- 
passed his  teacher  in  the  struggle  for  a  new  order  in  China. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  the  party  advocating  reform 
under  the  Manchus,  as  opposed  to  the  societies  conducting  an 
anti-dynastic  agitation.  From  1891  until  he  gained  the  ear  of 
the  Emperor  in  1898,  K'ang  Yu-wei  spread  his  ideas  by  means 
of  leaflets  and  tracts,  occasionally  sending  in  memorials  to  the 
Throne.  In  1893  he  started  a  Reform  Society  in  Peking,  in- 
tending to  establish  branches  throughout  the  Empire.  But 
before  long  the  society  had  become  sufficiently  well  known  to 

3  "K'ang  Yu-wei,  His  Life,  Ideas,  and  Character."  Professor 
M.  E.  Tsur.  (Reprinted  from  the  National  Revieiv  (China), 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          29 

reach  the  knowledge  of  the  court,  and  it  was  ordered  dis- 
solved by  an  Imperial  Edict.  This  preliminary  work  of  agi- 
tation and  diffusion  of  knowledge  was  continued  and  bore 
fruit  long  after  the  immediate  reform  programme  had  been 
rendered  impossible  of  achievement  by  the  coup  d'etat  of  1898. 
Before  proceeding  to  the  discussion  of  the  reform  edicts  it 
is  advisable  to  note  briefly  the  extent  to  which  foreign  ideas 
had  entered  China.  We  have  seen  that  the  coming  of  the 
foreigners  had  brought  a  great  many  new  problems  to  be 
solved  by  the  Imperial  Government.  Trade  had  increased 
continually  on  a  reciprocal  basis.  The  Chinese  had  begun  to 
use  foreign-made  goods,  and  to  see  that  the  trade  was  a  good 
thing  for  them  as  well  as  for  the  trading  nations.  At  first 
they  had  not  needed  foreign  products,  opium  being  almost  the 
sole  import  of  any  great  value.  With  the  extension  of  the ' 
desire  for  goods  from  abroad  commercial  relations  were  put 
on  a  much  firmer  basis  than  when  China  had  been  an  export- 
ing nation,  a  selling  and  not  a  buying  State.  The  daily  con- 
tact of  Occidentals  and  Chinese  in  the  treaty  ports  had  brought 
with  it  a  greater  mutual  tolerance  of  the  one  for  the  ideas  and 
peculiarities  of  the  other.  The  feeling  of  superiority  of  the 
Chinese  was  not  greatly  lessened,  but  a  growth  of  respect  for 
some  western  institutions  and  industrial  methods  was  mani- 
fested. This  was  shown  in  a  measure  in  the  attempts  made 
by  a  few  of  the  prominent  Viceroys  to  construct  arsenals  and 
shipyards ;  by  the  encouragement  offered  in  some  places  to  the 
building  of  factories  and  workshops ;  and  by  the  increased  in- 
terest in  the  development  of  the  coal  and  iron  deposits  of  the 
country.  Before  the  Japanese  war  an  abortive  attempt  had 
been  made  to  build  up  a  modern  navy  for  China  on  a  small 
scale.  After  the  war  the  reorganization -of  the  army  along 
western  lines  received  great  attention,  although  the  venality 
of  officials  prevented  much  being  accomplished. 


30          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

While  the  trade  contact  was  responsible  in  some  measure 
for  the  interest  manifested  in  the  material  side  of  European 
civilization,  the  missionaries  had  been  at  work  steadily  awak- 
ening the  people  to  a  realization  of  the  value  of  western  edu- 
cation. Although  they  were  impeded  in  their  work  by  its  limi- 
tation to  only  a  few  points  in  the  Empire,  and  by  the  hos- 
tility of  many  of  the  officials  of  the  old  type,  they  had  made 
continuous  progress,  partly  by  the  publication  and  distribution 
of  tracts  and  pamphlets,  partly,  where  that  was  possible,  by  the 
y  foundation  of  schools  for  the  Chinese.  Many  of  the  leaders 
in  the  movement  for  constitutional  government  and  govern- 
mental reform  were  educated  either  wholly  or  in  part  in  the 
mission  schools,  or  early  came  into  contact  with  missionaries. 
In  some  cases,  because  of  their  imperfect  assimilation  of  the 
new  ideas,  they  did  harm  rather  than  good.  But  even  so,  they 
had  a  place  in  the  movement  towards  a  new  China. 

Before  1900  there  had  been  little  attempt  to  secure  a  wes- 
V\  tern  education  in  foreign  lands.  But  as  early  as  1872  a  group 
7  of  1 20  Chinese  boys  was  sent  to  America  to  study.  The  in- 
centive to  take  this  step  came  from  a  graduate  of  Yale  Uni- 
versity, Dr.  Yung  Wing,  who  was  able  to  show  the  able  Vice- 
roy, Tseng  Kuo-fan,  the  value  of  such  a  proceeding.  In  1873 
another  detachment  was  sent  to  England  to  study  her  navy. 
China's  defeat  by  the  Japanese,  a  people  closely  akin  to  the 
Chinese  in  many  ways,  gave  to  modern  Japan  a  great  interest 
for  the  Chinese  people.  If  Japan,  a  nation  whose  civilization 
was  based  on  that  of  China,  had  suddenly  become  so  strong, 
there  must  be,  they  thought,  a  reason  for  it.  Those  who 
came  into  contact  with  the  Japanese  either  at  home  or  abroad 
ascribed  the  change  to  the  adoption  of  western  political  meth- 
ods. "Why  then,"  they  asked,  "could  not  China  become 
strong  by  adopting  the  same  ideas"?  There  were,  however, 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          31 

very  few  who  had  been  able  by  1898  to  study  the  changed 
Japan. 

While  a  beginning  had  been  made,  then,  in  the  introduction 
of  the  Chinese  to  the  civilization  of  the  West  through  con- 
tact with  the  trading  class,  by  the  sending  of  students  abroad, 
and,  to  a  greater  extent,  through  the  activities  of  the  mission- 
aries, it  had  not  extended  far  from  the  treaty  ports.  The 
Chinese  people  as  a  whole,  and  the  officials  as  a  class,  were  as 
conservative  as  ever,  and  as  wedded  to  the  old  institutions.  \ 
They  were  still  opposed  to  foreign  ideas  because  they  were 
foreign,  and  because  it  was  felt  that  things  Chinese,  by  the 
very  fact  of  being  Chinese,  were  superior  to  anything  that 
came  from  abroad.  They  had  not  yet  been  brought  to  a 
realization  of  the  fact  that  the  old  institutions  were  no  longer 
adapted  to  the  new  needs  of  the  State.  Many  felt  the  neces- 
sity for  administrative  reform,  but  few  perceived  that  the 
system  itself  was  antiquated  and  no  longer  capable  of  meeting 
the  needs  of  the  Empire. 

As  has  been  stated,  the  alignment  of  officials  either  on  the 
side  of  the  Empress  Dowager  or  with  the  Emperor  Kwang 
Hsu  was  determined  by  the  feeling  of  the  official  that  either 
the  one  or  the  other  would  be  victorious  in  the  struggle  for 
power.  And  it  was  only  after  the  Emperor  began  his  career  as 
a  reformer  that  the  officials  developed  any  feeling  for  change. 
To  quote  again  the  conversation  with  K'ang  Yu-wei : 
"Whereas  any  given  official  might  previously  have  felt  assured 
that  if  he  adhered  to  the  Emperor's  side  and  the  Emperor 
ousted  the  Empress  from  power  he  would  have  the  reward 
of  comfortable  continuance  in  office  on  the  old  lines,  it  was 
now  evident  that  supporting  the  Emperor  meant  acquiescence, 
if  not  zealous  cooperation,  in  changes  that  might  seriously 
affect  the  whole  position  of  the  official  class,  curtailing  their 
authority,  and  diminishing  their  pecuniary  gains,  besides  ex- 


32          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

posing  them  to  the  risk  of  being  removed  to  make  place  for 
younger  men  in  fuller  sympathy  with  the  sovereign's  ideas."4 
At  the  beginning  of  1898  affairs  were  much  as  they  had 
been  since  Kwang  Hsu  had  reached  his  majority.  The  rela- 
^  tions  of  the  Emperor  with  the  Empress  Dowager  were  seem- 
ingly friendly.  "Kwang^Hsu  never  failed  to  consult  Her 
Majesty  before  the  issue  of  any  important  Decree,  and  Tzu 
Hsi  was  usually  most  cordial  in  her  manner  towards  him.  .  .  . 
Whenever  the  Empress  came  to  Peking,  he  (Kwang  Hsu) 
obeyed  strictly  the  etiquette  which  required  him  reverently  to 
kneel  at  the  Palace  gates  to  welcome  her."  But  "when  visit- 
ing her  at  the  Summer  Palace,  he  was  not  permitted  to  an- 
nounce his  arrival  in  person,  but  was  obliged  to  kneel  at  the 
inner  gate  and  there  await  the  summons  of  admission  from 
the  Chief  Eunuch.  ...  At  each  of  these  visits  he  was  com- 
pelled, like  any  of  the  Palace  officials,  to  pay  his  way  by  large 
fees  to  the  eunuchs  in  attendance  on  Her  Majesty,  and  as  a 
matter  of  fact  these  myrmidons  treated  him  with  consider- 
ably less  respect  than  they  showed  to  many  high  Manchu  dig- 
nitaries. Within  the  Palace  precincts  the  Son  of  Heaven  was 
indeed  regarded  as  of  little  account."5  In  these  and  many 
other  little  ways  the  Emperor  was  constantly  reminded  that 
he  was  only  the  ruler  in  name,  and  was  so  regarded  by  many 
of  his  officials. 

The  atmosphere  of  Peking,  and  especially  of  the  Imperial 
City,  was  however,  most  favorable  to  the  growth  of  cliques 
and  parties.  This  condition  befriended  Kwang  Hsu  as  it 
caused  those  not  in  the  favor  of  the  Old  Buddha  to  look  to 
him  for  preference.  Since  the  beginning  of  his  reign  there 

*  Correspondence  Respecting  Affairs  in  China  (British),  1899. 
Inclosure  No.  2  in  401. 

5  Bland  and  Backhouse,  ''China  under  the  Empress  Dowager," 
p.  179. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          33 

had  been  growing  up  two  parties  in  Peking,  and  from  their 
leadership  these  parties  had  developed  as  representative  of  the 
^North  and  the  South.  The  leaders  of  the  northern  party  were 
Hsii  T'ung,  one  of  the  Chinese  Bannermen,  a  devoted  ad- 
herent of  the  Manchus,  and  tutor  to  the  former  Emperor 
T'ung  Chih;  and  Li  Hung-tsao,  a  native  of  the  metropolitan 
province  of  Chihli.  /The  southern  party  was  led  by  Weng 
T'ung-ho,  the  tutor  of  His  Majesty  Kwang  Hsu,  and  P'an 
Tsu-yin,  both  of  them  eminent  scholars,  as  were  also  the  lead- 
ers of  the  northern  group.  All  of  the  literary  graduates  grad- 
ually ranged  themselves  on  the  one  side  or  the  other.  Both 
Li  and  Weng  were  appointed  to  the  Grand  Council  in  1894, 
and  thereafter  the  Empress  espoused  the  cause  of  the  north- 
erners while  the  Emperor  looked  to  the  southern  party  for 
support. 

^  In  less  direct  contact  with  the.  Manchus,  the  South  had 
always^een  a  source  of  trouble  to  the  Dynasty.  Any  discrim- 
ination against  the  Chinese  in  favor  of  the  alien  Manchu  was 
more  immediately  felt  in  the  southern  provinces  than  in  the 
northern,  and  since  the  Empress  Dowager  had  always  been  of 
pronounced  Manchu  tendencies  the  Southerners  naturally 
wished  for  an  end  to  her  control  over  the  government.  It 
was  in  the  South,  too,  that  foreign  ideas  had  gained  the  greater 
hold,  most  of  the  reformers  from  this  time  on  being  men  from 
the  southern  provinces  and  in  many  cases  the  reforms  advo- 
cated being  directed  largely  against  the  Manchu  supremacy  in 
the  State. 

On  May  29,  1898,  Prince  Kung,  one  of  the  most  capable 
of  the  Manchu  statesmen,  died.  His  death  removed  a  great 
restraining  influence  from  both  parties  in  the  Empire.  "On 
the  one  hand  the  Manchu  party  lost  in  him  its  senior  repre- 
sentative, an  elder  whose  wise  counsel  had  guided  them,  and 
a  statesman  whose  influence  had  been  steadily  against  their 


34          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

tendencies  toward  an  anti-Chinese  and  anti-foreign  policy. 
.  .  .  On  the  other  hand  the  Emperor  had  always  deferred  to 
Prince  Kung's  advice,  and  it  was  not  until  after  his  death 
that  he  embarked  headlong  on  the  reform  schemes  of  K'ang 
Yu-wei  and  his  associates,  many  of  which  the  Prince,  though 
no  bigoted  conservative,  would  certainly  have  condemned."6 
Soon  after  the  death  of  Prince  Kung,  Weng  T'ung-ho 
recommended  K'ang  Yu-wei  to  the  Imperial  favor.  Un- 
doubtedly he  took  this  step  in  the  hope  of  strengthening  him- 
self and  his  party.  Prince  Kung  had  been  his  best  friend  at 
Court,  and  with  his  moderating  influence  removed  it  was 
necessary  to  take  steps  to  counteract  the  growing  influence  of 
the  pro-Manchu  party,  which  was  hostile  to  Weng.  The  Em- 
peror acted  on  the  recommendation  and  K'ang  Yu-wei  was 

/summoned  to  audience  on  the  I3th  of  June,  i898,7  by  an  Im- 
perial Edict.  He  found  Kwang  Hsu  favorably  inclined  to 
reform  and  soon  gained  considerable  influence  over  him. 
K'ang's  ideas  had  already  been  presented  to  His  Majesty  in 
the  form  of  a  memorial.  As  early  as  the  third  of  January  he 

..  had  been  accorded  an  interview  with  the  members  of  the 
Tsungli  Yamen,  through  the  influence  of  Weng  T'ung-ho,  and 
in  that  conference  he  offered  for  their  consideration  his  pro- 
posals for  reform,  which  were  embodied  in  the  memorial 
subsequently  presented  at  the  request  of  the  Emperor. 

This  memorial  pointed  out  "that  under  the  present  system 
there  was  no  way  of  ascertaining  the  desires  and  opinions  of 
the  people.  The  present  Ministers  and  Viceroys  could  act 
only  upon  orders  given  them,  and  were  unable  to  do  any 
original  thinking.  It  was  necessary  to  select  young,  intelli- 
gent men,  imbued  with  Western  ideas,  to  assist  in  the  regener- 

6  "China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,"  p.  184. 

7  North  China  //mi/</-Translation  of  Edict  given  Sept.  5,  1898. 
China  Year  Book  1913  gives  date  as  June  14. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          35 

ation  of  the  Empire,  to  confer  with  the  Emperor  every  day, 
discussing  measures  of  reform,  but  first  devoting  their  ener- 
gies to  a  revision  of  the  laws  and  the  administration."8  K'ang 
advocated  the  dispensing  with  old  officials,  and  he  suggested 
the  creation  of  twelve  new  departments.  In  view  of  the  fact 
that  they  hit  directly  at  the  official  class,  it  is  no  wonder  that 
the  Tsungli  Yamen  reported  unfavorably  on  these  proposals 
when  the  Emperor  asked  for  an  opinion  on  them.  It  was 
only  after  his  audience  in  June  that  K'ang  Yu-wei  had  an  op- 
portunity to  carry  out  some  of  his  ideas. 

In  an  edict  issued  a  few  days  before  the  audience  with 
K'ang  Yu-wei,  the  Emperor  set  forth  some  of  the  reasons  why 
reform  was  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 
"In  the  present  condition  of  Imperial  Affairs,  with  an  un- 
trained army,  with  limited  funds,  with  ignorant  'literati,'  and 
with  artisans  untaught  because  they  have  no  fit  teachers,  is 
there  any  difficulty  in  deciding,  when  China  is  compared  with 
foreign  nations,  who  is  the  strong  and  who  is  the  weak?  It 
is  easy  to  distinguish  between  the  rich  and  the  poor.  How 
can  a  man  armed  with  a  wooden  stick  smite  his  foe  encased 
in  a  coat  of  mail?  .  .  .  We  cannot  in  these  modern  days 
adhere  to  the  ways  of  the  five  Kings  (circa  B.C.  2500)  ;  even 
they  did  not  continue  after  the  manner  of  their  respective 
predecessors.  It  is  like  wearing  thick  clothes  in  summer  and 
thin  ones  in  winter."9 

The  "hundred  days"  of  reform  came  as  a  great  surprise  to    [* 
the  Empire  in  spite  of  the  known  leaning  of  the  Emperer 
toward  reform.     The  decrees  issued  involved  educational,  in- 
dustrial, agricultural,  and  army  changes  and  reorganization, 
as  well  as  some  alterations  in  the  administrative  organization. 

8  Smith,  "China  in  Convulsion,"  p.  132. 

9  Correspondence  Respecting  Affairs  in  China  (British),  1899. 
No.  266. 


36          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Y  The  first  of  the  Edicts10  dealt  with  the  need  for  change  in 
^1  the  system  of  education  in  China.  After  urging  the  officials 
and  literati  to  be  diligent  in  their  attempts  to  extend  their 
knowledge,  and  not  to  be  satisfied  with  a  mere  superficial 
learning,  the  Edict  provided  for  the  initial  steps  to  be  taken 
)  toward  the  establishment  of  a  central  University  in  Peking. 
Those  eligible  to  enter  this  highest  school  in  the  Empire  were : 
"Any  of  the  compilers  and  graduates  of  the  Hanlin  College, 
the  Secretaries  of  the  Boards,  the  officers  of  the  Palace  Guards, 
expectant  Intendants,  Prefects,  District  Magistrates,  and 
subordinate  officials,  sons  and  brothers  of  officials,  the  heredi- 
tary officials  of  the  Eight  Banners,  and  the  sons  of  the  mili- 
tary officials  of  the  Empire." 

By  later11  supplementary  Edicts  schools  and  colleges  were 
to  be  established  in  the  provincial  capitals  and  all  large  cities 
throughout  the  country.  These  provincial  schools  were  to 
act  as  feeders  for  the  central  University.  Dr.  W.  A.  P. 
Martin  was  appointed  the  head  of  the  University  faculty.  It 
was  made  clear  from  the  beginning  that  the  primary  purpose 
of  the  new  schools  was  to  be  the  dissemination  of  Western 
rather  than  of  Confucian  learning,  although  the  latter,  the 
old  classical  study,  was  not  to  be  done  away  with.  The  fac- 
ulty of  the  University  was  to  consist  largely  of  foreigners. 
The  work  of  establishing  the  provincial  schools  was  left  to 
the  Governors  and  other  provincial  officials,  and  they  were 
asked  to  memorialize  the  Throne  in  regard  to  the  progress 
made,  presenting  any  suggestions  for  reform  that  they  might 
desire  to  offer.12 

"Issued  June  n,  1898. 

11  Issued  July  10,  July  29,  and  August  4,  1898. 

12  The  attitude  of  the  officials  toward  the  reform  program  may 
be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  Emperor  was  forced  to  re- 
prove two  of  the  most  progressive  Viceroys   (Liu  K'un-yi  and 
Fan  Chung-lin)   for  dilatoriness. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          37 

Even  more  radical  than  the  changes  in  the  educational  sys- 
tem were  those  made  in  the  examination  system.  When  it  is 
remembered  that  by  far  the  most  influential  class  in  the  State 
was  that  of  the  scholars,  and  that  it  depended  for  its  suprem- 
acy on  the  maintenance  of  the  old  method  of  study  and  of  ex- 
amination, it  can  be  seen  what  powerful  forces  Kwang  Hsu 
was  arraying  against  himself  and  the  party  of  reform. 
,  On  June  23d  an  Imperial  decree  abolished  the  literary  essay 
as  the  standard  for  examination.13  For  the  old  literary  effu- 
sions it  was  proposed  to  substitute  practical  essays  on  subjects 
connected  with  and  drawn  from  the  new  learning.  The  edict 
stated:  "We  have  been  compelled  to  issue  this  decree  be- 
cause our  examinations  have  degenerated  to  the  lowest  point, 
and  we  can  see  no  way  to  remedy  matters  other  than  to  change 
entirely  the  old  methods  of  examination  for  a  new  course  of 
competition."14 

From  this  change  it  naturally  followed  that  the  old  methods 
of  instruction  and  of  preparation  for  examination  would  be 
obsolete,  and  that  the  influence  of  the  old  time  scholars  would 
be  reduced  greatly,  eventually  if  not  immediately.  The  long- 
nailed,  stoop-shouldered,  shuffling- footed  scholar  of  the  old 
regime  could  have  only  a  minor  place  in  a  world  where  the 
primary  emphasis  was  placed  on  practical  knowledge  and  effi- 
ciency. And  it  was  on  those  two  things  that  the  attention  of 
the  Chinese  would  have  to  be  focused  if  they  were  to  attempt 
seriously  to  maintain  themselves  against  the  aggressiveness  of 

13  Under  the  old  system  the  candidate  was  required  to  write 
an  essay  on  some  subject  taken  from  the  classics.  Practical  ad- 
ministrative knowledge  was  never  required  for  success  in  these 
examinations,  although  it  was  from  the  successful  candidates 
that  the  officials  of  the  Empire  were  invariably  chosen. 

*The  Confucian  Analects  and  the  Classics  were  still  to  be 
studied  in  the  schools,  but  studies  of  a  practical  nature  were  to 
be  emphasized. 


38          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  younger  nations  of  the  West.  This  change  in  the  ex- 
aminations was  but  the  logical  forerunner  of  still  more  radi- 
cal changes,  all  of  which  would  menace  the  predominance  of 
the  literati.  In  the  face  of  their  self-evident  interest,  (for 
the  literati  and  the  officialdom  were  largely  one),  it  is  hardly 
to  be  wondered  at  that  the  Emperor  complained  of  the  laxity 
of  the  officials  in  giving  effect  to  his  edicts. 

Together  with  the  reform  in  education  and  in  the  system  of* 
examination  came  a  plan  for  the  systematic  translation  of  the 
European  books  necessary  to  educate  the  older  people  in  the 
new  ideas,  and  for  use  in  the  schools.  A  translation  bureau 
was  to  be  established  at  Shanghai  with  Liang  Ch'i  Ch'ao15  at 
the  head.  Its  work  was  to  be  the  "putting  into  Chinese  West- 
ern works  on  science,  arts,  and  literature,  and  text  books  for 
the  schools  and  colleges." 

The  importance  of  such  a  step  can  be  immediately  seen. 
Before  the  new  system  of  education  could  be  put  into  opera- 
tion it  was  necessary  to  have  some  sort  of  an  approach  to 
the  new  learning.  Either  the  educated  class  in  the  future 
would  have  to  rely  on  a  foreign  language  for  their  knowledge, 
and  instruction  in  the  schools  would  have  to  be  in  a  foreign 
language  so  far  as  modern  science  and  learning  were  con- 
cerned, or  the  great  field  of  Western  investigation  would  have 
to  be  put  into  the  Chinese  language.  The  magnitude  of  this 
latter  task  was  greatly  increased  because  of  the  limited  few 
who  were  competent  to  undertake  such  \vork,  which,  to  be  of 
any  value,  demanded  a  thorough  training  in  foreign  lan- 
guages. Furthermore,  it  involved  the  creation  of  a  vocabu- 

15  Liang  Ch'i  Ch'ao  has  since  done  a  very  valuable  work  along 
that  line,  although  not  working  under  the  government,  as  planned 
in  this  edict.  Among  other  works  he  has  put  into  Chinese  the 
lives  of  Cavour  and  of  Bismarck.  His  translations  are  widely 
read  by  the  students  in  China. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          39 

lary,  such  concepts  as  spirit,  patriotism,  etc.,  being  entirely 
new  to  the  Chinese  language.16 

Foreigners,  especially  the  missionaries,  had  been  working 
along  this  very  line  in  their  attempts  to  reach  the  Chinese,  but 
their  work  had  been  limited  largely  to  the  translation  of  re- 
ligious literature,  the  field  of  science  being  untouched.  Liang 
Ch'i  Ch'ao  was  then,  and  is  today,  one  of  the  foremost  of 
Chinese  scholars.  But  he  had  only  a  limited  knowledge  of 
any  language  except  his  own  and  Japanese,  and  was  hardly 
competent  to  go  to  the  originals  for  the  Western  texts.  Work- 
ing with  foreigners  who  had  a  knowledge  of  Chinese  his  schol- 
arly ability  might  have  surmounted  the  limitations  of  his  own 
knowledge  and  training.  But  cooperation  with  foreigners  in 
the  task  does  not  seem  then  to  have  been/ contemplated.17  The 
great  importance  of  this  mandate  lies  in  its  emphasizing  one 
of  the  greatest  tasks  incident  to  educational  reform.18 

The  reformers  of  this  period  recognized  that  one  great  diffi-  * 
culty  in  their  way  was  the  unwillingness  of  officials  to  carry  J 
out  the  provisions  of  the  edicts.     It  was  also  clear  that  mis- 
understandings would  arise  because  of  the  ignorance  of  the 
people  as  to  the  importance  of  the  steps  being  taken,  and  as  to 
the  reasons   for  any  change  being  inaugurated.     To  avoid  * 
this  two  steps  were  taken.     Official  gazettes  were  to  be  pub- 
lished and  distributed  all  over  the  Empire.     The  Shanghai 
publication,    Chinese   Progress,    which    had    been    edited   by 

18  In  making  public  addresses  in  Chinese,  it  is  common  for  the 
speaker  to  give  an  English  word,  and  then  take  three  or  four 
minutes  explaining  in  Chinese  its  meaning. 

17  That  is,  no  cooperation  in  China,  although  the  Ministers  to 
European  Courts  were  ordered  to  carry  on  this  work  of  trans- 
lation in  the  countries  where  they  were  residing. 

18  This  work  of  translation  has  become  increasingly  important 
in  the  past  fifteen  years.     Further  reference  to  it  will  have  to 
be  made  later. 


40          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Liang  Ch'i  Ch'ao  was  made  the  leading  organ  of  this  nature. 
It  was  hoped  that  these  publications  would  establish  a  direct 
relationship  between  the  Central  Government  and  the  people. 
Formerly  newspapers  had  been  confined  largely  to  the  treaty- 
ports  and  were  more  in  the  nature  of  propagandist  pamphlets 
than  general  news  sheets.  They  had  been  used  largely  for 
anti-government  agitation,  being  frequently  under  the  ban  of 
the  authorities.  The  proposed  gazettes  were  to  be  official 
newspapers,  subsidized  by  the  government  and  privileged  to 
call  attention  to  all  kinds  of  abuses  and  evils. 

The  other  attempt  to  bring  about  a  closer  understanding  be- 
tween the  provinces  and  the  Central  Government  was  through 
an  enlargement  of  the  right  of  petition.  Formerly  only  the 
highest  officials  and  the  censors  were  allowed  directly  to  me- 
morialize the  Throne.  The  edict  issued  on  September  I2th, 
after  rebuking  officials  severely  for  refusing  to  transmit  me- 
morials which  had  come  in,  extended  the  right  of  petition 
"to  practically  every  soul  in  the  Empire."  "Next  day,  the 
thirteenth  of  September,  another  decree  repeated  the  terms  of 
the  above  in  clearer  detail,  and  laid  down  precisely  the  pro- 
cedure each  class  was  to  observe,  in  making  itself  heard.  The 
severest  penalties  were  threatened  should  there  be  any  inter- 
ference with  the  free  exercise  of  this  privilege  by  the  high 
officers  of  government,  who  were  commanded  to  report  by 
telegram  the  steps  they  were  taking  to  fulfil  the  Imperial 
wishes."1  Honestly  carried  into  effect,  this  change  would 
have  brought  the  Central  Government  into  actual  touch  with 
the  problems  and  abuses  of  the  provincial  administration,  and 
enabled  it  to  make  the  changes  necessary  to  rectify  these  abuses 
and  purify  the  administration.  It  would  also  have  brought 
new  life  to  the  only  body  in  the  Empire  whose  function  was 

19  (British)  Correspondence  Relative  to  China,  1899,  No.  371. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          41 

criticism — the  censorate.  Under  the  system  existing  in  1898 
the  Emperor  was  forced  to  rely  for  information  on  the  high 
officials,  themselves  the  very  men  most  interested  in  keeping 
from  him  a  knowledge  of  abuses.  The  censors,  too,  had  be- 
come open  to  bribery,  and  were  kept,  by  fear  of  punishment, 
from  too  great  criticism  of  the  acts  of  the  high  officers  of 
the  government. 

Other  decrees,  following  one  another  in  rapid  succession, 
dealt  with  the  need  of  agricultural,  industrial,  and  military  re- 
form. A  bureau  of  agriculture,  arts  and  commerce  was  estab- 
lished. Agricultural  education  was  to  be  undertaken  and  all 
new  ideas  calculated  to  improve  land  cultivation  were  to  be 
investigated  and  made  use  of  where  they  proved  to  be  of  value. 
Progress  in  invention  was  to  be  encouraged  by  the  giving  of 
exclusive  rights  to  the  inventor  for  a  number  of  years,— 
really  a  provision  for  the  granting  of  patent  rights.  "Re- 
wards were  also  to  be  given  to  those  who,  with  their  own  re- 
sources, establish  colleges,  open  up  mines,  or  set  up  arsenals 
for  the  manufacture  of  rifles  and  cannon."20  As  to  army 
reform  "two  decrees,  published  on  June  27th  and  July  5th, 
have  reference  to  reform  in  the  Chinese  army,  but  they  throw 
no  light  on  the  nature  of  them,  and  merely  refer  certain  sug- 
gestions to  various  departments  for  examination."21  In  order 
to  further  the  reconstruction  of  China's  fleet  the  establishment 
of  naval  colleges  was  ordered. 

Mention  should  also  be  made  of  the  announced  intention  of 
the  Emperor  to  hold  military  reviews  both  in  Peking  and 
Tientsin.  In  connection  with  the  latter  review  it  was  planned 
to  go  by  rail  to  Tientsin,  the  Imperial  party  including  the 
Empress  Dowager.22  This  would  have  been  the  first  time 

20  (British)  Correspondence  Relative  to  China,  1899,  No.  297. 

21  Correspondence  Relative  to  China  (British),  1899,  No.  297. 

22  China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,  pp.  196-7. 


42          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

either  the  Emperor  or  Empress  had  travelled  by  rail,  their 
experience  with  foreign  locomotion  being  limited  to  the  toy 
railroads  that  had  been  installed  in  the  pleasure  grounds  of  the 
Palace.  This  suggestion  came  as  a  great  shock  to  the  Man- 
chu  officials  who  felt  that  it  would  be  a  terrible  thing  for 
Their  Majesties  to  demean  themselves  by  breaking  so  far 
away  from  tradition.  Tzu  Hsi  however  was  delighted  at  the 
prospect  of  such  a  novel  experience.  Later  developments 
caused  the  abandonment  of  the  plan. 

When,  in  the  course  of  his  career  as  a  reformer,  the  Em- 
peror struck  directly  at  the  official  class  by  the  abolition  of«* 
useless  offices  he  sounded  the  death  knell  of  the  whole  move- 
/ \  ment.     Many  who  had  been  content  to  stand  by  wi 
position  so  long  as  they  were  not  directly  affected 
were  even  believers,  in  theory,  in  the  need  for  reform  were^  ~ 
immediately  antagonized  when  they  saw  a  possible  attack  on~* 
their   pocketbooks.      An  edict  of   August   30  abolished   six 
offices — i.e.,   the  Imperial   Supervisorate  of   Instruction,  the 
Office  of  Transmission,  the  Grand   Court  of  Revision,  the 
Court  of  Imperial  Entertainments,  the  Court  of  the  Imperial 
Stud,  and  the  Court  of  State  Ceremonial.     These  offices  had 
provided  lucrative  employment  for  Manchu  idlers  for  many 
generations.     "This  decree  was  loudly  denounced  as  contrary 
to  the  traditions  of  the  Manchu  Dynasty,  and  from  all  sides 
came  urgent  appeals  to  the  Old  Buddha  to  protect  the  privi- 
leges of  the  ruling  class,  and  to  order  its  cancellation."2     The 
reform  was  called  a  direct  blow  at  the  Manchus,  the  first  step 
in  a  movement  calculated  to  overthrow  the  Dynasty.    Further, 
"the  decree  specified  the  Governorships  of  Kuangtung,  Hupei,* 
and  Yunnan,  as  well  as  the  Director-Generalship  of  the  Yel- 
low River,  as  posts  which  could  well  be  transferred  to  other 

23  "China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,"  p.   197. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          43 

officers,  reducing  many  overgrown  salaries  and  perquisites. 
The  Tribute  Rice  Transport  by  the  Grand  Canal  (one  of  the 
most  wasteful  extravagances  even  in  China)  was  also  abol- 
ished, and  other  offices  pertaining  to  the  Salt  Revenue  were 
cut  off  with  a  stroke  of  a  pen."24 

It  is  always  much  easier  to  create  new  positions  without 
opposition  than  it  is  to  abolish  those  which  have  been  in  ex- 
istence even  for  a  short  time,  so  that  it  can  readily  be  imagined 
how  great  an  outcry  arose  among  all  the  officials,  since  no  one 
knew  where  such  changes  would  stop.  Many  less  important 
sinecures  had  been  filled  with  the  proteges  of  the  high  officials 
who  were  expected  to  provide  for  the  members  of  their  own 
families.  They  were  also  looked  to  as  the  source  of  official 
preferment  by  many  of  their  fellow-provincials  who  had  been 
successful  in  the  examinations  and  were  on  the  list  of  "ex- 
pectant" officials. 

Officialdom  was  affected  in  yet  another  way  by  this  attempt 
to  better  the  administration.  With  very  few  exceptions,  every 
officer  in  the  Empire  had  been  forced  to  buy  his  place  at  a 
figure  proportioned  to  its  importance,  so  that  he  stood  to  lose 
materially  by  its  abolition. 

This  fear  on  the  part  of  the  officials  was  intensified  by  the 
dismissal  from  office,  two  days  after  the  issue  of  these  de- 
crees, of  all  of  the  high  officials  of  the  Board  of  Rites25  for 
suppressing  a  memorial  because  of  its  radical  suggestions.26 

24  "China  in  Convulsion,"  p.  144. 

25  Hsu  Ying-k'uei  and  Huai  T'a-pu,  the  two  Presidents  of  the 
Board,  and  also  the  two  Senior  and  two  Junior  Vice-presidents. 

26  This  memorial,  submitted  by  a  third  class  secretary  of  the 
Board  of  Rites,  is  said  to  have  advocated:  "the  abolition  of  the 
queue  and  the  changing  of  the  Chinese  national  dress  to  that  of 
Western  lands;  the  embracing  the  Christian  religion  as  that  of 
the  State,  with  a  national  Parliament  in  prospect ;  and  a  journey 
by  the  Emperor  and  Empress  Dowager  to  the  Mikado,  that  they 


44          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

The  Empress  Dowager  had  been  sitting  quietly  by  during 
this  period  waiting  for  the  opposition  to  the  reformers  to  be- 
come sufficiently  pronounced  to  warrant  her  resuming  the  di- 
rection of  the  affairs  of  State.  It  was  not  until  she  learned 
that  the  reforms  were  to  be  safeguarded  by  rendering  her  in- 
capable of  interference  that  Tzu  Hsi  took  drastic  steps  against 

\  the  party  of  the  Emperor.  The  details  of  the  plot  against  her 
life  are  now  a  matter  of  history:  How  Yuan  Shih-kai  was 
entrusted  with  the  task  of  securing  control  of  the  foreign 
drilled  army  of  Chihli,  and  the  destruction  of  the  faithful  ad- 
herent of  the  Empress,  Jung  Lu,  then  Viceroy  of  Chihli 
Province.  It  is  equally  well  known  how  Yuan  went  to  his 
blood-brother,  Jung  Lu,  and  disclosed  the  plot27  instead  of 
killing  him,  thus  enabling  Jung  Lu  to  carry  out  what  has  be- 

i  come  known  as  the  coup  d'etat  of  1898,  by  which  the  Empress 
assumed  control  and  Kwang  Hsu  became  a  virtual  prisoner 
until  his  death  in  1908. 28 

After  the  restoration,  edicts  began  to  appear  in  rapid  suc- 
cession cancelling  all  of  the  reform  measures  enacted  during 

\  the  "hundred  days,"  and  providing   for  the  punishment  of 

/  K'ang  Yu-wei  and  his  followers.  K'ang  himself  escaped  to 
Tientsin  and  from  there  to  Shanghai  where  he  was  enabled 
to  elude  the  Imperial  authorities  by  the  aid  of  British  officials. 
Many  of  his  adherents  made  good  their  escape,  principally  to 

might  see  for  themselves  the  pitiful  condition  of  China  as  com- 
pared with  Japan."  "China  in  Convulsion,"  p.  145.  (See  also 
British  Correspondence  Relative  to  China,  1898,  No.  371.) 

27  For  Yuan's  version  of  the  affair  see  his  account  in  the  Times 
reprinted  and  commented  on  in  Kent's  "Passing  of  the  Manchus," 
pp.  17-22. 

28  As  a  matter  of  form  a  mandate  was  issued  in  the  name  of 
the  Emperor  calling  the  Empress  Dowager  into  consultation  on 
affairs  of  State.    Thus  the  Emperor  was  forced  to  authorize  his 
own  virtual  deposition. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          45 

Japan,  and  from  foreign  shores  entered  upon  a  new  propa- 
ganda of  reform  ideas. 

The  very  nature  of  the  changes  proposed  in  1898  revealed 
a  lack  of  an  appreciation  on  the  part  of  the  reformers  of  the 
fundamental  nature  of  the  weakness  of  the  Chinese  adminis- 
trative system.  The  reforms  inaugurated  would  have  been  of 
undoubted  value,  and  they  marked  an  advance  in  the  breaking 
away  from  the  past.  But  even  if  Kwang  Hsu  had  retained 
the  power  to  put  them  into  effect,  many  of  the  changes  would  j. 
have  remained  only  on  paper.  The  old  theory  that  the  relation 
of  the  Central  Government  to  the  Provinces  was  merely  super- 
visory was  not  disturbed  in  the  least  by  these  decrees.  The 
general  policy  of  reform  along  certain  lines  was  adopted  by 
the  Imperial  Government,  but  it  was  left  to  the  provincial 
authorities  to  put  this  programme  into  execution,  and  it  has 
been  pointed  out  already  that  the  officials  would  act  only  when 
it  was  to  their  interest  to  do  so,  or  when  strong  pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  on  them  forcing  them  to  act  against  their  in-  i 
clinations. 

The  most  essential  step  in  carrying  out  any  reforms  of  per- 
manent value  in  China  is  the  establishment  of  a  direct  rela- 
tionship between  the  Central  Government  and  the  people.  The 
mere  power  of  appointment  and  dismissal,  together  with  a 
general  supervision  and  direction,  is  not  sufficient  to  ensure  a 
uniform  administration.  The  reforms  of  1898  provided  for  ! 
the  introduction  of  new  ideas,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  en- 
larged the  scope  of  parts  of  the  existing  machinery  of  govern- 
ment, such  as  the  right  of  memorializing  the  Throne,  but  did 
not  alter  the  structure  or  the  form  of  the  government.  Neither 
did  the  history  of  the  years  following  1898  show  that  the  re- 
form movement  of  that  year  was  the  result  of  any  "national 
and  intellectual  movement  that  permeated  the  provinces  and 
moved  the  mind  of  the  nation."  It  was  simply  the  work  of 


46          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

a  group  of  thinkers  who  had  come  in  touch,  in  a  limited  way, 
with  the  civilization  of  the  West,  and  who  were  able  to  take 
advantage  of  the  factional  struggles  in  Peking  to  gain  a  hear- 
ing for  themselves  and  their  ideas.  The  movement  failed  be- 
cause the  reforms  attempted  came  into  conflict  with  the  self- 
interest  of  the  ruling  class,  including  those  who  would  have 
been  glad  to  see  China  strengthened  by  changes  that  did  not, 
at  the  same  time,  harm  their  own  interests. 

It  is  true  that  if  the  Emperor  had  been  strong  enough  to 
maintain  himself  as  the  real  ruler  of  the  country  against  the 
opposition  of  the  Empress  Dowager  he  might  have  been  able 
to  play  the  benevolent  despot,  forcing  officialdom  and  the  na- 
tion to  see  with  him,  and  aid  him  to  carry  out  in  good  faith 
the  regeneration  of  the  State.  But  he  seems  to  have  become 
interested  first  in  the  idea  of  change  because  he  perceived  the 
evils  of  the  system  as  shown  in  the  government  of  the 
Empress.  Until  he  was  carried  along  by  the  influence  of 
K'ang  Yu-wei,  his  conviction  of  the  need  for  reform  was 
based  on  the  feeling  that  he  was  being  defrauded  of  the 
power  that  should  have  been  his,  and  his  action  was  dictated 
by  a  desire  to  gain  that  power.  The  "outs"  are  always  bet- 
ter able  to  see  a  weakness  than  those  in  the  supremacy. 
Kwang  Hsu  would  have  been  no  great  exception  probably  if 
he  had  been  the  de  facto  as  well  as  the  de  jure  ruler  of  the 
Empire. 

The  chief  importance  of  this  movement  in  1898  lay  in  the 
fact  that  it  was  the  first  definite  attempt  to  adjust  the  admin- 
istration of  China  to  the  new  conditions  that  had  arisen.  It 
has  been  dealt  with  at  greater  length  than  its  ultimate  impor- 
tance would  warrant  because  from  its  failure  came  a  new  di- 
rection to  the  movement  toward  political  reform.  On  the 
one  hand  this  failure  gave  an  impetus  to  the  work  of  those 
men  who  felt  that  change  could  only  come,  and  progress  be 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          47 

*.  * 

made,  with  the  overthrow  of  the  Manchu  Dynasty.  While 
on  the  other  hand  the  direction  of  the  movement,  together 
with  the  failure  of  the  Boxer  uprising,  aroused  a  feeling 
among  the  Manchus  and  the  high  Chinese  officials  that  only 
by  admitting  the  necessity  of  change  and  assuming  the  con- 
trol and  leadership  of  a  conservative  party  of  reform  could 
they  hope  to  preserve  their  ascendency  in  the  State. 

To  the  failure  of  the  K'ang  Yu-wei  movement  and  the  con- 
sequent domination  of  the  ultra-conservatives  and  reaction- 
aries, both  Manchu  and  Chinese,  can  be  ascribed  the  growth 
of  the  Boxer  movement,  especially  in  its  anti-foreign  phase, 
which  culminated  in  the  uprising  of  1900.  The  failure  of 
that  attempt  to  drive  the  foreigner  and  his  demoralizing  in- 
fluence from  the  "Middle  Kingdom"  opened  the  door  for  the 
more  gradual  progression  toward  reform  which  marked  the 
period  from  1901  to  1910. 


CHAPTER  III 

The  failure  of  the  Boxer  movement  has  a  direct  bearing  on 
the  inauguration  of  reform  by  the  Empress  Dowager  in  1901 
so  that  a  few  words  may  be  advisable  in  explanation  of  that 
strange  and  yet  natural  attempt  to  drive  the  foreigners  from 
the  "Middle  Kingdom."  In  1894,  when  war  broke  out  be- 
tween Japan  and  China,  the  latter,  in  her  great  potential 
strength,  was  feared  by  the  Powers  of  Europe.  They  might 
push  their  demands,  and  force  redress  for  the  injuries  of 
their  citizens,  but  they  took  aggressive  action  always  with 
the  fear  of  going  too  far  and  awakening  the  "Sleeping 
Dragon."  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not  considered 
formidable.  She  shook  off  foreign  interference  more  quickly 
and  easily  than  China  has,  but  she  did  it  by  accepting  the 
West  and  adopting  and  adapting  to  her  own  needs  its  ideas 
and  institutions.  When  war  came  between  the  two  countries 
it  appeared  to  be  a  contest  between  unequals — between  a  giant 
and  a  dwarf.  When,  in  the  struggle,  the  dwarf  was  easily 
victorious,  it  caused  the  Western  governments  to  go  to  the 
other  extreme  in  their  thoughts  of  China.  No  longer  was 
she  feared  as  the  "Dragon"  whom  all  dreaded  to  see  awake! 
The  decay  of  the  Empire  was  seen  in  the  ease  with  which 
Japan  had  imposed  her  will  on  China.  Consequently  the 
Powers  became  more  aggressive  and  imperialistic  in  their 
policy  and  the  "concession  grabbing"  period  in  Chinese  his- 
tory was  inaugurated.  Germany,  Russia,  France  and  England 
all  staked  out  their  spheres  of  interest  and  secured  leased  ter- 
ritorial footholds  in  the  Empire.  The  actual  partition  of  the 
country  was  freely  predicted.  When  the  Powers  stopped  for 

48 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          49 

breath  before  taking  the  final  plunge,  the  Emperor  embarked 
upon  his  ill-fated  reform  adventure  in  an  attempt  to  check  the 
process  of  internal  disintegration.  Had  the  cause  of  reform 
triumphed  the  western  governments  still  had  a  sufficiently 
wholesome  fear  of  China  and  her  recuperative  powers  to 
stand  aside.  When  reform  failed  the  last  hope  of  China 
seemed  gone. 

The  people  of  the  country,  however,  felt  that  China  might 
yet  be  saved.  Their  unrest  and  dissatisfaction,  which  well 
might  have  been  directed  against  the  Manchus  at  that  time, 
because  of  this  foreign  aggression,  was  diverted  from  their 
rulers  and  directed  against  the  foreigners.  Anti-foreign  so- 
cieties known  as  Boxers  (Societies  of  Harmonious  Fists) 
sprang  up  all  over  the  North  and  Central  parts  of  China. 
Their  one  great  aim  was  to  drive  the  foreigner  into  the  sea, 
after  which  China  could  enjoy  again  the  old  peace  and  quiet. 
The  relation  of  the  Government  to  the  movement  in  its  incep- 
tion has  never  been  fully  established.  After  its  growth  Tzu 
Hsi  seems  to  have  thrown  her  weight  definitely  with  the 
Boxers.  The  legations  in  Peking  finally  were  beseiged,  but 
later  were  relieved  by  the  allied  force  of  Europeans,  Ameri- 
cans and  Japanese  thrown  into  the  country.  The  Court,  for 
a  second  time,  fled  from  the  capital  and  negotiated  a  peace  set- 
tlement that  meant  the  end  of  the  anti-foreign  phase  of 
recent  Chinese  history. 

The  Boxer  uprising  and  its  failure  logically  should  have 
hastened  the  movement  toward  the  partition  of  China  among 
the  Powers.  That  it  did  not  is  due  largely  to  the  position 
taken  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  in  1899,  when, 
in  an  attempt  to  protect  potential  American  commercial  in- 
terests in  China,  by  preserving  the  country  from  a  division  as 
colonial  territory  among  the  European  nations,  the  policy  of 
the  "Open  Door"  was  enunciated  by  John  Hay.  This  policy 


50          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

directed  to  the  preservation  of  the  territorial  integrity  of 
China,  and  thus  the  preservation  of  an  equality  of  commer- 
cial opportunity  for  all  nations,  was  reaffirmed  during  the  ne- 
gotiations leading  to  the  protocol  of  1901  reestablishing  peace 
between  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  other  States  of  the 
world.1  The  overthrow  of  Boxerism  marks  the  end  of  the 
period  of  active  hostility  to  change  in  China.  It  was  recog- 
nized that  either  progress  along  modern  lines  would  have  to  be 
made  or  China  would  lose  her  place  as  an  independent  mem- 
ber of  the  family  of  nations. 

After  the  failure  of  the  Boxer  movement  the  Empress  Do- 
wager herself  recognized  the  inevitability  of  some  sort  of  re- 
form in  the  Chinese  Empire.  \  *There  were  three  ways  in  which 
changes  might  be  made :  an  honest  reform  of  the  government 
by  the  Manchu  Dynasty  itself,  thereby  strengthening  its  hold 
on  the  Empire,  and  enabling  it  to  regain  the  position  which  had 
been  lost  during  the  nineteenth  century  by  inefficient  and  cor- 
rupt administration;  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  Manchus  persis- 
tently refused  to  set  the  house  in  order,  the  ever-increasing  anti- 
Manchu  agitation  in  the  South  and  overseas  would  attain  its 
object  of  a  reform  which  would  eliminate  the  Ta  Ts'ing  Dyn- 
asty altogether.  The  third  alternative,  feared  by  Manchu  and 
Chinese  alike,  was  a  forcible  reform  through  foreign  domina- 
tion of  China. 

1  The  Russian  activity  in  Manchuria  was  primarily  responsi- 
ble for  the  United  States  asking  the  Powers  a  second  time  to  put 
themselves  on  record  as  favoring  the  maintenance  of  China  in 
her  territorial  completeness,  in  spite  of  her  attempt  to  maintain 
herself  entirely  apart  from  contact  with  the  world.  England 
and  Japan,  because  of  their  peculiar  interest  in  the  developments 
in  the  Far  East,  threw  their  weight  behind  the  proposals  of  the 
American  government,  thus  forcing  the  other  Powers,  including 
Russia,  to  give  a  reluctant  reaffirmation  of  their  adherence  to 
the  general  principle  of  the  "Open  Door"  for  commerce  in  China. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          51 

Tzu  Hsi  accepted  the  situation  and,  even  before  the  return 
of  the  Court  to  Peking,  had  announced  her  decision.  The 
decree  in  which,  in  the  name  of  the  Emperor,  she  proclaimed 
the  need  of  reform,  is  a  remarkable  document.  The  Empress 
Dowager  was  under  the  necessity  of  "saving  her  face"  by 
making  it  clear  that,  carried  out  under  her  direction,  the  re- 
form ideas  were  something  radically  different  from  and  su- 
perior to  those  which  she  had  opposed  in  1898.  It  was  also 
essential  that  the  opponents  of  the  early  reform  movement 
should  be  reassured,  and  at  the  same  time  she  must  convince 
the  reformers  themselves  of  her  sincerity.  This  first  reform 
edict  of  the  Empress  Dowager  was  issued  from  Hsianfu  on 
January  28,  1901. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  reproduce  the  entire  edict,  but  certain 
portions  bearing  directly  on  government  change  are  well- 
worth  quotation.  The  text  runs: 

"Throughout  the  entire  universe  there  exist  certain  fixed  prin- 
ciples which  govern  the  conduct  of  men,  but  nowhere  do  we  find 
any  finally  fixed  form  of  government.  It  is  written  in  the  Book 
of  Changes  that  when  any  given  condition  of  affairs  has  run  its 
natural  course,  and  has  been  succeeded  by  another  there  is  no 
saying  how  long  this  new  State  may  last;  also  in  the  Dialogues 
of  Confucius  it  is  written  that  there  is  no  difficulty  in  tracing  the 
changes  and  reforms  which  each  Dynasty  has  made  in  regard  to 
the  methods  of  its  predecessors.  .  .  .  Looking  at  the  matter 
broadly,  we  may  observe  that  any  system  which  has  lasted  too 
long  is  in  danger  of  becoming  stereotyped,  and  things  which 
are  obsolete  should  be  modified.  The  essential  need  which  con- 
fronts us  is  at  all  costs  to  strengthen  Our  Empire,  and  to  im- 
prove the  condition  of  Our  subjects.  ...  At  this  moment  when 
peace  negotiations2  are  proceeding,  it  is  a  matter  of  urgent  neces- 
sity that  steps  be  taken  to  reorganize  our  system  of  government 
so  that  hereafter  Our  Celestial  Empire  may  recover  its  ancient 
place  of  wealth  and  power.  The  Empress  Dowager  has  now  de- 
cided that  we  should  correct  our  shortcomings  by  adopting  the 

2  With  the  Powers  after  the  Boxer  uprising. 


52          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

best  methods  and  systems  which  obtain  in  foreign  countries, 
basing  our  future  conduct  on  a  wise  recognition  of  past  errors.3 
.  .  .  The  chief  defect  in  our  system  of  administration  is  un- 
doubtedly too  close  an  adherence  to  obsolete  methods,  a  too 
slavish  devotion  to  the  written  word;  the  result  is  a  surfeit  of 
commonplace  and  inefficient  officials,  and  a  deplorable  lack  of 
men  of  real  talent.  The  average  commonplace  man  makes  a  god 
of  the  written  word,  whilst  every  bureaucrat  in  the  land  regards 
it  as  a  talisman  wherewith  to  fill  his  purse  so  that  we  have  huge 
mountains  of  correspondence  eternally  growing  up  between  one 
government  office  and  another,  the  value  of  which  is  absolutely 
nil  so  far  as  any  good  to  the  country  is  concerned.  On  the  other 
hand  men  of  real  ability  lose  heart  and  give  up  the  public  service 
in  disgust,  prevented  from  coming  to  the  front  by  the  mass  of 
inefficiency  that  blocks  the  way.  Our  whole  system  of  govern- 
ment has  come  to  grief  through  corruption,  and  the  first  steps  of 
progress  in  our  Empire  are  clogged  by  the  fatal  word  'precedent.' 

"Up  to  the  present  the  study  of  European  methods  has  gone 
no  further  than  a  superficial  knowledge  of  the  languages,  liter- 
ature and  mechanical  arts  of  the  West,  but  it  must  be  evident 
that  these  things  are  not  the  essentials  upon  which  European 
civilization  has  been  founded.  The  essential  spirit  of  that  civi- 
lization is  to  be  looked  for  in  the  fact  that  real  sympathy  and 
understanding  exists  between  rulers  and  people,  that  officials  are 
•equired  to  be  truthful  in  word  and  courageous  in  action.  The 
teachings  handed  down  to  us  by  our  sacred  Ancestors  are  really 
the  same  as  those  upon  which  the  wealth  and  power  of  European 
countries  have  been  based,  but  China  has  hitherto  failed  to  real- 
ize this,  and  has  been  content  to  acquire  the  rudiments  of  Euro- 
pean languages  or  technicalities  while  changing  nothing  of  her 
ancient  habits  of  inefficiency  and  deep-rooted  corruption.  Ig- 
noring our  real  needs  we  have  so  far  taken  from  Europe  nothing 
but  externals;  how  can  we  possibly  hope  to  advance  on  such 
lines?  Any  reforms  to  be  effective  and  permanent  must  be  made 
with  a  real  desire  for  efficiency  and  honesty. 

"We  therefore  hereby  decree  and  command  that  the  officials 

3  Here  follows  a  paragraph  repudiating  connection  with  the 
K'ang  Yu-wei  reforms,  stating  that  they  were  dangerous  and 
treasonable.  "Their  main  object  is  not  reform  but  a  revolution 
against  the  Manchu  Dynasty." 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          53 

concerned  shall  now  make  close  inquiry  and  comparison  as  to  the 
various  systems  of  government  in  force  in  European  countries 
with  special  reference  to  those  which  obtain  in  China  today,  not 
only  as  regards  the  constitution  of  the  Court  and  Central  Gov- 
ernment, but  also  concerning  those  things  which  make  for  the 
prosperity  of  our  subjects,  such  as  the  system  of  examination  and 
education,  the  administration  of  the  army  and  the  regulation  of 
finance.  They  will  be  required  to  report  as  to  what  changes  are 
advisable  and  what  institutions  should  be  abolished;  what  meth- 
ods we  should  adopt  from  abroad  and  what  existing  Chinese  in- 
stitutions should  be  retained.  The  things  we  chiefly  need  are  a 
constant  supply  of  men  of  talent,  a  sound  basis  of  national 
finance,  and  an  efficient  army.  Reports  on  these  matters  must 
be  forwarded  within  two  months,  and  upon  them  we  shall  humbly 
address  Her  Majesty,4  and  ask  for  Her  decision  before  we  take 
any  definite  action."5 

While  foreigners  looked  skeptically  on,  the  work  of  the 
Dowager  Empress  was  begun.  That  the  reactionary,  auto- 
cratic "Old  Buddha,"  who  had  brought  to  naught  the  previous 
movement  partially  to  modernize  the  Empire,  and  who  had 
connived  at  the  abortive  attempt  in  1900  to  drive  all  foreign- 
ers into  the  sea,  should  seriously  intend  to  lead  in  the  intro- 
duction of  Western  institutions  into  China  seemed  incredible. 
And,  granting  her  sincerity,  could  even  the  dominating  and 
masterful  Tzu  Hsi  overcome  the  passive  resistance  of  her 
Court  and  the  official  class? 

The  years  from  1901  to  1905  witnessed  the  acceptance  by 
the  country  of  many  of  the  changes  advocated  by  the  reform- 
ers in  1898.  The  old  examination  system  was  abolished;  the 
educational  system  was  brought  into  harmony  with  Western 
ideas,  largely  under  the  guidance  of  two  men,  Yuan  Shih-k'ai 
md  the  well-known  Viceroy  Chang  Chih-tung;6  and  steps 

*  This  edict  purported  to  be  from  the  hand  of  the  Emperor, 
ilthough  written  by  the  Empress  herself. 

'  "China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,"  j}p.  419-424. 

6  Author  of  the  widely  read  book,  "China's  Only  Hope." 


54          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

were  taken  looking  toward  the  consolidation  of  governmental 
posts,  with  the  practical  effect  of  doing  away  with  a  good 
many  sinecures. 

In  1905  a  Special  Commission  was  sent  abroad  to  study  for- 
eign constitutional  systems.  From  the  return  of  this  Commis- 
sion  in  1906  dates  the  beginning  of  the  period  of  constitutional 
reform  under  the  Manchus,  as  distinguished  from  the  reform 
movements  of  previous  years.  The  feeling  had  gradually  been 
growing  that  there  must  be  some  germ  of  strength  in  Occi- 
dental governments  that  was  unknown  to  the  Chinese.  To 
locate  and  introduce  that  source,  it  was  thought,  was  all  that 
was  needed  to  enable  China  to  regain  her  position  of  superior- 
ity in  the  world.  The  ten  years  from  1895  to  1905  had  pre- 
pared the  people  of  the  Empire  to  accept  conservatively  radi- 
cal innovations  in  their  government.  The  foreign  impact  had 
served  in  the  place  of  what  Mill  lays  down  as  one  of  the  es- 
sential functions  of  a  good  government — educating  the  people 
**  for  a  better  form  of  government.  In  China  this  meant,  first 
of  all,  breaking  down  the  conservatism  of  the  official  class 
and  extending  the  view  of  the  class  known  as  the  literati. 
This  had  been  brought  about  to  a  limited  extent  by  a  combina- 
tion of  several  factors. 

One  of  the  most  promising  fields  for  the  investment  of 
-  foreign  capital  in  China  was  early  seen  to  be  in  the  develop- 
ment of  railways  and  allied  means  of  communication.  It  took 
a  long  time  to  overcome  the  prejudices  of  the  Chinese  against 
such  an  innovation  as  the  steam  engine.  After  the  war  with 
Japan,  however,  the  government  felt  itself  unable  to  resist 
the  demands  that  were  being  pressed  continually  for  conces- 
sions to  build  railways,  develop  mines,  etc.  Consequently  the 
period  from  1895  to  1905  saw  projects  under  way  which  bade 
fair  to  connect  up  the  whole  country  in  a  system  of  railways. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          55 

The  Chinese  attitude  gradually  changed  from  that  of  hostility7 
to  the  building  of  railways  to  a  recognition  of  the  dangers 
involved  in  the  political  influences  which,  through  such  con- 
cessions, were  gradually  marking  off  China  into  spheres  of  in- 
terest. This  change  of  attitude  did  not  check  development 
but  rather  tended  to  promote  it  by  causing  the  Chinese  them- 
selves to  go  into  the  work.  Lf^ 

These  railways,  together  with  the  postal  and  telegraph  sys-  ' 
terns  that  had  been  developed  under  foreign  supervision,  \  I  / 
brought  Peking  into  direct  and  immediate  touch  with  the  \J 
provincial  governments,  and  made  it  possible  for  the  central 
government  to  exercise  a  greater  degree  of  control  over  its  ' 
agents  in  the  provinces.  The  very  fact  that  the  initiative  had 
been  taken  by  the  Imperial  authority  instead  of  coming  from 
the  provinces  individually  and  that  the  work  was  thus  under 
its  immediate  control  gave  a  direct  impetus  to  the  movement 
toward  centralization  of  the  government.  With  easy  and 
rapid  communication,  problems  arising  in  the  provinces  came 
to  be  referred  to  Peking  for  settlement  to  a  much  greater  ex- 
tent than  had  been  possible  in  the  past,  so  that  not  so  great  a 
necessity  remained  for  the  former  practical  autonomy  of  the 
provinces.  Naturally  the  gentry__ia  the  provinces  fought 
against  being  brought  under  the  control  of  what  was  to  them 
almost  a  foreign  authority,  and  their  opposition  was  far  from 
negligible.  But  certainly,  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  attempt 
at  constitutional  reform  in  1905,  the  growth  of  the  new  systems 
of  communication  had  made  practical  the  endeavor  of  the  Im- 
perial Government  to  centralize  the  administration  at  Peking. 

Perhaps  the  greatest  incentive  to  constitutional  change  inl 
China  came  from  Japan.    That  country  owed  all  of  her  earlyl 

7  The    Woosung   Railway,    opened   June    30,    1876,    was    're-  ' 
deemed^  by  the  Chinese,  and  in  1877  the  rails  were  torn  up  and 
shipped  to  Formosa. 


56          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

civilization  to  China.  Confucianism  had  as  much  weight  in 
Japan  as  in  China.  Buddhism  had  come  to  the  Islands  by 
way  of  China.  The  Japanese  literature  was  Chinese  in  origin 
as  was  their  written  language.  Their  art  was  developed  under 
Chinese  tutelage.  The  Chinese  people  in  thought  and  feeling, 
consequently,  refused  to  admit  their  neighbors  to  a  position 
of  equality.  But  of  recent  years  a  change  had  come  in  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries.  Japan  was  getting  her 
inspiration  from  foreign  sources,  and  under  this  inspiration 
was  continually  growing  stronger  while  China  had  become 
the  prey  of  foreign  nations.  The  Japanese  had  grown  so 
strong  that  they  had  been  able  to  secure  release  from  the  hu- 
miliating system  of  exterritoriality,  at  the  same  time  gaining 
control  of  their  customs  service.  China  herself  had  felt  the 
humiliation  of  defeat  by  Japan,  who  had  then  asserted  her 
right  to  a  voice  in  Chinese  affairs  and  had  ranged  herself  with 
the  despoilers  of  the  "Middle  Kingdom."  The  great  and 
powerful  England  had  come  to  Japan  to  ask  her  friendship 
and  alliance.8  And,  finally,  Japan  had  become  strong  enough 
to  wage  a  successful  war  against  the  colossus  of  the  East, 
Russia.  When  the  Chinese  asked  himself  what  the  reason  for 
this  change  in  the  respective  positions  of  Japan  and  China 
could  be,  he  found  the  answer  ready-made, — Constitutional 
Government.  Japan's  growth  in  strength  and  power  dated 
from  1867  when  she  had  accepted  the  inevitable  and  begun 
to  study  and  adopt  Western  institutions.  This  study  had  re- 
sulted in  the  promulgation  of  a  constitution.  In  that  consti- 
tution was  to  be  found  the  source  of  power.  Had  not  all 
the  Powers  of  the  West,  with  the  exception  of  Russia,  con- 

8  While  England  did  not  take  the  initiative  in  opening  nego- 
tiations for  an  understanding  with  Japan,  the  Chinese  justifiably 
felt  that  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  agreement  of  1902, 
and  alliance  of  1905  were  visible  signs  that  Japan  had  been  raised 
to  an  equality  with  the  Powers  of  the  West. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          57 

stitutions?  This  sort  of  reasoning  led  to  the  conclusion  that  if 
only  China  was  governed  under  a  constitution  she  too  might 
be  able  to  grow  strong  and  regain  her  ancient  position  as  dic- 
tator of  the  terms  of  intercourse  with  the  "outer  barbarians." 

The  nature  of  constitutional  development  under  the  Man- 
chu  Dynasty  shows  clearly  the  influence  of  the  study  the  Com- 
mission made  of  the  Constitution  of  Japan.  In  that  country  it  /* 
was  found  that  constitutionalism  and  Imperial  authority  were 
far  from  antagonistic.  Fundamentally  the  power  of  the  Em- 
peror and  of  the  great  Lords  had  not  been  weakened.  A  study 
of  the  political  institutions  of  Japan  might  well  have  convinced 
the  Empress  Dowager  of  the  innocuous  nature  of  foreign  in- 
novations in  the  government  of  that  country.  And  the  ad- 
vantages were  readily  apparent  that  would  accrue  to  her  and 
to  the  Dynasty  through  a  reform  which  would  show  the  people 
that  she  had  their  welfare  at  heart,  and  at  the  same  time  would 
not  limit  her  own  power.  So  it  was  not  long  after  the  return 
of  the  Special  Commission  until  the  Manchu  Dynasty  had  defi- 
nitely committed  itself  to  a  programme  of  constitutional  *~ 
change. 

The  members  of  the  Special  Commission  sent  abroad  to 
study  governmental  systems  submitted  their  reportsjnjt^od 
An  Imperial  edict  ordered  that  these  reports  should  be  con- 
sidered by  Tsai  Feng,  the  Prince  of  Ch'un,  with  the  Ministers 
of  the  Grand  Council,  the  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  State, 
the  Grand  Secretaries,  and  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Trade  for  the  North ;  and  that  after  such  joint  consider- 
ation they  should  "request  an  Imperial  decree  authorizing  the 
proper  form  of  procedure."  The  programme  of  reforms  laid 
down  in  the  decree  issued9  as  a  result  of  the  joint  memorial 
was  very  far  reaching  in  its  provisions,  and  laid  an  enormous 
task  on  the  government  if  honestly  carried  into  effect.  The 

9  September  i,  1906. 


58          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

weakness  of  China  was  stated  to  be  due  to  the  lack  of  confi- 
dence between  the  highest  and  the  lowest — "between  the 
Throne  and  the  Ministers  and  the  Masses."  The  strength  of 
foreign  nations  was  found  to  be  in  the  constitutions  granted 
to  the  masses,  and  in  universal  suffrage.  Applying  this  prin- 
ciple, the  Empress  laid  down  the  fundamentals  which  must 
guide  the  Throne  in  introducing  this  universal  panacea  into 
China. 

"As  for  ourselves,  it  is  necessary  at  present  to  make  a  care- 
ful investigation  into  the  matter,  and  prepare  ourselves  to 
imitate  this  government  by  constitution,  in  which  the  supreme 
control  must  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Throne,  while  the  interests 
of  the  masses  shall  be  given  to  the  elect,  advanced  to  such  po- 
sition by  the  suffrage  of  the  masses"10 

The  Empress  Dowager  knew  instinctively  where  the  differ- 
ence lay  between  representative  government  and  constitutional 
autocracy.  As  Mill  so  well  says :  "the  meaning  of  representa- 
tive government  is,  that  the  whole  people,  or  some  portion  of 
them,  exercise  through  deputies  periodically  elected  by  them- 
selves the  ultimate  controlling  power,  which,  in  every  consti- 
tution, must  reside  somewhere.  This  ultimate  power  they 
must  possess  in  all  its  completeness.  They  must  be  masters,, 
whenever  they  please,  of  all  of  the  operations  of  govern- 
ment."11 

It  was  no  part  of  Tzu  Hsi's  programme  of  constitutional  re- 
form that  the  ultimate  power  should  pass  from  the  Throne  to 
the  people.  So  she  stated  as  the  first  principle  of  China's  con- 
stutionalism  that  the  supreme  control  lay  in  the  hands  of  the 
ruler.  From  this  it  followed  that  the  representatives  of  the 

10  China  Year  Book,  1912,  p.  353.    The  italics  are  the  author's. 
See  also  Am.  For.  Relations,  1906,  p.  349-50.    Inclosure  i  in  No. 
386,  for  a  similar  translation. 

11  "Representative  Government,"  Ch.  V.    Everyman  Ed.,  p.  228. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          59 

"masses"  were_  merely  to  be  periodically  called  into  consulta- 
tion, theiit  adyiee  being  accepted  or  rejected  at  the  will  of  the 
Throne.  In  their  attempt  to  introduce  constitutional  forms 
and  at  the  same  time  preserve  autocratic  power  the  rulers  of 
the  Empire  had  a  guide  close  at  hand,  as  has  already  been 
pointed  out.  The  Japanese  constitution  reserves  the  ultimate 
control  to  the  Emperor  and  his  advisers,  leaving  only  the  right 
of  criticism  and  of  petition  to  the  Assembly  or  Diet.  The  ten- 
dency, of  course,  has  been  for  the  Diet  gradually  to  extend  its 
sphere  of  action,  and  one  of  the  interesting  features  of  Japa- 
nese political  development  has  been  the  struggle  to  bring  the 
Ministers  of  the  Crown  under  the  control  of  the  Assembly. 
But  the  fact  still  remains  that  the  final  control  lies  with  the 
Crown.  The  essence  of  Japanese  constitutional  government  *' 
is  autocracy,  and  it  was  that  principle  which  Tzu  Hsi  tried  to 
transplant  to  China  in  her  endeavor  to  strengthen  the  hold  of 
the  Manchu  Dynasty  on  the  Empire.  To  anyone  familiar 
with  the  history  of  constitutional  development  in  Japan,  the 
similarity  of  the  Manchu  movement  in  China  will  be  increas- 
ingly apparent  as  the  different  steps  leading  up  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  Constitution  and  the  summoning  of  the  first 
Parliament  are  considered. 

In  a  constitution,  then,  the  Empress  Dowager  expected  to 
find  the  means  of  strengthening  the  Empire,  and  at  the  same  ** 
time  of  preserving  the  supremacy  of  the  Manchu.  She  was 
wise  enough  to  perceive,  however,  that  the  transition  from 
the  old  form  to  the  new  could  not  be  made  in  a  day ;  that  be- 
fore the  Chinese  could  hope  to  derive  any  benefit  from  the 
introduction  of  constitutional  government  they  must  be  edu- 
cated and  prepared  for  it.  There  was  the  further  necessity 
for  her  to  let  it  be  definitely  understood  that  her  programme 
involved  gradual  rather  than  precipitate  reform  in  order  to 
conciliate  the  conservatives  and  secure  their  support. 


60          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

"Any  impetuosity  shown  in  introducing  these  reforms," 
said  Her  Majesty,12  "will  at  the  end  be  so  much  labor  lost. 
How  can  we  then  face  our  subjects  in  such  circumstances,  and 
how  regain  their  confidence  and  faith  in  us?  It  is  incumbent 
upon  us  as  a  beginning,  therefore,  to  reform  the  official  sys- 
tem; next  to  revise  carefully  the  laws  in  their  most  minute  de- 
tails ;  promote  and  encourage  universal  education ;  regulate  the 
finances  and  sources  of  revenue  of  the  Empire;  reorganize 
the  army;  and  establish  a  strong  gendarmerie  throughout  the 
Empire.  The  gentry  and  people  will  then  understand  the  kind 
of  government  needed  for  the  country,  and  be  prepared  to 
start  the  foundations  of  a  Constitutional  Government,  whilst 
the  officials,  high  and  low,  in  Peking  and  elsewhere,  will  use 
their  best  endeavors  to  bring  our  desires  to  a  triumphant  com- 
pletion. In  a  few  years  time,  when  it  is  found  that  there  is 
a  rough  outline  of  what  is  needed,  the  time  will  come  for  ap- 
pointing a  day  for  the  inauguration  de  facto  of  a  Constitu- 
tional Government."  The  Edict  concludes  with  the  usual  ex- 
hortation to  high  officials  "to  issue  proclamations  to  their  peo- 
ple, to  show  an  enthusiastic  desire  for  education,  to  be  loyal 
and  patriotic,  to  sacrifice  for  the  good  of  all,  and  to  refrain 
from  destroying  a  grand  structure  through  petty  strife  and 
private  quarrels.  Let  all  observe  law  and  order,  and  prepare 
themselves  to  enjoy  the  solid  advantages  of  a  Constitutional 
Government."13 

The  first  of  the  reforms  preparatory  to  the  establishment 
of  a  constitution  was  the  reorganization  of  the  administrative 
system.  An  Imperial  edict  issued  on  November  6,  I9O61*  set 
forth  the  changes  that  were  to  be  made,  following  the  sugges- 
tions of  the  Royal  Commission  that  had  been  appointed  to 

12  Edict  of  Sept.  i,  1906. 

13  China  Year  Book,  1912,  p.  353.    Ch.  XXI. 
"Ibid.,  p.  354- 


Modern  Consttittional  Development  in  China          61 

consider  administrative  reform.  In  effect  the  changes  made 
amounted  either  to  a  mere  alteration  in  the  name  of  a  depart- 
ment or  Board,  or  to  the  consolidation  of  Boards  under  the\ 
old  or  a  new  name.  Thus  "the  Hsunchingpu  (Board  of  Public 
Safety)  is  changed  to  the  Minchengpu  (Board  of  the  In- 
terior)"; and  "the  Board  of  War  (Pingpu)  is  to  be  changed 
to  the  Army  Board  (Luchunpu),  and  the  Council  of  Army 
Reorganization  and  the  Court  of  the  Imperial  Stud  are  to  be 
amalgamated  with  it."15 

Before  this  time  each  Board  had  two  Presidents  and  four 
Vice-Presidents,  divided  equally,  in  theory,  between  Manchu 
and  Chinese.  This  edict  provided,  however,  that  no  distinc- 
tion should  be  made  in  the  future  between  the  two  peoples,16 
and  that  each  Board,  with  the  exception  of  the  Waiwupu,17 
should  have  only  one  President  and  two  Vice-Presidents. 
Ostensibly  aimed  at  promoting  a  closer  feeling  of  union  be- 
tween the  two  races  by  removing  the  distinctions  between 
them,  this  provision  had  the  opposite  effect,  for  it  resulted  in 
the  appointment  of  Manchus  to  the  greater  number  of  im- 
portant offices,18  where  formerly  the  Court  had  been  under 
the  necessity  of  balancing  a  Manchu  appointment  with  a 
Chinese.  The  first  direct  reference  to  a  National  Assembly 
(Tzechengyuan)  was  also  made,  this  edict  stating  that  it  was 
to  be  created  as  an  additional  department. 

The  zeal  for  constitutional  reform,  or  the  introduction  of 
representative  government,  did  not  abate  during  1907.  But 
in  spite  of  all  the  exhortations  of  the  Throne  to  the  officials 

15  For  a  description  of  the  reorganized  Boards  of  Ministries 
see  China  Year  Book,  1912,  Ch.  XIV.    The  Government. 

16  See  also  edict  August  10,  1907  and  Sept.  27,  1907,  giving  in- 
structions for  abolition  of  privileges  of  Manchu  Bannermen. 

17  Board  of  Foreign  Affairs,  known  before  1900  as  the  Tsungli 
Yamen. 

18  China  Mission  Year  Book,  1910,  Ch.  Reforms  and  Changes. 


62          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

urging  the  education  of  the  people  and  the  introduction  of 
local  self-government,  there  was  little  real  progress.  It  is  true 
that  the  ''Office  for  the  Investigation  of  Administrative  Meth- 
ods" which  had  been  established  with  Prince  Ch'ing  at  its 
head,  was  specialized  and  made  an  "Office  to  arrange  for  Con- 
stitutional Government."  Furthermore,  in  response  to  a  me- 
morial from  Prince  Ch'ing  and  H.  E.  Sun  Chia-Nai,  regula- 
tions for  the  reorganization  of  the  Provincial  Governments 
and  of  the  Manchurian  Administration  were  drawn  up  and 
promulgated,  but  these  naturally  had  very  little  immediate 
effect.  It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  at  any  great  length  on 
many  of  these  memorials  and  edicts. 

Nevertheless  a  few  steps  in  advance  were  taken  and  must  be 
noted.  Hitherto  while  there  had  been  recognition  of  the  need 
for  a  National  Council  or  Assembly  no  move  had  been  made 
to  establish  such  a  body.  By  an  Imperial  decree  of  September 
20,  1907,  the  declaration  was  made  that  "as  the  principle  of 
constitutional  government  requires  that  political  questions  be 
decided  by  public  opinion,  and  as  the  Upper  and  Lower 
Houses  of  a  Parliament  are  the  source  of  political  acts,  it  is 
extremely  urgent  that  a  National  Assembly  (Tzechengyuan) 
be  created  to  serve  as  the  foundation  of  a  Parliament,  inas- 
much as  the  latter  cannot  be  established  at  present.  Accord- 
ingly We  hereby  appoint  Pu  Lun  and  Sun  Chia-nai  to  be 
Presidents  of  the  said  Council,  who,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Grand  Council,  shall  carefully  draw  up  detailed  regulations 
therefore  for  promulgation." 

The  making  of  regulations  is  both  a  pastime  and  a  profes- 
sion of  the  Chinese  official  class,  so  that  very  often  drawing 
them  up  becomes  an  end  in  itself,  instead  of  merely  the  means 
to  an  end.  Frequently,  with  the  promulgation  of  regulations 
the  reform  is  considered  to  be  accomplished.  Thus  a  month 
after  the  above  provision  was  made  for  establishing  the  As- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          63 

sembly  it  was  considered  to  have  been  duly  instituted.19  The 
National  Assembly  having  been  provided  for,  the  Empress 
next  proceeded  to  outline  another  step  in  her  constitutional 
programme. 

One  of  the  great  benefits  that  foreign  countries  were  sup- 
posed to  derive  from  their  constitutional  governments  was  a 
closer  sympathy  between  the  governed  and  their  rulers.  In 
order  to  realize  this  advantage  there  must  be  some  way  for  the 
Central  Government  to  ascertain  and  direct  public  opinion.  <c<^. 
The  administrative  officers  could  not  be  expected  to  point  out 
the  evils  in  their  own  administration  of  the  laws,  or  to  suggest 
changes  by  which  their  authority  might  be  limited.  There 
were,  it  is  true,  the  censors,  of  whom  mention  has  been  made,  ^^o 
The  Censorate  consisted  of  about  fifty-six  men,20  but  they 
were  scattered  throughout  the  Empire,  usually  two  to  a  prov- 
ince, and  they  lacked  the  intimate  touch  with  local  conditions 
and  needs  necessary  to  make  them  effective  spokesmen  for 
the  people  of  China.  Furthermore,  their  representative  ca- 
pacity was  limited  by  the  method  of  their  appointment  and  by 
the  nature  of  the  duties  laid  upon  them.  They  were  not  ex- 
pected to  represent  the  people,  but  were  rather  agents  of  the 
Imperial  Government  sent  out  to  report,  not  on  the  needs  of 
the  people,  but  on  the  acts  of  the  various  officials :  whether 
they  were  faithful  to  the  Dynasty,  and  how  well  they  were 
carrying  out  the  wishes  of  the  Emperor.  Sometimes  their 
criticisms  were  expressions  of  public  opinion,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  memorials  sent  in  urging  the  necessity  of  providing  an 
heir  for  the  Emperor  T'ung  Chih,  to  carry  on  the  worship  at 

19  "We  some  time  ago  issued  an  edict  establishing  a  National 
Assembly  in  the  Capital  to  serve  as  the  foundation  of  the  future 
Parliament"  states  a  decree  issued  a  month  after  the  one  quoted 
above. 

20  "China  in  Law  and  Commerce,"  p.  156. 


64          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

his  tomb.  But  as  a  rule  they  gave  voice  to  the  views  of  the 
literati  and  the  official  class  rather  than  the  sentiment  of  the 
masses. 

While  the  National  Assembly  was  intended  to  advise  the 
central  government  concerning  the  needs  and  desires  of  the 
people,  the  freedom  of  action  left  to  the  governors  of  the 
provinces  made  it  advisable  to  establish  similar  informative 
Councils  at  the  seats  of  provincial  government.  These  pro- 
vincial assemblies  were  in  the  nature  of  training  schools  for 
service  in  the  National  Assembly. 

Although  the  elective  principle  was  introduced,  membership 
in  the  assemblies  was  in  fact  by  appointment.  The  Gover- 
nors and  Viceroys  were  "carefully  to  select  upright  and  ex- 
perienced officials  and  gentry  to  begin  the  work,  and  to  order 
qualified  people  to  elect  worthy  and  able  men  to  be  the  mem- 
bers of  the  said  assemblies,  and  vigilantly  to  guard  against  the 
entrance  of  persons  of  an  insubordinate  disposition  or  of  dis- 
orderly conduct,  of  selfish  pursuit,  or  of  wil fulness."21 

The  function  of  the  assembly  was  purely  advisory.  The 
members  were  authorized  to  discuss  local  affairs  and  make 
recommendations  to  the  Viceroy  or  Governor,  but  they  could 
not  enforce  their  will  in  opposition  to  that  of  the  administra- 
tion. The  Throne  reserved  to  itself  the  right  of  final  decision 
on  all  matters  of  importance.  Provision  for  a  degree  of  co- 
operation between  Peking  and  the  Provinces  was  made  through 
the  National  Assembly  being  empowered  to  communicate  di- 
rectly with  the  provincial  assemblies  and  vice  versa,  in  addition 
to  the  right  of  address  through  official  channels. 

This  edict  was  followed  by  one  issued  just  before  the  close 
of  the  year22  reiterating  the  need  of  constant  preparation  be- 

21  Edict  of  Oct.  19,  1907,  China  Year  Book,  1912,  pp.  355-56. 

22  December  25,  1907,  China  Year  Book,  1912;  December  24, 
1907,  American  Foreign  Relations,  .1908. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          65 

fore  the  Constitution  could  be  promulgated.  The  need  for 
orderly  progression  was  emphasized  and  the  people  were  urged 
to  leave  the  decision  of  public  matters  to  the  duly  constituted 
assemblies,  which  would  discuss  all  popular  grievances.  When 
the  provincial  assembly  reached  an  important  conclusion  its 
decision  was  to  be  forwarded  to  the  National  Assembly  for 
further  consideration.  The  communication  was  to  be  made 
through  the  highest  provincial  officer.  The  edict  announced 
that  regulations  governing  the  press  and  public  meetings  were 
being  drawn  up  in  order  to  check  the  tendency  manifested  to- 
ward unlicensed  and  revolutionary  criticism  of  the  govern- 
ment and  the  Dynasty.23 

It  can  of  course  be  seen,  from  the  nature  of  these  later 
proposals  and  changes,  that  the  Empress  was  facing  a  grow- 
ing feeling  of  unrest  in  the  provinces.  Hard  times  resulting 
from  poor  harvests  brought  forth  the  usual  results, — brigand- 
age and  an  outspoken  criticism  of  a  government  which  could 
not  bring  peace  and  plenty  to  the  people.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  Emperor  and  his  people  stood  in  the  relationship 
of  a  father  to  his  children.  So  long  as  there  was  food  in  the  .^A< 
larder  and  clothes  on  the  backs,  the  people  would  find  little 
reason  for  censuring  the  government.  But  during  these  years 
conditions  were  changing  from  bad  to  worse  and  immediately 
the  Manchus  were  blamed.  General  criticism  might  easily  be- 
come so  widespread  as  to  lead  to  revolution.  For  this  reason 
Tzu  Hsi  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  steps  were  being 
taken  to  relieve  the  condition  of  the  people  by  giving  them  a 
constitutional  government;  that  agencies  had  been  created 

23  This  edict  was  generally  considered  to  have  been  called 
forth  by  the  popular  meetings  which  had  been  held  in  the  prov- 
inces protesting  against  certain  policies  of  the  Imperial  govern- 
ment in  connection  with  railway  loans,  policing  of  the  West 
River,  etc.  See  Am.  For.  Rel.,  1908,  p.  176-7.  Inc.  in  No.  804 
and  No.  804. 


66          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

through  which  abuses  could  be  pointed  out  and  criticisms 
made;  and  finally  that  it  was  essential  to  the  maintenance  of 
peace  and  order  that  the  people  should  not  harass  the  officials 
but  should  make  known  their  wants  through  the  agencies  pro- 
vided and  wait  patiently  for  a  change  for  the  better. 

The  steps  taken  by  the  beginning  of  1908  may  be  summar- 
ized as:  (i)  the  acceptance  in  principle  of  the  idea  of  Con- 
stitutional Government;  (2)  the  establishment  of  a  commis- 
sion to  investigate  procedure;  and  (3)  the  issuance  of  instruc- 
tions for  the  institution  of  a  National  and  of  provincial  As- 
semblies. It  should  be  noted  however  that  these  instructions 
were  vague  in  nature  and  were  so  enacted  as  to  free  the  Throne 
of  responsibility  for  their  observance.  No  time  was  set  within 
which  the  assemblies  were  to  be  constituted,  and  there  was 
danger  that  they  would  exist  only  on  paper. 


CHAPTER  IV 

In  China  more  than  in  most  other  countries  internal  prog- 
ress has  been  both  hastened  and  retarded  by  forces  apparently 
unconnected  with  those  definitely  at  work  to  bring  about  in- 
stitutional changes.  From  the  standpoint  of  international  af- 
fairs, even  after  the  second  enunciation  of  the  policy  of  the 
"open  door"  in  1901,  Chinese  integrity  was  menaced  by  the 
maintenance  of  Russian  power  in  the  North  which  might  at 
any  favorable  moment  be  directed  against  the  Empire.  The 
Russian  menace  was  removed  by  the  success  of  Japan  in  1905, 
and  it  was  some  time  before  Japan's  policy  unfolded  itself  so 
fully  as  to  cause  her  to  be  regarded  as  threatening  China.  In 
addition  to  the  struggle  in  the  North  between  Japan  and 
Russia,  however,  the  foreign  contact  was  being  felt  by  China 
in  the  economic  field.  Railway  concessions  were  granted  and 
the  Empire  bade  fair  to  be  bound  together  in  that  way.  But 
during  the  first  few  years  of  the  century  the  old  policy  of  the 
Powers  of  using  railway  concessions  to  develop  spheres  of 
interest  was  continued  and  it  again  appeared  as  though  the 
integrity  of  the  Empire  was  menaced  by  this  comparatively 
new  process  of  so-called  peaceful  penetration.  In  the  years 
preceding  the  revolution  of  1911,  however,  came  the  begin- 
ning of  the  movement  toward  international  cooperation  in- 
stead of  competition  in  railway  development  in  China.  But 
before  this  the  building  of  railways  by  foreigners  and  their 
operation  under  foreign  supervision  began  to  be  looked  upon 
with  suspicion  by  the  Chinese  people.  This  suspicion  was  not 
unjustified,  especially  during  the  six  or  seven  years  after  1900. 
One  result  of  this  suspicion  was  the  attempt  of  the  Chinese 

67 


68          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

themselves  to  build  railways.  Another  was  an  increased  hos- 
tility to  the  Central  Government,  and  this  strengthened  the 
lack  of  belief  in  its  reform  programme.  Again,  the  building 
of  roads  under  the  old  sphere  of  interest  idea  led  the  Manchu 
government  to  embark  on  the  policy  of  centralization  of  con- 
struction and  operation  which  brought  it  into  direct  conflict 
with  provincial  interests  and  which  precipitated  the  outbreak 
of  1911. 

The  ability  of  the  Powers  to  dictate  to  China,  after  the 
Boxer  uprising  had  been  put  down  by  foreign  arms,  led  them 
to  insist  on  modernizing  the  governmental  and  also  the  eco- 
nomic system.  From  the  latter  point  of  view  the  Powers  de- 
sired to  see  the  abolition  of  the  internal  customs  barriers  and 
wanted  a  thorough  investigation  and  reform  of  the  currency 
system.  Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  nothing  had 
been  done,  but  the  Ministers  at  Peking  continually  agitated  the 
question  of  these  reforms.  Governmentally  the  Powers  de- 
sired to  see  an  extension  of  the  control  of  the  Central  gov- 
ernment over  the  provinces  in  order  that  treaty  provisions 
might  be  uniformly  carried  out,  and  so  that  they  could  hold 
the  Imperial  government  responsible  for  the  protection  of  for- 
eign interests  throughout  the  Empire.  For  these  reasons  they 
were  interested  observers  of  the  movement  toward  constitu- 
tional government  and  served  as  a  continual  stimulus  to  the 
reform  zeal  of  the  Manchus. 

The  events  of  the  years  after  1894  served  in  another  way 
to  complicate  the  task  of  the  Central  government.  The  war 
with  Japan  left  China  with  an  indemnity  to  pay  as,  to  a  far 
greater  extent,  did  the  Boxer  uprising.  Necessary  military  re- 
organization, currency  reform  if  undertaken,  and  the  abolition 
of  the  internal  customs  all  presented  new  and  serious  financial 
problems  to  the  government.  Taxes  were  fixed  by  custom 
rather  than  by  the  changing  needs  of  the  State,  and  to  gain 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          69 

the  sums  needed  by  increased  taxes  meant  the  arousing  of 
certain  antagonism  at  the  time  when  the  Manchus  needed  to 
conciliate  instead  of  stirring  up  ill-feeling.  To  borrow  meant 
the  pledging  of  revenue  services  or  the  granting  of  conces- 
sions and  could  only  give  temporary  relief.  In  both  cases  the 
people  were  certain  to  be  aroused  against  a  government  which 
was  apparently  giving  over  the  country  to  the  foreigner. 

During  the  first  half  of  the  decade  of  Manchu  reform  the 
government  itself  did  not  see  clearly  what  was  happening. 
Consequently  the  Manchus  were  not  so  interested  in  reforms 
that  would  really  strengthen  China  as  they  became  in  the  last 
two  years  of  the  period.  As  has  been  pointed  out  already  not 
much  was  really  accomplished  in  the  way  of  reform,  except 
on  paper  before  -19Q&.,  The  edicts  issued  were  vague  in  their 
pronouncements  and  the  activity  of  Peking  was  mainly  horta- 
tory. 

A  much  greater  definiteness  characterized  the  important  en- 
actments of  1908  than  had  been  shown  in  any  of  the  edicts  of 
previous  years.  The  movement  began  to  assume  a  more  con- 
crete form.  The  action  taken  during  1908  followed  three  dis- 
tinct lines :  i )  regulations  governing  the  provincial  assem- 
blies were  sanctioned  by  the  Throne,  the  assemblies  to  be  sum- 
moned within  a  year;  2)  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
Constitution  were  promulgated;  and  3)  a  definite  programme 
of  constitutional  change,  leading  up  to  the  calling  of  the  Na- 
tional Parliament  within  nine  years,  was  issued  under  the  Im- 
perial sanction. 

The  provincial  Assemblies  were  provided  for  as  part  of  the 
national  constitutional  machinery,  and  not  merely  as  local  self- 
government  bodies,  so  that  an  examination  of  their  organiza- 
tion, powers,  and  limitations  is  essentially  a  part  of  a  study 
of  constitutional  development.1 

"The  method  of  operation  of  the  Parliament  and  the  pro- 


70          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

The  difference  between  the  existing  provincial  system  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  and  local  government  in  foreign  countries  like 
England  or  Germany  seems  to  have  been  clearly  recognized 
by  the  "Office"  to  which  had  been  given  the  task  of  drawing 
up  regulations  governing  the  provincial  Assemblies.  The 
regulations  were  embodied  in  a  memorial  submitted  to  the 
Throne,  and  sanctioned  by  an  Imperial  Rescript  of  July  22, 
1908.  The  memorialists  stated  that  "owing  to  the  size  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  local  administration  centers  in  the  Viceroy 
and  Governor,  thus  marking  a  differentiation  from  the  for- 
eign type  of  government.  The  provincial  authorities  are  un- 
der the  direct  control  of  the  Throne,  another  point  of  differ- 
ence. The  provincial  assemblies,  while  concerned  with  local 
government  and  designed  to  voice  popular  opinion,  cannot  be 
held  to  diminish  the  supreme  authority  of  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment. It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  all  deliberative  bodies 
are  restricted  in  their  functions  to  debate.  They  have  abso- 
lutely no  executive  powers."2  The  next  few  sentences  indi- 
cate the  countries  from  a  study  of  whose  institutions  had  been 
drawn  the  principles  of  constitutional  government  applicable 
in  China.  "In  foreign  constitutional  governments  the  pow- 
ers of  popular  deliberative  bodies  are  similarly  restricted.  In 
Germany  the  promotion  and  removal  of  officials  is  expressly 
reserved  as  a  prerogative  of  the  Throne,  likewise  in  Japan."3 

We  have  seen  that  the  Empress  Dowager  based  her  whole 

programme  on  the  principle  that  constitutionalism  did   not 

\j      imply  a  lessening  of  the  Imperial  power.     It  followed,  then, 

that  the  functions  of  the  assemblies  would  be  so  limited  as  not 

vincial  deliberative  assemblies  will  be  identical"  wrote  the  me- 
morialists whose  regulations  for  the  provincial  Assemblies  re- 
ceived the  Imperial  sanction. 

2  Translation,  Inclosure  in  No.  989,  Am.  For.  Relations,  1908. 

3  Ibid. 


~^  (UJGJ 

Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          71 

to  infringe  on  Royal  prerogatives.  The  provincial  deliber- 
ative assemblies,  according  to  section  i  of  the  regulations,  were 
to  "act  as  places  where  the  public  opinion  of  the  respective 
provinces  may  be  ascertained;  they  shall  also  deliberate  as  to 
what  would  seem  to  be  beneficial  for  the  Province  and  shall 
advise  their  superiors  of  their  opinions.  The  above  shall  be 
their  principal  function."* 

The  assemblies  were  not  expected  to  act  as  critics  of  the 
government  nor  to  hold  it  to  accountability  for  its  acts.  It 
would  seem  that  a  large  scope  for  discussion  and  action  by 
the  assemblies  was  allowed  since  they  might:  i)  determine 
the  policy  of  the  province;  2)  make  preliminary  estimates  of 
the  income  and  expenditure  of  the  province;  3)  settle  the 
amount  of  the  above;  4)  determine  the  taxes  to  be  levied  and 
the  funds  to  be  borrowed;  5)  decide  as  to  innovations  in  the 
provinces  (additional  taxes,  etc.);  6)  decide  as  to  changes  in 
the  administration  of  the  provincial  government;  7)  elect  dele- 
gates to  the  constitutional  assembly;  8)  answer  questions  put 
by  the  constitutional  assembly;  9)  answer  questions  put  by  the 
Viceroy  or  Governor;  10)  supervise  the  local  self-government 
societies;  and  n)  receive  and  consider  the  proposals  of  the 
local  self-government  societies  and  the  people.5 

But  in  their  discussions  on  the  first  seven  topics  enumer- 
ated they  were  limited  to  a  consideration  of  specific  proposi- 
tions brought  before  them  by  the  Viceroy  or  Governor.  No 
debates  were  allowed  on  the  budget,  the  assembly  only  rnalc^ 
ing  estimates  and  settling  the  amounts.  If  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  assembly  were  considered  unwise  by  the  authori- 
ties they  were  to  be  reconsidered.  If  they  did  not  choose  to 
revise  or  withdraw  their  proposals  after  reconsideration,  the 

4  Trans.  Incl.  in  No.  989,  Am.  For.  Relations,  1908,  p.  183. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  186.    Art.  VI,  Powers  and  Duties  of  the  Assembly 
sec.  21. 


72          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

provincial  officials  were  empowered  to  lay  the  matter  be- 
fore the  assembly  in  Peking,  whose  decision  was  final.  Ow- 
ing to  the  limitations  imposed  on  the  National  Assembly,  ref- 
erence to  Peking  amounted  simply  to  bringing  the  difference 
of  opinion  before  the  Imperial  administration.  While  the 
Viceroy  or  Governor  had  the  right  to  question  the  assembly  on 
any  matter,  the  converse  did  not  hold  true.  The  assembly 
could  request  information  from  the  administration  but  a  de- 
tailed answer  could  be  avoided  on  the  ground  that  a  certain 
amount  of  secrecy  was  necessary.6 

The  indirect  method7  of  selecting  members  of  the  assem- 
blies was  chosen  as  more  applicable  to  a  country  in  which  rep- 
resentative government  was  a  novelty.  The  right  to  vote  for 
electors  was  extended  to  all  males  twenty-five  years  of  age 
who  possessed  any  one  of  five  sets  of  qualifications.  These 
were :  i )  Having  been  successfully  engaged  for  three  years  or 
more  in  teaching  or  in  some  other  occupation  conducive  to  the 
public  good;  2)  having  graduated  from  a  middle  school,  or 
school  of  corresponding  grade,  in  China  or  abroad,  and  pos- 
sessing proof  of  the  same;  3)  having  the  former  literary  de- 
gree of  a  senior  licentiate  (kung-sheng)  or  a  higher  one;  4) 
having  held  any  substantive  official  post  of  the  seventh  civil 
or  fifth  military  rank  or  higher,  and  not  having  been  degraded 

6  Ibid.,  Arts.  22-30,  sec.  26. 

7  "The  method  of  election  is  a  double  or  indirect  one,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Council  (Assembly)  being  elected  by  electoral  col- 
leges, one  college  in  each  Fu.    The  members  of  the  electoral  col- 
leges are  elected  by  the  voters  of  all  the  hsien  in  one  Fu.    Each 
hsien  elects  so  many  voters  to  the  electoral  college,  each  voter 
casting  a  single  vote  irrespective  of  the  number  of  members  to 
be  elected  from  the  particular  hsien.    In  the  second  election  each 
Fu  electoral  college  elects  so  many  members  of  the  Council,  each 
voter  in  the  electoral  college  casting  only  one  vote."    Prof.  L.  R. 
O.  Bevan,  China  Mission  Year  Book,  1911.    Ch.  III.    The  New 
Chinese  Constitution. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          73 

on  impeachment;  5)  having  any  business  capitalized  for 
$5,000  or  possessing  real  estate  to  that  value.8 

The  reasons  for  not  granting  universal  suffrage  were  stated 
by  the  memorialists  to  be  that  "at  the  present  time  when  a 
beginning  is  being  made  in  the  establishment  of  elective  offices, 
the  universal  franchise  cannot  be  granted.  If  a  property 
qualification  alone  were  demanded  it  would  tend  to  inculcate 
money  greed  among  the  people  and  lead  them  to  honor  the 
rich.  So  various  qualifications  have  been  selected  and  the 
range  has  been  widened  to  include  other  things  besides  ma- 
terial wealth.  There  have  been  added  qualifications  of  repu- 
tation, learning  and  official  office,  all  of  which  are  adjudged 
of  equal  importance  with  wealth,  and  any  one  of  which  will 
entitle  a  man  to  vote.  And  thus  the  admission  of  unqualified 
men  to  vote  will  be  avoided  and  no  partiality  will  be  shown."9 

Each  regular  session  of  the  assembly  was  to  last  about 
forty  days,  but  provision  was  made  for  continuity  through 

8  Am.  For.  Relations,  1908,  p.  184,  Art.  Ill,  sec.  3.   Sec.  4  pro- 
vides that  men  who  were  not  natives  of  the  province  but  had 
lived  there  ten  years  and  had  money  invested  there  to  the  amount 
of  $10,000  might  vote.     Further,  any  native  of  a  province  or 
any  non-native  over  30  years  of  age,  who  had  lived  ten  years  in 
the  province,  might  be  elected  to  the  Assembly. 

9  Sec.  6 — disqualifications  were  I )  any  turbulent  or  lawbreak- 
ing  person;  2)   any  person  who  has  suffered  imprisonment  or 
any  more  serious  penalty  of  the  law;  3)  any  person  who  has  been 
engaged  in  a  disreputable  business ;  4)  any  person  who  has  been 
put  under  suspicion  in  a  business  matter  and  not  been  exoner- 
ated; 5)   any  opium  user;  6)   any  insane  person;  7)   any  who 
himself  or  a  member  of  whose  family  is  engaged  in  a  disreputable 
pursuit;   8)    any    illiterate    person.      Sec.    7 — Occupational   dis- 
qualifications— i)  tenure  of  public  office  in  province  or  acting  as 
private  secretary  to  any  official;  2)  enrollment  as  a  soldier,  or 
in  first  or  second  reserves;  3)  holding  a  commission  as  a  police 
officer;  4)  religious  occupation  as  Taoist  or  Buddhist  priest  or 
teacher  in  any  other  creed;  5)   being  enrolled  as  a  student  in 
any  school. 


74          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  establishment  of  a  permanent  committee  which  should 
carry  on  the  work  of  the  assembly  while  it  was  not  in  session. 
Furthermore  when  necessary,  special  sessions  could  be  called 
by  the  Viceroy  or  Governor. 

The  power  of  adjourning  the  assembly  for  cause  was  vested 
in  the  head  of  the  provincial  administration,  as  was  also  the 
right  to  dissolve  it  with  the  sanction  of  the  central  authori- 
ties. The  acts  for  which  an  assembly  might  be  dissolved  were 
four  in  number :  The  expression  of  sentiments  reflecting  un- 
favorably on  the  Throne;  any  act  calculated  to  disturb  the 
peaceful  rule  of  the  country;  refusal  to  adjourn  when  ordered 
to  by  the  Viceroy  or  Governor,  or  refusal  to  yield  after  hav- 
ing been  adjourned  several  times;  and,  finally,  the  refusal  of 
a  considerable  number  of  the  members  of  the  assembly  to  at- 
tend its  meetings,  after  having  been  summoned  several  times.10 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  that  in  no  way  had  the 
hold  of  the  official  class  on  the  administration  been  directly 
relaxed  by  the  creation  of  these  assemblies.  They  did  offer 
a  point  of  departure  for  resistence  to  disliked  governmental 
policies,  it  is  true,  and  they  were  so  used  subsequently.  But 
their  chief  value  to  the  cause  of  reform  in  China  lay  in  their 
ability  to  bring  the  government  into  touch,  to  a  certain  extent, 
with  local  sentiment.  Public  opinion  is  far  from  being  de- 
spised in  China,  the  great  necessity  being  to  devise  a  way  to 
give  it  true  national  expression.  The  provincial  assemblies, 
in  spite  of  their  limited  sphere  of  action,  were  able  to  bring 
a  surprising  pressure  to  bear  against  unpopular  government 
measures  from  the  very  fact  that  they  did  give  a  voice  to  the 
popular  opinions.11 

10  Art.  VII  and  Art.  VIII.    The  italics  are  the  author's. 

11  Furthermore,  they  were  stronger  relatively  than  the  national 
assembly  from  the  beginning  because  of  the  traditional  admin- 
istrative  decentralization  of   the  country   which   resulted   prac- 
tically in  provincial  autonomy. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          75 

In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  greatest 
efforts  of  the  assemblies  were  bent  towards  checking  the  in- 
creasing assumption  of  authority  by  the  Central  Government 
over  the  provincial  administration ;  in  other  words,  as  we  shall 
see  later,  the  creation  of  these  assemblies  checked  the  Imperial 
policy  of  centralization. 

Turning  our  attention  again  to  Peking,  an  edict  was  issued 
on  August  27,  accepting  the  "Principles  of  the  Constitution" 
as  presented  in  a  memorial  from  the  officials  to  whom  had 
been  given  the  task  of  framing  the  constitution.  In  the  me- 
morial was  embodied  a  discussion  of  the  different  ways  in 
which  constitutions  are  gained — some  being  granted  from 
above,  and  some  coming  from  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  on 
the  Government  by  the  people.  "It  should  be  noted,"  the 
memorialists  wrote,  "that  the  nations  of  the  East  and  the 
West  all  have  established  constitutional  governments.  Some 
have  done  so  by  pressure  from  below  and  some  under  infl- 
ences  from  above.  All  have  constitutions  and  Parliaments. 
Those  which  have  established  their  constitutions  under  pres- 
sure from  below  have  commenced  with  strife  between  sover- 
eign and  people,  and  have  ended  the  work  by  mutual  con- 
cessions between  sovereign  and  people.  Those  that  have  es- 
tablished their  constitutions  under  influences  from  above  have 
first  determined  the  ultimate  authority  of  the  Court,  and  there- 
after there  has  been  granted  to  the  people  the  advantage  of 
inquiring  about  the  affairs  of  government.  ...  In  most  of 
the  nations  in  which  the  constitution  has  been  granted  from 
above  the  origin  of  all  powers  is  in  the  Court.  The  Parlia- 
ment must  grow  out  of  the  Constitution,  not  the  constitution 
out  of  the  Parliament.  The  government  of  China  is  to  be 
constitutional  by  Imperial  decree.  This  is  an  unchangeable 
principle.  Therefore  in  regard  to  establishing  a  parliament, 
the  general  principles  of  the  constitution  will  be  settled  as  a 


76          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

preliminary.  When  they  are  announced  the  Parliament  may 
be  assembled.  The  principles  of  the  constitution  are  the  great 
laws  which  may  not  be  discussed.  Once  fixed  they  may  not  be 
lightly  altered.  .  .  .  The  constitution  is  designed  to  conserve  ' 
the  power  of  the  sovereign  and  protect  the  officials  and  the 
people"™ 

The  general  purport  of  the  "principles"  is  so  clearly  laid 
down  in  the  above  passage  that  it  is  only  necessary  to  examine 
the  method  by  which  the  powers  of  the  sovereign  were  to  be 
conserved,  and  parliamentary  institutions  operated  without  im- 
pairing them. 

From  the  first  section  of  the  "principles"  which  provided 
that  "the  Ta  Ts'ing  Dynasty  shall  rule  over  the  Ta  Ts'ing 
Empire  for  ever  and  ever,  and  be  honored  through  all  ages" 
to  the  last  clause  of  section  fourteen  "Parliament  cannot  inter- 
fere" the  supreme  power  of  the  Emperor  was  jealously  pro- 
vided for  and  safeguarded.  All  legislative,  executive,  and  ju- 
dicial power  was  to  remain  concentrated  in  his  hands.  The 
Emperor  alone  could  appoint  and  dismiss  officials,  and  fix 
their  salaries.  As  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy 
he  was  to  have  the  power  to  make  laws  and  regulations  for 
both  forces.  In  addition  to  the  general  legislative  authority, 
the  Emperor  was  given  the  right  to  issue  ordinances  within 
the  limit  of  the  law.  All  control  over  foreign  relations  was 
vested  in  the  Crown,  as  was  the  right  to  declare  war  and  make 
peace.  Naturally  the  affairs  of  the  Imperial  Household  and 
the  Imperial  Ceremonies  including  the  expenses  of  the  Court 
were  withdrawn  from  outside  interference.  Unwilling  to 
leave  anything  to  chance  the  framers  of  the  constitution  put 
in  two  emergency  clauses :  one  giving  the  Emperor  the  au- 
thority, if  circumstances  required  it,  to  issue  edicts  restricting 

12  Am.  For.  Relations,  1908,  Incl.  i  in  No.  1005,  p.  192.  The 
italics  are  the  author's. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          77 

the^iberty  of  his  subjects;  and  the  other  providing  that  "in 
time  of  emergency,  when  Parliament  is  not  in  session,  the 
Emperor  may  issue  edicts  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  the 
government,  and  for  raising  the  necessary  funds — these  meas- 
ures however  must  be  submitted  to  Parliament  when  it  next 
assembles/'13 

All  regulation  of  the  time  of  meeting  or  adjournment  of 
Parliament  was  taken  from  its  hands  and  maintained  as  one  of 
the  prerogatives  of  the  Crown.  While  the  Assembly  was 
created  ostensibly  to  aid  in  the  government  of  the  Empire  the 
sphere  of  parliamentary  activity  was  so  hedged  about  with 
limitations  as  to  render  it  impotent  as  a  controlling  or  di- 
recting organ.  The  fact  that  it  did  exercise  an  influence  on 
the  administration  was  due  not  to  its  granted  but  to  its  usurped 
powers,  and  to  the  political  condition  of  the  Empire  at  the 
time  it  was  first  summoned. 

Parliament  was  given  power  to  propose  legislation  for  the 
consideration  of  the  government;  it  might  adopt  measures  of 
government;  and  it  might  impeach  Ministers  for  illegal  acts, 
but  no  action  it  took  had  any  weight  or  validity  save  that  de- 
rived from  the  Imperial  sanction.  All  matters  affecting  a 
single  province  were  removed  definitely  from  its  consideration. 
It  was  granted  the  privilege  of  assisting  in  the  compilation  of 
the  budget  of  the  Empire,  but  nowhere  was  the  Assembly 
given  any  control  over  it.  Indeed  such  control  was  expressly 
denied,  since  the  Constitution  provided  that  "regular  expendi- 
ture, authorized  by  the  Emperor,  and  expenditure  already 
fixed  by  law  shall  not  be  abolished  or  reduced  except  in  con- 
sultation with  the  government."1* 

13  "Principles  of  the  Constitution,"  Powers  of  the  Sovereign, 
14  sections.    Am.  For.  Relations,  1908.    Incl.  i  in  No.  1005,  pp. 
194-6.    See  also  China  Year  Book,  1912,  for  synopsis. 

14  Sec.  3,   12  clauses.     Am.   For.   Relations,   10*08,   Incl.    I    in 
No.  1005,  p.  195.    Also  China  Year  Book,  1912,  Ch.  XXI. 


78          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

In  order  to  give  effect  to  their  decisions,  after  agreement 
had  been  reached  in  both  houses  of  Parliament,  the  conclu- 
sions formulated  had  to  be  embodied  in  a  memorial  to  the 
Throne,  transmitted  through  the  President  of  the  Upper 
House.  The  presiding  officer  was  not  elected  by  the  House 
but  was  appointed  by  the  Emperor.  He  was  given  control 
over  deliberations  in  the  Parliament,  with  the  right  to  order 
anyone  committing  a  breach  of  parliamentary  rules  to  desist 
from  speaking,  or  to  retire  from  the  House.  In  addition  to 
this  right,  the  President  was  empowered  to  strike  off  the  roll 
of  the  House  any  member  found  to  be  unqualified  or  unfit  for 
membership.15  Thus  the  Parliament  was  not  even  allowed  to 
pass  on  the  qualifications  of  its  own  members,  and  their  free- 
dom of  expression  was  restricted  by  the  condition  that  they 
must  not  use  disrespectful  language  concerning  the  Court  or 
abuse  other  persons. 

In  addition  to  the  above  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  a 
section  was  included  laying  down  the  duties  and  privileges  of 
subjects  of  the  Empire.  The  usual  provision  was  made  for 
freedom  of  speech  and  meeting,  subject  to  law;  for  the  right 
of  legal  trial  in  properly  constituted  courts;  and  for  freedom 
of  property  and  residences  from  interference  without  due 
legal  reason.  Their  duties  were  to  pay  duly  imposed  taxes, 
to  perform  military  service,  and  to  generally  obey  the  laws.18 

The  limitations  imposed  on  both  the  provincial  assemblies 
and  the  National  Parliament  certainly  justified  the  conclusion 
reached  by  Mr.  W.  W.  Rockhill17  that  the  object  of  the  Im- 

15  The  principles  governing  elections  were  laid  down  in  the 
"Principles  of  the  Constitution."    They  were  general  in  nature, 
principally  providing  for  supervision  and  due  care  in  elections. 
Ibid. 

16  Sec.  2,  The  Duties  and  Privileges  of  Subjects,  9  clauses. 
Am.  For.  Relations,  1908.     Incl.  I  in  No.  1005,  p.  195. 

1T  American  Minister  at  the  Court  of  Peking. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          79 

perial  Government  was  "no  other  than  a  perpetuation  of  the 
existing  system  under  a  thin  veil  of  constitutional  guarantees." 
But  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  institution  of  organs  representa- 
tive in  their  nature  was  a  step  so  far  in  advance  of  anything 
previously  attempted  that  due  credit  must  be  given  the  hither- 
to reactionary  Empress  Dowager  and  Court  for  having  any 
connection  with  such  reforms.  Furthermore  such  is  the  force 
of  what  may  be  called  public  opinion  in  China  that  it  would 
have  been  almost  fatal  to  the  Dynasty  continually  to  disregard 
the  recommendations  of  a  legally  constituted  Parliament,  espe- 
cially in  matters  vitally  affecting  the  interests  of  the  nation. 
That  one  is  justified  in  assuming  that  Parliament  would  have 
been  able  to  exercise  a  considerable  and  ever  increasing  in- 
fluence is  evident  from  the  pronounced  activity  of  the  National 
Assembly  in  the  last  days  of  the  Manchu  rule,18  and  from  the 
influence  exerted  from  the  first  by  the  provincial  assem 

Simultaneously  with  the  promulgation  of  the  "Principles  of 
the  Constitution,"  a  programme  of  constitutional  prepara- 
tion, covering  a  period  of  nine  years,  was  adopted.  Each 
year  was  to  witness  certain  changes,  such  as  the  introduction 
of  local  self-government,  law  reform,  census  taking,  police 
reorganization,  the  extension  of  the  educational  system  so  as 
gradually  to  reduce  illiteracy,  the  introduction  of  a  budget  and 
auditing  system,  and  the  issue  of  constitutional  laws,  Im- 
perial House  Laws  and  Parliamentary  Laws.  The  whole  pro- 
gramme culminated  in  the  establishment  of  a  Parliament  and 
the  organization  of  a  Privy  Council  and  a  Cabinet  in  the 
ninth  year. 

The  idea  of  extended  preparations  before  the  summoning  of 
a  Parliament  was  undoubtedly  borrowed  from  the  Japanese 
who  had  gone  through  a  somewhat  similar  process  before  the 

18  The  work  of  the  National  Assembly  is  discussed  in  the  fol- 
lowing chapter. 


8o          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

granting  of  their  constitution.  What  the  Manchu  Dynasty 
needed  more  than  anything  was  a  breathing  space, — a  time  in 
which  to  take  stock  of  themselves,  their  weakness  and  their 
strength  as  rulers  of  the  Empire.  This  nine  year  period  would 
give  just  the  opportunity  so  badly  needed.  Further,  it  was 
felt  that  the  reforms  outlined  would  serve  to  convince  not 
only  the  Chinese  but  foreigners  as  well,  of  the  zeal  of  the  gov- 
ernment for  reform  and  change.  If  these  nine  years  had  been 
conceded  to  the  Manchus,  the  Dynasty  might  have  been  able 
to  control  the  situation  so  as  to  introduce  political  institutions 
of  a  constitutional  nature  much  better  fitted  to  China  and  the 
state  of  western  political  education  of  the  Chinese  people  than 
anything  the  Republic  has  been  able  thus  far  to  develop.  But 
the  very  elaboration  of  the  programme,  bringing  home  to  the 
radicals  in  the  Empire  the  slowness  of  the  movement,  served 
to  defeat  its  purpose,  for  it  immediately  called  forth  an  agi- 
tation for  a  material  reduction  of  the  time  alloted  to  prepara- 
tion. The  times  were  out  of  joint  for  the  Manchus;  things 
were  moving  too  rapidly  to  suit  them,  and  after  1908  they 
were  forced  to  bend  every  effort  to  stem  the  rising  tide  of 
radicalism,  anti-dynastic  in  its  nature. 

The  reform  movement  was  controlled  and  directed  by  Her 
Majesty,  the  Empress  Dowager,  until  the  very  hour  of  her 
death.  When  it  was  clear  that  the  Emperor  Kwang  Hsu 
would  not  survive  the  year  (1908)  steps  were  immediately 
taken  to  name  his  successor.  The  Empress  was  not  content 
even  then  to  allow  the  reins  to  slip  from  her  own  hands,  and 
she  practically  forced  the  appointment  of  the  infant  son  of 
Prince  Ch'un  as  the  heir  to  the  Throne.  At  the  time  when 
this  was  done  the  Empress  herself  undoubtedly  expected  to 
survive  Kwang  Hsu,  continuing  to  govern  as  the  virtual  re- 
gent. However,  she  caused  Prince  Ch'un  to  be  named  the 
nominal  Regent. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          81 

The  ill-fated  Emperor  Kwang  Hsu  passed  away  October 
14,  1908,  and  within  twenty- four  hours  the  death  of  the  "Old 
Buddha"  herself  was  reported.  With  her  death  one  of  the 
most  masterful  personalities  of  Chinese  history  quitted  the 
world,  leaving  an  infant  on  the  Dragon  Throne.  The  reign 
title  of  Hsuan  T'ung  was  assumed. 

The  new  Regent,  Prince  Ch'un,  was  a  brother  of  the  late 
Emperor.  He  had  held  many  high  government  offices  under 
Tzu  Hsi,  and  had  been  connected  directly  with  the  work  of 
constitutional  reform.  Naturally  now  that  the  control  was 
in  his  hands  all  were  interested  in  ascertaining  his  attitude 
toward  the  changes  that  were  under  way. 

The  year  1909  was  marked  by  the  issuance  of  edicts  pledg- 
ing the  new  administration  to  the  continuance  of  the  reforms 
outlined  by  Her  Majesty  the  Dowager  Empress  in  the  nine 
year  programme.20  Thus  the  work  of  establishing  local  self- 
government  was  pushed,  the  officials  being  urged  to  exercise 
the  greatest  diligence  in  putting  into  effect  the  wishes  of  the 
government.21  One  of  the  greatest  dangers  was  that  the  offi- 
cials would  take  action  only  on  paper.  This  was  clearly  rec-> 
ognized  and  deprecated.  "It  is,  however,  to  be  feared,  that 
committing  a  long  standing  error,  some  of  them  (i.e.  the  pro- 
vincial officials)  may  seek  to  discharge  their  responsibilities 
by  presenting  a  mere  memorial,  without  taking  any  definite 
action.  They  should  bear  in  mind  that  these  measures  are  of 
the  highest  importance,  and  are  to  be  carried  out  in  com- 

20  In  an  edict  of  November  25,  1909,  are  the  following  words : 
"We  will  reverently  obey  the  edict  issued  on  the  first  day  of  the 
eighth  moon  last  year  (August  27,  1908)."    This  edict  contained 
the  "Principles  of  the  Constitution"  and  the  "Nine  year  pro- 
gramme."   See  also,  edict  of  March  6,  1909. 

21  Edict  of  January  18,  1909 — Financial  reorganization  was  dis- 
cussed in  an  edict  of  January  n,  1909. 


82          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

pliance  with  the  plans  of  the  late  Emperor,  as  well  as  to  satisfy 
the  aspirations  of  the  people."22 

The  most  important  event  of  1909  was  the  meeting  of  the 
provincial  assemblies  for  the  first  time23  in  accordance  with 
the  decree  promulgating  their  regulations,  and  setting  the  time 
for  their  initial  convocation.24  From  the  beginning  they  be- 
came a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with  in  provincial  government.25 
No  detailed  account  of  their  labors  was  published,  but  it  may 
be  said  that  these  assemblies  more  than  fulfilled  expectations. 
On  the  whole,  they  conducted  their  deliberations  with  dignity, 
sincerity,  and  with  due  regard  to  the  limits  imposed  on  their 
powers  by  the  Throne.  There  were  cases  of  friction  between 
the  assemblies  and  officials,  when  the  former  did  not  scruple 
to  denounce  what  they  considered  the  wrongful  practises  of 
the  latter.26  In  addition  to  their  activity  in  the  affairs  -of  the 
province,  the  assemblies  led  in  the  agitation  for  the  early  con- 
vocation of  Parliament,  bringing  all  the  force  of  provincial 
opinion  to  bear  on  the  Central  Government,  and  giving  real 
weight  to  the  agitation  of  the  National  Assembly. 

The  National  Assembly  met  for  the  first  time  October  3, 

"Edict  of  November  25,  1909.  China  Year  Book,  1912,  Ch. 
XXI,  p.  367. 

23  Oct.  14,  1909. 

24  Edict  of  July  22,  1908. 

25  The  expectations  of  the  Throne  with  regard  to  the  provincial 
assemblies  was  as  follows:     "The  respective  Viceroys  and  Gov- 
ernors are  desired  to  gather  and  accept  without  predeliction  or 
prejudice  the  suggestions  of  the  Assemblies,  and  put  them  into 
operation  after  due  deliberation,  so  that  a  unity  of  mind  may  be 
established,  and  good  government  attained  in  course  of  time. 
After  the  opening  of  the  Assemblies  the  Viceroys  and  Governors 
are  further  commanded  to  superintend  their  deliberations  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  regulations  and  to  see  that  the  measures  de- 
cided upon  neither  exceed  the  proper  bounds  of  authority,  nor 
contravene  the  laws  of  the  land,"    Edict,  Oct.  13. 

28  China  Year  Book,  1912. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          83 

1910,  under  regulations  that  had  been  sanctioned  by  an  Im- 
perial Edict  of  October  26,  1909.  These  rules  were  revised  in 
a  few  particulars  in  191 1.27  They  were  in  ten  chapters.  The 
principles  governing  the  Assembly  were  first  laid  down.  The 
President  was  to  be  chosen  from  among  the  Princes,  Dukes, 
or  Ministers  of  State  "of  recognized  merit,"  and  he  was  to 
direct  all  the  affairs  of  the  Assembly.  In  addition  to  the 
President,  there  was  to  be  a  Vice-President,  an  official  above 
the  third  rank.  Both  of  these  men  were  to  be  appointed  by 
the  Throne.  Two  principles  governed  the  choice  of  members 
of  the  Assembly, — i.e.  Imperial  selection  and  election.  Out 
of  the  total  membership  of  two  hundred  the  Emperor  had 
the  right  to  choose  one  hundred,  the  other  half  being  elected 
by  the  provincial  assemblies  from  their  own  membership. 
The  Imperial  appointees  were  to  come  from  seven  different 
classes,  including  representatives  of  the  Manchu,  Chinese, 
Mongolian  and  Tibetan  nobility,  as  well  as  representatives  of 
the  official  and  literary  classes,  and  the  class  of  large  tax- 
payers.28 

27  Since  the  revised  rules  were  substantially  the  same  as  the 
regulations  of  1909  the  former  alone  are  discussed  here.  The 
translation  used  is  that  given  in  the  China  Year  Book  for  1912, 

PP-  377-396. 

!8  In  deciding  upon  the  representatives  from  these  different 
classes  a  method  of  elimination  was  adopted.  A  list  of  all  eligible 
candidates  in  the  first  three  groups  was  compiled  and  submitted 
to  the  Throne  for  a  selection  of  the  proper  number.  Choice  was 
made  from  the  other  four  groups  by  a  combination  of  election 
and  Imperial  selection.  First  of  all  an  election  was  held,  under 
proper  supervision,  by  all  of  those  who  were  listed  as  members 
of  a  particular  group.  This  election  provided  a  list  of  two  or 
three  times  the  number  of  representatives  the  group  was  en- 
titled to  have  in  the  Assembly.  Then  the  Emperor  selected  from 
this  number  those  who  were  actually  to  serve. 


84          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

The  hundred  representatives  from  the  provincial  assemblies 
were  apportioned  among  the  different  provinces,  according  to 
their  size  and  estimated  population.  Thus  the  Chihli  assembly 
had  the  right  to  select  nine,  the  Kuangtung  assembly  six, 
et  cetera.  AThe  assembly  was  to  choose  twice  the  number  of 
representatives  it  was  entitled  to  have,  submitting  its  choice 
to  the  Superintendent  of  Elections, — the  Viceroy  or  Gover- 
nor of  the  Province.  He  then  selected  the  proper  number 
from  the  head  of  the  list  and  confirmed  them  as  the  mem- 
bers of  the  National  assembly  from  his  province.  Since  the 
members  of  the  provincial  assemblies  were  all  chosen  indi- 
rectly by  a  carefully  restricted  suffrage,  it  can  be  seen  that 
little  was  left  to  the  popular  choice  in  the  selection  of  even 
the  half  of  the  membership  of  the  National  Assembly  repre- 
sentative of  provincial  and  local  interests. 

The  functions  of  the  Assembly  were  to  be  substantially  the 
same  as  those  laid  down  for  the  future  Parliament  in  the 
"Principles  of  the  Constitution."  It  was  to  consider  the  na- 
tional budget;  national  revenue  and  expenditure;  revenue  col- 
lection and  public  loans;  legislation;  compilation  of  new  laws 
and  revision  of  old  ones,  with  the  exception  that  matters  af- 
fecting the  constitution  were  excluded  from  its  consideration; 
and  matters  specially  referred  to  the  Assembly  by  the  Throne. 
However,  proposals  under  any  one  of  the  first  four  classified 
heads  had  to  be  made  by  the  Cabinet  or  the  ministries  and  sub- 
mitted to  the  Throne  before  being  considered  by  the  Assembly. 
So  that  in  fact  it  was  only  empowered  to  discuss  matters  sub- 
mitted to  it  by  the  Emperor. 

Chapter  IV  of  the  revised  regulations  dealt  with  the  rela- 
tions between  the  Assembly  and  the  executive.  The  Ministers 
were  to  be  represented  in  the  Assembly  either  in  person  or  by 
deputy,  and  had  the  right  to  present  their  views  on  its  floor. 
In  its  turn  the  Assembly  might  question  the  Ministers,  the 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          85 

President  or  Vice-President  serving  as  the  medium  of  com- 
munication. But  the  Ministers  of  State  were  not  required  to 
answer  these  questions,  although  they  did  have  to  give  reasons 
for  a  refusal  to  reply.  In  case  of  disagreement  between  the 
executive  and  the  Assembly  the  final  decision  rested  with  the 
Emperor.  The  National  Assembly  had  the  right  to  impeach 
Ministers  of  State  in  a  memorial  to  the  Throne,  the  memorial 
to  be  drawn  up  by  the  President  and  Vice-President  only  after 
a  two-thirds  majority  of  the  members  present  at  the  meeting 
voted  for  such  an  impeachment.  Here  again  the  final  deci- 
sion rested  with  the  Emperor. 

While  the  Assembly  had  the  right  to  call  upon  the  provin- 
cial assemblies  for  information  concerning  the  public  welfare, 
all  other  direct  communication  with  the  provinces  was  denied 
it.  Differences  of  opinion  between  the  provincial  assemblies 
and  the  Governors,  as  has  already  been  noted,  were  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  National  Assembly  for  discussion,  after  which 
the  final  decision  would  be  made  by  the  Throne.  "But  this 
rule  shall  not  apply  to  questions  affecting  the  executive  gov- 
ernment. All  such  shall  be  sent  forward  to  the  Cabinet  for  its 
consideration."  The  people  were  to  have  the  right  of  petition- 
ing the  National  Assembly,  providing  that  the  person  so  ad- 
dressing it  was  guaranteed  by  a  member  from  his  own  prov- 
ince. The  petition  could  only  be  considered  by  the  Assembly 
if  it  accorded  with  the  law,  and  was  free  from  disrespectful 
language,  and  providing  it  concerned  a  matter  with  which  the 
Assembly  was  competent  to  deal. 

An  Assembly  so  constituted  by  Imperial  appointment  and 
indirect  election  might  well  have  been  expected  to  remain  sub- 
servient to  the  Emperor  and  the  Court.  But  quite  the  con- 
trary was  true.  From  the  time  of  its  convocation  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  led  in  the  agitation  for  an  early  summoning 
of  Parliament  and  a  shortening  of  the  time  of  preparation. 


86          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

The  result  of  the  movement  was  the  issuance  of  an  Imperial 
decree  ori  November^,  iQio29  promising  the  Parliament  for 
the  fifth  year  of  HsuanVung  (1913)  instead  of  four  years 
later.  At  the  same  time  a  modified  programme  of  constitu- 
tional preparations  was  promised.  However  the  Throne  did 
not  give  the  assemblies  the  credit  for  having  brought  about 
the  change.  The  edict  says,  "there  is  no  need  for  the  high 
Ministers  and  the  people  to  beg  and  pray.  We  Ourselves  have 
arrived  at  this  conclusion."  And  again,  "the  shortening  of 
the  time  limit  is  the  result  of  taking  the  opinions  of  memorials 
from  the  Viceroys  and  Governors,  and  of  the  most  careful 
counsel  of  the  Princes  and  Ministers  who  have  requested  Our 
decision."30 

While  this  edict  did  not  satisfy  the  wishes  of  the  National 
Assembly  for  the  immediate  establishment  of  a  Parliament, 
other  matters  began  to  assume  a  greater  importance.  From 
the  first  the  Assembly  and  the  Council  of  State  came  into  con- 
flict. Once  it  was  over  a  loan  contracted  by  the  Governor  of 
Hunan  province  without  consulting  the  provincial  assembly. 
Again,  the  Assembly  attacked  the  Ministers  because  it  had 
not  been  consulted  concerning  some  Salt  Gabelle  matters. 
Several  times  the  Assembly  was  on  the  point  of  impeaching 
the  Grand  Council  in  a  memorial  to  the  Throne,  but  gave  it 
up  because  of  concessions  on  the  point  at  issue.  Finally  it  did 
call  the  attention  of  the  Emperor  to  the  fact  that  the  Council 
was  an  irresponsible  body  and  should  be  placed  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  Assembly,  demanding  the  creation  of  a  responsible 
Cabinet,  and  memorializing  to  that  effect.  As  a  result  an 
edict  was  issued31  ordering  the  promulgation  of  the  revised 

29  China  Year  Book,  1912,  pp.  372-3. 

80  Ibid. 

81  December  25,  1910. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          87 

programme  of  constitutional  preparation,32  and  also  ordering 
the  Commission  of  Constitutional  Reform  to  frame  the  official 
constitution  of  the  Cabinet  and  submit  it  to  the  Throne.  This 
practically  conceded  the  point  raised  by  the  Assembly,  so  it 
withdrew  the  memorial  attacking  the  Grand  Council. 

According  to  the  promise  given  the  National  Assembly,  an 
edict,  creating  a  Cabinet  and  containing  the  regulations  under 
which  it  should  be  organized  and  carry  on  its  duties  was  pro- 
mulgated on  May  8,  1911.  By  this  edict  the  old  advisory 
bodies  were  abolished,  the  Cabinet  taking  their  place.  Far 
from  meeting  the  demand  for  a  responsible  ministry,  the  con- 
stitution and  regulations  of  the  Cabinet  showed  clearly  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  government  to  persuade  the  As- 
sembly to  accept  the  shell  for  the  kernel  of  the  nut.33  The 
new  Cabinet  was  simply  the  old  Grand  Council  under  a  new 
name.  The  Ministers  were  the  old  heads  of  the  Boards.  All 
members  of  the  Cabinet  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  Emperor 
and  were  responsible  to  him  alone.  Nowhere  was  there  the 
slightest  suggestion  that  the  Assembly  would  exercise  any 
control  over  the  Cabinet.  The  membership  was  to  consist  of 
a  Prime  Minister,  a  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of  Civil  Af- 
fairs, of  Finance,  Education,  Agriculture,  Industry  and  Com- 
merce, Justice,  Posts  and  Communications,  and  finally,  the 
Minister  of  Dependencies.  The  members  of  the  Cabinet  were 
to  have  access  to  the  Throne,  but  always  in  company  with  the 
Prime  Minister,  who  might  be  received  at  any  time  and  alone. 
Only  the  Ministers  of  War  and  of  the  Navy  had  the  right  to 
present  memorials  directly  to  the  Throne,  without  using  the 
intermediation  of  the  Prime  Minister. 

82  For  the  revised  programme  see  China  Year  Book,  1912,  p. 
376. 

J3  For  translation  of  "Constitution  of  the  Cabinet"  and  regu- 
lations, see  China  Year  Book,  1912,  pp.  222-226. 


88          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

The  functions  of  the  Cabinet  were  precisely  those  of  the 
old  Grand  Council:  to  deliberate  and  advise  on  affairs  of 
State;  to  supervise  the  work  of  the  different  departments; 
and  to  "formulate  the  national  policy,  in  obedience  to  Im- 
perial commands,  and  maintain  the  executive  unification." 
The  Cabinet  had  the  right  to  discuss :  i )  law  bills,  Imperial 
Rescripts,  and  the  official  system;  2)  budget  balance;  3)  ex- 
penses not  detailed  in  the  budget;  4)  treaties  and  important 
diplomatic  affairs;  5)  movements  of  officials  above  those  ap- 
pointed by  memorials;  6)  conflict  of  powers  of  the  different 
departments;  7)  matters  submitted  for  discussion  by  special 
edicts,  or  petitions  of  the  people  transmitted  by  Parliament; 
8)  important  administrative  questions  of  the  different  depart- 
ments; 9)  matters  which  should  be  discussed  by  the  Cabinet 
according  to  laws  and  regulations;  10)  matters  which,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Prime  Minister  or  the  Ministers  of  the  differ- 
ent departments  ought  to  be  discussed  by  the  Cabinet.  All 
questions  were  to  be  decided  by  majority  vote. 

The  decisions  reached  by  the  Cabinet  were  not  to  have  the 
force  of  law,  except  after  the  Imperial  sanction,  which  could 
be  given  or  withheld  at  will.  In  other  words  the  members  of 
the  Cabinet  had  only  the  right  to  memorialize  the  Throne  for 
its  decision  in  a  matter,  and  to  submit  advice  on  questions 
when  the  Emperor  wished  their  opinion.  They  received  their 
appointments  from,  and  were  responsible  only  to,  the  Emperor. 

The  same  edict  of  May  8  created  a  Privy  Council,  which 
was  to  consist  of  "personal  advisers  to  the  Emperor."  This 
Council  was  given  no  administrative  power,  but  might  me- 
morialize the  Throne  on  matters  of  ceremonial,  investigation 
and  interpretation  of  constitutional  laws,  treaties  and  diplo- 
matic negotiations,  and  the  revision  of  its  own  regulations. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          89 

In  addition,  special  matters  might  be  referred  to  it  by  the 
Throne.34 

The  progress  of  constitutional  development  during  the  last 
months  of  1911  was  strongly  influenced  by  the  revolution  in 
the  Yangtze  valley.  For  this  reason  it  should  be  discussed  in 
connection  with  the  revolution  rather  than  as  a  part  of  the 
normal  course  of  constitutional  development  under  the  Man- 
chus. 

The  revolution  which  broke  out  at  Wuchang  in  October 
1911,  created  an  abnormal  condition.  It  is  impossible  to  do 
more  than  guess  as  to  what  would  have  been  accomplished  by 
way  of  establishing  a  limited  constitutional  monarchy  if  the 
Manchus  had  been  allowed  to  carry  out  their  programme  un- 
der normal  conditions.  Certainly  the  National  Assembly  and 
the  assemblies  in  the  provinces  showed  from  the  very  begin- 
ning a  decidedly  progressive  and  at  the  same  time  obstreperous 
spirit.  The  members  of  the  National  Assembly,  many  of  them 
Nobles,  and  all  of  them  from  the  higher  classes  of  society, 
were  practically  unanimous  in  their  decision  that  the  essence 
as  well  as  the  form  of  constitutionalism  must  be  introduced. 
Their  ability  to  take  matters  into  their  own  hands,  to  assume 
an  initiative  and  a  power  of  direction  in  the  reform  move- 
ment was  indicated  clearly  during  the  first  session.  They  did 
not  accomplish  all  that  they  wished  to,  but  they  did  force 
concessions  from  the  Throne  and  the  Ministers  sufficient  to 
show  them  their  power.  It  is  safe  to  assume  that  they  would 
have  been  able,  gradually,  to  gain  the  position  in  the  govern- 
mental system  that  Parliament  holds  in  the  English  system, 
relegating  the  Emperor  to  the  position  of  a  figure-head.  Every 
concession  granted  by  the  Crown  to  the  Assembly  would  have 
become,  by  usage,  an  inviolable  right  in  a  country  where  pre- 

34  China  Year  Book,  1912,  p.  226. 


90          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

cedent  is  all  important.  Of  course  there  is  the  possibility  that 
as  the  Assembly  grew  in  power  and  importance  it  would  have 
tended  to  lose  in  progressiveness,  but,  together  with  the  grad- 
ual assumption  of  control  by  the  Assembly  would  certainly 
have  gone  a  growth  of  political  consciousness  on  the  part  of 
the  people  of  China,  perhaps  even  greater  than  has  resulted 
from  the  introduction  of  republican  institutions.  So  that, 
as  the  gentry  and  upper  classes  established  themselves,  through 
the  Parliament,  in  place  of  the  Imperial  family  as  the  supreme 
governing  power,  they  would  have  been  subjected  to  as  strong 
a  pressure  from  below  as  they  themselves  had  exerted  formerly 
on  the  Crown.  At  any  rate,  if  the  constitutional  programme 
of  the  Manchus  had  been  carried  out,  China  would  have  been 
given  at  least  as  stable  and  enlightened  a  government  as  that 
of  the  Republic  of  the  last  eight  years. 

A  comparison  of  constitutional  development  in  Japan  and 
in  China  during  the  last  days  of  the  Manchu  Dynasty  is  often 
made,  invariably  lauding  the  success  of  the  Japanese  and  dis- 
paraging  the  work  attempted  in  China.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
the  conditions  were  so  different  as  to  make  a  comparison  value- 
less. Japan  was  a  small  and  compact  nation,  whose  rulers  and 
nobility  were  of  the  same  stock  as  the  common  people.  Com- 
pared with  China  the  government  of  Japan  was  highly  cen- 
tralized. The  feudal  condition  of  Japan  made  it  possible  to 
set  up  a  constitutional  government  which  left  the  actual  gov- 
erning power  in  the  hands  of  the  small  group  of  nobles,  who 
had  exercised  the  actual  governing  power  prior  to  the  Restor- 
ation, and  who  were  experienced  administrators.  The  Diet, 
nominally  elective,  was  in  reality  controlled  by  the  nobility  and 
not  by  the  people.  In  case  of  a  conflict  between  the  Ministers 
and  the  Diet,  it  was  only  necessary  to  call  upon  the  sacred 
name  of  the  Emperor  to  secure  the  acquiescence  of  the  people 
in  the  wishes  of  the  government.  In  Japan  the  people  were 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          91 

willing  to  accept  an  autocratic  constitutionalism  because  it 
meant  simply  the  continuance  of  the  old  government. 

Contrast  with  this  the  conditions  faced  by  the  Manchus  in 
China!  They  wished  to  gain  the  consent  of  the  people  to  a 
system  intended  to  consolidate  the  supremacy  of  an  alien  race. 
They  were  bent  on  centralization  of  the  government,  a  policy 
which  found  great  opposition  in  the  hitherto  practically  auton- 
omous provinces.  The  work  of  reform  had  been  undertaken 
to  placate  a  hostile  people,  and  to  counteract  an  anti-dynastic 
agitation  throughout  the  country.  There  was  no  such  respect 
for  the  word  of  the  Emperor  in  China  as  in  Japan.  And 
finally  there  was  no  group  of  capable  administrators  with  suffi- 
cient strength  to  dominate  the  administration.  China  had  no 
"Elder  Statesmen"  to  lend  equilibrium  to  the  government! 

There  is  a  better  reason  to  compare  the  progress  made  by 
the  Manchus  with  the  constitutional  progress  under  the  Re- 
public than  to  contrast  it  with  the  Japanese  Restoration,  and 
the  introduction  of  constitutional  government  into  that  coun- 
try. It  is  unquestionable  that  the  Manchus  attempted  to  im-  /c>- 
pose  the  form  of  a  constitutional  government  on  China  which 
did  not  realize  the  spirit  of  such  a  system.  But  from  the  first 
meeting  of  the  assemblies  it  was  evident  that  the  control  of  the 
situation  had  passed  from  the  Throne  to  the  representative 
body.  While  neither  the  National  Assembly  nor  the  provin- 
cial assemblies  were  representative  of  the  mass  of  the  people, 
they  represented,  what  is  more  important  in  a  country  like 
China,  different  interests  in  the  State.  It  was  a  class  repre- 
sentation undoubtedly  but  the  Chinese  people  have  always 
been  governed  by  a  distinct  official  heirarchy  and  are  not  fitted 
at  the  present  time  for  anything  else.35  The  classes  repre- 

55  It  must  be  remembered,  of  course,  that  admission  to  the 
official  class  was  open  to  all  who  could  qualify  in  the  examina- 
tions, but  this  does  not  mean  that  the  government  was  any  the 
less  class  government. 


92          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

sented  in  the  assemblies  were  the  Manchu  and  Chinese  nobil- 
ity, both  representative  of  the  same  class  of  interests;  the 
bureaucracy,  through  the  members  who  were  selected  from  the 
officials  of  the  ministries;  the  literati,  one  of  the  most  influ- 
ential of  all  classes  in  China;  those  interested  in  the  govern- 
ment because  they  supported  it  by  the  payment  of  taxes;  and, 
finally,  the  provincial  interests  were  given  the  largest  repre- 
sentation. The  fact  of  the  appointment  of  the  membership  of 
the  National  Assembly  does  not  take  away  from  its  repre- 
sentative character. 

As  has  been  stated,  all  of  the  signs  pointed  to  an  eventual 
control  of  the  government  by  the  Parliament,  and  not  by  the 
Emperor.  This  change  would  have  come  about  step  by  step 
instead  of  all  at  once  as  has  been  the  case  since  republican  in- 
stitutions have  been  introduced.  It  would  have  left  a  definite 
symbol  of  power  in  the  person  of  the  Emperor,  to  which  the 
people  could  have  rendered  homage,  instead  of  giving  them 
only  the  abstract  conception  of  the  State  to  hold  their  loyalty. 
One-man-power  is  something  understandable  to  the  Chinese 
mind.  Representative  government  as  a  limitation  of  that 
power  is  also  understandable,  but  government  by  an  Assembly 
without  one  "Son  of  Heaven"  to  personify  the  power  of  gov- 
ernment is  not  so  easily  comprehended. 

The  main  thing  emphasized  by  the  constitutional  monarch- 
ists from  the  very  beginning  was  the  need  of  preparation  in 
order  to  fit  the  Chinese  people  to  share  in  the  government. 
This  was  partly  due  to  their  imitation  of  the  Japanese  method 
of  introducing  a  constitutional  regime;  it  is  to  be  explained  in 
part,  perhaps,  by  a  desire  to  placate  the  people  by  words  in- 
stead of  acts;  but  it  was  certainly  owing,  to  a  large  extent, 
to  a  realization  of  the  real  need  for  such  preparation  and 
training.  That  representative  or  constitutional  government 
is  nothing  more  than  a  phrase  to  many  of  the  Chinese  has  been 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          93 

demonstrated  beyond  question  since  the  establishment  of  the 
Republic.  The  Republic  itself  has  done  a  great  deal  to  justify 
the  Manchu  desire  to  "jnake  haste  slowly." 

What  China  needed  was  what"  John  Stuart  Mill  has  called 
a  "government  of  leading  strings."  This  is  what  constitu- 
tional government  under  the  Manchus  would  have  given.  But 
such  a  government  is  desirable  only  if  it  prepares  the  nation 
for  higher  forms  of  political  institutions.  In  other  words,  the 
supreme  duty  of  a  "government  of  leading  strings"  is  the  po- 
litical education  of  the  people  so  that  they  may  be  progressive- 
ly better  fitted  for  self-government.  This  educative  function 
was  emphasized  by  the  Manchus  in  their  insistence  on  the 
need  for  a  period  of  preparation  before  true  constitutional 
government  was  introduced.  It  was  a  debatable  question, 
certainly,  how  far  the  Manchu  rulers  of  China,  if  left  to 
themselves,  could  be  trusted  to  carry  out  their  own  programme 
in  good  faith.  But  the  constant  criticism  and  interference  of 
the  National  Assembly  was  calculated  to  help  the  Imperial 
government  to  be  true  to  its  promises,  and  warrants  the  belief 
that  the  ideal  of  political  education  would  not  have  been  ne- 
glected. 

Further  speculation  as  to  the  possibility  of  ultimately  achiev- 
ing true  constitutional  government  under  the  Manchu  Dynasty 
is  useless.  A  new  phase  of  constitutional  development  ap- 
peared as  a  result  of  the  series  of  events  which  culminated  in 
the  establishment  of  a  Republic  at  Nanking  in  1912. 


CHAPTER  V 


The  revolution  which  accomplished  the  overthrow  of  the 
Manchu  Dynasty,  and  the  establishment  of  a  Republic  in 
China,  broke  out  at  Wuchang  on  October  10,  1911.  From 
a  mere  mutiny  of  the  Wuchang  garrison  the  movement  rap- 
idly spread  up  and  down  the  Yangtze  until  it  had  become  a 
formidible  opposition  to  the  Manchu  rule.  The  foreign  edu- 
cated Chinese  and  the  European  and  American  residents  in 
China  alike  hailed  it  as  the  first  step  in  the  regeneration  of 
the  nation.  At  last  the  sleeping  Dragon  had  shaken  off  its 
lethargy!  The  Chinese  people  had  arisen  in  their  might  and 
declared  their  intention  of  replacing  the  autocracy  of  the 
Manchu  with  the  democracy  of  the  West.  Very  few  stopped 
to  question  the  basis  for  the  claim  that  the  revolt  was  an  ex- 
pression of  the  desire  of  the  people  for  a  free  government. 
Foreigners  saw  the  revolution  as  an  accomplished  fact  and 
were  satisfied.  The  Manchus  had  never  welcomed  foreign 
trade  or  foreign  innovations  of  any  kind,  and  it  was  believed 
that  the  new  government,  founded  on  foreign  ideas,  would  be 
instrumental  in  promoting  a  more  friendly  intercourse  between 
the  East  and  the  West.  The  establishment  of  a  Republic  in 
China  seemed  to  mark  the  end  of  the  idea  that  "East  is  East 
and  West  is  West,  and  never  the  twain  shall  meet." 

This  feeling  of  the  Europeans  and  Americans  was  played 
upon  by  the  revolutionary  leaders  to  secure  the  support  of  the 
Powers  for  the  revolution.  Great  stress  was  laid  on  the  fact 
that  foreign  interests  must  be  protected,  and  were  protected 
by  the  republican  forces.  The  appeal  addressed  to  the  Powers 
by  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang  in  a  communication  to  the  foreign  press 

94 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          95 

is  well  worth  quoting.  "The  foreign  Powers  individually  and 
collectively  have  stood  hammering  at  the  door  of  China  for 
centuries  pleading  for  the  diffusion  of  knowledge,  a  reforma- 
tion of  national  services,  the  adoption  of  Western  sciences  and 
industrial  processes,  the  jettisoning  of  the  crude,  out-of-date 
and  ignoble  concepts  which  have  multiplied  to  keep  the  nation 
without  the  pale  of  the  great  family  constituting  the  civilized 
world.  They  have  failed.  .  .  .  "The  Manchu  Dynasty  has  tri- 
umphantly carried  on  its  reactionary  policy  despite  the  strong- 
est pressure  exerted  from  within  and  without,  until  the  op- 
pressed people  could  endure  the  disgrace  and  contumely  of 
it  no  longer.  They  rose,  and  with  what  result  the  history  of  the 
past  few  weeks  has  shown.  .  .  .  "The  Manchu  Dynasty  has 
been  tried  by  a  patient  and  peaceful  people  for  centuries  and  has 
been  found  more  than  wanting.  It  has  sacrificed  the  rever- 
ence, forfeited  the  regard,  and  lost  the  confidence  freely  re- 
posed in  it  by  all  Chinese.  The  popular  wish  is  that  the  Dy- 
nasty must  go." 

Concerning  the  policy  of  the  revolutionists  Dr.  Wu  wrote : 
"We  have,  in  short  taken  every  possible  step  to  protect  vested 
interests,  safeguard  international  obligations,  secure  continu- 
ance of  commerce,  and  shield  educational  and  religious  in- 
stitutions; and  what  is  even  more  important,  striven  con- 
tinually to  maintain  law  and  order,  sustain  peace,  and  pro- 
mote a  constructive  policy  upon  sound  and  enduring  grounds. 
.  .  .  "We  must  not  be  judged  by  the  past;  we  are  trying  to 
bring  China  into  her  own;  to  elevate  her  to  the  standard  that 
the  people  of  the  Occident  have  ever  been  urging  her  to  attain, 
and  the  stumbling  block  today,  as  it  has  been  during  the  past 
centuries,  is  the  Manchu  Dynasty.  Our  foreign  friends  must 
from  a  sheer  sense  of  fairness  concede  that  we  have  the  right 
to  win  the  laurels  of  freedom  by  fair  fight  in  the  field,  and 
to  avoid  the  rest  we  again  appeal  to  them  to  use  their  influ- 


96          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

ence  to  secure  in  the  Manchu  mind  recognition  of  the  utter 
hopelessness  of  the  continuance  of  the  Dynasty."1 

Such  an  appeal  was  well  calculated  to  secure  the  support 
of  foreigners  for  the  revolution.  The  prejudices  of  the  past, 
self-interest,  love  of  humanity  and  the  spirit  of  fair  play  were 
all  invoked  in  turn.  Nothing  was  said  of  the  part  the  Chinese 
had  played  in  opposing  the  introduction  of  western  industrial 
methods,  of  western  education,  of  railroads  and  the  telegraph. 
No  mention  was  made  of  the  part  played  by  the  people  in  the 
anti-foreign  riots  and  especially  in  the  Boxer  uprising.  And 
in  fact  foreigners  were  glad  to  accept  the  Republican  protesta- 
tions of  friendship  at  their  face  value;  to  forget  the  past,  or 
blame  it  on  the  Manchus;  and  to  hail  the  foundation  of  the 
Republic  as  the  dawn  of  a  new  era  in  the  history  of  the  Orient. 

When  defenders  of  the  Republic  were  asked  how  an  Oriental 
despotism  could  be  suddenly  and  permanently  transmuted  into 
a  modern  democratic  State,  they  pointed  to  the  local  self- 
government  which  the  Chinese  had  enjoyed  for  generations; 
the  common  management  of  the  affairs  of  the  village  under 
the  leadership  of  the  head  man  chosen  by  the  people  and  under 
their  control.  The  ability  of  the  people  to  manage  their  own 
local  affairs,  it  was  said,  showed  that  they  could  be  entrusted 
with  the  larger  affairs  of  the  nation. 

But  this  local  democratic  government  had  engendered  a 
spirit  of  locality  in  the  Chinese  people  which  must  be  con- 
sidered in  estimating  their  ability  to  assume  control  of  the 
general  government  of  the  Empire.  They  had,  and  still  have, 
no  conception  of  national  as  opposed  to  local  interests. ,  If 
Russia  seized  territory  in  the  North  the  people  of  Kuangtung 
or  Yunnan  provinces  felt  no  especial  concern.  Let  the  North 
protect  itself,  was  the  feeling.  If  the  Yellow  River  over- 

1  China  Year  Book,  1912.     The  Revolution,  pp.  xvn-xx. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          97 

flowed  its  banks,  Shansi  Province  took  the  necessary  steps  to 
protect  itself  without  regard  to  the  situation  in  Honan  or 
Shantung  Provinces,  perhaps  even  at  their  expense. 

This  spirit  of  locality  had  been  strengthened  by  the  nature 
of  the  central  authority  to  which  the  Chinese  had  become  ac- 
customed. The  Manchu  government  had  been  interested  in 
the  provincial  administration  only  so  far  as  the  revenues  had 
been  affected,  or  anti-dynastic  agitation  had  arisen.  It  was 
only  in  the  last  years  of  Manchu  rule  that  an  attempt  had  been 
made  to  unify  and  centralize  the  administration. 

John  Stuart  Mill,  perhaps  the  ablest  expounder  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  representative  government,  lays  it  down  as  a  general 
rule  that  a  people  who  have  a  strongly  developed  spirit  of 
locality  are  not  ready  for  the  introduction  of  representative 
government.  "One  of  the  strongest  hindrances  to  improve- 
ment," he  says,  "up  to  a  rather  advanced  stage,  is  an  inveterate 
spirit  of  locality.  Portions  of  mankind,  in  many  other  re- 
spects capable  of,  and  prepared  for,  freedom,  may  be  un- 
qualified for  amalgamating  into  even  the  smallest  nation.  .  .  . 
They  may,  like  the  citizens  of  an  ancient  community,  or  those 
of  an  Asiatic  village,  have  had  considerable  practice  in  exercis- 
ing their  faculties  on  village  or  town  interests,  and  have  even 
realized  a  tolerably  effective  popular  government  on  that  re- 
stricted scale,  and  may  yet  have  but  slender  sympathies  with 
anything  beyond,  and  no  habit  or  capacity  of  dealing  with  in- 
terests common  to  many  such  communities/'2 

It Js_£artlyjbecause_  such  a  spirit  of  locality Jiad^grownjip 
among  the  Chinese  people.^thatjt  has  proven,  so  far,  impos- 
sible~Tb72them  to 

"t^ejiatipnal  gpveniment,  or  to  substitute  a  representative  re- 
publican government  for  _thg_pld  Imperial  rule 


2  « 


"Representative  Government,"  Everyman  Edition,  p.  222. 


98          Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  Chinese  attitude  to  the  revolution 
and  the  Republic  we  must  briefly  review  the  conception  of  gov- 
ernment common  to  all  but  the  educated  few.  The  govern- 
ment has  always  been  something  apart  from  the  life  oflhe 

direct  concernjmd 


IfTwhich  they  have  no  great  interest.  Because  of  this  it  has 
always  been  easy  for  an  alien  rule  like  that  of  the  Manchus 
to  maintain  itself  in  China.  The  only  direct  connection  be- 
tween the  rulers  and  the  ruled  came  in  connection  with  the 
payment  of  taxes.  However,  in  return  for  the  taxes  which 
they  paid  to  the  government,  the  Chinese  people  demanded 
that  they  should  be  given  protection  for  life  and  property. 

_ttjfou_  Hkejjheir  j^tu^ejwa^rmj^ 

pays  a  detective  toj^uard  his  possessions.     He  jisjwilling  to 
pay  so  longjisjiej^etsjhe  jeturn  asked. 

The  visible  sign  of  decay  of  every  dynasty  in  the  history 
of  China  has  been  its  weakening  of  control  internally,  with  a 
consequent  prevalence  of  brigandage  and  piracy.  In  a  coun- 
try where  a  large  number  of  people  live  always  near  the  star- 
vation line  the  government  must  exercise  a  strong  authority 
in  order  to  protect  those  who  have  property  from  those  who 
have  none.  If  conditions  get  too  bad  the  government  is 
doomed.  Usually  the  Dynasty  has  been  able  to  maintain  it- 
self until  a  leader  has  arisen  strong  enough  to  rally  the  dis- 
affected to  his  banner,  thus  centralizing  opposition.  The  ex- 
haustion of  the  "mandate  of  heaven"  has  come  usually  simul- 
taneously with  the  appearance  of  such  a  leader,  and  he  has 
been  able  to  establish  his  family  as  the  ruling  House. 

For  about  seventyjjiyf  ypqrs  the  overtbfow--**f  t^^  Manchu 
Dynasty  had  been  confidently  predicted.     One  uprising  fol- 

lowed another  throughout  the  Empire.  Brigandage  and 
piracy  were  the  accepted  order  of  things.  But  until  1911  the 
Dynasty  had  always  been  able  to  recover  itself  sufficiently  to 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China          99 

retain  its  hold  on  the  Throne.     This  had  been  due,  not  so  | 
much  to  its  strength  as  to  the  inability  of  the  opposition  to  j 
concentrate  and  obtain  competent  leadership.     The  leader  of 
the  Taiping  revolt  bade  fair  to  overthrow  the  Manchus,  ex- 
cept for  two  things.     He  was  able  to  destroy  the  power  of 
the  government  but  lacked  the  constructive  ability  necessary 
to  reorganize  the  country  under  his  own  control.     The  sec-  \ 
ond  reason  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Manchus  in  control  J 
was   the  aid  extended  to  them  by   foreigners.      The  great 
Mahommedan   rebellion,  which  arose  almost  simultaneously 
with  that  of  the  Taipings  was  also  put  down  largely  because 
of  its  lack  of  organization  and  leadership.    Aside  from  these 
two  great  rebellions  there  were  innumerable  smaller  upris- 
ings throughout  the  country.     Wherever  there  was  a  lack  of 
equilibrium  between  the  food  production  and  the  increase  of 
population  a  revolt  against  the  government  was  certain  to  oc- 
cur.    After  foreign  aggression  in  China  became  pronounced 
this  local  dissatisfaction  could  be  diverted  for  a  time  into  anti- 
foreign  channels.     But  foreign  aggression  together  with  the  \ 
lack  of  power  to  preserve  order  in  the  country  soon  revealed  [ 
the  weakness  of  the  Manchu  Dynasty. 

After  1900  the  efforts  of  the  Manchus  to  maintain  them- 
selves in  power  took  a  new  form.  Hitherto  they  had  opposed 
the  introduction  of  foreign  ideas  into  the  country,  feeling  that 
their  very  life  depended  upon  the  continuance  of  the  old 
order.  Finally,  however,  they  tried  to  use  foreign  ideas  and 
institutions  to  strengthen  their  position.  If  foreign  educa- 
tion was  to  be  introduced  let  it  be  under  the  direction  of  the 
Central  Government!  If  railroads  were  necessary  they 
should  be  constructed  under  agreements  concluded  with  the 
Peking  government,  and  not  through  provincial  initiative.3 

3  This  conclusion  was  reached  particularly  during  the  period 
after  1905. 


ioo        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

This  movement  toward  a  centralization  of  the  government 
at  the  expense  of  the  old  provincial  autonomy  however 
aroused  immediate  opposition  in  the  provinces.  It  was  pro- 
vincial opposition  that  forced  the  cancellation  of  the  Ameri- 
can loan  agreement  to  construct  the  Hankow-Canton  line. 
When  an  agreement  with  the  Four  Power  group  to  construct 
the  same  road  was  concluded  in  the  spring  of  1911,  provin- 
cial opposition  again  developed.  The  gentry  of  the  provinces 
concerned  claimed  the  right  to  build  the  road  themselves,  and 
began  an  agitation  for  the  cancellation  of  the  agreement.  It 
was  the  whole  policy  of  the  government  that  was  objected  to, 
rather  than  this  single  agreement.  So  firm  was  the  attitude 
of  the  provinces  that  the  government  was  forced  to  adopt  a 
conciliatory  policy.  The  blame  for  the  trouble  was  laid  on 
the  Minister  of  Communications,*  under  whose  direction  the 
policy  of  railroad  centralization  had  been  developed.  Here 
again  the  weakness  of  the  Manchu  rule  was  revealed.  Their 
policy  of  centralization  had  come  too  late,  and  had  furnished 
one  more  weapon  for  the  opposition  to  the  Dynasty. 

As  Manchu  weakness  became  increasingly  clear  to  the  coun- 
try, revolutionary  secret  societies,  which  never  entirely  dis- 
appear from  China,  sprang  into  new  life.  Probably  the  most 
influential  of  these  organizations  at  the  time  of  the  revolu- 
tion was  that  known  as  the  Tung  Meng  Hui.5  This  society 
had  been  formed  shortly  after  the  failure  of  the  1898  reform 
movement  and  in  its  aims  was  avowedly  anti-dynastic.  The 

4  Sheng  Hsuan-hui,  (he  is  better  known  perhaps  by  his  title 
Sheng  Kung-pao).  The  agitation  against  him  personally  and  his 
policy  of  centralization  resulted  in  a  victory  for  the  provinces 
when  he  was  removed  by  Imperial  Edict,  issued  at  the  request 
of  the  National  Assembly. 

8  For  description  of  the  Tung  Meng  Hui  see  sec.  "Political 
Societies  and  Parties."  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  663-666. 
Also  Hornbeck,  Ch.  V,  Pol.  Parties. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  Chmft:  :\;* 

Tung  Meng  Hui  resulted  from  the  union  of  several  inde- 
pendent revolutionary  organizations  which  had  been  formed 
in  Japan  by  Chinese  students.  Its  recognized  leader  was  Sun 
Wen,  or,  as  he  is  better  known,  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen.6 
f  For  ten  years  preceding  the  revolution  Dr.  Sun  had  spent 
mVfime  in  travel  in  Europe  and  America  wherever  there  were 
Chinese,  carrying  the  doctrines  of  the  revolution  and  secur- 
ing financial  support  for  the  movement  to  overthrow  the  Man- 
chus.  The  great  strength  of  the  Tung  Meng  Hui  lay  in  its 
overseas  membership  rather  than  in  its  adherents  in  China, 
but  its  propaganda  had  also  enlisted  the  support  of  many  in 
China  proper,  especially  in  the  Southern  provinces. 

The  history  of  the  revolution  of  1911  shows,  however,  that 
it  was  not  the  result  of  a  carefully  planned  movement,  but  was 
rather  a  spontaneous  and  contagious  uprising  at  isolated  points, 
which  was  later  partially  unified  and  coordinated.  The  Wu- 
chang outbreak  was  preceded  by  a  rebellion  of  serious  propor- 
tions in  Szechuan  province7  with  which  the  government  proved 
unable  to  cope  successfully.  As  the  news  of  the  successes  at 
Wuchang  and  Hankow  spread  up  and  down  the  Yangtze  one 
section  after  another  repudiated  the  Manchu  authority,  but 
always  under  local  leaders,  and  without  accepting  any  central 
control.  The  leader  of  the  revolting  troops  at  Wuchang,  Li 
Yuan-hung,  had  never  been  identified  with  any  revolutionary 
organization  before  he  was  compelled  to  assume  the  direction 
of  affairs.  The  Republican  Committee  at  Shanghai,  which 

6  The  name  Sun  Yat-sen  has  been  used  throughout  because  of 
its  greater  familiarity  to  foreign  readers. 

7  Caused  by  the  conflict  over  the  assumption  of  control  over 
railroad  construction  in  the  province  by  the  Central  Government. 
The  trouble  arose  over  the  refusal  of  the  Government  to  pay 
more  of  the  obligations  of  the  provincial  Board  than  those  in- 
curred for  materials  actually  purchased  and  work  actually  done. 
This  lost  the  Gentry  much  of  their  "squeeze"  on  the  undertaking. 


Coujstitidional  Development  in  China 


finally  claimed  the  right  to  represent  the  revolution  in  nego- 
tiations with  the  Manchu  government,  was  organized  almost 
a  month  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  Nevertheless,  all 
had  a  common  determination  that  the  Manchu  rule  must  go  — 
and  this_Jialred  of  the  reigning  dynasty  provided  the  bond 
of  union  which  held  the  revolutionary  leaders  together  so 
long  as  the  common  foe  existed. 

It  is  outside  the  scope  of  a  discussion  of  constitutional  de- 
velopment to  give  a  detailed  account  of  the  revolutionary 
movement,  except  in  its  bearing  on  the  establishment  of  a 
constitutional  regime  in  China./^While  the  Manchu  authority 
was  being  overthrown  in  the  Yangtze  valley,  in  Peking  the 
National  Assembly  was  continuing  to  force  concessions  from 
the  Imperial  government  so  limiting  the  power  of  the  Throne 
as  to  give  the  Assembly  practical  control.  The  effect  of  the 
revolution  was  very  marked  in  the  influence  it  exerted  upon 
this  struggle  between  the  Throne  and  the  National  Assembly. 
The  National  Assembly  reconvened  on  October  22,  ten  days 
after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  at  Wuchang.  Its  first  act  was 
to  secure  the  dismissal  of  Sheng  Kungpao,  the  Minister  of 
Communications,  whose  policy  of  railroad  centralization  had 
aroused  such  opposition  In  the  provinces  as  to  lead  directly  to 
the  revolt  of  the  Szechuanese.8  Then  it  turned  its  attention 
I  to  constitutional  questions.^ 

During  the  latter  part  of  its  first  session  the  members  of 

/the  Assembly  had  demanded  the  establishment  of  a  responsi- 

ble Cabinet,  and  had  secured  the  promise  of  the  Emperor  to 

Ij  organize  it.    We  have  seen  that  this  promise  was  carried  out 

by  a  mere  change  of  name,  the  Grand  Council  being  trans- 

formed into  a  Cabinet,  with  a  responsibility  only  to  the  Throne. 

Prince  Ch'ing,  an  old  and  reactionary  member  of  the  Imperial 

8  China  Year  Book,  1912,  pp.  xx. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        103 

family,  was  made  the  Premier  and  most  of  the  Cabinet  posts 
were  held  by  Manchu  Nobles.9  Such  a  body  was  far  from 
satisfactory  to  the  Assembly,  both  in  its  composition  and  be- 
cause it  was  responsible  only  to  the  Emperor. 

Emboldened   by   its   success   in    forcing   the   dismissal   of 
Sheng  Hsuan-hui,  and  by  the  compliant  attitude  of  the  gov- 
ernment, due  to  conditions  in  the  South,  /the  Assembly  im- 
mediately made  three  demands  on  the  Throne.     They  were: 
i  )  that  a  constitution  should  be  framed  only  after  consultation 
with  the  Assembly;  2)   the  exclusion  from  the  Cabinet  of  i 
members  of  the  Imperial  family,  and  the  immediate  appoint-  ;' 
ment  of  a  capable  and  virtuous  person  to  organize  a  respon-  1 
sible  Cabinet;  and  3)  an  immediate  Jmne1^y%)  all  political  1 
offenders,  including  those  who  had  been  proscribed  in  iSQS.10 
Added  weight  was  given  these  demands  by  the  refusal  of  the 
troops  stationed  at  Lanchou,  on  the  Peking-Mukden  railroad, 
to  entrain  for  the  South  until  the  demands  had  been  acceded 
to.     The  action  of  the  troops  was  supported  by  their  com- 
manding officer. 

Therewas  nothing^for  the  Regentjo^dq  but  yjgM.    All  the 
demands  of  the  Ass^ml)I}rwere^onceded  in  a  series  of  edicts     1 
Hrsstted  on  "October  3O.irTThe  first  of  these,  ack.nawledg.ed  the~- 
"negligence  ot  ^ejl'hrorfe^assurning,  according  to  the  Chinese  ( 
^  for  the  unsettled 


and  weakened  condition_of  the  country.  "In  Szechuan  trouble 
ih-st^c^uffedrtKe^Wuchang  rebellion  followed;  now  alarming 
reports  come  from  Shensi  and  Honan.  In  Canton  (city)  and 
Kiangsi  (province)  riots  appear.  The  whole  Empire  is  seeth- 
ing, the  minds  of  the  people  are  perturbed  and  the  spirits  of 
our  nine  late  Emperors  are  not  able  properly  to  enjoy  the 

9  See  China  Mission  Year  Book,  1912,  p.  41. 

10  China  Year  Book,   1912,  pp.  xx. 

11  Ibid.,  pp.  xx-xxni. 


IO4        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

sacrifices  made  to  them,  while  it  is  feared  that  the  people  will 
suffer  grievously. 

"All  these  things  are  my  own  fault.  Hereby  I  announce  to 
the  world  that  I  swear  to  reform  and  with  Our  soldiers  and 
people  to  carry  out  the  constitution  faithfully,  modifying 
legislation,  developing  the  interests  of  the  people  and  abolish- 
ing their  hardships,  all  in  accordance  with  the  interests  and 
wishes  of  the  people.  .  .  .  Being  a  very  small  person  stand- 
ing at  the  head  of  my  subjects,  I  see  that  my  heritage  is  nearly 
falling  to  the  ground.  I  regret  my  fault  and  repent  greatly. 
I  can  only  trust  that  my  subjects  will  support  the  soldiers  in 
order  to  support  me,  to  comfort  the  millions  of  my  people,  to 
hold  firmly  the  eternity  of  the  Dynasty,  and  to  convert  danger 
into  tranquility.  The  patriotism  of  the  Empire's  subjects  will 
be  appreciated  and  trusted  forever."12 

After  this  most  humble  "apologia"  the  direct  demands  of 
the  Assembly  were  discussed.  In  each  of  the  three  cases  it 
was  stated  that  the  Assembly  was  only  asking  for  the  faith- 
ful observance  of  principles  already  well  established.  For 
this  reason  it  was  possible  to  give  in  and  yet  "save  the  face" 
_of  the  Emperor.  As  to  the  adoption  ofthe  constitution  the 
edict  said :  "Now  asT  memorialized  T)ythe  said  Yuan  (As- 
sembly), constitutional  law  is  a  law  to  be  faithfully  respected 
by  both  sovereign  and  people,  it  should  be  advisable  to  permit 
the  officials  and  people  to  give_their_advice  at  _the_oiiiset  be- 
fore_its  final  adoption,  ^gain  it  says  that  their  deliberation 
and  advice  shouldjDe  after  the  conclusion  of  the  framing  and 
before  thTTmperial  sanction!  This  wUTnot  in  the  least  affect 
ih^frmciple  of  Imperial  sanction  as  ordered  by  the  former 
Emperor.™  Pu  Lun14  and  others  are  hereby  commanded  to 

12  China  Year  Book,   1912,  pp.  xxi. 
3  The  italics  are  the  author's. 
14  A  Prince  of  the  Imperial  family. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        105 

obey  the  main  principle  which  was  Imperially  sanctioned,  by 
framing  the  clauses  of  the  constitutional  law  speedily,  and  then 
handing  them  to  the  Tszechengyuan  for  careful  deliberation 
and  discussion,  and  to  wait  upon  Us  to  give  Imperial  sanc- 
tion before  promulgation."15 

It  is  apparent  that  this  was  far  from  the  idea  of  the  Em- 
press-Dowager. She  thought  of  the  constitution  as  a  docu- 
ment promulgated  by  the  Throne  and  depending  for  its  valid- 
ity only  on  the  Imperial  sanction.  In  the  "Principles  of  the 
Constitution,"  it  will  be  remembered,  discussion  of  the  con- 
stitution both  before  and  after  its  promulgation,  was  a  prw^ 
lege  expressly  withheld  from  the  Assembly.  This  was  a  very 
different  principle  from  the  one  now  established.  The  Emp- 
ress Dowager  emphasized  the  absolute  supremacy  of  the 
Throne  while  the  Regent  was  compelled  to  acknowledge  that 
the  Assembly  had  an  equal  right  with  the  Throne  to  a  voice* 
in  the  determination  of  the  principles  of  the  constitution. 

The  question  of  the  Cabinet  was  just  as  fully  conceded.  The 
members  of  the  Assembly  objected  to  the  personnel  of  the 
Cabinet,  as  well  as  to  the  fact  that  they  were  not  able  to  as- 
sume any  control  over  it  under  the  "regulations"  which  had 
been  sanctioned  by  Imperial  edict. 

The  edict  of  October  30  marks  the  end  of  the  attempt  to  | 
maintain  old  institutions  under  a  new  name.     "Relatives  of  j 
Nobles,"  it  runs,  "in  holding  political  supremacy,  are  contrary  1 
to  the  general  usage  obtaining  in  all  other  constitutional  coun-  j 
tries.     The  Law  of  Our  Dynasty  forbids  them  to  interfere  I 
with  political  affairs.     Our  ancestral  rules  are  very  explicitly 
worded,  they  fit  well  with  the  spirit  of  a  constitutional  nation. 
After  the  reign  of  T'ung  Chi(h),  national  calamity  not  having 
ended,  prince  councillors  were  first  created  to  support  and 
assist   (the  government),  and  the  practice  has  been  handed 

15  China  Year  Book,  1912,  p.  xxi. 


io6        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

down  to  the  present.  During  this  year,  princes,  dukec  and 
others  have  been  again  appointed  Ministers  of  Stati;  upon  the 
formation  of  the  Cabinet.  This  was  a  matter  of  temporary 
policy,™  and  the  Throne  had  not  done  it  intentionally.  Now, 
as  memorialized  by  the  said  Yuan,  a  Cabinet  of  members  of 
the  Imperial  family  cannot  exist  concurrently  with  a  consti- 

Jutional  form  of  government.  It  requests  the  cancellation 
of  the  temporary  rules  for  the  Cabinet,  the  genuine  establish- 

^ment  of  a  complete  system  for  a  Cabinet,  and  the  discontinua- 
tion of  the  employing  of  relatives  or  Nobles  as  Ministers  of 
State,  etc.  These  suggestions  are  made  with  a  view  to  en- 
hancing the  nobleness  of  the  Imperial  House,  and  solidifying 
the  foundation  of  the  Empire,  and  are  much  appreciated  and 
approved  by  Us.  As  soon  as  affairs  get  a  little  settled,  and 
competent  officials  are  obtainable,  We  shall  order  them  to 
form  a  complete  Cabinet,  and  not  again  to  appoint  relatives 
or  Nobles  to  be  Ministers  of  State,  and  at  the  same  time,  to 
have  the  temporary  rules  for  the  Cabinet  cancelled,  in  order 
to  conform  with  the  principles  of  constitutional  government 
and  to  establish  national  foundations."17 

The  proclamation  of  mercy  for  political  offenders  was  em- 
bodied in  the  fourth  of  this  series  of  edicts  issued  on  Oc- 
tober 30,  1911. 

The  National  Assembly  was  not  slow  to  take  advantage  of 

1  these  concessions.  ^Within  three  days  a  new  set  of  principles 
to  be  embodied  in  the  constitution  had  been  drawn  up  and 
adopted.  These  principles  were  immediately  submitted  to  the 

j  Throne  and  received  the  Imperial  sanction  on  November  3. 

While  providing  for  the  continued  reign  of  the  Manchu 
Dynasty  it  was  made  evident  that  the  Imperial  family  was  no 
longer  to  rule.  Instead  of  the  constitution  being  granted  by 

16  The  italics  are  the  author's. 

17  China  Year  Book,  1912,  p.  xxn. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        107 

the  Emperor,  it  was  to  be  drawn  up  and  adopted  by  the  As- 
sembly and  promulgated  by  Imperial  mandate.  Even  the  right 
to  withhold  his  assent  to  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
was  taken  from  the  Emperor. 

Instead  of  the  Parliament  being  merely  an  advisory  body, 
the  new  "principles"  gave  it  a  supervisory  power  over  the  en- 
tire administration/^  "Parliament  shall  elect  and  the  Emperor 
shall  appoint  the  Premier,  who  will  recommend  the  other 
members  of  the  Cabinet,  these  also  being  appointed  by  the 
Emperor.  The  Imperial  Princes  shall  be  ineligible  as  Premier, 
Cabinet  Ministers  or  administrative  heads  of  provinces." 
Then  followed  the  provision  for  a  Cabinet  responsible  to 
Parliament:  "If  the  Premier,  on  being  impeached  by  Parlia- 
ment, does  not  dissolve  Parliament  he  must  resign,  but  one 
Cabinet  shall  not  be  allowed  to  dissolve  Parliament  more 
than  once." 

While  the  command  of  the  army  and  navy  was  vested  in 
the  Emperor,  "when  that  power  is  used  with  regard  to  inter- 
nal affairs  he  must  observe  special  conditions  to  be  imposed 
by  Parliament."  L.The  legislative  power  was  transferred  to 
the  Parliament  as  was  the  treaty  making  power.  The  privi- 
lege of  discussing  the  budget,  which  had  been  given  the  As- 
sembly by  the  "constitutional  principles"  sanctioned  by  the 
Empress-Dowager,  was  changed  into  an  absolute  control  over 
the  national  finances.  'And,  finally,  the  Parliament  alone  was  I 
authorized  to  amend  the  constitution.18 

No  greater  confession  of  weakness  could  have  been  made 
by  the  Manchus  than  their  acceptance  of  this  work  of  the 
Assembly  by  which  the  centre  of  control  was  shifted  from  the    • 
Crown  to  the   Parliament.      Instead   of   strengthening  their 
hold  on  the  country  and  enabling  them  to  retain  their  old 

18  For  a  summary  of  the  new  "principles"  see  China  Year 
Book,  1912,  pp.  xxui-xxiv. 


f 

io8        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

position  of  supremacy  in  the  State,  the  representative  insti- 
tutions which  the  Manchus  had  called  into  being  had  brought 
about  a  complete  limitation  of  their  authority.  The  National 
Assembly,  carefully  selected  so  that  it  would  act  at  the  dic- 
tation of  the  Government,  had  shown  a  spirit  of  insubordina- 
tion from  the  time  of  its  convocation  in  the  fall  of  1910.  It 
had  not  been  content  with  the  minor  position  assigned  to  it, 
and  had  bent  every  effort  to  secure  a  recognition  of  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  Government  to  the  duly  selected  repre- 
sentatives of  the  nation.  It  is  remarkable  that  such  a  spirit 
should  have  been  manifested  by  an  Assembly  consisting  of 
representatives  of  the  Nobility  and  the  official  classes,  as  well 
as  the  stubbornly  conservative  literati,  and  the  gentry  of  the 
provinces.  It  might  be  said  that  the  liberal  element  injected 
from  the  provincial  assemblies  was  responsible  for  the  atti- 
tude of  the  National  Assembly,  but  this  does  not  account  for 
the  practical  unanimity  of  all  classes  of  representatives  in 
their  opposition  to  the  government.  It  would  have  been  in- 
teresting to  watch  the  development  of  a  constitutional  mon- 
archy out  of  an  Oriental  despotism,  but  the  demand  of  the 
Southern  revolutionists  for  the  abdication  of  the  Emperor 
ended  the  possibility  of  such  an  evolution.  No  matter  how 
limited  the  power  of  the  Throne,  the  Manchus  were  no  longer 
acceptable  to  the  country,  especially  the  South. 

While  the  National  Assembly  was  busy  wresting  conces- 
sions from  the  Throne,  the  revolutionary  movement  had  been 
spreading  rapidly.  ^  The  actual  military  successes  of  the  one 
side  or  the  other  do  not  furnish  any  indication  of  what  was 
happening.  The  strength  of  the  revolution  was  measured  not 
by  defeats  inflicted  on  the  Imperialists,  but  by  defections  from 
the  Imperial  ranks.  Soldiers  mutinied  and  joined  the  revo- 
lutionary forces;  districts  and  whole  provinces,  one  after  the 
other,  declared  their  independence  of  the  Central  Government. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        109 

The  cry  of  "down  with  the  Manchus"  was  fast  becoming  uni- 
versal. The  moderation  of  the  attitude  of  the  government 
toward  the  Assembly,  and  the  successes  achieved  by  that  body 
seemed  to  have  no  effect  in  the  South.  The  feeling  was  that 
voiced  by  Dr.  Wu  T'ing-fang,  that  the  Manchus  had  for- 
feited the  respect  of  the  country,  and  that  they  could  not  be 
trusted,  no  matter  how  conciliatory  their  attitude.  Nothing 
short  of  abdication  would  satisfy  the  people. 

The  Regent,  however,  was  not  prepared  to  succumb  with- 
out a  struggle.  It  was  felt  in  the  North  that  only  one  man 
could  cope  with  the  situation.  This  man  was  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
who  had  been  in  retirement  since  the  accession  of  Hsuan  T'ung. 
The  last  expressed  wish  of  the  late  Emperor,  Kwang  Hsu,  is 
said  to  have  been  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  should  be  killed.19  He 
had  always  been  blamed  by  the  Emperor,  and  rightly,  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  reform  movement  in  1898.  The  Regent 
had  not  dared  to  carry  out  his  promise  to  Kwang  Hsu  to  kill 
Yuan,  but  he  had  immediately  sent  him  to  the  country  to  "re- 
cover'' from  his  activities  in  the  service  of  the  State.  The 
condition  of  the  Empire  now  made  Prince  Ch'un,  the  Regent, 
feel  that  the  safety  of  the  State  demanded  the  "recovery"  of 
Yuan  Shih-kai  and  his  return  to  active  political  life.  Since 
the  death  of  the  Empress  Dowager  there  had  been  no  out- 
standing personality  in  the  Manchu  administration.  Men  of 
the  strength  and  ability  of  the  old  Viceroys,  Tsung  Kuo-fan, 
Tso  Tsung-t'ang,  Li  Hung-chang,  and  Chang  Chih-tung  were 
sorely  needed.  The  only  one  left  was  Yuan  Shih-kai,  and  he 
had  been  in  retirement  since  January,  1909.  With  him  had 
gone  many  of  his  able  lieutenants,  foreign  educated  men  of 
the  type  of  T'ang  Shao-yi.20 

19  "China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,"  p.  286. 

20  Later  Yuan's  representative  in  negotiating  with  the  South, 
and  first  Premier  of  the  Republic  after  the  election  of  Yuan  as 
President. 


no        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

In  response  to  the  generally  expressed  desire,  the  Regent 
issued  an  edict  recalling  Yuan  to  service  on  October  14,  1911. 
He  was  appointed  Viceroy  of  the  Hukuang  provinces,  and 
given  supreme  command  of  the  Imperial  forces  in  Hupeh  and 
Hunan,  with  full  power  of  granting  pardons.  Yuan  Shih- 
kai,  however,  did  not  manifest  any  great  desire  to  return  to 
office.  While  he  did  not  refuse  to  obey  the  command  of  the 
Emperor,  he  made  it  perfectly  plain  that  he  would  come  back 
only  on  his  own  terms.  His  stipulation  being  for  practically 
a  free  hand  in  dealing  with  the  South,  his  terms  were  accepted 
in  an  edict  of  October  27,  which  conferred  on  him  substan- 
tially a  military  dictatorship.21  He  was  placed  in  command 
of  all  the  Imperial  forces,  both  the  army  and  the  navy,  and 
immediately  assumed  direction  of  the  military  operations  in 
the  Yangtze  valley.  On  November  8,  he  was  elected  Premier 
by  the  National  Assembly,  and  returned  to  Peking  to  take 
charge  of  the  almost  hopeless  affairs  of  the  Dynasty. 

As  a  result  of  Imperial  successes  at  Hanyang,  the  head  of 
the  Wuchang  revolutionary  organization,  Li  Yuan-hung, 
opened  negotiations  with  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  the  last  days  of 
November.  These  negotiations  were  almost  immediately 
transferred,  first  to  Shanghai  and  then  to  Nanking.  Out  of 
the  resulting  conferences  between  the  representatives  of  Yuan 
Shih-kai  and  of  the  Provisional  Republican  Government  came 
the  settlement  by  which  the  Manchu  Emperor  abdicated  and 
the  Republic  established  itself  as  the  recognized  government 
of  China."^ 

Since  Li  Yuan-hung  and  the  other  leaders  of  the  revolution 
acknowledged  the  right  of  the  Shanghai  Revolutionary  Coun- 
cil to  speak  for  them,  it  is  advisable  to  discuss  that  organiza- 
tion briefly.  It  was  not  until  November  3  that  Shanghai  took 

21  Edicts  of  October  14  and  October  27,  1911.  China  Year 
Book,  1912.  "The  Revolution,"  p.  xxvm. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        in 

its  stand  on  the  side  of  the  Revolution.  On  that  date  control 
of  the  city  passed  into  the  hands  of  an  organization  calling 
itself  "The  Military  Government  of  the  Chinese  People,"  or 
as  it  later  styled  itself,  "The  Republican,  Government  of 
China."  Several  meetings  of  the  inhabitants  of  Shanghai 
were  held  and  Chen  Chi-mei  was  chosen  as  the  military  gov- 
ernor of  the  city.  Dr.  Wu  T'ing-fang  acted  as  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Shanghai  government.  November 
13  Chen  Chi-mei  issued  a  letter  to  the  newly  established  Mili- 
tary-Governors of  the  provinces  under  the  control  of  the  revo- 
lution asking  them  to  see  that  representatives  of  the  provinces 
were  chosen  to  act  as  a  National  Council  for  the  Revolution. 
The  Council  met  first  at  Hanyang  and  later  at  Nanking  where 
it  secured  recognition  as  the  Republican  Assembly.22 

It  was  with  the  self-styled  "Military  Government  of  the 
Chinese  People"  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  finally  opened  discussions. 
The  first  move  toward  peace  came  from  General  Li  Yuan- 
hung  at  Wuchang,  and  while  he  did  not  insist  on  the  negotia- 
tions being  conducted  under  his  own  supervision,  he  did  insist 
that  conferences  be  held  by  duly  accredited  agents  of  the  Revo- 
lution with  the  representatives  of  the  Imperial  government. 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  anxious  to  secure  a  settlement  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, appointed  his  old  henchman,  T'ang  Shao-yi,  as  his  rep- 
resentative, with  full  powers  to  act  for  the  Imperial  govern- 
ment.23 Dr.  Wu  T'ing-fang  was  appointed  as  the  chief  rep- 
resentative of  the  Revolution. 

22  "This  Council  was  composed  of  delegates  from  most  of  the 
provinces   (fourteen  in  fact),  some  duly  authorized  by  the  re- 
spective   Provincial    Assemblies,    and    others    self-appointed    or 
nominated  by  some  local  official  of  the  faction  in  control  of  the 
affairs  of  the  province."    China  Year  Book,  1913,  p.  466. 

23  The  text  of  T'ang's  credentials  read  as  follows :     "I,  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  in  compliance  with  the  said  edict  (empowering  him  to 
reach   a   settlement  with  the   South)    appoint   your   Excellency 


H2        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

At  the  first  meeting  of  the  conferees,  December  18,  1911, 
(the  revolutionary  demands  were  presented  to  T'ang  and  trans- 
mitted by  him  to  Peking.     They  were  that  the  Manchu  Dy- 
i' I  nasty  abdicate  and  a  Republic  be  established  as  the  govern- 

jment  of  China;  and  they  promised  liberal  treatment  for  the 
Imperial  family.24  While  negotiations  were  at  a  standstill 
pending  the  reply  of  the  Emperor,  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  arrived  in 
Shanghai  from  Europe  where  he  had  been  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  revolution.  He  immediately  made  himself  an  important 
factor  in  the  future  negotiations.  He  arrived  on  the  twenty  - 
fifth  of  December,  and  readily  consented  to  become  a  candi- 
date for  the  presidency  of  the  Provisional  Republican  Govern- 
pient  which  had  been  formed  at  Nanking  by  the  representa- 
tives of  the  provinces  who  had  assembled  in  response  to  the 
call  of  the  Military  Governor  of  Shanghai.  The  Nanking 

/  Council  elected  Dr.  Sun  President  on  the  twenty-eighth  of 

I  December. 

On  the  day  that  Dr.  Sun  was  elected  the  reply  of  the  Em- 
peror to  the  demand  for  abdication  was  received.  Instead  of 
giving  a  definite  yes  or  no,  the  edict  suggested  that  the  whole 
question  be  referred  to  a  legally  constituted  National  As- 
sembly, the  Throne  agreeing  to  accept  the  decision  of  such 
a  body  as  final.25  This  concession  was  a  great  step  towards 
a  basis  of  settlement,  since  always  before  the  idea  of  abdica- 
tion had  -been  totally  repudiated  by  the  Manchu  government. 
The  revolutionaries  agreed  to  the  proposal,  but  laid  down  such 
conditions  as  would  have  made  impossible  any  solution  other 
than  abdication.  T'ang  Shao-yi  accepted  their  terms,  but  his 

(T'ang  Shao-yi)  as  my  delegate  with  full  powers,  and  request 
you  to  proceed  there  (to  Shanghai)  immediately  in  accordance 
with  the  edict."  China  Year  Book,  1913,  p.  467. 

24  Ibid.,  p.  466. 

25  Edict  28  Dec.  Trans.,  Ibid.,  p.  467. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        113 

action  was  repudiated  by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  and  Tang  resigned 
from  his  post  as  Imperial  delegate,  although  he  continued  to 
act  as  the  intermediary  between  Yuan  and  the  Republican 
leaders. 

Yuan  Shih-kai's  position  was  a  very  delicate  one  throughout 
the  period  of  these  negotiations.  He  was  the  head  of  the  Im- 
perial government,  with  full  power  to  take  any  steps  neces- 
sary to  bring  about  a  settlement  between  the  North  and  the 
South,  but  he  did  not  have  the  money  or  the  supplies  to  force 
a  fight  to  the  finish.  The  best  he  could  hope  for  was  to  secure  v 
the  retention  of  the  Emperor,  stripped  of  practically  all  power, 
as  the  nominal  head  of  the  State.  The  first  conferences 
showed  clearly  that  the  Manchus  must  go, — that  the  Republi- 
cans would  not  permit  them  to  retain  even  the  semblance  of 
power.  Yuan's  task  eventually  came  to  this,  then:  he  must 
use  the  threat  of  continued  fighting  to  secure  the  best  terms 
possible  for  the  Imperial  family,  and  he  had  to  keep  the 
strength  of  the  revolution  constantly  before  the  Manchus  in 
order  to  bring  them  to  the  point  of  abdication  when  favorable 
terms  had  been  secured.  It  was  well  known  that  the  revolu-f 
tionary  party  was  even  more  urgently  in  need  of  funds  than 
the  Imperialists,  so  that  the  desire  for  peace  was  as  great  atj 
Nanking  as  at  Peking.  By  skilfully  playing  on  the  fears  and 
weaknesses  first  of  the  one  and  then  of  the  other  side,  Yuan 
Shih-kai  was  able  to  secure  a  settlement  which  was  compara- 
tively satisfactory  to  both,  and  which  left  him  as  the  strongest 
single  factor  in  the  State. 

About  the  middle  of  January  Dr.  Sun  Yat-Sen,  seemingly 
on  his  own  initiative,  telegraphed  Yuan  offering  him  the  presi- 
dency of  the  Republic  after  the  abdication  of  the  Manchu 
Dynasty,  which  was  then  a  foregone  conclusion.26  This  was 

26  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  474-76. 


H4        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

on  the  condition  that  Yuan  would  become  a  Republican  and 
promise  to  uphold  the  government  established  by  the  Revolu- 
tion. The  acceptance  of  this  proposition  in  the  final  settle- 
ment might  be  called  the  first  compromise  of  the  Chinese  Re- 
publican Constitutionalism.  The  South  did  not  like  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  and,  as  it  later  developed,  did  not  trust  him.  But 
his  position  in  the  North  was  unassailable,  his  control  of  the 
Imperial  army  giving  him  the  balance  of  power  in  the  strug- 
gle between  the  revolutionaries  and  the  Manchus. 
v  The  Emperor  met  this  offer  by  conferring  on  Yuan  the 
honor  of  the  second  order  of  Nobility,  with  but  one  exception, 
the  highest  rank  possible  of  attainment  for  a  Chinese.  While 
he  had  not  accepted  Dr.  Sun's  proposal,  at  least  openly,  neither 
did  he  accept  the  Manchu  distinction.  Four  times  it  was  of- 
fered and  four  times  he  declined  it!27  There  was  then  no 
doubt  of  the  final  outcome.  On  January  28  a  telegraphic 
memorial  was  received  in  Peking  signed  by  the  Hukuang 
Viceroy  and  all  the  Imperial  Commanders  urging  abdication 
as  the  only  possible  solution.28 

On  February  3  the  end  was  heralded  in  a  secret  edict  which 
ran  as  follows:  "As  we  have  received  the  telegraphic  me- 
morials from  Tsun  Chun-hsuan,  Yuan  Shu-hsun,  and  Min- 
ister to  Russia  Lu  Cheng-hsiang,  and  others,  and  Tuan  Chi-jui 
and  the  other  Military  Commanders,  requesting  us  speedily  to 
adopt  the  Republican  form  of  government  to  avoid  further 
bloodshed,  and  in  view  of  the  perilous  situation  of  the  coun- 
try and  the  industrial  depression  from  which  the  people  have 
suffered,  We  cannot  bear  to  see  the  millions  in  misery  for  the 
glory  of  one  Family.  But  the  questions  of  the  matters  relating 
to  Our  Ancestral  Temples  and  the  Imperial  Masolea  are  im- 

27  Account  in  the  London  Times.  Reproduced,  China  Year 
Book,  1913,  pp.  477-48o. 

"China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  477-480. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        115 

portant,  and  the  courteous  treatment  of  the  Imperial  House 
and  the  Imperial  kinsmen,  the  treatment  of  Manchus,  Mon- 
golians, Mohammedans,  and  Tibetans  should  be  prearranged. 
We,  therefore,  give  whole  powers  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  make 
the  arrangements  carefully,  and  speedily  to  consult  with  the 
People's  Army  beforehand  in  regard  to  the  articles  of  treat- 
ment, and  to  report  the  whole  to  Us."29 

The  terms  of  abdication  having  been  agreed  upon,  a  series 
of  three  abdication  edicts30  was  issued  on  February  12,  1912, 
providing  for  the  transfer  of  sovereignty  from  the  Emperor 
to  the  people,  through  the  establishment  of  the  republican  form 
of  government.  By  so  doing  the  Imperial  Family  "would 
gratify  on  the  one  hand  the  desires  of  the  whole  nation  who, 
tired  of  anarchy,  are  desirous  of  peace,  and  on  the  other  hand 
would  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  the  Ancient  Sages,  who  re- 
garded the  Throne  as  the  sacred  trust  of  the  Nation."  No 
mention  was  made,  in  the  Abdication  Edicts,  of  the  Republi- 
can Government  at  Nanking,  headed  by  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen.  The 
responsibility  for  the  organization  of  China  as  a  Republic  was 
transferred  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  the  representative  of  the 
Emperor.  The  edict  stated :  "Yuan  Shih-kai  was  elected  by 
the  Tzucheng-yuan  to  be  the  Premier.  During  this  period  of 
the  transfer  of  the  government  from  the  old  to  the  new,  there 
should  be  some  means  of  uniting  the  South  and  the  North. 
Let  Yuan  Shih-kai  organize  with  full  powers  a  provisional 
republican  government  and  confer  with  the  Republican  Army 
as  to  methods  of  union,  thus  assuring  peace  to  the  people  and 
tranquillity  to  the  Empire,  and  forming  the  one  Great  Repub- 
lic of  China  by  the  union  as  heretofore  of  the  five  peoples, 


"Ibid.,  p.  481. 

80  Ibid.,  pp.  481-484. 


n6        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

namely,  Manchus,  Chinese,  Mongols,  Mohammedans,  and 
Tibetans  together  with  their  territory  in  its  integrity."3 

The  manner  in  which  the  Manchu  Dynasty  gave  way  to  the 
Republic  may  not  seem  important  so  long  as  the  Republic  was 
established.  But  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  Emperor  did  not 
abdicate  in  favor  of  the  already  existing  Republican  govern- 
ment. He  simply  gave  way  to  Yuan  Shih-kai,  who  was  to 
establish  a  Provisional  Republican  Government  himself  and 
then  negotiate  a  settlement  with  the  Army  of  the  Republic  in 
the  South.  Thus  Yuan  was  continued  in  control  of  the  situ- 
ation. It  was  just  as  essential  to  a  settlement  that  an  agree- 
ment be  reached  with  him  as  it  had  been  to  force  the  abdica- 
ftion  of  the  Emperor.  Furthermore  it  would  seem  to  the  peo- 
ple as  though  the  Republic  had  been  established  by  the  action 
of  the  Throne,  rather  than  by  the  strength  of  the  revolution, 
if  it  was  organized  under  the  delegated  authority  of  the  Em- 
peror. That  this  was  not  desirable  was  recognized  by  the 
Nanking  government.  Dr.  Sun,  in  acknowledging  the  mes- 
sage from  Yuan  Shih-kai  announcing  the  abdication,  said  that 
"the  Republican  Government  cannot  be  organized  by  any 
authority  conferred  by  the  Ch'ing  Emperor.  The  exercise  of 
such  pretentious  power  must  surely  lead  to  serious  trouble." 
Yuan,  however,  assured  Dr.  Sun  that  he  did  not  intend  to 
take  advantage  of  the  wording  of  the  edicts,  and  the  republi- 
cans accepted  his  assurances.  Whether  he  took  advantage  of 
his  peculiar  position  or  not,  unquestionably  Yuan  Shih-kai 
was  greatly  strengthened  in  the  eyes  of  his  countrymen  be- 
cause of  the  power  bestowed  upon  him  by  edict,  although  the 
Imperial  authority  had  ceased  to  exist. 

The  understanding  had  been  that  upon  the  abdication  of  the 
Emperor  Sun  Yat-sen  would  resign  from  the  presidency  in 

81  China  Year  Book,  1913,  p.  482. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        117 

favor  of  Yuan,  providing  he  had  first  given  his  unconditional 
promise  of  support  to  the  Republic.  This  Yuan  did  in  an- 
nouncing the  abdication.  His  statement  follows :  "A  Repub- 
lic is  the  best  form  of  government.  The  whole  world  admits 
this.  That  in  one  leap  we  have  passed  from  autocracy  to  re- 
publicanism is  really  the  outcome  of  the  many  years  of  strenu- 
ous efforts  exerted  by  you  all,  and  is  the  greatest  blessing  to 
the  people.  The  Ta  Ch'ing  Emperor  has  proclaimed  his  abdi- 
cation by  edict  countersigned  by  myself.  The  day  of  the 
promulgation  of  this  edict  shall  be  the  end  of  Imperial  rule 
and  the  inauguration  of  the  Republic.  Henceforth  we  shall 
exert  our  utmost  strength  to  move  forward  in  progress  until 
we  reach  perfection.  Henceforth,  for  ever,  we  shall  not  al- 
low a  monarchical  government  in  our  country."32 

On  February  14  Dr.  Sun  submitted  his  resignation  as  the 
provisional  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  at  the  same 
time  presenting  the  name  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  for  the  consider- 
ation of  the  Assembly.  "Today  I  present  to  you  my  resigna- 
tion and  request  you  to  elect  a  good  and  talented  man  as  the 
new  President.  The  election  of  President  is  a  right  of  our 
citizens,  and  it  is  not  for  me  to  interfere  in  any  way.  But 
according  to  the  telegram  which  our  delegate  Dr.  Wu  was 
directed  to  send  to  Peking,  I  was  to  undertake  to  resign  in 
favor  of  Mr.  Yuan  when  the  Emperor  abdicated  and  Mr. 
Yuan  had  delclared  his  political  views  in  favor  of  the  Re- 
public. I  have  already  submitted  this  to  your  honorable  As- 
sembly and  obtained  your  approval.  The  abdication  of  the 
Ch'ing  Emperor  and  the  union  of  the  North  and  South  are 
largely  due  to  the  great  exertions  of  Mr.  Yuan.  Moreover, 
he  has  declared  his  unconditional  adhesion  to  the  national 
cause.  Should  he  be  elected  to  serve  the  Republic  he  would 

32  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  485-6. 


n8        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

surely  prove  himself  a  most  loyal  servant  of  the  State.  Be- 
sides, Mr.  Yuan  is  a  man  of  political  experience,  upon  whose 
constructive  ability  our  united  nation  looks  forward  for  the 
consolidation  of  its  interests.  Therefore,  I  venture  to  express 
my  personal  opinion  and  to  invite  your  honorable  Assembly 
carefully  to  consider  the  future  welfare  of  the  State,  and  not 
to  miss  the  opportunity  of  electing  one  who  is  worthy  of  your 
election.  The  happiness  of  our  country  depends  on  your 
choice.  Farewell."33 

33  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  487-88. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  abdication  of  the  Emperor  left  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  con- 
trol in  the  North,  with  delegated  authority  to  organize  the 
government  as  a  Republic.  Sun  Yat-sen's  resignation  and  the 
election  of  Yuan  to  the  presidency  by  the  Nanking  Council 
consolidated  the  two  governments.  Officialdom  transferred 
its  allegiance  from  the  old  regime  to  the  new.  The  same  local 
governmerit^agencies  remained.  But  the  new  government  was 
confronted  with  problems  similar  to  those  that  have  been 
faced  by  all  authority  established  as  a  result  of  revolution. 
The  revolution  had  caused  the  recruiting  of  large  bodies  of 
soldiers.  These  men  were  under  arms  largely  because  of  the 
pay  promised  them  and  not  because  they  wished  to  see  a  prin- 
ciple triumph  or  to  bring  about  a  new  political  order.  Their 
allegiance  was  not  to  the  Nanking  Council  or  to  the  Peking 
government,  but  to  the  commander  who  fed  and  paid  them. 
What  he  ordered  they  would  execute  if  they  were  confident 
that  their  stipend  would  be  forthcoming.  In  most  cases  the 
military  leaders  themselves  were  not  unselfish  servers  of  a 
cause.  This  was  more  true  of  the  southern  soldiery  than  of 
the  Imperial  troops. 

At  the  time  of  the  settlement  between  the  North  and  the 
South,  districts  and  even  entire  provinces  were  under  the  con- 
trol of  self -constituted  authorities  maintaining  themselves  by 
force  of  arms.  So  long  as  a  commander  led  a  considerable 
body  of  men  he  could  exercise  a  great  deal  of  influence,  but 
let  him  disband  his  soldiers  and  his  influence  would  be  negli- 
gible. Thus  Yuan  Shih-kai  faced  a  situation  that  demanded 

119 


I2O        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

his  immediate  and  earnest  attention.  The  people  expected  the 
new  regime  to  reestablish  peace  and  order.  But  many  of  the" 
provinces  were  dominated  by  men  over  whom  the  President 
had  only  a  nominal  control,  and  who,  in  many  cases  com- 
manded as  large  forces  as  he  himself  had  under  his  imme- 
diate authority.  The  situation  was  further  complicated  by  the 
fact  that  the  pay  of  the  soldiers  in  many  cases  was  in  arrears, 
and  the  men  refused  to  disband  until  they  had  received  a  com- 
plete settlement.  Their  commanders  had  been  paying  them  by 
requisitions  on  the  people,  and  by  the  collection  and  disburse- 
ment of  the  governmental  revenues.  Lacking  the  power  to 
enforce  the  demobilization  of  the  troops,  the  Government 
could  get  rid  of  them  only  by  buying  off  their  leaders  with 
substantial  sums,  and  meeting  the  demand  of  the  common 
soldiers  for  their  back  pay. 

Yuan,  then,  had  to  consider  the  question  of  ways  and  means 
of  getting  this  money  at  a  time  when  the  public  purse  was 
empty;  when  the  normal  sources  of  revenue  could  not  be  de- 
pended upon ;  when  the  interest  on  foreign  obligations  had  not 
been  paid  for  some  time;  and  when  the  authority  of  the  gov- 
ernment was  not  widely  recognized. 

Neither  had  the  abdication  of  the  Manchus  served  to  end 
the  general  unrest.  The  presence  of  armed  bands  living  on 
the  peaceful  inhabitants  promoted  rather  than  discouraged  a 
feeling  of  uncertainty.  The  establishment  of  a  Republic  in 
place  of  the  Empire  was  not  fully  understood  by  the  people. 
To  whom  did  they  owe  obedience?  Formerly  they  knew  that 
the  Emperor  and  his  agents  represented  authority  of  no  un- 
certain kind.  The  Republic,  they  were  told,  meant  that  the 
people  controlled.  Many  understood  from  this  that  they  could 
do  as  they  pleased,  and  a  feeling  of  freedom  from  all  restraint 
inevitably  resulted. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        121 

Furthermore,  in  many  of  the  provinces  the  revolution  had 
resulted  in  a  temporary  breakdown  of  the  administrative  ma- 
chinery. The  officials,  where  they  were  not  merely  self-ap- 
pointed military  chiefs,  and  where  they  acknowledged  the 
authority  of  the  government,  were  awaiting  instructions  from 
Peking  to  guide  their  action.  The  uncertainty  of  the  people 
as  to  the  meaning  of  the  new  order  had  thus  communicated 
itself  to  the  officials. 

Republicanism  had  to  justify  itself  by  bringing  in  its  train 
peace  and  prosperity  as  well  as  the  principles  of  liberty,  equal- 
ity and  fraternity.  Yuan  Shih-kai  knew  better  than  any  one 
else,  perhaps,  what  the  first  demands  of  the  people  were  of 
their  government — whether  Manchu  or  Chinese,  Monarchy  or 
Republic.  The  machinery  of  administration  must  continue  to 
function.  His  first  act  after  the  abdication,  therefore,  was  to 
provide  that  there  should  be  no  suspension  of  the  routine  of 
government.  A  proclamation  issued  on  February  13,  1912, 
emphasized  this  fact.  It  read:  "Now  that  the  republican 
form  of  government  has  been  announced,  Yuan  Shih-kai  has 
been  entrusted  with  the  duty  of  organizing  the  provisional 
government.  His  ability  being  limited  and  his  responsibility 
being  great,  he  is  conscious  of  his  incompetency.  He  is  of 
the  opinion  that  the  governmental  machinery  cannot  be  sus- 
pended for  even  a  single  day,  and  in  the  course  of  the  organi- 
zation of  the  provisional  government,  all  of  the  political  af- 
fairs of  yore  shall  continue  to  be  prosecuted  as  usual.  In  the 
present  new  regime  there  are  hundreds  of  details  to  be  at- 
tended to.  Cooperation  and  mutual  assistance  are  to  be  de- 
pended upon  and  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  order  and  the 
preservation  of  the  public  welfare  should  be  regarded  as  being 
of  great  importance.  "Pending  the  promulgation  of  the  new 
administrative  system,  all  of  the  civil  and  military  officials  in 
the  Metropolis  as  well  as  in  the  provinces  should  discharge 


122        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

their  respective  functions  as  heretofore,  and  should  not  shirk 
their  usual  responsibility.  All  of  the  affairs  to  be  transacted 
by  the  various  governmental  offices,  all  of  the  responsibili- 
ties to  be  assumed,  and  all  of  the  public  funds  and  public 
property  should  be  carried  on  or  properly  taken  care  of  as  be- 
fore, and  no  negligence  will  be  tolerated.  .  .  .  All  of  the  mili- 
tary and  police  regulations  of  the  old  regime  should  be  en- 
forced as  usual;  thus  may  power  be  unified  and  order  pre- 
served. In  the  event  of  anyone  making  trouble  under  what- 
ever pretext,  to  disturb  the  peace,  he  is  to  be  dealt  with  ac- 
cording to  law."1 

The  formality  of  giving  Yuan  the  sanction  of  the  Revolu- 
tion as  the  first  head  of  the  Republican  Government  of  a 
united  China  was  accomplished  on  the  fifteenth  of  February 
when  he  was  unanimously  elected  by  the  Nanking  Council.  A 
few  days  later  General  Li  Yuan-hung  was  chosen  Vice-Presi- 
dent.  One  of  the  conditions  of  Yuan  Shih-kai's  election  was 
that  the  seat  of  government  should  be  changed  from  Peking 
to  Nanking.  This  transfer  would  mean  a  closer  control  over 
the  government  by  the  South  than  would  be  possible  if  Peking 
remained  the  capital  city.  Since  the  President  was  reluctant 
to  leave  the  North,  the  stronghold  of  his  power,  a  deputation 
was  sent  to  Peking  to  show  him  the  necessity  for  the  change. 
A  very  opportune  mutiny  of  the  troops  in  Peking  which  was 
marked  by  extensive  looting  occurred  at  this  time,  however, 
and  weight  was  given  to  Yuan's  contention  that  it  was  unsafe 
for  him  to  go  South.2  Consequently  the  Republican  leaders 

1  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  486-87. 

2  Yuan  was  generally  believed  to  have  been  chiefly  responsi- 
ble himself  for  this  mutiny.    The  fact  that  it  was  so  timed  as 
to  strengthen  his  argument  against  leaving  the  North,  taken  with 
his   previous   and   subsequent   excellent   control   of   the    Peking 
soldiery  certainly  lends  color  to  the  allegation. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        123 

were  forced  temporarily  to  absolve  him  from  his  promise,  and 
his  inauguration  took  place  on  March  10  in  the  old  capital. 
The  oath  of  office  prescribed  was  as  follows :  "At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  establishment  of  the  Republic  there  are  many  mat- 
ters to  be  taken  charge  of.  I,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  sincerely  wish 
to  exert  my  utmost  (strength)  to  promote  the  democratic 
spirit,  to  remove  the  dark  blots  of  despotism,  to  obey  strictly 
the  constitution,  and  to  abide  by  the  wish  of  the  people,  so 
as  to  place  the  country  in  a  safe,  united,  strong  and  firm  po- 
sition, and  to  effect  the  happiness  and  welfare  of  the  five  di- 
visions of  the  Chinese  race.  All  these  wishes  I  will  fulfill 
without  fail.  As  soon  as  a  President  is  elected  by  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  I  shall  at  once  vacate  my  present  position. 
With  all  sincerity  I  take  this  oath  before  the  people  of  China/' 

On  the  same  day  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  inaugurated  as 
President  of  the  Republic,  the  Provisional  Constitution  was 
adopted  by  the  National  Council  at  Nanking.  tThe  first  sec- 
tion of  the  constitution  vested  the  sovereignty  in  the  whole 
body  of  the  people,  to  be  exercised  through  their  representa- 
tives— the  National  Council,  the  Provisional  President,  the 
Cabinet,  and  the  Judiciary.  The  territory  of  the  Republic 
was  defined/  (art.  3)  so  as  to  include  the  twenty-two  prov- 
inces, Inner  and  Outer  Mongolia,  Tibet  and  Chinghai  (Koko- 
nor).  /^The  second  section  included  a  bill  of  rights  of  citizens 
of  the  Republic.j  Stipulations  of  freedom  of  speech,  of  the 
press,  and  of  public  meeting,  together  with  provisions  for  the 
security  of  property  and  freedom  of  persons  from  punish- 
ment except  in  accordance  with  the  law  were  incorporated  in 
this  section. 

The  legislative  power  of  the  government  was  given  to  the 
National  Council  until  the  convocation  of  the  National  As- 
sembly. Then  all  powers  vested  in  the  Council  were  to  be 


124        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

transferred  to  the  Assembly.j  It  was  impossible  immediately 
to  work  out  regulations  for  the  election  of  an  Assembly,  so 
that  a  continuance  of  the  Nanking  Council  for  the  time  being 
was  necessary.  This  body,  according  to  the  Constitution, 
was  composed  of  five  members  from  each  of  the  provinces  and 
dependencies,  with  the  exception  of  Chinghai  which  was  al- 
lowed one  representative.  The  method  of  election  was  to  be 
determined  by  each  province  for  itself.  Consequently  some 
of  the  members  were  chosen  by  the  provincial  assemblies, 
where  such  bodies  were  in  existence;  some  were  selected  by 
the  Military  Governors  of  the  provinces;  and  some  were  self- 
constituted  representatives  of  their  locality.  Those  disquali- 
fied for  membership  were:  a)  men  who  were  under  the  age 
of  twenty-five;  b)  men  whose  rights  of  citizenship  had  been 
removed  or  temporarily  suspended;  c)  opium  smokers;  d)  em- 
ployees in  the  army  or  navy;  e)  holders  of  offices  in  the  ex- 
ecutive or  judicial  departments.3 

"'The  most  notable  feature  of  the  Provisional  Constitution j 
was  its  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  National 
Council  at  the  expense  of  the  executive  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment.jThe  aim  of  the  Nanking  Council  which  framed  the 
Constitution,  was  certainly  to  limit  as  extensively  as  pos- 
sible the  authority  of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  He  represented  the 
North  and  they  the  South.  His  election  as  President  was  a 
compromise  pure  and  simple,  made  necessary  by  his  control 
north  of  the  Yangtze.  The  easiest  solution  was  to  confer  on 
him  the  dignity  of  the  presidency  and  then,  by  constitutional 
provisions,  to  strip  that  high  office  of  all  real  weight  in  the 
Government.  In  other  words  the  intention  was  to  legislate 
Yuan  Shih-kai -out  of  his  control  of  the  situation. 

8  Regulations  of  Council,  sec.  2.     See  China  Year  Book,  1913, 
P-  503- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        125 

This  was  accomplished,  on  paper,  by  vesting  all  legislative 
power  in  the  Council ;  giving  it  a  control  over  the  finances  of 
the  State  and  a  supervision  over  the  administration;  and  by 
the  creation  of  a  Cabinet  which,  while  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent, must  be  acceptable  to  the  Council.  In  addition  to  the 
legislative  authority  and  a  control  over  the  budget  and  State 
finances,  including  taxation,  the  Council  had  the  constitutional 
right  to  impeach  the  President,  if  he  were  guilty  of  treason, 
and  to  impeach  any  member  of  the  Cabinet  "if  he  be  held  to 
have  failed  to  perform  his  official  duties  or  to  have  violated 
the  law."4  It  was  within  the  power  of  the  Council  to  convoke, 
conduct  and  adjourn  its  own  meetings,  and  to  decide  upon  its 
own  procedure. 

By  article  29,  it  was  provided  that  "the  Provisional  Presi- 
dent and  Vice-President  shall  be  elected  by  the  National  Coun- 
cil, by  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  present  at  a  sitting 
of  the  Council  consisting  of  over  three-fourths  of  the  total 
number  of  members."  The  President  was  given  the  general 
supervision  over  the  administration,  although  the  National 
Council  was  required  to  approve  all  regulations  promulgated 
for  the  administrative  and  official  system.  *^As  the  head  of 
the  executive  branch  of  the  government  the  President  was  the 
"fountain  of  all  executive  powers,"  and  all  laws  were  to  be 
promulgated  by  him  as  well  as  orders  for  the  "execution  of 
laws  and  of  powers  delegated  to  him  by  the  law."  The  su- 
preme command  of  the  army  and  navy  was  vested  in  him,  and 
he  had  the  right  to  declare  a  state  of  siege  in  case  of  necessity, 
and  to  declare  war,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  National 
Council. 

As  the  representative  of  the  State  the  President  might  con- 
clude treaties,  again,  however,  with  the  concurrence  of  the 

*  China  Year  Book,  1913,  p.  490. 


126        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Council,  and  he  received  Ambassadors  and  Ministers  of  for- 
eign countries.  The  power  of  appointment  was  conferred  on 
him,  with  the  limitation  that  he  must  have  the  concurrence 
of  the  Council  in  the  appointment  of  the  Cabinet,  Ambassadors 
and  Ministers.  The  general  pardoning  power  was  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  provisional  President,  with  the  restriction 
that  he  might  not  grant  a  general  amnesty  without  authoriza- 
tion from  the  National  Council.  In  case  of  impeachment  of 
the  President  "he  shall  be  tried  by  a  special  Court  consisting 
of  nine  judges  elected  among  the  Justices  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  realm." 

iThe  Cabinet  consisted  of  the  Premier  and  the  heads  of  the 
government  departments.!  By  the  law  defining  the  duties  and 
powers  of  the  Cabinet  it  might  consider:  i)  law  bills  and 
ordinances;  2)  budget  bills,  estimated  and  executed;  3)  ex- 
penditure apart  from  the  estimate;  4)  organization  of  the 
army;  5)  treaties;  6)  declarations  of  war  and  treaties  of 
peace;  7)  appointments  and  removal  of  officers  specially  ap- 
pointed by  the  President;  8)  differences  regarding  the  special 
powers  of  the  Ministries;  9)  matters  which  according  to  law 
should  pass  through  a  Cabinet  meeting;  10)  petitions  of  citi- 
zens which  are  transmitted  by  the  National  Council ;  1 1 )  mat- 
ters which  the  Premier  or  a  Minister  of  State  considers  should 
pass  through  a  Cabinet  meeting.  A  majority  vote  was  to  de- 
cide all  Cabinet  discussions.  Both  the  "regulations"  and  the 
provisional  Constitution  provided  that  all  laws  and  ordinances, 
before  promulgation  by  the  President,  must  be  countersigned 
either  by  all  the  Ministers  of  State,  or  by  the  Premier  and  the 
Minister  whose  department  was  especially  affected  by  the 
measure.  ^  The  Premier  was  given  control  over  local  admin- 
istration, subject  to  any  limitations  imposed  upon  him  by  law. 
The  close  relationship  which  should  exist  between  the  Coun- 
cil and  the  Cabinet  was  recognized  as  the  Council  was  given 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        127 

the  right  to  make  suggestions  to  the  Government,  and  might 
question  the  Ministers,  insisting  on  their  appearing  in  person 
or  by  deputy  to  answer  the  interpellation.  On  the  other  hand, 
members  of  the  Cabinet  had  the  right  to  be  present  and  to 
speak  in  the  National  Council. 

Section  six  of  the  provisional  Constitution  established  a 
judicial  system  for  the  country.  All  judges  were  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  President  and  the  Minister  of  Justice.  They 
were  to  try  civil  and  criminal  cases,  "but  cases  involving  ad- 
ministrative affairs  or  arising  from  other  particular  causes 
shall  be  dealt  with  according  to  special  laws." 

jjThis  provisional  Constitution  was  to  remain  in  force  until 
after  a  National  Assembly,  elected  to  replace  the  Council, 
should  have  promulgated  the  permanent  Constitution  of  the 
Republic.  The  election  regulations  for  the  National  Assembly 
were  to  be  drawn  up  by  the  Council  and  the  Assembly  con- 
vened within  ten  months  from  the  promulgation  of  the  pro- 
visional Constitution  on  March  10. 

It  was  by  no  means  an  easy  task  that  developed  on  Yuan 
Shih-kai  as  President  of  the  Republic.  Both  the  old  Imperial 
Government  and  the  Nanking  Revolutionary  Government 
were  without  financial  resources.  The  collection  of  taxes  had 
been  impossible  in  many  of  the  provinces  since  the  outbreak 
of  the  revolution.  Where  they  had  been  collected  the  money 
had  been  applied  largely  to  meet  local  needs.  The  piolicy  of 
the  Powers  during  the  revolution  had  been  not  to  lend  financial 
support  to  either  side,  and  for  that  reason  they  had  discour- 
aged their  nationals  from  entering  into  loan  agreements.  The 
sympathy  of  the  world  had  been,  unquestionably,  with  the 
revolutionary  leaders,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  there  was  a 
pronounced  feeling  among  foreigners  in  China  that  a  strong 
man  was  essential  to  the  development  of  a  stable  government 
from  the  revolutionary  chaos,  and  it  was  doubtful  whether 


128        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

such  a  man  would  emerge  from  among  the  leaders  of  the  re- 
publican movement.  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  considered  the  strong- 
est personality  in  the  country,  and  while  he  was  at  the  head 
of  the  Imperial  government,  it  was  felt  to  be  safest  to  defer 
judgment  as  to  the  future  of  the  Imperial  rule. 

When,  however,  Yuan  was  given  the  Imperial  Commission 
to  establish  a  Republican  government  as  the  President  of  the 
Chinese  Republic,  thus  concentrating  in  the  one  hands  the 
prerogatives  of  the  crown  and  the  executive  powers  of  the 
Republican  President,  the  Powers  were  willing  to  resume  ne- 
gotiations for  a  loan  to  China.  The  negotiation  of  this  loan, 
and  the  r establishment  of  the  finances  of  the  State  on  a  sound 
basis  was  one  of  the  first  tasks  to  which  the  new  government 
addressed  itself. 

At  the  same  time,  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  to  organize  an  admin- 
istration (under  the  limitations  of  the  provisional  Constitu- 
tion) which  would  be  acceptable  to  the  National  Council,  and 
could  secure  its  cooperation  in  the  necessary  work  of  reorgani- 
zation and  reconstruction.  This  was  no  slight  undertaking, 
since  the  Council  at  Nanking  represented  the  South  and  was 
suspicious  of  every  move  made  by  a  President  whom  consider- 
ations of  expediency  had  forced  it  to  elect.  As  the  first  step 
in  the  formation  of  a  Cabinet,  the  President  appointed  T'ang 
Shao-yi  as  the  Pr£rnier.  T'ang  immediately  began  the^  forma- 
tion of  a  Cabinet,  but  since  his  first  proposals  were  not  well 
received  at  Nanking  he  left  for  the  South  to  undertake  per- 
sonal negotiations  with  the  Council.  After  several  days  of 
negotiation  Mr.  T'ang,  su£ported  by  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen,  was 
able  to  reach  an  agreement  with  the  Council,  his  nominees  for 
Cabinet  positions  being  accepted.  The  greatest  contest  came 
over  the  appointment  of  the  Ministers  of  War  and  of  Finance. 
The  southern  party  insisted  that  these  posts  be  held  by  South- 
erners, while  the  North,  equally  aware  of  their  importance, 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        129 

refused  to  concede  them  to  the  South.  A  compromise  was 
finally  reached,  and  the  appointment  of  Tuan  Chi-jui,  Presi- 
dent Yuan's  nominee  for  Minister  of  War,  was  confirmed,  on 
the  understanding  that  the  post  of  Resident-General  of  Nan- 
king, with  control  of  the  armies  in  the  South,  should  be  held 
by  Huang  Hsing,  a  well  known  revolutionary  leader.  Hsiung 
Hsi-ling,  the  final  choice  for  Minister  of  Finance,  was  a  Hu- 
nan man,  and  had  been  very  active  in  support  of  the  revolu- 
tion in  his  native  province.  He  was  not  a  member  of  the 
southern  radical  party,  however,  and  was  not  the  first  choice 
of  the  southern  delegates,5  so  his  selection  was  essentially  a 
compromise. 

The  Cabinet  as  finally  constituted  was  representative  of 
neither  the  North  nor  the  South.  Yuan  Shih-kai's  aim  in 
choosing  this  first  Cabinet,  as  well  as  later  ones,  was  to  se- 
cure the  best  men  possible,  irrespective  of  party,  for  the  heads 
of  departments.  It  was  necessary  for  his  own  security  that 
the  Minister  of  War  should  be  in  close  sympathy  with  him, 
since  "whoever  controls  the  army  controls  China."  And  in 
view  of  later  developments,  his  wisdom  in  insisting  on  the 
appointment  of  Tuan  Chi-ju  instead  of  Huang  Hsing  cannot 
be  questioned.  The  other  Cabinet  portfolios  were  held  by 
men  who  were  either  members  of  the  Tung  Meng-hui  (the 
radical  southern  party),  or  who  claimed  no  party  affiliations 
which  would  unfit  them  for  cooperation  with  the  National 
Council. 

During  his  visit  to  Nanking  the  Premier,  T'ang  Shao-yi, 
became  a  member  of  the  Tung  Meng-hui.  As  a  Cantonese  he 
had  more  interests  in  common  with  that  party  than  with  any 
other.  Although  he  had  been  the  representative  of  the  North 
in  the  negotiations  preliminary  to  the  abdication  of  the  Man- 

5  Their  first  choice  was  Chen  Chin-tao. 


130        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

chus,  and  had  long  been  a  follower  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  T'ang 
had  shown  an  interest  in  the  revolutionary  movement  even 
while  acting  as  the  Imperial  representative  at  Shanghai  and 
Nanking.  A  Cantonese,  dealing  with  the  Cantonese  leaders 
cf  the  republican  movement,  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  and  Dr.  Wu 
T'ing-fang,  he  was  more  inclined  to  compromise  with  them 
than  to  act  as  the  out  and  out  advocate  of  the  Manchu 
Dynasty,  or  even  the  conservatively  progressive  party  of  the 
North.  It  may  be  that  in  affiliating  himself  with  the  Tung 
Meng-hui  he  sought  to  secure  a  greater  influence  in  the  gov- 
ernment than  he  could  hope  for  as  the  recognized  henchman 
of  the  President.  Whatever  his  reasons,  T'ang's  adherence  to 
the  radical  southern  party,  of  which  he  rapidly  became  the 
leader,  made  cooperation  between  the  President  and  his  Prime 
Minister  difficult,  and  finally  led  to  their  estrangement. 

Before  passing  on  to  the  problems  confronting  the  new 
regime  it  is  worth  our  while  to  note  the  composition  of  the 
National  Council  when  it  assembled  in  Peking  for  its  first 
session  under  the  provisional  Constitution.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  the  original  intention  of  the  Nanking  republicans 
had  been  to  make  Nanking  the  capital  city.  But  since  it  was 
impossible  to  get  Yuan  Shih-kai  out  of  the  northern  capital 
it  was  necessary  for  the  Council  to  move  from  Nanking  to 
Peking.  It  was  hardly  possible  to  conduct  the  affairs  of  gov- 
ernment with  the  President  and  Cabinet  several  hundred 
miles  away  from  the  legislative  organ.  On  April  29,  then, 
the  National  Council  was  formally  opened  by  the  President, 
in  Peking.  At  that  time  there  were  three  principal  parties  in 
the  Council,  no  one  group  strong  enough  by  itself  to  control. 
The  Tung  Meng  Hui  (the  Alliance  Party)  and  the  Kung 
Ho-t'ang  or  Conservative  party  were  nearly  equal  in  voting 
strength,  so  that  the  balance  of  power  lay  with  the  third  party 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        131 

mentioned,  the  Tung-yi-kung-ho-tang  (the  Coalition  party).8 
This  coalition  party  was  more  closely  allied  to  the  Tung  Meng 
Hui  than  to  the  Conservatives,  but  exercised  entire  freedom 
of  action,  sometimes  voting  with  the  one  and  sometimes  the 
other.7  Because  of  this  division  in  the  Council  it  was  possible 
for  its  deliberations  to  be  brought  to  an  end  by  the  lack  of  a 
quorum  whenever  the  members  of  any  one  of  the  parties  chose 
to  absent  themselves  from  the  meetings. 
^  Naturally  the  chief  interest  of  the  early  part  of  1912  cen- 
tered on  the  attempts  the  government  was  making  to  secure 
funds  for  the  reorganization  of  the  country.  The  provisional 
Constitution  provided  that  the  Council  should  control  all  of 
the  financial  affairs  of  the  State,  including  measures  for  ne- 
gotiating loans.8  Before  the  Council  had  assembled  in  Peking, 
however,  the  first  steps  had  been  taken  to  negotiate  a  loan 
with  the  Four  Power  Group.9  The  government  desired  to  se- 
cure monthly  advances  to  meet  its  immediate  needs,  estimating 
that  10,000,000  taels  would  be  required  at  once,  and  monthly 
advances  of  Tls.  "5,406,000  would  be  necessary  during  the  re- 
construction period.  On  February  28  the  Hongkong  and 
Shanghai  Bank,  acting  for  the  Four  Power  syndicate,  made 
an  advance  of  Tls.  2,000,000,  and  on  March  7  a  further  ad- 
vance of  Tls.  1,100,000  was  made  to  the  government.  In 
consideration  of  these  advances  Yuan  Shih-kai  agreed :  "That 
the  Banks  hold  a  firm  option  for  the  provision  of  further 

6  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  504-505,  shows  the  party  divi- 
sion of  the  members  of  the  Council. 

7  Some  of  the  members  of  the  Tung-yi-kung-ho-tang  were  also 
members  of  the  Tung  Meng  Hui,  and  vice  versa.     For  the  or- 
ganization of  the  parties  see  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  662-670. 

8  Provisional  Constitution,  Art.   19,  clauses  2-3-4. 

9  The  original  members  of  the  International  Loan  Group  were 
representatives    of    Great    Britain,    France,    Germany,    and    the 
United  States. 


132        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

monthly  requirements  of  the  Chinese  Government  for  the 
months  of  March,  April,  May,  June,  and  possibly  July  and 
August,  which  the  Four  Groups  have  already  been  requested 
to  finance,  against  the  delivery  of  additional  sterling  Treasury 
Bills  on  terms  to  be  arranged.  (4)  That  in  consideration  of 
the  assistance  rendered  by  the  Groups  to  China  in  the  present 
emergency,  and  of  their  services  in  supporting  her  credit  on 
the  foreign  markets,  the  Chinese  Government  assures  to  the 
Groups  (provided  their  terms  are  equally  advantageous  with 
those  otherwise  obtainable)  the  firm  option  of  undertaking 
the  comprehensive  loan  for  general  reorganization  purposes 
already  proposed  to  them,  to  be  floated  as  soon  as  possible, 
and  to  be  applied  in  the  first  instance  to  the  redemption  of  the 
sterling  Treasury  Bills  aforesaid."10 

In  spite  of  this  undertaking,  a  loan  agreement  with  an 
Anglo-Belgian  syndicate  was  signed  by  the  President  on 
March  15,  six  days  after  he  had  written  the  above  to  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Four  Power  Group.  When  this  became 
known,  the  Four  Power  Group  immediately  suspended  nego- 
tiations with  the  Chinese  Government,  charging  it  with  acting 
in  bad  faith. 

Immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  this  so-called  Belgian 
loan  agreement,  T'ang  Shao-yi,  who  had  been  conducting  all 
loan  negotiations,  left  for  Nanking.  While  there  he  was  able 
to  secure  the  consent  of  the  Council  to  the  Belgian  loan,  taking 
occasion  at  the  same  time  to  address  it  on  the  subject  of  the 
dangers  of  a  foreign  financial  monopoly  in  China.  In  this 
way  he  sought  to  arouse  a  hostility  to  the  Four  Power  Group 
which  could  be  used  to  secure  a  moderation  of  the  terms  on 
which  it  was  willing  to  undertake  the  financing  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. 

10  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  349-50. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        133 

When  he  returned  to  Peking  a  month  later  he  found  that  in 
order  to  get  the  large  sum  necessary  for  immediate  expenses 
he  would  have  to  resume  negotiations  with  the  Groups.  Since 
they  would  consider  further  advances  only  if  the  Belgian 
agreement  was  cancelled,  the  Premier  definitely  undertook  to 
cancel  it,  except  in  so  far  as  the  advances  already  made  were 
concerned.  With  this  understanding  negotiations  were  re- 
sumed on  May  3.  The  rock  on  which  they  finally  split  was 
the  question  of  foreign  supervision  of  the  moneys  advanced, 
and  of  the  securities  given. 

Because  of  the  demand  of  the  foreign  bankers  for  super- 
visory rights,  the  National  Council  took  occasion  to  criticise 
the  entire  loan  policy  of  the  Government.  This  critical  atti- 
tude was  natural  since  the  Council  was  determined  to  assert 
its  supremacy  and  could  not  do  so  if  such  important  negotia- 
tions as  those  with  the  Four  Power  Group  (extended  by  May 
to  include  Japan  and  Russia,  and  from  that  time  known  as  the 
Six  Power  Group)11  were  conducted  independent  of  its  super- 
vision. The  criticism  of  the  Council  came  at  a  time  when 
the  breach  between  the  Premier  and  the  President  was  con- 
stantly widening.  As  Premier,  T'ang  Shao-yi  felt  that  he 
should  have  a  greater  control  over  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment than  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  willing  to  give  him.  Yuan  had 
the  old  Manchu  idea  of  a  Cabinet  which  should  carry  out  the 
policy  dictated  by  the  head  of  the  Executive,  in  this  case  the 
President.  T'ang  on  the  other  hand,  was  determined  that  the 
Cabinet  should  be  the  real  executive,  assuming  the  responsi- 

11  Neither  Japan  nor  Russia  were  lending  nations  nor  were 
they  in  a  position  then  to  absorb  their  shares  of  the  loans,  but 
for  political  and  international  reasons  it  was  considered  advisable 
to  admit  them  to  the  consortium. 


134        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

bility  for  the  administration.12  As  a  member  of  the  party 
which  had  as  its  chief  aim  the  limitation  of  the  power  of  the 
President,  and  with  his  desire  to  assert  himself,  it  was  im- 
possible for  him  to  act  long  in  cooperation  with  the  President. 

On  June  15  T'ang  Shao-yi  suddenly  left  Peking  for  Tient- 
sin, absolutely  refusing  to  continue  in  office.  The  reasons  he 
gave  for  his  action  were:  i)  the  President's  refusal  to  carry 
out  his  (the  Premier's)  undertaking  to  appoint  Mr.  Wang 
Chih-hsiang  as  Tutuh  of  Chihli  province;  and  2)  a  disagree- 
ment with  the  President  in  regard  to  the  action  of  General 
Chang  Hsun  in  continuing  to  occupy  a  position  upon  the 
Tientsin-Pukow  Railway.13 

That  T'ang  was  determined  to  force  recognition  of  the 
principle  of  party  government  was  evidenced  by  the  action  of 
the  other  Tung  Meng  Hui  members  of  the  Cabinet.  They 
resigned  with  the  Premier  and  in  spite  of  Yuan  Shih-kai's 
plea  for  harmony  refused  to  reconsider  their  resignations.  The 
attitude  of  the  Tung  Meng  Hui  was  that  the  Cabinet  Min- 
isters must  either  be  members  of  one  party  or  of  none.  In 
spite  of  the  action  of  the  Tung  Meng  Hui  Ministers,  however, 
the  President  insisted  that  the  time  had  not  yet  come  for  the 
introduction  of  Cabinet  or  party  government. 

The  first  requisite  of  party  government  is  the  presence  in 
the  Assembly  of  one  party  which  has  an  absolute  majority, 

12  The  provisional  Constitution  provided  that  every  act  of  the 
President  must  receive  the  sanction  of  a  member  of  the  Cabinet. 
That  is,  every  measure  must  be  countersigned  by  a  Cabinet  Min- 
ister.    Thus  it  was  intended  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution 
that  the  real  executive  power  should  be  vested  in  the  Cabinet, 
the  President  being  simply  a  figurehead. 

13  General   Chang  Hsun   was  the   Imperialist   Commander   at 
Nanking,  and  after  his  defeat  and  retreat  he  occupied  various 
positions  upon  the  Tientsin-Pukow  line,  where  he  retained  and 
even  augmented   his   forces.     The  Premier  demanded  the  dis- 
bandment  of  these  troops,  to  which  the  President  refused  to  agree. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        135 

and  of  an  opposition  so  organized  as  to  be  capable  of  assum- 
ing control  of  the  government  when  the  existing  majority  is 
overthrown.  In  July  1912,  when  a  one  party  Cabinet  was 
demanded,  there  were  three  groups  in  the  Council  none  of 
them  with  a  controlling  vote.  Each  of  the  parties  was  made 
up  of  several  smaller  groups  united  only  by  the  exigencies  of 
the  moment.  A  Tung  Meng  Hui  Cabinet  could  endure  only 
so  long  as  it  was  supported  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the 
third  party  which  held  the  balance  of  power  between  it  and 
the  Kung  Ho  Tang.  The  same  would  have  been  true  of  a 
Kung  Ho  Tang  Cabinet.  It  would  have  been  equally  impos- 
sible to  construct  a  Ministry  from  the  membership  of  this  third 
party  (the  Tung  Yi  Kung  Ho  Tang).  Until  there  was  a  re- 
grouping of  the  membership  of  the  Council  under  the  stand- 
ards of  two  parties,  one  of  which  controlled  the  Assembly, 
President  Yuan  was  quite  right  in  insisting  on  a  Cabinet  of 
the  ablest  men  in  the  country  rather  than  one  representative 

of  party. _- 

Determined  not  to  recognize  the  principle  of  party  govern- 
ment, Yuan  Shih-kai  attempted  to  form  another  coalition 
Cabinet.  His  choice  for  Premier  was  Lu  Cheng-hsiang,  a 
non-party  man  who  had  been  filling  the  position  of  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs.  Mr.  Lu's  nomination  was  confirmed  by 
the  Council  without  much  hesitation.  The  other  Ministries 
to  be  rilled  were  Finance,  Justice,  Education,  Agriculture  and 
Forestry,  Commerce  and  Industry,  and  Communications.  To 
fill  these  vacancies  the  President  nominated  two  members  of 
the  Tung  Meng  Hui,  two  Kung  Ho  Tang  men,  and  two  non- 
party  men.  All  of  the  nominees  were  rejected  by  the  Coun- 
cil after  a  heated  debate  in  which  the  Premier  took  part.  The 
Tung  Heng  Hui  members  voted  against  them  because  of  their 
insistence  on  a  party  Cabinet,  and  the  Tung  Yi  Kung  Ho 


136        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Tang  members  for  the  opposite  reason,  i.e.,  because  they  were 
given  no  representation. 

This  action  of  the  Council  in  obstructing  the  work  of  form- 
ing a  Cabinet  caused  a  considerable  agitation  against  the  Coun- 
cil itself,  especially  on  the  part  of  the  Military.  The  appar- 
ent deadlock  that  had  been  reached  was  broken,  however, 
when  the  Council  accepted  all  but  one  of  the  next  set  of  nomi- 
nees sent  to  them  by  the  President.  The  one  rejected  was  a 
member  of  the  Tung  Meng  Hui,  the  only  one  nominated  for 
a  Cabinet  position.  Two  of  the  others  were  members  of  the 
Kung  Ho  T'ang. 

From  the  time  of  this  first  Cabinet  crisis  the  partizan  ac- 
tivity of  the  Tung  Meng  Hui  tended  to  discredit  it  more  and 
more  in  the  eyes  of  the  country,  which  wanted  above  all  things 
peace  and  harmony.  After  the  Council  had  finally  agreed  upon 
a  Cabinet  from  which  members  of  the  Tung  Meng  Hui  were 
excluded,  that  party  began  to  look  to  the  future,  and  to  lay 
its  plans  ultimately  to  control  the  government.  With  this  in 
view  steps  were  taken  to  amalgamate  with  several  of  the 
v  smaller  factions.  A  union  of  four  other  groups  with  the  Tung 
'Meng  Hui  was  finally  effected  (August  13),  the  name  chosen 
>v  by  the  new  party  being  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang.  The  objects  of 
'the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  were  stated  to  be:  "i)  to  protect  and  up- 
hold a  strong  and  united  Government,  and  to  organize  a  sys- 
tem of  centralization  so  that  all  constructive  measures  will  be 
systematized  and  coordinated.  2)  To  promote  and  support 
local  government,  and  to  develop  in  our  people  such  powers 
of  self-government  as  are  necessary  for  a  Republic,  so  as  to 
be  able  to  mend  the  deficiencies  of  the  Central  Government. 
3)  To  carry  out  effectively  all  measures  to  unite  the  different 
races  in  China,  and  to  practice  real  equality  and  civilization  so 
that  our  people  will  soon  be  united  and  strong.  4)  To  adopt 
the  principles  of  social  service,  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  in- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        137 

troduction  of  socialism  in  order  to  facilitate  and  better  the 
standard  of  living,  and  to  employ  the  powers  and  strength  of 
the  Government  quickly  and  evenly  to  develop  the  resources  of 
our  country.  5)  To  cultivate  friendly  feelings  with  foreign 
nations,  and  to  use  our  wisdom  in,  and  show  our  due  respect 
for,  our  diplomacy  with  them,  so  as  to  be  able  to  hold  the  bal- 
ance of  power  and  to  devote  a  good  part  of  attention  to  our 
self-improvement."1* 

This  programme,  although  very  vague  in  most  particulars, 
embodied  many  good  principles,  notably  the  determination  to 
effect  the  centralization  of  the  government.  But  the  basic 
doctrine  of  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  was  not  stated  in  their  pro- 
gramme— i.e.,  the  determination  to  subordinate  everything  to 
the  attainment  of  a  controlling  power  over  the  government. 
Their  tactics  were  obstructive  rather  than  constructive,  and 
did  more  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  attempted  overthrow  of 
the  Republic  than  to  secure  the  acceptance  of  the  principle  of 
party  government. 

The  antagonism  between  the  Government  and  the  Council 
during  July  and  August  was  increased  by  the  seizure  and  exe- 
cution of  two  prominent  revolutionaries.  They  were  accused  of 
participation  in  a  plot  against  the  government,  the  accusation 
being  made  by  the  Vice-President,  Li  Yuan-hung,  then  acting 
Viceroy  of  Hupeh  province.  Great  criticism  was  aroused 
over  the  way  in  which  the  seizure  and  execution  took  place. 
Both  men  were  seized  at  night  and  shot  in  the  morning  after 
a  hurried  trial  by  a  Military  Court.  When  the  Council  de- 
manded proofs  of  their  guilt  and  questioned  the  right  of  the 
Government  to  act  in  such  an  arbitrary  manner,  the  President 
refused  any  explanation  on  the  ground  that  it  was  inexpedient 
to  present  the  proofs  of  their  guilt  at  that  time,  although  later 

14  China  Year  Book,  1913,  p.  670.  For  the  best  discussion  of 
political  parties  in  China  see  Hornbeck,  Ch.  V,  Political  Parties. 


138        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

it  was  stated  that  General  Li  had  made  ten  specific  charges 
against  the  accused.  The  President's  attitude  was  not  con- 
sidered satisfactory  and  the  Council  threatened  to  impeach 
the  government.  The  effectiveness  of  the  impeachment  power 
given  the  National  Council,  however,  was  greatly  lessened  be- 
cause, on  the  threat  of  impeachment  proceedings,  the  sup- 
porters of  the  government  always  absented  themselves  from 
the  Assembly,  thereby  preventing  further  action  because  of 
the  lack  of  a  quorum.15 

Just  when  affairs  were  reaching  a  crisis,  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen 
visited  the  capital  in  response  to  an  oft-extended  invitation  of 
President  Yuan.  His  visit  did  much  to  clear  up  the  situation, 
since  he  came  out  definitely  in  support  of  the  President,  criti- 
cising the  actions  of  the  party  of  which  he  was  one  of  the 
leaders,  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang.  Dr.  Sun's  visit  was  followed 
by  the  arrival  of  Huang  Hsing  and  Mr.  Chen  Chi-mei,  and 
the  understanding  apparently  reached  between  Yuan  Shih-kai 
and  these  leaders  of  the  radical  party  paved  the  way  for  a 
better  cooperation  between  the  Government  and  the  Council. 

During  the  time  of  the  Cabinet  crisis  due  to  the  resignation 
of  T'ang  Shao-yi  negotiations  had  been  conducted  intermit- 
tently with  the  Six  Power  Group.  Several  advances  were 
made  to  the  Government  during  May  and  June,  but  the  con- 
clusion of  the  comprehensive  loan  seemed  to  be  blocked  by  the 
disagreement  over  supervision.  In  his  endeavor  to  get  money, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  satisfy  the  demand  that  no  supervisory 
rights  should  be  granted  foreigners,  the  Minister  of  Finance 
was  finally  forced  to  conclude  a  loan  outside  the  Groups. 
This  loan,  known  as  the  Crisp  loan,  was  for  ten  million  pounds. 
But  the  Groups  were  too  powerful,  and  they  were  successful, 
because  of  the  support  of  the  six  governments  concerned,  in 

15  An  attempt  had  been  made  to  impeach  the  Premier,  Lu 
Cheng-hsiang,  on  July  29,  but  it  had  failed  for  lack  of  a  quorum. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        139 

forcing  the  cancellation  of  the  Crisp  Loan  Agreement,  and 
eventually  Mr.  Crisp  agreed  to  the  cancellation  of  the  flota- 
tion of  the  second  half  of  the  loan,  in  return  for  a  compensa- 
tion of  £150,000.  Unable  to  secure  money  outside  of  the  Six 
Power  Group  in  large  amounts,  the  Chinese  Government  was 
finally  forced  to  agree  to  the  terms  of  those  Bankers.  These 
were  announced  to  be :  i )  That  the  purposes  for  which  the 
funds  were  required  should  be  stated  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment to  the  approved  Groups;  2)  That  China  should  adopt 
a  system  of  audit  which  would  ensure  the  effective  expenditure 
of  the  loan  funds  for  the  purposes  specified;  3)  that  the  Salt 
taxes  should  be  hypothecated  for  the  service  of  this  loan,  and 
should  be  administered  either  by  the  existing  Chinese  Mari- 
time Customs  organization,  or  by  a  separate  service,  similar 
to  the  Customs,  under  foreign  direction,  thus  safeguarding  the 
proper  administration  of  the  security,  despite  the  possible  con- 
tinuance or  recurrence  of  the  unsettled  conditions  in  China.16 
On  December  27  the  proposed  loan  contract  was  submitted 
to  the  National  Council  and  accepted  by  it.  Before  the  actual 
signature  of  the  contract,  however,  disagreement  arose  among 
the  Groups  as  to  the  distribution  of  the  posts  that  were  created 
under  the  Agreement,  such  as  the  directorship  of  the  Salt 
Gabelle,  and  the  head  of  the  Audit  Bureau.17  By  the  time  this 
had  been  satisfactorily  adjusted,  and  some  smaller  disagree- 
ments with  the  Chinese  government  smoothed  over,  it  was 
April  of  1913.  On  April  8,  the  New  National  Assembly  met 
for  the  first  time,  and  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  members  of  the 
Assembly  protested  against  the  conclusion  of  the  loan  before  it 
had  been  passed  upon  by  the  Assembly.  The  government, 
however,  disregarded  their  protest  on  the  ground  that  the 

16  China  Year  Book,  1913,  p.  357. 

17  China  Year  Book,  1914,  pp.  381-384  for  discussion  of  this 
disagreement  and  the  final  settlement  reached. 


140        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

loan  had  been  sanctioned  by  the  old  National  Council.  The 
Bankers  making  up  the  Group  took  the  position  that  they  were 
dealing  only  with  the  government,  and  could  not  recognize  any 
parliamentary  protest  unless  it  was  brought  to  their  attention 
through  the  Chief  Executive.  The  contract  was  finally  signed 
on  the  26th  of  April  1913. 

There  has  been  a  good  deal  of  controversy  over  the  policy 
of  the  Powers  concerned  in  supporting  certain  Groups  of  their 
nationals  in  their  attempt  to  finance  the  Chinese  Government. 
It  has  been  alleged  that,  because  of  this  government  support, 
the  Group  imposed  unduly  harsh  terms  on  the  Chinese,  and 
made  unnecessary  stipulations  infringing  on  the  sovereignty 
and  limiting  the  independence  of  the  Republic  in  her  internal 
affairs.  We  are  not  concerned  with  the  rights  and  wrongs  of 
the  question,  but  only  with  the  influence  of  this  loan  on  con- 
stitutional development  in  China.  Unquestionably  in  the  light 
of  the  experience  of  several  South  American  Republics,  it  was 
far  better  for  China  that  responsible  concerns  should  under- 
take the  financing  of  her  government,  and  that  the  borrowing 
should  be  done  by  the  central  authority.  Only  through  some 
such  union  as  was  effected  by  the  Powers  interested  could  the 
large  sums  so  urgently  needed  by  the  Chinese  Republic  have 
been  secured.  If  the  Group  had  not  insisted  on  a  virtual  finan- 
cial monopoly  in  return  for  the  flotation  of  the  big  Reorgani- 
zation loan,  the  resources  of  the  different  provinces  would 
have  been  hypothecated  in  order  to  secure  funds  for  local 
needs,18  and  such  a  financial  disorganization  would  have  re- 
sulted that  not  only  the  central  government  but  the  provinces 
as  well  would  have  gone  eventually  into  bankruptcy.  As  it 
has  turned  out,  the  reorganization  of  the  Salt  Gabelle  under 
foreign  supervision  has  taken  care  of  the  loans  for  which 

18  This  was  actually  happening  during  the  negotiations,  pro- 
vincial loans  being  made  through  concerns  like  the  Krupps. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        141 

the  Salt  Revenues  have  been  pledged,  and  in  spite  of  the  con- 
tinued disturbances  in  China,  has  always  provided  a  surplus 
which  has  been  held  in  safety  at  the  disposal  of  the  govern- 
ment. This  surplus  has  been  not  unwelcome  certainly  to  the 
party  gaining  the  upper  hand  after  one  of  the  periodical  out- 
bursts which  have  marked  the  recent  history  of  China. 

On  the  other  hand  it  was  only  the  conclusion  of  this  loan 
that  so  strengthened  the  hand  of  the  President  that  he  was 
able  to  make  himself  virtually  dictatory/and  finally  to  embark 
on  the  fatal  attempt  at  restoration  of  file  monarchy.  His  po- 
sition was  considered  so  strong  by  the  foreign  Powers  that 
they  were  willing  to  conclude  this  loan  agreement  with  him 
in  spite  of  the  announced  opposition  of  the  radical  party  which 
controlled  the  first  Assembly  elected  under  the  laws  promul- 
gated by  the  National  Council. 

The  National  Assembly  which  met  in  April  of  1913  was 
elected  under  the  laws  promulgated  by  the  National  Council 
in  August  of  1912.  The  provisional  Constitution  stipulated 
that  a  National  Assembly  should  be  summoned  within  ten 
months  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  Assembly 
actually  met  within  three  months  of  the  scheduled  time.  Since 
the  provisional  Constitution  did  not  provide  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Assembly,  only  stipulating  that  there  should  be  a 
duly  elected  Assembly  to  replace  the  Council,  the  latter  body 
undertook  the  organization  of  the  Assembly  as  well  as  passing 
the  laws  governing  elections. 

The  "Rules  for  Organization"  promulgated  on  August 
10,  1912,  provided  that  the  National  Assembly  should  consist 
of  two  Chambers,  the  Ts'an  Yi  Yuan  (Senate)  and  the  Cheng 
Yi  Yuan  (House  of  Representatives).  The  members  of  the 
Senate  were  to  be  chosen  by  indirect  election  as  follows: 
i)  Ten  representatives  to  be  elected  by  the  Provincial  as- 
sembly of  each  province;  2)  twenty-seven  elected  by  the  Elec- 


142        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

toral  College  of  Mongolia;  3)  ten  representatives  elected  by 
the  Electoral  College  of  Tibet;  4)  three  elected  by  the  Elec- 
toral College  of  Chinghai;  5)  eight  members  selected  by  the 
Central  Educational  Society;  6)  six  representatives  elected  by 
the  Electoral  College  of  Chinese  resident  abroad. 

The  House  of  Representatives  was  to  consist  of  members 
chosen  directly  by  the  people.  Each  800,000  of  the  population 
was  to  have  one  representative,  every  province,  however,  hav- 
ing at  least  ten  even  where  the  provincial  population  fell  be- 
low 8,ooo,ooo.19  Mongolia,  Tibet  and  Chinghai  were  en- 
titled to  the  same  number  of  representatives  as  Senators. 

The  term  of  office  was  placed  at  six  years  for  Senators, 
one  third  of  the  body  being  elected  every  two  years.  Mem- 
bers of  the  House  were  to  be  elected  for  three  years,  the  whole 
House  being  renewed  at  the  same  time.  The  powers  and 
duties  of  the  National  Council  were  transferred  to  the  Na- 
tional Assembly,  each  Chamber  acting  separately,  the  decision 
of  the  Assembly  being  by  the  concurrence  of  both  Chambers. 

Each  Chamber,  independent  of  the  other,  was  given  the 
right :  i )  to  institute  a  debate ;  2  )  to  question  the  government ; 
3)  to  demand  investigation  of  charges  of  bribery  or  violation 
of  the  law  made  against  officials;  4)  to  reply  to  inquiries  from 
the  government;  5)  to  receive  petitions  from  the  people;  6) 
to  permit  the  arrest  of  its  members;  and  7)  to  adopt  regula- 
tions and  rules  of  procedure. 

19  For  the  first  Assembly  the  distribution  of  representatives 
was : 


Chihli  46 
Kirin  10 
Kiangsu  40 
Kiangsi  35 
Fukien  24 
Hunan  27 
Kuei  Chow  13 

Honan  32 
Shensi  21 
Sinkiang  10 
Kuangtung  30 
Yunnan  22 
Mongolia  27 
Tibet    10 

Fengtien  16 
Heilungkiang 
Anhui  27 
Chekiang  38 
Hupeh  26 
Shantung  33 
Chinghai  3 

Shansi  28 
loKansu  14 
Szechuan  35 
Kuangsi  19 

Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        143 

The  estimates  and  accounts  of  the  Government  were  to  be 
discussed  in  the  House  of  Representatives  before  being  pre- 
sented to  the  Senate.  In  addition  to  the  general  powers  given 
it,  the  National  Assembly  was  charged  with  the  task  of  draft- 
ing the  permanent  constitution  for  the  Republic.xTne  actual 
drafting  was  to  be  done  by  a  committee  composed  of  an  equal 
number  of  members  from  each  Chamber,  and  the  constitution 
was  to  be  passed  upon  and  adopted  by  the  Chambers  in  joint 
session.  For  such  joint  meetings  a  quorum  of  two-thirds  of 
the  total  number  of  members  of  the  Assembly  was  required 
before  any  business  could  be  undertaken,  and  all  decisions  were 
to  be  by  a  three-fourths  majority  of  the  members  present. 

The  Senate  was  to  be  representative  of  the  provinces  and 
the  dependencies  rather  than  directly  of  the  people.  The 
qualifications  for  election  to  the  Senate  and  the  House  were 
the  same,  except  that  the  age  limit  was  placed  at  thirty  years 
for  Senators  instead  of  twenty-five.  Any  Chinese  male  citi- 
zen thirty  years  of  age  was  eligible  to  election  as  a  Senator 
subject  to  the  usual  disqualifications :  illiteracy,  opium  smok- 
ing, insolvency,  and  deprivation  of  civil  rights.  Service  in  the 
army  or  police,  the  holding  of  executive,  judicial  or  adminis- 
trative office,  or  service  in  a  monastic  order  constituted  a  dis- 
qualification for  serving  either  as  an  elector  or  as  a  member  of 
the  Assembly.20 

The  members  of  the  Senate,  as  has  been  noted,  were  to  be 
chosen  by  the  provincial  Assemblies  in  China  proper,  and  by 
Electoral  Colleges  in  the  Dependencies,  and  where  special 
classes  were  given  representation  as  in  the  representation  of 
the  Chinese  resident  abroad.  A  candidate  had  to  secure  one 
third  of  the  total  number  of  votes  cast  in  order  to  be  elected. 

0  The  disqualification  attendant  on  office  holding  or  member- 
ship in  a  monastic  or  religious  order  did  not  apply  to  Mongolia 
or  Tibet. 


144        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

If  the  first  ballot  did  not  result  in  an  election  of  the  entire 
number  to  be  chosen,  balloting  was  to  continue  until  the  full 
number  had  been  selected.  In  addition  to  the  selection  of 
members  of  the  Senate,  the  electors  were  required  to  choose  an 
equal  number  of  reserve  candidates  in  order  to  fill  any  va- 
cancies that  might  exist  through  resignation  or  otherwise. 
The  provincial  Assemblies  might  select  half  of  the  number 
of  Senators  for  their  province  from  their  own  membership. 
Mongolia  and  Chinghai  were  divided  into  electoral  dis- 
tricts, each  entitled  to  choose  a  certain  number  of  members  of 
the  Senate.  The  electors  making  up  the  Electoral  Colleges 
were  Nobles  and  Princes.  Tibet  was  similarly  divided  into 
two  districts,  each  entitled  to  return  five  members,  the  mem- 
bership of  the  Electoral  Colleges  to  be  appointed  by  the  Delai 
Lama  and  the  Tashi  Lama,  acting  in  cooperation  with  the 
Chinese  Resident  in  Tibet.  The  Central  Educational  Society, 
which  was  entitled  to  choose  eight  members  was  composed  of 
the  Minister  and  Vice-Minister  of  Education ;  a  representative  ^ 
of  each  of  the  Ministries;  one  from  the  authorities  of  each 
province,  Mongolia,  and  Tibet;  one  from  each  high  institution 
under  the  direct  control  of  the  Ministry  of  Education;  one 
from  each  National  Library;  one  from  each  National  Mu- 
seum ;  two  from  the  State  schools  in  each  province,  Mongolia, 
and  Tibet ;  one  representing  the  Chinese  residents  of  America,  « 
one  of  Japan,  and  two  of  the  Straits  Settlements ;  and  twenty 
noted  educators  at  the  invitation  of  the  Minister  of  Educa- 
tion.21 Although  the  electors  did,  the  candidates  for  election 

21  China  Year  Book,  1913,  p.  386.  This  was  the  recommen- 
dation of  the  National  Educational  Conference,  which  met  dur- 
ing 1912,  as  to  the  organization  of  the  Central  Educational  So- 
ciety. The  law  on  the  Central  Educational  Society  was  promul- 
gated on  the  29th  of  the  nth  month  of  the  first  year  of  the  Re- 
public. See  China  Year  Book,  1914,  p.  502. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        145 

as  representatives  of  the  Central  Education  Association  did  not 
have  to  be  members  of  the  Association. 

The  Electoral  College  organized  to  choose  the  representa- 
tives in  the  Senate  of  the  Chinese  resident  abroad^consisted  of 
one  member  appointed~by  each  Chamber  of  Commerce  formed 
in  their  places  of  residence  by  Chinese  residing  abroad.  These 
Chambers  of  Commerce,  however,  must  have  secured  the  rec- 
ognition of  the  Chinese  Government.  The  representatives  of 
overseas  Chinese  were  required  to  have  a  knowledge  of  the 
Chinese  language  in  addition  to  their  other  qualifications. 

While  the  Senate  was  to  be  elected  by  a  system  of  Electoral 
Colleges,  the  "Regulations"  provided  that  the  members  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  should  be  chosen  by  the  people. 
The  plan  adopted,  however,  resulted  in  an  indirect  election 
just  as  much  as  in  the  choice  of  Senators.  There  were  two 
stages  to  the  election.  The  first,  in  which  all  qualified  electors 
took  part,  was  called  the  primary  election.  Until  a  regrouping 
of  administrative  districts  was  made,  the  Hsien22  were  to  con- 
stitute the  electoral  districts  for  primary  elections,  several 
Hsien  being  joined  together  to  make  up  the  final  electoral  dis- 
trict, of  which  there  were  several  to  each  province.  At  the 
primary  election  fifty  times  the  number  of  representatives  to 
which  the  district  was  entitled  were  chosen.  These  consti- 
tuted the  electors  in  the  final  election.23  So  that,  in  fact,  the 

22  For  purposes  of  election  hsien  districts  were  places  under 
the  direct  jurisdiction  of  Fu,  Chihli-t'ing,  and  Chow;  T'ing  and 
chow.  See  Election  Laws  Ch.  I  Clause  10  China  Year  Book, 
1913,  p.  412. 

!3  See  appended  table  for  illustrative  case. 
Kiangsu  Province  was  alloted  40  Representatives. 
Suppose — The  province  to  be  divided  into  eight  final  electoral 

districts  and  each  final  electoral  district  to  be  divided  into 

8  primary  electoral  districts. 
On  estimate  of  one  per  cent  of  population  voting  the  province 

would  have  230,000  qualified  electors.      (Approx.  customs 


146        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  were  chosen  by  an 
Electoral  College  of  fifty  times  the  membership  of  the  House, 
In  the  primary  elections  "any  Chinese  male  citizen  of 
twenty-one  years  or  upwards,  who  at  the  time  the  list  of  elec- 
tors is  made  up  has  resided  in  the  electoral  district  for  two 
years  or  more,  and  possesses  one  of  the  following  qualifica- 
tions, shall  be  eligible  to  vote  for  members  of  the  House  of 
Representatives:  a)  payment  of  a  direct  tax  of  $2.00  per  an- 
num or  upwards;  b)  possession  of  immovable  property  of  a 
value  of  $500.00  or  upwards  (except  in  the  case  of  Mongolia, 
Chinghai  and  Tibet,  where  the  possession  of  movable  property 
of  this  value  shall  be  sufficient  to  qualify  as  an  elector)  ;  c)  a 
graduate  of  an  elementary  or  higher  school;  d)  possession  of 
an  education  equivalent  to  clause  (c)."23 

The  Chief  Controller  of  Elections  was  to  be  the  highest  ad- 
estimate  of  population  1910,  23,980,000.)  230,000  -f-  40  = 
5750  electors  to  each  representative. 

Each  electoral  final  district  would  contain  230,000  -r-  8  =  28,750 
electors.  28,750  -f-  5750  (no.  of  electors  to  each  Representa- 
tive) ==  5  representatives  to  be  elected  in  each  final  electoral 
district. 

There  would  be,  therefore,  115  electors  to  each  candidate  in  pri- 
mary electoral  district 

3593-75  =  number  of  electors  in  each  primary  district 
3593.75  ~-  115  =  31.25  candidates  to  be  elected  in  each  pri- 
mary district. 

31.25   X   8   (primary  districts)   =  250  candidates   (making  up 
electorate  in  final  electoral  district)  X  8  (final  electoral  dis- 
tricts =  2000  candidates  or  electors  who  would  have  the  se- 
lection of  the  40  representatives  for  Kiangsu  province. 
NOTE — One  per  cent  is  generally  accepted  as  a  high  estimate  of 
the  percentage  of  the  population  qualified  and  interested  to 
vote.     The  figures  throughout  represent  the  author's  calcu- 
lations rather  than  published  statistics. 
23  China  Year  Book,  1913,  p.  411. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        147 

ministrative  officer24  of  the  province.  He  was  to  appoint  the 
Controller  for  each  final  electoral  districtjn^his  jurisdiction. 
The  chief  administrative  orhcer  or  each^primary  district  was 
to  act  as  Controller  in  the  primary  elections.  The  Controller 
was  to  supervise  the  elections,  pass  judgment  on  the  qualifica- 
tions of  voters,  and  take  charge  of  all  other  matters  connected 
with  the  election,  such  as  preparing  the  ballot  cards,  and  regis- 
tration lists,  appointing  officials  to  take  charge  of  the  polls, 
prepare  the  list  of  successful  candidates,  etc. 

It  was  necessary  for  a  candidate  to  obtain  "a  number  of 
votes  equal  to  one-third  of  the  sum  produced  by  the  division 
of  the  number  of  candidates  to  be  elected  in  the  district  into 
the  number  of  votes  cast,"25  in  order  to  be  elected  at  the  pri- 
mary election.  In  the  final  election  the  successful  candidate 
needed  to  obtain  a  number  of  votes  equal  to  one-half  the  sum 
produced  by  a  similar  division. 

uthe  first  National  Assembly  elected  under  the  provisions  of 
the  laws  and  regulations  just  discussed  was  controlled  by  the 
Kuo  Ming  Tang  in  both  Chambers.  That  party  had  returned 
more  than  twice  as  many  members  as  any  other  single  party, 
and  almost  as  many  as  all  the  others  combined.  It  might  be 
expected,  then,  that  from  the  opening  of  the  Assembly  in 

24  In   response  to  the   question   who  the   chief   administrative 
officer  was,  the  National  Council  decided  that  "in  any  province 
where,  in  addition  to  the  Military  Governor,  a  Civil  Administra- 
tor has  been  specially  appointed,  such  administrator  shall  be  re- 
garded as  the    'Chief  Administrative  Authority'    referred  to  in 
the  Electoral  Laws,  but  that  in  any  province  where  no  Civil  Ad- 
ministrator has  been  appointed,  and  where  there  is  only  a  head 
of  the  department  of  civil  affairs,  subordinate  to  the  Military 
Governor,  it  is  necessary  to  regard  the  Military  Governor  as  the 
'Chief   Administrative   Authority'   referred   to   in   the   Electoral 
Laws."      Pres.    Mandate,    Sept.    10.      China   Year   Book,    1913, 

P-  423. 

25  China  Year  Book,  1913,  pp.  416-17. 


148        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 


April  1913,  the  movement  toward  party  government  would 
continually  grow  in  strength.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however, 
the  activity  of  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  during  1913  braught  about 
its  overthrow,  and  made  possible  the  establishment  of  auto- 
cratic government. 

The  aim  of  the  revolutionary  leaders  had  been  to  impose  a 
parliamentary  regime  on  the  country  in  place  of  the  Manchu 
rule,  and  the  movement  toward  this  end  reached  its  height 
in  the  election  of  a  radical  Assembly.  During  the  next  year 
the  influence  of  the  1911  revolutionists  gradually  declined, 
partly  because  of  their  own  actions  and  partly  because  their 
activity  was  limited  by  the  drastic  measures  taken  against  them 
by  the  government.  The  history  of  the  next  few  years  in 
China  is  marked  by  reversion  to  the  old  order  of  things,  the 
return  to  the  governmental  conditions  of  the  past  under  the 
influence  of  the  idea  that  only  through  "strong  man"  rule  could 
China  hope  to  endure  as  a  nation. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  old  Empress  Dowager,  Tzu  Hsi,  had  announced  that 
the  introduction  of  constitutional  government  would  bring  to 
an  end  all  of  the  troubles  of  the  State.  The  Manchus  had 
tried  it,  and  it  had  failed  to  save  them,  or  to  bring  more  settled 
conditions  in  the  country. y'This  was  not  held  to  discredit 
constitutionalism,  however,  for  the  failure  was  attributed  to 
the  insincerity  of  the  Manchus  and  to  the  fact  that  they  were 
aliens  in  China.  The  need  of  an  effective  and  honest  govern- 
ment under  constitutional  limitations  was  one  of  the  argu- 
ments advanced  by  the  revolutionists  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
Dynasty.  The  revolution  resulted  in  an  unexpected  change  in 
the  form  of  the  government  as  well  as  the  establishment  of 
representative  institutions,  and  under  this  new  form  consti- 
tutional government  had  been  tried  for  a  year  without  bring- 
ing the  greater  political  strength  and  stability  to  the  country 
that  had  been  expected. 

That  government  under  the  Nanking  constitution  had  not 
materially  bettered  conditions  was  admitted  by  everyone,  but 
the  radical  party  claimed  that  this  was  due  partly  to  the  lack 
of  a  truly  representative  Assembly,  in  which,  of  course,  it 
would  have  the  controlling  interest,  and  in  part  to  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  President  to  the  introduction  of  party  government, 
concentrating  the  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  a  Cabinet 
representative  of  and  controlled  by  the  majority  party  in  the 
Assembly.  The  followers  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  the  conserva- 
tive elements  in  the  country,  'on  the  other  hand,  held  that  the 
failure  of  representative  government  in  China  was  to  be  ex- 
plained by  the  attempt  to  subordinate  the  executive  to  the 


150        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

legislative  branch  of  the  government.  The  point  at  issue  was 
clear  then.  Should  the  Assembly  continue  to  be  the  dominant 
branch  of  the  government  through  a  control  of  the  executive, 
or  should  the  Assembly  be  limited  to  criticism  and  the  giving 
of  advice,  the  power  of  interfering  in  the  administration  being 
withdrawn  from  it? 

The  National  Assembly  elected  in  1913  was  more  nearly 
controlled  by  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang,  or  radical  party  than  by 
any  other  single  organization,1  and  it  might  be  said  that  the 
electorate  had  given  its  decision  in  favor  of  parliamentary  gov- 
ernment.2 Naturally  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  members  assembled 
in  Peking  in  a  jubilant  frame  of  mind,  prepared  to  resist  every 
increased  assumption  of  power  by  the  President.  This  de- 
termination was  strengthened  by  indications  that  the  President 
did  not  intend  to  give  up  the  struggle  against  parliamentary 
dominance. 

Two  months  before  the  meeting  of  the  Assembly  the  at- 
tempt was  made  partially  to  remove  the  work  of  framing  the 
permanent  constitution  from  the  legislative  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment. Upon  the  receipt  of  a  memorial  submitted  by  many 
of  the  Tutuhs,  the  National  Council  was  asked  to  pass  a  bill 
establishing  a  committee  for  the  drafting  of  the  constitution. 
This  committee  was  to  consist  of  eight  representatives  of  the 
National  Assembly,  (or  the  Council  if  the  Assembly  had  not 
yet  been  convened),  six  appointees  of  the  Cabinet,  two  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Tutuh  of  each  province,  and  one  representa- 

1  "It  had  almost  as  many  seats  as  all  the  other  parties  com- 
bined," says  Millard.    "Our  Eastern  Question,"  p.  63. 

2  The  electorate  of  course  must  be  understood  as  including  only 
a  Very  small  proportion  of  the  total  population,  in  pre-republic 
China.  Millard  says  only  about  10,000  people  (1/35  of  I  per  cent) 
took  part  in  the  elections  held  and  it  is  doubtful  if  many  more 
participated  in  this  election.     See  Millard,  "Our  Eastern  Ques- 
tion," p.  54. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        151 

tive  appointed  by  each  of  the  provincial  assemblies.  The  bill 
was  rejected  by  the  Council  without  even  the  formality  of  a 
discussion.  But  the  proposal  certainly  indicated  a  desire  on 
the  part  of  the  President  to  have  some  share  in  making  the 
permanent  constitution. 

The  next  month  (March)  was  marked  by  the  murder  of 
the  leader  of  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang,  .Sim^  Chiao-ien^  The  pub- 
lications  controlled  by  his  party  charged  the  government  with 
the  instigation  of  the  assassination.  It  was  said  that  Yuan 
hoped  in  that  way  to  intimidate  the  party.  While  the  respon- 
sibility for  the  murder  has  never  been  definitely  placed,  there 
is  good  ground  for  belief  that  the  government  was  not  en- 
tirely free  from  blame.  Later  developments  would  seem  to 
place  it  as  the  first  of  a  series  of  similar  assassinations  de- 
signed to  remove  the  leaders  of  the  opposition  to  the  President. 
Whatever  the  truth  of  the  charges  made  against  the  govern- 
ment by  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  leaders,  this  murder  was  not 
calculated  to  make  more  harmonious  the  relations  between  the 
Assembly  and  the  presidential  office. 

In  addition  to  the  murder  of  Sung  Chiao-jen  and  the  at- 
tempted interference  of  the  executive  in  the  framing  of  the 
permanent  constitution,  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  had  a  third  spe- 
cific grievance  against  the  government — the  definitive  con- 
clusion of  the  quintuple  loan  agreement  before  the  Assembly 
had  passed  upon  it.  The  hostility  of  the  National  Assembly 
to  the  President  was  manifested  from  the  time  of  its  con- 
vocation. The  Kuo  Ming  Tang  members  let  the  President 
know  that  if  he  appeared  in  person  formally  to  open  the  legis- 
lative body  he  would  not  be  received  in  his  capacity  of  pro- 
visional President,  but  could  only  appear  as  a  private  citizen! 
The  presidential  message,  consequently,  was  transmitted 
through  his  secretary,  but  he  in  turn  was  denied  permission  to 
read  it  in  person,  being  only  allowed  to  present  it. 


152        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

The  early  sessions  of  both  Chambers  were  taken  up  with 
the  work  of  organization,  election  of  officers,  etc.  Time  was 
found,  nevertheless,  to  call  the  government  to  account  for  the 
conclusion  of  the  loan.  Many  of  the  sessions  of  the  Assembly 
were  marked  by  great  disorder,  the  lack  of  internal  harmony 
being  clearly  revealed.  Instead  of  consolidating  their  posi- 
tion under  the  Constitution  by  a  constructive  attitude  toward 
the  problems  of  the  day,  the  members  of  the  Assembly  limited 
/their  activity  to  the  work  of  obstruction.  While  demanding  the 
subordination  of  the  President  and  Cabinet  to  the  legislature, 
they  failed  to  convince  thoughtful  people  of  their  ability  to 
carry  on  the  administrative  work  that  would  have  devolved 
upon  them.  If,  during  1913,  the  National  Assembly  had  at- 
tempted to  supplant  Yuan  Shih-kai  by  demonstrating  the  fit- 
ness of  an  Assembly  to  exercise  the  large  powers  entrusted  to 
that  branch  of  the  government  by  the  Nanking  Constitution; 
it  might,  conceivably,  have  been  successful.  But  by  blocking 
the  work  of  administration  by  obstructive  tactics,  hindering 
all  attempts  at  reconstruction  and  reorganization  undertaken 
by  the  President  whether  good  or  bad,  the  National  Assembly 
gave  Yuan  Shih-kai  a  reasonably  good  excuse  for  his  subse- 
quent attempt  to  overthrow  parliamentary  government.3 

While  the  Assembly  was  occupied  with  its  own  quarrels, 
and  with  its  criticism  of  the  policy  of  the  executive,  Yuan 
Shih-kai  was  calmly  proceeding  to  strengthen  his  position 
throughout  the  country.  In  pursuance  of  this  end  he  began 
to  replace  the  men  in  the  provincial  administrations  who  were 
hostile  to  him  with  his  own  friends.  The  President  had  the 
constitutional  right  to  appoint  and  dismiss  from  office,  so  that 

• 8  This  attitude  caused  the  people  to  think  of  President  Yuan 
as  one  who  was  trying  to  do  something  for  the  betterment  of  the 
country,  while  the  Parliament  wanted  to  prevent  anything  being 
done  of  a  constructive  nature. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        153 

nominally  no  exception  could  be  taken  to  his  action.  This 
was  especially  tfue  of  the  first  important  change  that  he  made. 
So  far  as  the  new  provincial  system  had  been  worked  out 
provision  was  made  for  a  head  of  the  Civil  Administration 
who  should  be  eventually  the  highest  provincial  official;  and 
for  a  Military  Governor  or  Tutuh..  In  1913  most  of  the 
provinces  were  controlled  by  the  Tutuhs.  The  Tutuh  of 
Kiangsi  province  was  a  member  of  the  Kuo  Ming  party,  so 
that  early  in  1913  Yuan  appointed  a  Chief  Civil  Administrator 
to  relieve  him  of  part  of  the  administrative  work.  The  Tu- 
tuh, Li  Lieh-chun,  resented  this  limitation  of  his  authority 
and  prepared  to  resist  the  change  by  force.  On  the  surface 
the  President  was  absolutely  in  the  right  in  beginning  to  build 
up  a  civil  administration  by  doing  away  with  the  military  rule 
in  the  country.  But  exception  could  be  and  was  taken  to  his 
use  of  his  constitutional  powers  to  eliminate  his  strongest  op- 
ponents in  this  way,  while  maintaining  in  office  the  Military 
Governors  who  were  friendly  to  him. 

No  active  steps  were  taken  to  make  Li  Lieh-chun  recognize 
the  authority  of  the  Civil  Administrator  until  June  when  he 
was  ordered  to  vacate  his  post  and  come  to  Peking  for  reap- 
pointment.  Li  gave  up  his  office,  but  proceeded  to  Shanghai, 
and  not  to  Peking.  The  Vice-President,  Li  Yuan-hung:  was 
then  appointed  acting  Tutuh  of  Kiangsi  in  addition  to  the 
other  posts  which  he  held.  In  July  two  other  Kuo  Ming  Tang 
Tutuhs  (in  Anhui  and  Kuangtung  provinces)  were  removed 
from  office. 

'.In  justice  to  the  President  it  can  be  said  that  not  only  was 
he  strengthening  himself  by  removing  those  hostile  to  him 
from  control  in  the  provinces,  but  that  he  was  gradually  re- 
storing peace  and  order,  and  thus  prosperity,  to  the  country. 
Policies  were  being  formulated  and  put  into  effect  by  which 
the  troops  were  being  gradually  disbanded  and  returned  to 


154        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

normal  peaceful  pursuits.  Taxes  were  being  collected  again 
by  official  agents  and  paid  into  the  national  treasury,  instead 
of  being  used  for  the  support  of  the  independent  military 
chiefs.  And  while  there  were  still  a  great  many  of  the  latter 
in  the  provinces,  the  administration  being  military  in  nature, 
yet  the  Tutuhs  were  being  brought  to  recognize  the  authority 
of  the  President  so  that  control  was  becoming  more  central- 
ized. 

All  of  this  was  being  done  independently  of  the  Parliament. 
Peking  remained  a  hotbed  of  intrigue,  but  a  considerable  part 
of  the  activity  of  the  radicals  had  been  transferred  to  the  in- 
ternational settlement  at  Shanghai.  There,  under  foreign  pro- 
tection, the  opposition  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  became  centered. 
This  opposition  rapidly  assumed  a  revolutionary  nature.  The 
radical  press  began  a  campaign  to  undermine  and  eventually 
oust  the  President  from  his  office.  Secretly  foreign  aid  was 
sought  for  revolution,  and  it  was  no  secret  that  the  Kuo  Ming 
Tang  leaders  were  preparing  to  reenact  the  scenes  of  1911-12. 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  with  his  agents  everywhere,  was  fully  in- 
formed of  the  progress  of  the  movement.  From  the  time  of 
the  growth  of  the  revolutionary  activity  dates  his  use  of  as- 
sassination and  terrorist  methods  in  ruling  the  country.  The 
more  the  activity  of  the  radicals  was  extended,  the  more  de- 
termined he  became  to  complete  the  consolidation  of  his  po- 
sition in  the  provinces  by  removing  possible  enemies  and  by 
filling  the  high  offices  with  his  friends.  Kiangsi  being  a 
strategic  province,  it  was  natural  that  he  should  attempt  to 
oust  Li  Lieh-chun,  a  man  of  radical  affiliations.  He  was  for- 
tunate in  that  his  right  and  duty  to  appoint  a  Civil  Adminis- 
trator enabled  him  to  accomplish  his  purpose,  and  at  the  same 
time  permitted  him  to  point  out  that  he  was  only  doing  his 
duty  by  reestablishing  the  civil  authority. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        155 

Naturally  this  strengthening  of  his  hand  by  the  President 
was  viewed  with  alarm  by  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  and  a  series 
of  small  uprisings  took  place  in  the  Yangtze  valley.  Finally, 
early  in  July,  what  is  known  as  the^SecondLEevolntion  broke, 
out,  when  the  ex-Tutuh  of  Kiangsi,  Li  Lieh-chun,  attacked  the 
forts  at  Hukow,  and  those  forts  declared  their  independence.4 
Many  of  the  prominent  leaders  of  the  1911  revolution  were 
implicated  in  this  movement  Proclamations  were  issued  in 
the  names  of  Huang  Hsing,  Chen  Chi-mei  and  Dr.  Sun  Yat- 
sen  calling  upon  the  country  to  overthrow  the  traitor  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  and  announcing  the  formation  of  a  "punitive  expe- 
dition" to  Peking.  The  revolt  was  ill-timed  however,  and  by 
September  the  situation  was  well  in  hand.  "The  rebellion" 
says  Dr.  Hornbeck,  "was  altogether  premature,  futile  in  its 
conception,  an  evidence  of  lack  of  statesmanlike  qualities  on 
the  part  of  its  leaders,  and  an  indication  that  their  much 
vaunted  love  of  country  was  a  cloak  for  personal  self -seek- 
ing/'5 That  is  rather  a  severe  indictment,  but  it  is  a  just  one. 
The  whole  struggle  at  Peking  had  developed  into  a  quarrel 
over  the  control  of  the  spoils.  The  majority  of  the  members 
of  the  Parliament,  the  Kuo  Ming  members  as  well  as  the  oth- 
ers, were  struggling  against  the  dominance  of  Yuan  Shih-kai 
not  solely  or  mainly  because  of  their  desire  to  preserve  free 
government.  In  considerable  part  they  were  actuated  by  the 
desire  to  prevent  the  President  from  leaving  them  out  in  the 

4  This  "declaration  of  independence"  as  a  political  move  is 
very  interesting.    Men  who  have  control  of  no  territory  and  no 
army  issue  declarations  of  independence  to  protest  against  ac- 
tions of  the  Central  Government.     Provinces  declare  their  in- 
dependence similarly,  and  several  times  there  have  been  almost 
as  many  provinces  "independent"  of  the  Central  Government, 
and  not  acknowledging  any  common  control,  as  there  are  pro- 
vinces in  the  Republic. 

5  "Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,"  p.  43. 


156        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

distribution  of  offices  and  the  spending  of  the  public  money. 
Votes  were  for  sale  openly  in  Peking  before  the  convocation 
of  the  Assembly,6  and  it  was  largely  because  the  spoils  were 
going  to  northerners  instead  of  southerners  that  the  Kuo 
Ming  Tang  so  consistently  opposed  the  government.  Parlia- 
mentary government  was  desirable  in  the  eyes  of  many  po- 
litical leaders  because  it  created  an  opportunity  for  a  greater 
number  to  participate  in  the  disposal  of  patronage  and  the 
disbursement  of  the  State  revenue,  than  was  the  case  under 
a  monarchical  rule. 

The  abortive  uprising  in  the  Yangtze  valley  was  followed 
by  an  increased  activity  at  Peking.  The  work  of  framing  a 
permanent  constitution  for  the  Republic  had  been  passed  on  to 
the  National  Assembly  by  the  Council.  After  the  overthrow 
of  the  revolutionists  the  Assembly  took  up  this  task  in  earnest, 
hoping  to  get  it  passed  and  accepted  as  the  fundamental  law 
of  the  land  before  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  able  to  make  him- 
self absolute  master  of  the  country.  The  President,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  anxious  to  have  his  position  confirmed  by  an 
election  as  permanent  President.  The  section  of  the  constitu- 
tion dealing  with  the  election  and  term  of  office  of  the  Presi- 
dent was  first  completed  in  order  that  the  President  might  be 
elected  and  inaugurated  on  the  date  of  the  outbreak  of  the  first 
revolution.  Parliament  was  persuaded  to  take  this  action  by 
an  intimation  that  the  Powers  who  had  not  yet  recognized  the 
Republic  would  give  this  recognition  as  soon  as  a  permanent 
President  had  been  chosen.  The  threat  of  possible  foreign 
intervention  was  also  used  by  the  government  in  order  to 
hasten  the  action  of  the  Assembly. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  42.  As  to  this  amenability  of  Parliament  to  bribery 
see  also  Weale,  "The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,"  p.  55. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        157 

The  sixth  chapter7  of  the  new  constitution  dealt  with  the 
election  and  term  of  office  of  the  President.  Any  citizen  of 
the  Chinese  Republic,  forty  years  of  age,  who  had  been  a  resi- 
dent of  the  country  for  at  least  ten  years  was  eligible  for  elec- 
tion. This  election  was  to  be  by  the  National  Assembly  sitting 
as  a  National  Convention.  Two-thirds  of  the  total  member- 
ship of  the  Convention  was  necessary  for  a  quorum,  and  elec- 
tion was  to  be  by  two-thirds  majority.  If,  after  two  ballots, 
no  candidate  had  secured  the  necessary  number  of  votes,  the 
third  ballot  was  to  be  on  the  two  names  having  the  largest 
number  of  votes  on  the  second  ballot.  A  majority  was  suffi- 
cient to  elect  on  the  third  ballot. 

.Little  anxiety  was  felt  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  election  for 
the  first  permanent  President  of  the  Republic  since  the  oppo- 
sition to  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  temporarily  paralysed  by  the 
overthrow  of  the  revolutionists  in  the  Yangtze  valley.  Never- 
theless three  ballots  were  necessary  before  the  final  choice  was 
made.  The  Vice-President  on  the  first  two  ballots  developed 
unexpected  strength,  preventing  a  two-thirds  majority  for  the 
President.  The  third  ballot,  when  only  the  two  highest  candi- 
dates could  be  voted  for  gave  Yuan  not  only  a  majority,  but 
the  necessary  two-thirds.  His  inauguration  four  days  later 
was  followed  by  the  recognition  of  the  Republic  by  the  Powers 
who  had  not  already  taken  such  action.  Secure  now  in  his 
office  for  a  period  of  five  years  the  President  was  in  a  position 
to  deal  more  firmly  with  Parliament. 

On  October  26th  the  Constitution  drafting  committee8 
finally  passed  the  draft  of  the  entire  national  constitution. 
The  next  step  would  have  been  the  consideration  of  the  draft 
by  Parliament  itself.  However,  other  developments  prevented 

7  Articles  56-57-58.     See  China  Year  Book,  1914,  pp.  494-496. 
Entire  draft  given,  pp.  490-499. 

8  This  committee  was  composed  of  an  equal  number  of  num- 
bers elected  by  and  from  each  House  of  Parliament.     It  was 


158        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

this,  and  as  it  for  that  reason,  never  went  into  effect  it  is  not 
necessary  to  consider  it  in  any  detailed  way.  u  The  underlying 
motive  in  the  draft  was  the  limitation  of  the  executive  and  the 
concentration  of  legislative  power  and  administrative  control 
in  the  hands  of  the  Assembly.  No  acts  of  the  President  were 
to  be  valid  without  the  approval  of  a  Cabinet  Minister.  The 
Cabinet  itself  was  subordinated  to  the  Assembly  since  the 
Premier  could  be  appointed  only  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
popular  Chamber,  and  the  Ministers  were  to  hold  office  only 
so  long  as  they  had  the  support  of  that  body.  State  finances 
were  controlled  by  the  Assembly,  although  the  government 
had  the  right  to  introduce  an  estimate  of  the  expenses  and 
revenues  for  the  ensuing  year.  The  provision  was  made  also 
that  the  budget  estimates  could  not  be  increased  by  the  As- 
sembly. In  order  to  prevent  any  assumption  of  increased  au- 
thority by  the  executive  when  the  Assembly  was  not  in  session 
the  draft  permanent  constitution  created  a  permanent  com- 
mittee which  was  to  continue  in  session  throughout  the  recesses 
of  the  legislature  and  exercise  all  of  the  powers  vested  in  that 
branch  of  the  government,  thus  holding  the  President  at  all 
times  under  the  active  control  of  the  Parliament.9 

for  that  reason  primarily  representative  of  the  ideas  of  the  Kuo 
Ming  Tang  which  was  more  nearly  in  control  of  this  first  Parli- 
ament than  any  other  faction  or  party.  The  committee  met  in 
the  Temple  of  Heaven,  the  work  of  framing  a  constitution  con- 
taining ideas  and  principles  new  to  China  being  carried  on  in  the 
place  peculiarly  dedicated  to  old  China.  There  it  was  that  the 
Emperor,  the  "Son  of  Heaven,"  had  in  the  past  conducted  the 
worship  of  Heaven  and  Earth,  and  there  in  the  first  days  after 
the  "Mandate  of  Heaven"  had  been  taken  from  an  Emperor  and 
given  to  the  people  acting  through  their  representatives,  these 
representatives  endeavored  to  frame  an  instrument  of  govern- 
ment that  would  consolidate  control  in  the  hands  of  the  new 
organ,  Parliament,  the  executive  being  subordinated  to  it. 

9  It  should  be  remarked  that  during  the  period  of  framing  of 
the  draft  constitution  at  this  time,  and  its  discussion,  revision  and 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China  '      159 

Yuan  Shih-kai  had  made  several  attempts  to  secure  modifi- 
cations of  the  constitution  while  the  committee  was  working 
on  it,  but  his  suggestions  had  been  disregarded  and  his  dele- 
gates refused  a  hearing.  He  took  exception  to  the  constitu- 
tion as  it  was  finally  drafted  because  of  the  limitations  im- 
posed on  the  executive  authority,  and  the  creation  of  the  com- 
mittee of  the  National  Assembly  to  watch  over  the  adminis- 
tration. After  the  draft  had  been  passed  he  called  upon  the 
high  provincial  officials  for  their  opinion  of  it  and  for  advice 
as  to  his  action.  The  response  was  immediate.  The  draft 
constitution  was  denounced  in  a  flood  of  telegrams  from  the 
provinces,  and  in  some  cases  the  dissolution  of  the  Assembly 
was  demanded. 

Secured  by  his  election  as  permanent  President,  and  by  the 
suppression  of  the  rebellion  against  his  authority,  and  assured 
of  the  support  of  the  provincial  officials,  Yuan  Shih-kai  pro- 
ceeded to  take  matters  into  his  own  hands.  As  a  preliminary 
move,  he  ordered  the  dissolution  of  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang10 
throughout  the  country  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  seditious 
organization  and  had  been  implicated  in  the  "summer  revolu- 
tion." The  Kuo  Ming  members  of  the  Assembly  were  de- 
prived of  their  seats  at  the  same  time,  by  an  executive  man- 
date. Since  their  presence  was  necessary  to  secure  a  quorum, 
this  act  virtually  brought  about  the  dissolution  of  the  Assem- 

elaboration  after  the  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  the  Assembly  had 
the  benefit  of  the  gratuitous  advice  of  many  capable  lawyers  and 
political  scientists,  foreign  as  well  as  Chinese,  and  that  the  draft 
constitutions  they  prepared  followed  the  French  rather  than  the 
British  or  American  systems.  The  French  model  was  in  gen- 
eral followed  in  drafting  the  constitution  perhaps  partly  for  this 
reason.  Among  those  preparing  such  drafts  may  be  mentioned 
Messers  Piggott  and  Barrand. 

10  November  4,  1913.  In  this  act  he  had  the  full  concurrence 
of  his  Cabinet.  Weale,  "Fight  for  the  Republic,"  pp.  55-56. 


160        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

bly.  Although  the  President  was  careful  to  make  known  his 
intention  to  preserve  the  Republic,  he  took  no  steps  to  have 
the  Assembly  brought  up  to  its  full  strength  by  new  elections, 
and  it  soon  became  evident  that  parliamentary  participation  in 
the  government  for  the  time  being  was  en<Jed. 

After  having  successfully  eliminated  the  Assembly,  it  might 
have  been  expected  that^  Yuan  Shih-kai  would  proceed  to 
govern  as  a  dictator  without  troubling  about  constitutional 
forms.  But  he  chose  the  wiser  course,  of  preserving  the  forms 
of  constitutionalism,  without  however  limiting  his  own  su- 
preme control. 

Whether  for  effect,  or  because  of  a  real  desire  for  advice, 
he  made  use  of  the  foreign  constitutional  and  legal  advisers 
to  the  government,  asking  an  American,  Dr.  F.  J.  Good- 
no  w,  who  held  the  post  of  legal  adviser  at  that  time  for  a 
memorandum  discussing  parliamentary  conditions  and  pro- 
cedure in  China.  It  is  worth  while  studying  this  document 
since  it  recommended  several  departures  from  the  ideas  of 
representative  government  which  had  prevailed  during  the 
first  years  of  the  Republic. 

The  first  part  of  the  memorandum  was  devoted  to  a  con- 
sideration of  the  way  in  which  representative  government  had 
developed  in  Europe  through  the  exercise  of  the  Royal  pre- 
rogative. Thus  the  author  showed  that  originally  the  parlia- 
ments were  not  dependent  on  popular  will  or  choice,  but  were 
made  up  of  representatives  of  the  three  predominant  classes 
in  the  State — the  Lords,  the  Church,  and  the  Third  Estate — 
summoned  by  the  King's  writ  to  advise  in  the  government  of 
the  realm.  In  other  words,  the  foundations  of  the  present 
popular  representative  governments  of  Europe  were  laid  while 
the  State  itself  was  organized  practically  as  an  absolute  mon- 
archy. Applying  this  to  China  Dr.  Goodnow  said :  "Within 
the  last  two  years,  however,  China  has  departed  from  her  tra- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        161 

ditions  and  has  attempted  to  establish  a  Republic.  This  at- 
tempt has  been  made,  however,  without  any  such  experience  as 
most  European  countries  have  had  in  parliamentary  govern- 
ment. In  other  words,  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  estab- 
lish a  Republic  before  the  foundations  have  been  laid  for  a 
parliament.  .  .  .  China  is  liable,  if  her  position  is  not  clearly 
apprehended,  to  pass  through  the  same  unfortunate  experi- 
ences which  have  been  characteristic  of  recent  South  Ameri- 
can political  life,  and  which  find  their  most  notable  manifes- 
tation in  the  occurrences  now  taking  place  in  Mexico."11  The 
attempts  at  representative  government  in  South  American 
countries,  he  said,  resulted  in  dictatorships  with  the  continual 
strife  and  political  disturbance  incident  to  such  regimes,  and 
the  same  conditions  would  be  produced  in  China  because  of 
her  premature  attempt  to  introduce  popular  government,  un- 
less representative  institutions  were  adopted  suited  to  the 
actual  state  and  needs  of  the  country. 

All  governments  are  founded  upon  interests  in  the  State 
and  not  upon  abstract  theory.  Thus  China  should  undertake 
the  establishment  of  a  parliament  representative  of  interests 
and  not  simply  of  indviduals.  In  that  way  the  cooperation  of 
the  strongest  classes  would  be  enlisted  in  the  effort  to  maintain 
a  stable  government.  Dr.  Goodnow  suggested  that  the  liter- 
ary class,  which  had  always  been  the  governing  class  in  China, 
should  be  given  representation  in  the  parliament,  together 
with  representatives  of  the  landholding  or  agricultural  class, 
the  merchant  class,  and  the  provinces.  The  latter  group  would 
represent  the  interests  of  localities. 

In  order  to  obviate  the  difficulties  of  numerous  and  fre- 
quent elections,  these  representatives  should  be  chosen  mainly 
by  appointment.  Consequently,  it  was  suggested  that  the 

11  American  Political  Science  Review,  November  1914. 


1 62        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

President  should  have  the  right  to  appoint  a  certain  number 
of  the  representatives,  and  the  remainder  should  be  appointed 
partially  by  the  local  assemblies,  and  in  part  by  the  chief  ad- 
ministrative officers  of  the  provinces.  The  memorandum  sug- 
gested that  the  members  appointed  by  the  President  should 
serve  for  long  terms,  and  should  continue  in  their  appoint- 
ments through  dissolutions  of  the  parliament.  The  idea  run- 
ning through  the  entire  memorandum  was  that  such  an  ar- 
rangement would  provide  a  "safe"  representative  body  for  the 
immediate  needs  of  the  country,  and  that  it  would  later  de- 
velop into  a  truly  representative  assembly  as  new  groups  in 
the  State  reached  a  condition  of  political  consciousness  suffi- 
ciently pronounced  to  enable  them  to  gain  a  representation  in 
the  government.  The  evolution  of  China's  parliamentary  sys- 
tem was  to  follow  the  lines  of  European  development  from 
an  Assembly  depending  upon  the  Royal  will  to  an  Assembly 
founded  upon  the  will  of  the  people. 

Yuan  Shih-kai  was  a  practical  politician,  concerned  with 
the  establishment  of  a  government  which  could  meet  effectively 
the  needs  of  the  State.  Furthermore,  the  fact  had  been  re- 
peatedly emphasized  by  a  large  group  of  Chinese,  and  by  the 
foreign  governments  represented  at  Peking  that  the  hope  of 
China  lay  in  the  President.  So  that  it  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at  if  Yuan  began  to  feel  that  the  country  could  not  exist  with- 
out his  strong  hand  at  the  helm.  He  had  given  the  Parliament 
a  chance  to  show  what  it  could  do,  and  it  had  failed  to  do 
anything.  The  sentiment  of  the  country  seemed  to  be  behind 
him  in  his  overthrow  of  parliamentary  government.  It  is 
true  that  the  "advices"  he  sought  from  the  provinces  and  from 
officials  generally,  came  for  the  most  part  from  men  who  de- 
pended upon  the  President  for  their  places,  and  who  could  be 
trusted  to  give  acceptable  advice.  But  in  spite  of  that  fact, 
it  remains  true  that  the  sentiment  of  the  people  was  just  as 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        163 

truly  reflected  by  these  appointees  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  if  it 
had  been  given  expression  through  some  more  popular  agency. 
At  the  beginning  of  1913  a  radical  majority  had  been  re- 
turned to  the  Assembly,  and  yet,  when  that  majority  was  de- 
prived of  power,  the  only  protests  came  from  those  actually 
driven  from  office.  The  constituencies  they  claimed  to  repre- 
sent remained  silent. 

In  estimating  the  popular  attitude  toward  the  action  taken 
by  Yuan  Shih-kai  at  this  time,  it  must  be  remembered  that  he 
held  a  double  mandate  to  reorganize  the  government — that 
which  he  held  as  the  elected  representative  of  the  people,  and 
that  derived  from  the  abdication  edict  of  the  Manchu  Emperor, 
by  which  Yuan  was  given  full  power  to  establish  a  republican 
government  suited  to  the  needs  of  China.  He  had  sworn  to 
uphold  the  Republic,  and,  while  the  Assembly  was  dissolved, 
the  Republic  still  existed.  With  that  the  people  rested  content. 

The  memorandum  submitted  by  the  Constitutional  Adviser 
to  the  government  laid  down  principles  entirely  in  harmony 
with  the  President's  own  ideas  of  the  needs  of  the  State.  The 
only  thing  that  remained  was  to  give  effect  to  them  in  the 
most  acceptable  way.  \From  the  time  of  the  dissolution  of  the 
National  Assembly  Yuan  Shih-kai  exercised  dictatorial  pow- 
ers. But  he  was  too  astute  a  politician  not  to  recognize  the 
value  of  clothing  his  power  in  constitutional  garb.  The  peo- 
ple wanted  a  representative  government  and  at  the  same  time 
they  demanded  a  strong  hand  in  that  government.  They 
wanted  to  reconcile  oriental  absolutism  with  western  consti- 
tutionalism. So  the  President  adhered  to  the  forms  of  a  con- 
stitutional government  during  the  period  immediately  follc%- 
ing  his  overthrow  of  the  Parliament.  When  he  departed  from 
this  line  of  procedure  he  paved  the  way  for  his  own  downfall. 

His  first  act  was  to  appoint  an  advisory  Council  to  aid  him 


164        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

in  the  work  of  reconstituting  the  government.  This  Cheng 
Chih  Hui  Yi,  or  Political  Council,12  was  made  up  of  men  of 
practical  administrative  experience,  men  of  long  service  under 
the  former  Dynasty  who  hacLbeen  trained  in  the  same  political 
school  as  Yuan  Shih-kai.  /Working  through  the  instrumen- 
tality of  this  Council  the  JPresident  proceeded  to  construct  a 
constitutional  system  in  which  the  executive  was  supreme,  the 
representative  assembly  being  more  in  the  nature  of  an  ad- 
visory than  a  controlling  body. 

The  first,  recommendation  made  by  the  Political  Council 
was  that  an  elected  Assembly  be  called  into  being,  "which, 
being  representative  of  the  nation,  would  give  constitutional 
sanction  to  the  acts  of  the  President."13  The  regulations  for 
this  assembly,  the  Constitutional  Council,  were  so  drawn  up 
as  to  exclude  from  membership  all  except  members  of  the  old 
official  and  literati  classes.  J  Only  men  who  had  held  an  official 
post  for  at  least  five  years,  or  were  graduates  of  a  law  school, 
or  holders  of  a  degree  higher  than  that  of  Chu-jen  were  eligi- 
ble for  membership.  The  electorate  was  limited  to  those  over 
forty  years  of  age  who  were  officials,  or  held  the  rank  of  Chu- 
jen,  or  were  graduates  of  provincial  high  schools,  or  possessed 
property  to  the  value  of  $10,000.  [The  Council  was  to  consist 
of  only  fifty-six  members.  Its  chief  function  was  to  revise 
the  Provisional  Constitution,  and  advise  the  President  on  any 
matters  submitted  to  it.1* 

The  Council  was  convened  on  March  18,  1914,  and  imme- 
diately addressed  itself  to  the  question  of  constitutional  re- 
vision. Its  work  was  soon  completed  and  the  revised  consti- 
tution promulgated  on  May  i,  1914. 

12  China  Year  Book,  1916,  p.  432. 

13  China  Year  Book,  1916,  p.  433. 
"ibid. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        165 

The  "Constitutional  Compact,"  as  the  revised  provisional 
constitution  was  called,  was  in  the  nature  of  a  voluntary 
agreement  by  which  the  sovereign  accepted  certain  limitations 
on  his  absolute  freedom  of  action.  Instead  of  a  bicameral 
legislature,  with  executive  as  well  as  legislative  powers,  and 
a  President  and  Cabinet  accountable  to  the  legislature,  the 
Compact  provided  for  a  President  who  would  "combine  in 
himself  all  the  powers  of  government";  a  unicameral  legisla- 
ture with  limited  powers;  and  a  Council  of  the  nature  of  a 
Privy  Council.15 

All  power  over  the  administration  was  vested  in  the  Presi- 
dent, unlimited  by  any  necessity  to  consider  the  wishes  of 
other  branches  of  the  government.  .  Thus  he  was  empowered 
to  prescribe  and  determine  the  organization  of  all  offices,  and 
to  fix  the  duties  of  the  officials ;  all  civil  and  military  appoint- 
ments were  to  be  made  by  him ;  he  was  madelhe  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  with  the  power  to  declare 
war  and  make  peace,  and  to  declare  a  state  of~seige;  and  he 
was  the  fountain  of  honor  in  the  State.  As  the  head  of  the 
State,  diplomatic  relations  were  controlled~1)y  the  chief  ex- 
ecutive. Ambassadors  and  Ministers  were  to  be  received  by 
him,  and  all  treaty  negotiations  remained  in  his  hands,  with 
the  exception  that  in  case  a  treaty  involved  territorial  change, 
or  increased  the  burdens  of  the  citizens,  the  concurrence  of  the 
legislature  was  required.  This  limitation  was  a  direct  benefit 
to  the  President  since  it  forced  him  to  share  witli  the  legisla- 
ture the  responsibility  for  making  any  change  to  which  the 
people  might  be  opposed.  In  addition  to  the  powers  vested  in 
him  as  the  head  of  the  administration,  the  President  was 
brought  into  direct  contact  with  the  legislative  branch  of  the 

15  For  translation  of  "The  Constitutional  Compact"  see  China 
Year  Book,  1916,  pp.  437-443- 


1 66        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

government.  He  might  initiate  legislation  and  prepare  the 
financial  estimates  for  the  consideration  of  the  legislature.  In 
time  of  emergency,  executive  ordinances  were  to  have  the 
force  of  law,  but  they  must  be  submitted  as  soon  as  possible 
to  the  legislature  for  its  approval.  If  this  approval  was 
withheld  they  were  to  become  null  and  void.16 

The  Constitutional  Compact  "further  provided  that  the  legis- 
lature should  be  convoked  and  all  its  sessions  opened,  pro- 
rogued or  closed  by  the  President. "\  As  has  been  stated,  it 
was  to  be  a  single-chambered  body,  and  was,  in  theory,  elec- 
tive. Its  ordinary  sessions  were  limited  to  four  months,  al- 
though they  might  be  prolonged  if  the  President  felt  the  need 
for  a  more  extended  session ;  he  also  had  the  right  to  summon 
the  legislature  in  special  session.  Its  powers  were  similar  to 
those  exercised  by  the  first  National  Assembly,Xvhich  met  in 
1910.  It  was  competent  to  discuss  and  pass  bills,  and  the  fi- 
nancial estimates,  including  the  right  to  "discuss  and  pass  or 
approve  measures  relating  to  the  assumption  of  public  debts, 
and  to  the  contracting  of  other  liabilities  to  the  charge  of  the 
National  Treasury."17  But,  as  will  be  seen  when  we  discuss 
the  provisions  of  the  Compact  relative  to  finance,  these  rights 
were  so  limited  as  to  give  the  executive  an  absolute  control 
over  the  finances  of  the  StateJ.  In  addition  to  the  above,  the 
legislature  could  reply  to  inquiries  from  the  President,  receive 
petitions  from  the  people,  and  initiate  legislation  equally  with 
the  President.  It  also  might  submit  suggestions  and  opinions 
relating  to  legislation  and  other  matters  to  the  administration, 

16  For  the  promotion  of  the  public  welfare,  for  the  execution 
of  the  statutes,  or  in  pursuance  of  authority  granted  by  statute, 
the  President  was  empowered  to  issue,  or  cause  to  be  issued 
ordinances,  but  no  ordinance  might  alter  a  statute.  Ch.  Ill,  art. 

1  »  Ch.  IV,  art.  31  (3). 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        167 

and  had  the  right  of  interpellation,  although  such  interpella- 
tions could  not  be  so  made  as  to  censure  the  government. 
The  President  might  refuse  to  answer  questions  put  to  him, 
if  he  felt  that  secrecy  was  desirable.  Bills  passed  by  the 
legislature  were  to  be  promulgated  by  the  President,  but  if 
he  disapproved  of  any  measure  it  might  be  returned  for  re- 
consideration. On  reconsideration,  the  bill  had  to  be  passed 
by  a  two-thirds  majority,  but  even  then  the  President  did  not 
need  to  promulgate  it  if  he  felt  that  it  would  harm  either  the 
internal  administration  or  the  foreign  relations  of  the  State. 
If  the  President  withheld  promulgation  on  the  above  grounds 
it  must  be  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Council  of  State.,  The 
President  had  the  right,  in  concurrence  with  that  body,  to 
dissolve  the  legislature,  in  which  case  it  was  stipulated  that 
new  elections  must  be  held  within  six  months  from  the  date 
of  dissolution.  On  the  other  hand  the  legislature  was  em- 
powered to  impeach  the  President  on  charge  of  treason,  but 
all  danger  to  the  President  from  this  provision  was  removed 
by  the  fact  that  impeachment  proceedings  must  have  the  ap- 
proval of  a  three-fourths  majority  of  a  four-fifths  quorum  of 
the  legislature.  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  determined  to  avoid  the 
difficulties  arising  from  a  constant  criticism  of  the  government 
through  impeachments,  and  yet  felt  it  best  to  give  the  legisla- 
ture the  feeling  that  it  had  a  weapon  by  which  the  form  of 
the  State  might  be  preserved  in  case  the  President  proved  a 
traitor  to  republican  institutions. 

The  other  constitutions  under  which  the  government  had 
been  established  at  different  times  had  made  provision  for  a 
Cabinet  to  assume  a  measure  of  responsibility  for  the  admin- 
istration, but  the  Constitutional  Compact  marks  a  decided  di- 
vergence from  the  former  practice.  The  President,  assisted 
by  a  Secretary  of  State,  was  given  the  sole  responsibility  for 


1 68        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  administration  of  the  government.  The  actual  work  of 
administration  was  to  be  conducted  by  the  heads  of  the  De- 
partments, acting,  not  as  a  body,  but  separately.  The  Secre- 
tary of  State,  the  heads  of  Departments,  and  special  delegates 
representing  the  President,  were  given  the  right  to  appear  and 
to  speak  in  the  legislature,  but  could  not  be  held  accountable 
for  their  acts  except  through  the  President.  They  could  be 
impeached  only  by  the  Board  of  Censors,  and  were  to  be  tried, 
not  in  the  ordinary  Courts  of  law,  but  in  special  administra- 
tive Courts,  which  were  to  apply  administrative  law.  Thus 
all  control  over  the  administration  was  removed  from  the  rep- 
resentative branch  of  the  government. 

The  ordinary  Courts  of  law  were  to  be  composed  of  judges 
appointed  by  the  President,  and  were  given  jurisdiction  over 
civil  and  criminal  cases,  except  where  administrative  officers 
or  administrative  provisions  were  concerned.  Trials  were  to 
be  conducted  publicly,  except  where  publicity  was  considered 
prejudicial  to  law  and  order  or  public  morality,  when  secrecy 
might  be  observed.  Thus  secret  trials  such  as  had  been  ob- 
jected to  by  the  National  Council  in  1912  were  provided  for 
by  law. 

The  legislature  was  given  the  constitutional  right  to  pass  on 
the  estimates  of  the  government,  but  certain  estimates  might 
be  neither  rejected  nor  reduced,  unless  with  the  consent  of 
the  President.  These  were:  i)  those  pertaining  to  the  legal 
obligations  of  the  State;  2)  such  necessary  expenditures  as 
might  have  arisen  from  the  provisions  of  statutes;  3)  ex- 
penditures necessary  to  carry  out  treaties;  4)  expenditures 
necessary  for  the  organization  of  the  army  and  the  navy.  The 
Compact  provided  that  all  the  old  taxes  and  revenues  should 
be  continued  unless  changed  by  statute,  and  all  new  taxes 
should  be  imposed  by  statute.  But  when  it  is  considered  that 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        169 

the  President  determined  the  statutes  through  his  power  to 
refuse  to  promulgate  bills  passed  by  the  legislature,  it  is  ap- 
parent that  final  control  over  revenues  was  retained  by  the 
government.  Furthermore  a  "continuing  expenditure  fund" 
was  provided  which  was  to  embody  appropriations  extending 
over  a  period  of  years,  and  which  could  be  used  to  meet  spe- 
cial emergencies.  After  this  fund  was  once  voted  the  govern- 
ment had  resources  for  which  it  did  not  have  to  account  to  the 
legislature.  Then  there  was  to  be  a  reserve  fund  to  be  used 
to  supply  deficiencies  in  the  estimates,  or  to  meet  requirements 
not  otherwise  provided  for.  In  time  of  war  or  internal  dis- 
turbance the  President  might  make  emergency  appropriations, 
submitting  them  later  to  the  Assembly  for  ratification.  If  the 
legislature  should  delay  action  on  the  budget,  or  should  re- 
fuse to  pass  it  the  last  year's  estimates  were  to  continue  in 
force.  The  compact  made  provision  for  a  Board  of  Audit, 
which  was  to  go  over  the  accounts,  after  which  the  receipts 
and  expenditures  of  the  year,  with  the  report  of  the  Board, 
should  be  presented  to  the  legislature  for  approval. 

Since  the  Constitutional  Compact  was  provisional,  one  sec- 
tion of  it  was  devoted  to  the  procedure  for  framing  a  perma- 
nent constitution.  That  instrument  was  to  be  drafted  by  a 
committee  not  exceeding  ten  in  number,  appointed  by  the 
Council  of  State.18  When  the  committee  had  completed  its 
work  it  was  to  be  submitted  to  the  Council  of  State  for  ex- 
amination and  approval.  After  it  had  been  accepted  by  the 
Council  the  constitution  was  to  be  submitted  by  the  President 

18  This  committee  was  actually  appointed  in  July  1915.  Its 
work,  however,  was  interrupted  by  the  agitation  for  a  restoration 
of  the  monarchy,  and  the  subsequent  rebellion  which  finally 
brought  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  back  into  power.  For  a  brief  de- 
scription of  the  membership  of  the  constitutional  drafting  com- 
mittee see  National  Review  (China)  for  August  21,  1915. 


170        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

to  a  National  Convention  for  final  adoption.  Until  the  per- 
manent constitution  had  been  adopted  the  Constitutional  Com- 
pact was  to  have  the  same  force  as  the  constitution. 

In  addition  to  the  work  of  drawing  up  this  Constitutional 
Compact,  the  Constitutional  Council,  or  Conference,  was  given 
the  task  of  framing  the  regulations  for  the  Tsan  Cheng  Yuan 
(Council  of  State),  the  Li  Fa  Yuan  (legislative  assembly), 
and  the  National  Convention  which  was  ultimately  to  pass  on 
the  permanent  constitution.  Furthermore  any  question  of 
amendment  of  the  Compact  was  to  be  submitted  to  it.  The 
Compact  provided  that  amendment  might  be  undertaken  on 
a  proposal  of  the  President  or  a  two-thirds  majority  of  the 
legislature.  In  either  case  the  proposal  of  amendment  had  to 
be  sanctioned  by  a  majority  of  three-fourths,  of  a  quorum  of 
four-fifths,  of  the  total  membership  of  the  legislature.  The 
actual  work  of  amendment  was  to  be  undertaken  by  the  Con- 
stitutional Compact  Conference  summoned  by  the  President. 

In  May  the  Constitutional  Compact  Conference  completed 
the  regulations  for  the  Council  of  State,  and  they  were  pro- 
mulgated by  the  President  on  May  24.  The  members  of  the 
Council  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  President,  and,  as  it  was 
actually  constituted,  the  membership  numbered  seventy.  The 
sole  function  of  the  Council  of  State  was  to  advise  the  Presi- 
dent on  matters  of  State  or  such  matters  as  he  chose  to  sub- 
mit to  it^xlt  was  further  empowered  to  offer  suggestions  to 
the  President,  but  any  memorandum  embodying  such  sugges- 
tions had  to  be  signed  by  ten  members.  The  work  of  inter- 
preting the  constitution  devolved  on  it  also,  as  did  the  settle- 
ment of  any  disputes  arising  between  the  executive  and  the 
judiciary. 

The  Council  of  State  met  for  the  first  time  on  June  20, 
1914.  For  the  time  being  it  was  to  act  as  the  legislative  As- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        171 

sembly  in  addition  to  exercising  its  own  advisory  functions, 
and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Council,  with  the  President,  con- 
stituted the  government.  Regulations  for  the  legislature  were 
drawn  up  and  promulgated,  but  on  one  pretext  or  another  its 
convocation  was  delayed.  Since  the  members  of  the  Council 
of  State  were  appointed  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  that  body  was  what 
might  have  been  expected :  a  highly  conservative  group  of  men 
fully  in  sympathy  with  the  aims  of  the  President  and  com- 
pletely under  his  control.  China  had  indeed  reverted  to 
autocracy  under  a  constitutional  disguise! 

The  next  step  in  the  organization  of  the  government  under 
the  Compact  was  the  promulgation  of  the  laws  governing  the 
Li  Fa  Yuan,  or  legislative  council.  This  body  was  to  consist 
of  two  hundred  and  seventy-five  members  elected  indirectly, 
and  holding  office  for  a  period  of  four  years.  Those  qualified 
to  serve  as  electors  in  the  primary  election19  were  men  who 
had  held  or  were  holding  the  position  of  a  high  official;  had 
graduated  from  an  institution  of  learning  not  lower  than  a 
middle  school;  possessed  immovable  property  to  the  value  of 
$5000  or  more,  invested  in  commerce  or  industry.  The  quali- 
fications for  election  in  the  primary  election  were  the  same 
as  for  electors  except  that  they  were  moved  up  one  degree. 

19  The  double  system  of  primary  and  final  elections  was  fol- 
lowed in  the  provinces.  The  Central  Electoral  College  consis- 
ted of  residents  of  Peking  who  had  rendered  meritorious  service 
to  the  country ;  or  had  been  high  officials ;  or  were  recognized 
scholars,  or  had  certain  other  educational  qualifications ;  or  pos- 
sessed property  to  the  value  of  $10,000 ;  or  were  members  of  the 
nobility  or  held  rank  in  one  of  the  eight  Banner  Corps.  Over- 
seas citizens  with  property  to  the  value  of  $30,000  might  vote 
in  the  Central  Electoral  College  by  coming  to  Peking.  The  Mon- 
golian, Tibetan  and  Chinghai  Electoral  Colleges  were  made  up 
of  nobles  of  Princely  or  hereditary  rank  or  title,  or  men  other- 
wise distinguished. 


172        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Thus,  in  addition  to  the  middle  school  education,  the  candi- 
date was  required  to  have  continued  his  study  in  a  high  grade 
technical  school.  The  property  qualification  was  moved  to  ten 
thousand  dollars,  and  the  official  must  have  held  office  for  at 
least  a  year.  The  qualifications  for  membership  in  the  legis- 
lative Council  were  placed  even  higher.  Anyone  might  be 
elected  who  had  rendered  meritorious  service  to  the  State; 
who  had  been  a  high  official  for  five  years  or  more ;  who  was 
an  eminent  or  learned  scholar;  who  had  graduated  from  an 
educational  institution  not  lower  than  a  middle  school  after 
study  of  not  less  than  three  years,  either  in  China  or  abroad, 
or  who  had  an  equivalent  education;  who  had  been  a  teacher 
in  an  institution  not  lower  than  a  high  grade  technical  school 
for  three  years  or  more;  who  had  immovable  property  to  the 
value  of  $30,000,  or  who  had  that  amount  invested  in  com- 
mercial or  industrial  enterprises. 

These  requirements  followed  closely  Dr.  Goodnow's  sug- 
gestion that  the  official,  literati  and  gentry  classes,  as  such, 
should  be  represented  in  a  single  chamber  legislature,  thus  con- 
stituting a  representation  of  interests  rather  than  of  popula- 
tion. 

It  was  intended  that  elections   for  the  legislative  council 
should  be  held  early  in  1915  but  by  that  time  other  affairs  of 
•  greater  immediate  importance  held  the  attention  of  the  gov- 
flernment,  and  later  developments  precluded  the  idea  of  a  con- 
|  vocation  of  such  a  body,  so  that,  in  fact,  the  promulgation  of 
/  the  regulations  was  as  far  as  Yuan  Shih-kai  advanced  toward 
/   the  establishment  of  a  semi-popular  branch  of  the  .government. 
At  the  request  of  the  Council  of  State  the  Constitutional 
Compact  Conference  took  up  the  question  of  the  Presidential 
succession,  and  the  Presidential  Election  Law  was  promul- 
gated on  December  29,  1914.     This  law  is  one  of  the  most 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        173 

interesting  documents  of  Chinese  constitutional  history.  In- 
stead of  following  western  methods  for  presidential  elections, 
provisions  were  made  entirely  unique  to  China.  A  candidate 
for  the  office  of  President  had  to  be  forty  years  old,  and  of 
twenty  years  residence  in  the  country.  The  term  of  office 
was  advanced  from  five  to  ten  years.  When  the  time  for  an 
election  drew  near  the  President  was  to  write  the  names  of 
three  men  as  his  nominees  for  the  office  on  a  plate  of  gold. 
This  plate  was  then  to  be  locked  up  in  a  casket,  which  was  to 
be  kept  in  a  stone  house  in  the  residence  of  the  President. 
The  key  to  the  casket  was  to  be  retained  by  the  President,  and 
the  keys  to  the  stone  house  were  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  President,  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  chairman  of  the 
Council  of  State.  On  the  day  of  the  election  a  committee  of 
ten  was  to  be  empowered  to  open  the  casket  and  the  President 
was  to  make  known  the  names  of  the  candidates  to  the  elec- 
toral college.  The  presidential  electoral  college  was  to  be  com- 
posed of  fifty  members  elected  from  the  Council  of  State  and 
fifty  from  the  legislative  Council.  In  addition  to  the  three 
names  submitted  by  the  President  the  electoral  college  might 
vote  on  the  name  of  the  President  for  reelection.  For  pur- 
poses of  election  a  quorum  of  three-fourths  of  the  total  mem- 
bership of  the  electoral  college  was  required.  On  the  first 
ballot  a  two-thirds  majority  was  necessary  for  election.  If 
no  one  secured  the  requisite  majority  the  two  names  standing 
highest  on  the  list  were  to  be  voted  on  at  the  second  ballot, 
when  a  majority  was  sufficient  for  election.  In  case,  however, 
it  should  appear  inadvisable  to  hold  an  election  at  the  ap- 
pointed time  the  Council  of  State  might  extend  the  term  of 
office  of  the  President  for  another  ten  years  without  the  for- 
mality of  an  election.  At  the  time  of  taking  office  the  fol- 
lowing oath  was  prescribed  for  the  President-elect :  "I  swear 


174        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

that  I  shall  with  all  sincerity  adhere  to  the  constitution  and 
execute  the  duties  of  the  President.  I  reverently  swear." 

The  term  of  office  of  the  Vice-President  was  to  be  the  same 
as  that  of  the  President.  At  the  time  for  a  vice-presidential 
election  the  President  was  to  nominate  three  candidates  for 
the  office.  The  form  of  election  was  the  same  as  for  the 
President. 

The  regulations  for  the  National  Convention  which  was  to 
be  convoked  to  pass  on  the  draft  of  the  permanent  constitu- 
tion were  promulgated  in  March,  1915.  But,  owing  to  later 
developments,  no  attempt  was  made  to  give  effect  to  them. 
The  Convention  was  to  consist  of  three  hundred  and  thirty- 
five  elected  members;  forty  from  the  metropolitan  district; 
two  hundred  and  two  from  the  provinces;  nine  from  special 
territories;  twenty-four  from  Mongolia,  Tibet,  and  Kokonor, 
and  twenty  each  from  the  legislative,  judicial,  and  administra- 
tive offices.  The  Convention  was  to  pass  on  the  draft  of  the 
constitution  submitted  to  it  by  the  Council  of  State.  It  could 
only  consider  amendments  to  the  Constitution  on  the  proposal 
of  at  least  forty  m.embers.  Any  amendments  suggested  must 
be  submitted  to  the  Constitution  Drafting  Committee,  before 
being  incorporated  in  the  Constitution.  The  Convention  was 
to  meet  in  sessions  extending  over  four  months.  If  it  did  not 
reach  a  decision  in  that  time  it  was  to  be  dissolved  and  a  new 
Convention  elected. 

At  the  time  when  Yuan  Shih-kai  carried  out  these  measures 
concentrating  power  in  his  own  hands  there  was  no  popular 
feeling  against  his  action.  The  only  strongly  organized  party 
of  opposition  had  been  broken  up  and  its  leaders  driven  from 
the  country;  the  parliament,  elected  in  theory  by  the  people, 
had  been  dissolved;  the  Provisional  Constitution  had  been 
amended  out  of  existence  by  a  body  which  was  unknown  to 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        175 

the  Constitution;  the  provincial  assemblies  had  been  dissolved 
together  with  the  local  government  bodies;  a  constitutional 
system  had  been  inaugurated  which  reestablished  executive 
authority  on  practically  the  same  basis  as  that  upon  which  the 
authority  of  the  Manchu  Dynasty  had  rested.  It  would  seem^ 
indeed,  that  the  entire  work  of  the  revolution  of  1911,  which 
had  been  represented  as  an  expression  of  the  popular  desire  to  j 
assume  a  share  in  the  direction  of  political  affairs,  had  beenf 
undone. 

Upon  what,  then  did  the  revolution  accomplished  by  Yuan 
Shih-kai  depend  for  its  strength?  Why  was  he  able  to  bring 
about  such  radical  changes  without  provoking  an  outburst  too 
strong  to  be  resisted  ?  The  answer  to  these  questions  involves 
three  conditions  which  have  already  been  touched  upon.  In 
the  first  place  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  a  certain  legal  basis  for  his 
reorganization  of  the  government.  He  had  been  commis- 
sioned by  the  retiring  Dynasty  to  "organize  with  full  powers 
a  provisional  republican  government,  and  confer  with  the  Re- 
publican Army  as  to  methods  of  union."20  His  authority  as 
the  commissioner  of  the  old  regime  meant  more  to  one  section 
of  the  country  than  any  mandate  he  had  received  from  the 
revolutionary  organization  at  Nanking.  He  had  sworn,  it  is 
true,  to  uphold  the  Provisional  Constitution,  but  that  did  not 
preclude  the  possibility  of  making  any  changes  in  that  instru- 
ment necessary  for  the  good  of  the  country.  His  legal  right 
to  institute  changes  incompatible  with  the  Provisional  Consti- 
tution was  weakened  by  his  statement  before  election  that  he 
considered  the  revolution  as  the  source  of  his  authority  rather 
than  the  Abdication  Edicts.  But  that  did  not  prevent  a  great 
many  of  the  people  from  looking  on  him  as  the  successor  to 
the  old  government  in  the  same  sense  as  the  Ts'ing  Dynasty 

20  Abdication  Edicts,  see  above  pp.  115-16. 


176        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

had  been  successor  to  the  Mings,  and  with  the  same  right  to 
make  changes  in  the  constitution  of  the  State,  provided  he  did 
not  harm  directly  the  everyday  interests  of  the  people. 

The  second  factor  to  be  considered  is  the  fact  that  the  ultra- 
liberal  ideas  of  the  southern  revolutionary  leaders  had  been 
tried,  after  a  fashion,  and  found  wanting.  The  Parliament, 
with  its  extensive  powers,  had  not  only  failed  to  maintain 
itself  against  the  constitutionally  limited  executive,  but  it  had 
also  failed  to  formulate  any  constructive  policy  which  would 
have  indicated  its  fitness  to  wield  the  powers  given  it  even  if 
it  had  been  able  to  maintain  its  supremacy  against  Yuan  Shih- 
kai.  The  case  against  the  Parliament  is  presented  by  one  of 
the  most  noted  of  Chinese  scholars,  Liang  Ch'i  Ch'ao,  in  the 
following  words:  "For  more  than  twenty  days  it  [the  As- 
sembly] could  not  elect  a  speaker,  and  over  a  hundred  days 
elapsed  before  it  was  able  to  draw  up  rules  and  regulations 
for  its  own  procedure.  For  a  long  time  the  absence  of  a 
quorum  and  the  irregular  attendance  of  the  members  became 
an  almost  everyday  occurrence,  and  when  there  was  a  quorum 
the  members  quarreled  with  each  other  like  a  lot  of  old  ladies 
from  the  country  and  behaved  like  naughty  school  boys.  Be- 
fore dispersing  each  day  the  members  wasted  half  the  day 
in  wrangling  about  unnecessary  things.  With  a  salary  of 
$6,000  per  annum,  none  of  the  members  seems  ever  to  have 
given  a  thought  for  the  benefit  of  the  country.  .  .  .  We  may 
have  a  great  love  for  parliamentary  institutions,  but  we  love 
our  country  much  more."21  In  the  face  of  parliamentary  in- 
competency  the  country  was  more  than  ready  to  respond  to 
any  attempt  to  restore  a  system  which  at  least  promised  an 
efficient  administration.  The  people  were  all  the  more  recon- 

21  "Contemporary  Politics  in  Far  East,"  pp.  49-50 — (citation 
taken  from  "The  Justice,"  Vol.  I,  no.  15,  July  i,  1913). 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        177 

\i 

ciled  to  the  change  by  the  fact  that  the  form  of  the  Republic 
was  preserved,  and  a  certain  appearance  of  constitutional  sanc- 
tion for  the  acts  of  the  government  was  maintained. 

The  most  important  point  to  be  remembered,  however,  is 
that  the  people  of  China  have  never  felt  that  their  daily  lives 
were  very  greatly  influenced  by  the  central  government.  They 
paid  their  taxes,  and  they  knew  that  it  was  possible  for  them 
to  resist  any  great  encroachments  by  the  central  authority  on 
local  prerogatives  and  customs.  Further  than  that,  what  went 
on  at  Peking  did  not  interest  them  very  greatly.  They  lived 
their  lives  and  were  content  to  let  those  who  wished  to  main- 
tain themselves  as  part  of  the  machinery  of  government  carry 
on  the  administration.  Naturally,  the  ones  who  made  up  the 
bureaucracy  were  the  educated  classes  and  the  men  of  means. 
There  was  no  hereditary  nobility  to  make  up  the  governing 
class  and  restrict  it  to  its  own  membership.  Education  was 
made  the  basis  for  membership  in  the  ruling  class  at  a  very 
early  period  of  Chinese  history,  and  every  man  who  had 
money  had  a  certain  amount  of  education.  So  that  the  gentry 
and  the  literati  formed  one  distinct  class  from  which  official- 
dom was  entirely  recruited.  That  there  was  no  great  jealousy 
of  this  class  was  due  to  the  fact  that  membership  in  it  was 
open  to  any  one,  and  indeed  many  of  the  officials  came  from 
poor  and  humble  surroundings.  The  revolution  of  1911  had 
not  overthrown  the  conception  of  the  right  of  this  class  to 
wield  the  administrative  authority.  It  had  simply  changed 
the  organs  of  government  so  that  instead  of  the  administra- 
tive policy  being  formulated  and  directed  by  an  absolute  mon- 
arch it  was  given  over  to  the  control  of  an  assembly  which 
exercised  the  same  absolute  power  as.  had  the  former  monarch. 
Now  Yuan  Shih-kai,  in  effect,  reversed  the  change  made  in 
1911.  Through  all  these  shifts  the  administration  was  carried 


178        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

>y  the  same  class,  and  the  relation  of  the  people  to  the 
c^dtral  government  had  undergone  no  change.  They  saw  the 
same  officials  functioning  after  Yuan  had  become  the  dictator 
as  before;  the  condition  of  the  country  was  not  changed  either 
for  the  better  or  the  worse  so  far  as  they  could  see.  Those 
interested  in  opposition  had  been  driven  from  the  country  or 
temporarily  silenced.  And  that  national  panacea — a  constitu- 
tion— had  been  preserved.  It  mattered  little  to  the  mass  of 
the  people  whether  the  President  or  the  Parliament  had  the 
supreme  power  until  their  selfish  interests  or  local  privilges 
were  directly  affected,  or  until  they  were  otherwise  stirred  to 
action. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  monarchy  movement  of  1915-16  was  but  an  incident, 
an  interlude,  in  the  constitutional  history  of  the  last  few  years. 
From  one  point  of  view  it  deserves  but  a  bare  mention  in  the 
story  of  constitutional  development,  but  from  another  it 
throws  so  many  sidelights  on  Chinese  politics  that  it  cannot 
be  ignored.  As  we  have  seen,  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  taken  all 
the  necessary  steps  to  consolidate  his  position  as  dictator  in 
the  Chinese  Republic.  He  had  replaced  the  Assembly  elected 
under  the  Nanking  Constitution  with  a  body,  the  Council  of 
State,  so  constituted  as  to  be  entirely  subservient  to  himself. 
The  Constitution  itself,  which  had  concentrated  the  supreme 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  Assembly,  had  been  replaced  by  an 
instrument  drawn  up,  under  the  supervision  of  the  President, 
by  a  Conference  of  officials  which  based  its  authority  on  a 
presidential  mandate.  The  Constitutional  Compact  not  only 
combined  in  the  President  the  supreme  powers  of  government, 
but,  together  with  the  Presidential  Election  Law,  made  it 
possible  for  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  retain  the  presidency  as  long  as 
he  wished  to  do  so.  All  of  this  had  been  done  with  the  pas- 
sive acquiescence  of  all  classes  in  the  State.  Any  who  showed 
a  tendency  to  oppose  the  President  were  either  forced  to  leave 
the  country  or  were  removed  by  imprisonment  or  assassina- 
tion. Men  like  the  Vice-President,  Li  Yuan-hung,  of  whose 
sympathy  the  government  was  doubtful,  were  concentrated  in 
Peking  on  the  pretext  of  giving  advice  to  the  executive,  but 
in  reality  to  keep  them  under  the  eye  of  the  President.  It 
seemed  as  though  China,  after  four  years  of  turmoil,  had 

179 


180        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

settled  down  for  a  few  years  under  the  rule  of  a  "strong  man" 
whose  position  was  nearly  impregnable,  fortified  as  it  was  by 
the  support  of  the  Powers,  and  by  the  acquiescence  of  most 
of  the  gentry  and  literati. 

The  opening  days  of  1915,  however,  brought  to  China  a 
more  acute  danger  than  any  she  has  faced  in  modern  times, 
not  excepting  even  the  danger  to  her  national  existence  from 
the  Russian  policy  in  the  North  before  the  Russo-Japanese 
war.  Less  than  six  months  after  the  outbreak  of  the  great 
war  in  Europe,  and  its  extension  to  the  Far  East  by  the  action 
of  Japan  in  driving  German  interests  from  Shantung  province, 
while  the  attention  of  the  western  States  was  distracted  from 
the  non-European  world,  Japan  suddenly  served  on  Yuan 
Shih-kai  a  series  of  astounding  'demands'  ranging  from  the 
disposition  of  the  German  holdings  in  Shantung  to  an  agree- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  government  to  allow  Japan 
large  administrative  and  police  powers  in  China.  These  de- 
mands were  presented  out  of  a  clear  sky,  when  there  were  no 
oustanding  questions  under  discussion  by  the  two  governments. 
Japan  tried  in  vain  to  keep  the  world  in  ignorance  of  her 
action  both  by  demanding  secrecy  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese 
and,  when  news  of  her  action  gradually  leaked  out,  by  at  first 
denying  that  such  demands  had  been  made.  When  the  fact 
of  the  negotiations  had  been  so  clearly  established  as  to  make 
denial  futile,  she  denied  that  they  were  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  endanger  Chinese  independence  and  territorial  integrity. 
Finally  she  admitted  the  fact  of  Group  V,1  but  insisted  that 
that  group  had  been  presented  not  as  'demands/  but  as  ma- 
terial for  friendly  discussion. 

1  The  demands  were  arranged  in  groups,  one  relating  to  Shan- 
tung, one  to  South  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  etc.  Group  V 
consisted  of  the  provisions  designed  to  limit  Chinese  adminis- 
trative autonomy. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        181 

The  negotiations  were  prolonged  until  May  when  China 
was  forced,  under  pressure,  to  agree  to  most  of  the  least  ob- 
noxious of  the  rights  and  privileges  desired  by  Japan.  While 
forced  to  concede  much,  the  Chinese  government  was  able  to 
safeguard  the  Republic's  interests  at  the  most  vital  points, 
This  was  due  in  large  part  to  the  diplomacy  of  the  President; 
— to  his  skill  in  bringing  the  pressure  of  the  other  Powers 
to  bear  on  the  Japanese  government,  and  in  arousing  the 
country  to  the  danger  of  the  situation. 

Shortly  after  the  conclusion,  in  May  1915,  of  the  negotia- 
tions with  Japan  over  these  now  famous  'demands'  however, 
a  feeling  of  unrest  and  uncertainty  became  marked  in  Peking. 
This  rapidly  crystallized  into  an  agitation  for  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  the  monarchical  form  of  government  in  name  as  well 
as  in  fact,  with  Yuan  Shih-kai  as  Emperor.  What  influence 
the  Japanese  question  had  in  strengthening  the  movement  will 
probably  never  be  fully  and  conclusively  established.  The  at- 
tempt has  been  made,  through  some  unofficial  documents,  to 
establish  the  fact  that  Japan  would  have  been  glad  to  see  China 
monarchical  once  more,  providing  the  head  of  the  State  was 
amenable  to  Japanese  influence.2  This  fact,  it  is  said,  was 
intimated  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  he  accepted  the  suggestion 
-that  the  time  was  ripe  for  the  reestablishment  of  the  Empire 
but  refused  to  act  as  the  tool  of  the  Japanese  government. 
Whatever  the  truth  of  this  story  of  Japanese  influence,  it  is 
certain  that  the  Japanese  demands  influenced  the  course  of 
events  in  another  and  more  indirect  way.  President  Yuan  had 
conducted  the  negotiations  with  great  skill,  and,  while  forced 
to  make  concessions,  had  managed  to  check  the  Japanese  at 
several  points.  His  adherents  could  point  to  the  fact  that  the 

2  See  Weale,  "The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,"  pp.  123- 
148. 


1 82        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

international  situation  was  such  that  China  must  needs  pre- 
pare against  future  activity  of  the  Powers  in  the  Far  East. 
The  Japanese  activity  showed  the  necessity  for  preserving 
strong  government  at  home,  and  so  long  as  there  was  an  elec- 
tive head  to  the  State  there  was  danger  of  internal  commotion, 
and  thus  of  weakness,  which  would  invite  further  foreign  ag- 
gression. 

Unquestionably  the  1915  "demands"  aroused  an  outburst  of 
patriotic  feeling  among  the  Chinese  such  as  had  not  been  ex- 
hibited for  years.  For  the  time  being  sectional  feeling  was 
erased  by  the  need  for  action  against  the  common  enemy. 
This  national  patriotism  was  manifested  in  the  organization 
of  societies  for  the  protection  of  the  country;  in  the  boycott 
of  Japanese  goods ;  and  in  subscription  to  the  fund  which  came 
to  be  known  as  the  "National  Salvation"  fund.  Schoolboys, 
small  farmers,  the  poorest  of  the  coolies,  officials,  gentry  and 
scholars  all  contributed  to  this  fund  for  the  protection  of  the 
country  against  foreign  aggression.  All  parties  rallied  to  the 
support  of  the  President.  This  unanimity  of  sentiment  may 
have  caused  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  feel  that  the  country  would 
support  him  if  he  should  undertake  to  overthrow  the  Republic 
and  make  himself  the  founder  of  a  new  Dynasty, 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  in  the  furtherance  of  a  movement 
of  any  kind  in  China  is  to  establish  a  society  to  conduct  the 
necessary  propaganda.  China  is  indeed  the  home  of  the  "so- 
ciety" or  "association" !  The  organization  through  which  the 
monarchists  worked  was  called  the  Chou-an-hui  or  "Society 
for  the  Preservation  of  Peace."  The  prime  mover  in  the  or- 
ganization of  the  Chou-an-hui  was  Yang  Tu,  a  member  of 
the  Council  of  State,  and  an  intimate  of  the  President.3  Num- 

8  See  National  Review  (China),  15  January  1916.  Article  re- 
printed from  North  American  Review,  Dec.  1915. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        183 

erous  other  societies  sprang  up  either  in  support  of  the  move- 
ment or  in  opposition  to  it,  but  the  Chou-an-hui  was  the  organ 
used  to  force  the  question  on  the  attention  of  the  country. 
The  President  kept  carefully  in  the  background,  always  posing 
as  the  defender  of  the  Republic,  but  in  reality  directing  and 
controlling  the  whole  movement. 

Whisperings  of  possible  change  had  been  in  the  air  for  a 
long  time  before  an  opportunity  for  direct  action  came.  Short- 
ly after  the  Chou-an-hui  had  became  an  active  organization 
Dr.  Goodnow*  returned  to  China  for  a  visit.  The  administra- 
tion took  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offered  to  secure  his 
views  on  abstract  questions  of  government.  Dr.  Goodnow 
may  have  known  of  the  agitation  that  was  going  on  at  the 
time,  but  he  certainly  did  not  know  that  the  President  desired 
to  make  use  of  his  recognized  position  as  an  authority  on  ques- 
tions of  government  in  order  to  further  the  movement  for  a 
restoration  of  the  monarchy  in  China.5 

In  response  to  the  request  of  the  government  he  submitted  a 
memorandum  setting  forth  his  views  in  the  abstract  on  the  re- 
spective merits  of  various  forms  of  government,  and,  further, 
he  applied  these  abstract  decisions,  reached  by  a  study  of  the 
political  institutions  of  the  West,  to  China.  He  said :  "China, 
owing  to  the  folly  of  an  absolute  monarchical  system,  has  ne- 
glected the  education  of  the  masses,  whose  intellectual  attain- 
ments have  been,  consequently,  of  a  low  standard.  Then, 
there  is  the  additional  fact  that  the  people  have  never  had  a 

*Dr.  Goodnow  had  been  away  on  leave  of  absence,  and  was 
still  considered  an  "Adviser"  to  the  government. 

5  There  is  no  basis  in  fact  for  the  charge  made  (see  Weale, 
"Fight  for  the  Republic")  that  Dr.  Goodnow  returned  to  China 
at  the  request  of  the  government  to  advise  it  on  the  question  of 
the  change  in  the  form  of  the  State.  His  visit  was  entirely  un- 
official, and  when  he  left  America  he  was  unaware  of  the  strong 
movement  on  foot  to  restore  the  monarchy. 


184        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

voice  in  the  doings  of  their  government.  Therefore  they  have 
not  the  ability  to  discuss  politics.  Four  years  ago  the  absolute 
monarchy  was  suddenly  changed  into  a  republic.  This  move- 
ment was  all  too  sudden  to  expect  good  results.  If  the  Man- 
chus  had  not  been  an  alien  race,  which  the  country  wished  to 
overthrow,  the  best  step  which  could  then  have  been  adopted 
was  to  retain  the  Emperor,  and  gradually  lead  him  to  a  con- 
stitutional government.  What  the  Commissioners  on  Consti- 
tutional Government  suggested  was  quite  practical  if  carried 
out  gradually  until  perfection  was  reached.  Unfortunately 
the  feeling  of  alien  control  was  bitter  to  the  people,  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  throne  was  an  utter  impossibility.  Thus 
the  monarchy  was  overthrown  and  the  adoption  of  a  republi- 
can system  was  the  only  alternative. 

"Thus  we  see  that  China  has  during  the  last  few  years  been 
progressing  in  constitutional  government.  The  pioneering 
stage  of  the  process  was,  however,  not  ideal.  The  -results 
could  have  been  much  better  if  a  person  of  royal  blood  re- 
spected by  the  people  had  come  out  and  offered  his  services. 
Under  the  present  conditions  China  has  not  yet  solved  the 
problem  of  the  succession  to  the  presidency.  What  provisions 
we  have  now  are  not  perfect.  If  the  President  should  one  day 
give  up  his  power  the  difficulties  experienced  by  other  nations 
will  manifest  themselves  again  in  China.  The  conditions  in 
other  countries  are  similar  to  those  obtaining  in  China  and 
the  dangers  are  also  the  same.  It  is  quite  within  the  bounds  of 
possibility  that  the  situation  might  threaten  China'sv  indepen- 
dence if  internal  disturbance  should  occur  in  connection  with 
this  problem  and  not  be  immediately  put  down. 

"What  attitude  then,  should  those  who  have  the  good  of 
the  nation  at  heart,  take  under  the  present  circumstances? 
Should  they  advocate  the  continuance  of  the  Republic  or  sug- 
gest a  change  for  a  monarchy?  It  is  difficult  to  answer  these 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        185 

questions.  But  I  have  no  doubt  in  saying  that  the  monarchical 
system  is  better  suited  to  China  than  the  Republican  system. 
For  if  China's  independence  is  to  be  maintained,  the  govern- 
ment should  be  constitutional,  and  in  consideration  of  China's 
conditions  as  well  as  her  relations  with  other  powers,  it  will 
be  easier  to  form  a  constitutional  government  by  adopting  a 
monarchy  than  a  Republic."8 

But  the  memorandum  went  on  to  point  out  that  three  in- 
dispensable conditions  must  be  observed  before  the  restoration 
of  the  monarchy  could  be  considered  advisable.  In  the  first 
place  it  must  be  certain  that  such  a  change  as  was  contemplated 
had  the  support  of  the  people  and  would  not  be  opposed  by 
the  Powers.  It  must  be  made  in  such  a  way  that  there  would 
be  no  uncertainty  as  to  the  succession  after  the  death  of  the 
Emperor.  And,  finally,  it  must  make  definite  provision  for 
the  progressive  development  of  constitutionalism  in  China. 

This,  then,  was  the  memorandum  which  the  Chou-an-hui 
seized  upon  and  used  as  a  basis  for  its  agitation  for  the  restor- 
ation of  the  Empire.  It  was  translated  into  the  vernacular  and 
spread  broadcast  throughout  the  country,  together  with  a 
manifesto  of  the  Society,  based  upon  it.  The  Society  spread 
rapidly  in  the  provinces,  most  of  the  Military  Governors  be- 
coming affiliated  with  it  and  lending  their  support  to  the  move- 
ment. When  the  time  was  considered  ripe  the  whole  question 
was  brought  to  an  issue  by  a  petition  to  the  Council  of  State 
asking  that  the  question  of  the  form  of  government  be  taken 
under  consideration.  At  the  same  time  memorials  and  peti- 
tions poured  in  from  the  provinces.  Petitions  had  been  used 
to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Manchus  to  secure  limita- 
tions on  their  power,  and  now  they  were  used  to  force  the 

6  National  Review  (China),  August  28,  1915. 


1 86        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

executive  to  assume  a  greater  authority  and  power.7  But  with 
this  difference,  that  the  petitioners  for  a  change  back  to  the 
monarchy  were  men  who  held  official  positions  under  the  gov- 
ernment and  who  were  interested  directly,  not  in  a  limitation 
of  the  power  of  the  central  government,  but  in  extending  that 
power  because  it  had  been  intimated  to  them  that  the  President 
desired  such  action.  In  other  words,  the  whole  "popular" 
agitation  expressed  through  these  petitions,  and  which  finally 
caused  the  Council  of  State  to  take  action,  was  carefully  en- 
gineered from  Peking  by  the  henchmen  of  Yuan  Shih-kai. 
Yang  Tu,  the  ostensible  head  of  the  Chou-an-hui,  was  really 
only  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  President  and  his  advisers. 
The  real  brain  back  of  the  movement,  aside  from  the  Presi- 
dent, was  Liang  Shih-yi,  the  head  of  the  Bank  of  China  and 
a  politician  of  no  mean  ability. 

Instead  of  proclaiming  the  monarchy  and  trusting  to  force 
to  overcome  all  opposition,  a  plan  was  worked  out  by  which 
the  people  could  have  an  opportunity  to  express  their  will  as 
to  the  future  form  of  the  State.  Then,  if  opposition  on  the 
part  of  the  Powers  developed,  the  monarchists  could  point  out 
the  fact  that  it  was  the  will  of  the  people,  and  that  since  the 
people  had  voted  for  the  change  no  internal  disturbance  need 
be  feared. 

On  September  6,  1915  the  President  referred  to  the  agita- 
tion for  a  reestablishment  of  the  Empire  in  a  message  to  the 
Council  of  State.8  This  agitation,  he  said,  was  incompatible 
with  the  position  he  held  as  President.  But  instead  of  order- 
ing all  such  talk  absolutely  repressed  he  went  on  to  say  that 
any  question  of  a  change  in  the  form  of  the  State  was  very 

7  It  is  claimed  that  the  signatures  to  many  of  these  petitions 
were  forged.    National  Review  (China),  25  Sept.  1915. 

8  National  Review  (China),  10  September  1915. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        187 

important,  and  he  recommended  it  to  the  careful  consideration 
of  the  Council.  After  consideration,  that  body  suggested  that 
the  National  Convention,  for  which  provision  had  been  made 
in  the  Constitutional  Compact  and  which  was  to  be  convened 
later  in  the  fall  of  1915  should  be  authorized  to  pass  on  the 
question  of  the  monarchy.  That  would  have  meant  a  delay  of 
several  months,  giving  time  for  the  opposition  to  the  move- 
ment to  unite  and  possibly  prevent  favorable  action.  Further- 
more there  was  always  the  danger  of  foreign  interference. 
So  the  Chou-an-hui  requested  the  Council  of  State  "further 
to  discuss  the  question  and  to  suggest  the  organization  of  an- 
other popular  body  with  large  and  adequate  powers,  at  an 
earlier  date  than  the  convocation  of  the  National  Conven- 
tion."9 This  body  should  be  empowered  to  consider  the  pro- 
posed change. 

The  Council  of  State  lost  no  time  in  acting  on  this  sug- 
gestion, and  on  October  6  passed  "the  Law  on  the  Organiza- 
tion of  the  Convention  of  Citizen's  Representatives."10  Two 
days  later  this  law  was  promulgated  by  the  President.  In 
submitting  the  law  to  him  the  Council  stated:  "In  spite  of 
the  fact  that  we  were  reluctant  to  make  any  hasty  proposals 
since  we  have  already  suggested  methods  and  the  Great  Presi- 
dent has  also  decided  upon  the  procedure  to  follow,  we  cannot 
ignore  the  'united  appeal  of  the  people'  repeatedly  uttered ;  and 
in  consideration  of  the  necessity  of  respecting  the  'will  of  the 
people'  this  House  has  again  brought  up  the  subject  for  dis- 
cussion. .  .  .  The  State  is  the  State  of  the  people,  and  the 
form  of  the  State  should  be  adopted  or  rejected  according  to 
the  wish  of  the  people ;  and  as  the  will  of  the  people  is  now  for 
a  speedy  solution,  it  becomes  our  duty  to  yield  to  the  desire  of 

9  China  Year  Book,  1916,  p.  483. 
"Ibid.,  pp.  483-4- 


1 88        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  people  and  place  the  question  above  everything  else.  .  .  . 
We  therefore  decide  that  the  name  of  the  body  should  be 
called  the  Convention  of  Citizen's  Representatives,  which  shall 
be  drawn  from  the  members  elected  by  the  successful  candi- 
dates of  the  primary  election  of  the  Citizen's  Convention  for 
the  purpose  of  settling  the  question  of  the  form  of  the  State. 
In  this  way  all  the  provinces,  special  administrative  areas, 
Manchuria,  Mongolia,  Mohammedan  regions  and  Tibet  shall 
have  representatives  therein.  ...  As  the  entire  body  of  the 
country  is  in  a  state  of  exceeding  haste  to  see  the  solution  of 
the  question  of  the  form  of  the  State,  we  hereby  submit  to  you 
the  text  of  the  said  law,  together  with  the  petitions  and  ask 
that  the  Great  President  shall  speedily  promulgate  the  same."11 
The  Convention  of  Citizen's  Representatives12  was  to  con- 
sist of  1834  representatives  elected  from  the  provinces,  and 
special  administrative  areas;  32  from  Inner  and  Outer  Mon- 
golia; 12  from  Tibet;  6  from  Chinghai;  24  representatives  of 
the  Manchu,  Mongolian  and  Chinese  Banners;  60  elected  by 
the  Chambers  of  Commerce;  30  representatives  of  the  learned 
scholars;  and  20  representatives  elected  by  those  who  had 
done  good  service  to  the  country.  In  the  provinces  and  de- 
pendencies the  election  was  to  proceed  from  the  point  reached 
in  the  election  of  candidates  for  the  National  Convention. 
Thus  the  successful  candidates  in  the  primary  elections  were 
empowered  to  choose  the  representatives  for  the  Citizen's  Con- 
vention. The  electorate  was  carefully  restricted  in  all  cases, 
and  the  election  was  put  under  the  control  of  the  high  officials. 
Care  was  taken  that  the  electors  should  act  as  desired  by  the 
government.  Thus  voters  were  required  to  sign  their  ballots. 

11  Ibid. 

12  China  Year  Book,  1916,  pp.  444-446,  for  text  of  law  organiz- 
ing the  "Citizen's  Convention." 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        189 

After  the  Convention  of  Citizen's  Representatives  had  been 
constituted,  the  members  were  to  have  only  one  function — to 
vote  on  a  question  submitted  to  them  by  the  government. 
This  question  was  drawn  up  and  passed  by  the  Council  of 
State,  as  the  acting  legislative  body,  and  was  then  submitted 
to  the  President  for  approval,  after  which  it  was  transmitted 
to  the  Superintendents  of  Election. 

Absolutely  no  opportunity  was  afforded  the  members  of  the 
Convention  for  deliberation  and  discussion  of  the  proposed 
change.  They  were  to  be  simply  the  means  of  registering  the 
will  of  the  people  at  the  dictation  of  the  government.  Care- 
ful instructions  were  sent  to  the  Superintendents,  who  were  all 
officials  of  the  government,  as  to  the  exact  procedure  to  be 
followed,  so  that  there  would  be  no  chance  of  a  slip.13  The 
ballots  were  all  printed  in  advance  and  marked  in  the  proper 
way  so  all  that  the  people's  representatives  had  to  do  was  to 
sign  their  names.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  care  was  taken  to 
see  that  only  "favorable"  representatives  should  be  elected, 
the  actual  voting  on  the  question  of  the  change  in  the  form  of 
the  State  was  conducted  in  most  cases  under  the  eyes  of  police- 
men and  soldiers,  so  that  the  necessity  for  affirmative  action 
was  kept  continually  before  the  voters  in  the  Convention.  As 
each  vote  was  cast  it  was  opened  and  scrutinized  before  the 
representative  was  allowed  to  leave  the  room.  Under  the  cir- 
cumstances it  is  little  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  Convention 
of  Citizen's  Representatives  decided  unanimously  for  restora- 
tion of  the  monarchy.  The  result  could  well  have  been  an- 
nounced in  advance. 

The  elections  were  completed  and  the  vote  taken  in  Decem- 
ber, and,  on  December  n,  the  Council  of  State  announced  that 
the  opinion  of  the  country  was  in  favor  of  a  monarchy,  and  of 

13  See  Weale,  "The  Fight  for  the  Republic,"  ch.  XI. 


190        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Yuan  Shih-kai  as  Emperor.  A  petition  was  immediately  sent 
the  President  asking  him  to  ascend  the  Throne.  He  refused 
at  first,  because  of  his  oath  to  support  the  Republic.  But  after 
being  petitioned  a  second  time  he  accepted,  since  the  change 
had  come  from  the  people  and  he,  as  their  servant,  could  not 
refuse  to  do  their  will.14  Steps  were  immediately  taken  to 
prepare  for  the  coronation  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  "advice" 
had  been  tendered  from  several  sources  against  the  change  of 
name  for  the  government. 

While  the  monarchists  had  been  maturing  their  plans  for 
securing  the  consent  of  the  country  to  a  reversion  to  the  mon- 
archical form  of  government,  the  opposition  had  not  been  idle. 
Signs  of  discontent  with  the  proposed  change  had  been  mani- 
fested in  many  of  the  provinces.  The  office  of  a  pro-monarchy 
paper  in  Peking  had  been  bombed  as  a  sign  of  disapproval  of 
its  activity.  Notable  scholars,  led  by  Liang  Ch'i  Ch'ao  had 
come  out  as  opponents  of  the  movement.  Liang  presented  the 
case  for  the  anti-monarchists  in  a  very  able  pamphlet  which 
was  widely  read  throughout  the  country.  As  he  said  in  the 
beginning  in  order  to  make  his  position  clear,  Liang  Ch'i  Ch'ao 
was  not  a  radical  Republican.  In  fact  he  had  maintained  con- 
sistently, since  1898,  that  constitutional  government  could  be 
introduced  into  China  best  under  a  monarchical  form  of  gov- 
ernment. "Before  I  proceed  with  my  argument,"  he  said,  "I 
wish  to  make  plain  two  points.  One  is  that  I  am  not  one  of 
those  reformers  whose  ears  are  their  brains,  and  who  are  in- 
toxicated with  the  doctrine  of  republicanism.  I  have,  there- 
fore, no  partiality  for  the  republican  form  of  government  nor 
any  bias  for  or  against  other  forms  of  government.  .  .  .  The 
second  point  is  that  I  am  not  one  of  the  veteran  conservatives 

14  Translation  of  the  mandates  given,  National  Review 
(China),  18  Dec.  1915. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        191 

who  lay  so  much  stress  on  the  importance  of  having  a  Dy- 
nasty. ...  If  one  wishes  to  consider  the  present  situation  of 
the  country  without  bias  or  prejudice  he  must  disregard  the 
rise  or  fall  of  any  particular  family."15  This  statement  of  his 
position  was  certainly  borne  out  by  the  facts.  Liang  Ch'i 
Ch'ao  had  been  against  the  disenthronement  of  the  Manchus 
in  the  first  place,  but  after  the  Republic  had  been  established 
he  had  come  forward  in  its  support.  When  Parliament  had 
discredited  itself  he  had  seen  the  necessity  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  regime  such  as  had  been  inaugurated  under  the  Con- 
stitutional Compact.  Therefore  his  arguments  at  this  time 
carried  great  weight  in  the  country.  In  his  pamphlet  Liang 
argued  that  the  time  had  come  when  agitation  for  a  change  in 
the  form  of  the  State  should  cease,  the  Republic  be  accepted 
as  a  fact,  and  all  efforts  bent  toward  a  reorganization  of  the 
government  so  as  to  give  an  efficient  administration.  The 
main  thing  was  to  get  a  workable  organization  and  then  con- 
solidate and  strengthen  the  country  in  order  to  secure  peace 
and  order,  and  prevent  any  foreign  aggression  such  as  had 
been  undertaken  successfully  by  Japan.  He  pointed  out  that 
Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  given  a  term  of  office  long  enough  to 
enable  him  to  accomplish  this  work,  and  that  provision  had 
been  made  for  his  reelection  if  it  should  be  advisable  for  him 
to  continue  in  office  for  more  than  the  ten  year  term  for  which 
he  had  been  chosen.  At  the  end  of  twenty  years  surely  the 
country  would  not  be  endangered  by  the  necessity  of  choosing 
a  new  executive.  All  the  possible  arguments  against  a  change 
in  the  form  of  the  State  were  advanced  in  this  pamphlet,  which 
became  to  the  opponents  of  the  monarchical  movement  what 
Dr.  Goodnow's  memorandum  had  been  to  the  advocates  of  a 
restoration. 

15  See  Weale,  "Fight  for  the  Republic,"  ch.  X,  for  the  com- 
plete text  of  this  pamphlet. 


192        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

In  spite  of  the  known  opposition,  the  movement  continued, 
however,  until,  as  we  have  seen,  its  object  had  been  attained. 
During  the  period  from  September  until  the  death  of  Yuan 
Shih-kai  the  country  was  ruled  under  the  iron  hand  of  the 
military.  Men  who  dared  raise  their  voices  against  the  change, 
or  who  were  suspected  of  hostile  sentiments  were  summarily 
arrested  and  executed  if  they  remained  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  government.  It  was  only  in  the  treaty  ports  where  for- 
eign protection  was  enjoyed  that  opposition  to  the  President 
could  be  shown.  This  arbitrary  suppression  of  all  opposition 
accounts  for  the  fact  that  the  monarchists  were  able  so  com- 
pletely to  carry  out  their  plans. 

Another  fact  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  forced  to  consider 
carefully  before  allowing  himself  to  be  crowned  as  Emperor 
was  the  danger  of  possible  foreign  intervention.  The  Jap- 
anese had  never  been  very  favorably  inclined  to  the  Chinese 
Republic,  and,  as  has  been  said,  it  was  reported  indirectly  to 
the  President  that  no  opposition  would  be  offered  to  a  restora- 
tion of  the  monarchy.  Many  prominent  Japanese  statesmen 
had  prophesied  that  the  Republic  could  not  have  a  very  long 
life.16  But  the  fact  that  it  was  Yuan  Shih-kai  who  was  ex- 
pecting to  make  himself  the  Emperor  changed  the  point  of 
view  of  the  Japanese.  Since  the  time  when  Yuan  had  held  the 
post  of  Chinese-Resident  in  Korea,  where  he  had  used  his 
position  to  work  against  Japanese  interests  in  that  country,  he 
had  been  little  loved  in  Japan.  During  the  whole  of  his  offi- 
cial life  he  had  come  into  conflict  with  the  neighboring  Empire 
in  one  way  or  another,  so  that  it  was  a  question  from  the  very 
beginning  whether  Japan  would  sanction  his  elevation  to  the 
Dragon  Throne.  To  offset  the  danger  of  possible  Japanese 

16  See  Count  Okuma's  views  and  Dr.  Hioki's  views  as  given 
in  National  Review  (China),  10  Sept.  1915. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        193 

intervention,  however,  there  was  the  hatred,  in  China,  of  Japan 
and  things  Japanese,  engendered  by  the  Demands.  Interven- 
tion really  might  strengthen  Yuan's  position  throughout  the 
country  and  enable  him  to  defy  his  old  enemy. 

The  restoration  movement  was  well  under  way  before  Japan 
took  any  open  action.  On  October  28  Great  Britain  and  Rus- 
sia united  with  Japan,  at  the  latter's  request,  in  tendering  ad- 
vice to  the  Chinese  Government  opposing  the  establishment 
of  a  monarchy  in  China.  They  inquired  what  effect  the  change 
would  have  on  the  peace  of  the  country,  expressing  the  fear 
that  a  change  in  the  form  of  the  State  would  lead  to  wide- 
spread opposition,  especially  in  the  South  where  considerable 
unrest  already  was  apparent.  It  was  felt  to  be  unwise  to  stir 
up  trouble  at  a  time  when  the  international  situation  was  so 
disturbed.  All  intention,  however,  of  interference  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  the  country  was  disclaimed. 

The  Chinese  Government  replied  that  no  danger  was  to  be 
feared  from  an  internal  revolt  against  the  monarchical  change, 
and  that  it  was  more  apt  to  cause  trouble  if  the  change  was 
given  up  for  a  time  at  the  request  of  the  foreign  powers. 
Preparations  went  on  for  the  coronation  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  advice  counselling  delay  was  again  tendered,  this  time 
by  Japan,  Great  Britain,  Russia,  France  and  Italy. 

After  the  monarchy  movement  was  well  under  way,  every- 
one within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  central  government  hastened 
to  safeguard  himself  by  going  on  record  as  favoring  the 
change.  Among  those  who  submitted  memorials  favoring  the 
overthrow  of  the  Republic  was  a  young  Yunnanese  who  had 
been  acting  Tutuh  of  Yunnan  province  during  the  first  revo- 
lution and  after  the  establishment  of  the  Republic.  In  Janu- 
ary, 1915,  this  man,  Tsai  Ao,  had  been  appointed  Director- 
General  of  the  Bureau  of  Resurveying  Cultivated  Land,  and 


194        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

had  come  to  Peking  to  assume  his  new  duties.  Thus  he  was 
among  the  high  officials  who  were  under  the  surveillance  of 
the  President  when  the  Imperial  bee  began  to  buzz.  His  later 
actions  show  that  he  sent  in  his  memorial  advocating  change 
merely  to  quiet  any  suspicions  which  might  be  entertained  of 
his  loyalty  to  Yuan  Shih-kai.  He  was  next  heard  from  in 
Yunnan  province  on  December  23,  when  he  united  with  other 
provincial  officials  in  demanding  that  the  Republic  be  restored. 
No  answer  being  received,  Yunnan  province  declared  its  in- 
dependence and  under  the  leadership  of  Tsai  Ao  prepared  to 
resist  the  Central  Government. 

The  reply  that  was  finally  made  to  the  Yunnan  telegrams  is 
of  interest  because  of  its  discussion  of  the  threat  of  foreign 
interference,  and  its  justification  of  the  President's  action  in 
accepting  the  Throne  and  overthrowing  the  Republic  which  he 
had  sworn  to  uphold.  "The  question  whether  the  telegrams 
from  Yunnan  dated  the  23rd  instant  are  genuine  documents 
or  not  has  still  to  be  ascertained.  But  in  order  to  avoid  mis- 
understanding we  wish  to  reply  to  the  principal  points  raised 
as  follows : — The  fact  that  Japan  has  together  with  Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia  and  another  Government,  tendered 
advice  in  a  friendly  spirit  to  China,  requesting  the  postpone- 
ment of  the  monarchical  movement  for  fear  that  a  hurried 
change  might  cause  internal  disturbance  which  would  damage 
the  commerce,  life  and  property  of  their  nationals — but  with 
the  distinct  assurance  that  they  have  had  no  wish  to  interfere 
with  our  internal  affairs — is  not  without  precedent  in  the  his- 
tory of  diplomacy.  This,  together  with  their  declaration  of 
watchful  waiting,  may  be  regarded  as  in  the  nature  of  ap- 
proval; and  recognition  is  in  a  fair  way  of  being  accorded. 
There  is,  therefore,  no  question  of  interference  or  disregard 
at  issue.  How  can  anyone  fasten  any  blame  on  the  govern- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        195 

ment  on  such  a  pretext,  seeing  that  the  act  was  the  friendly 
advice  of  the  friendly  Powers?  On  the  other  hand  the  re- 
sponsibility must  fall  on  those  who  consider  such  a  friendly 
act  as  an  act  of  intervention  and  thus  cast  an  insult  on  the 
country. 

V/  "The  Presidential  mandate  issued  on  the  nth  instant  con- 
tains the  following  passage" :  'Keeping  faith  is  of  primary 
importance  in  connexion  with  the  administration  and  protec- 
tion of  a  country.  When  the  Republic  was  first  established 
I,  the  President,  first  took  an  oath  before  the  Senate,  promis- 
ing to  do  my  utmost  to  glorify  the  Republic.  If  I  should  set 
up  an  Imperial  system  for  myself  I  should  be  violating  my 
own  oath,  an  accusation  which  I  shall  not  be  able  to  explain: 
I,  therefore,  request  that  another  person  be  designated  as  the 
Emperor.' 

"The  Tsanchengyuan,  in  the  capacity  of  the  general  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people,  then  replied  that  the  taking  of  the 
oath  was  simply  a  formal  undertaking  by  the  Chief  Executive 
of  the  Republic,  registered  strictly  in  his  capacity  as  such  Chief 
Executive,  which  office  is  itself  based  on  the  choice  of  the 
whole  body  of  the  people.  The  Chief  Executive  should  follow 
the  dictates  of  the  people.  If  the  people  are  for  the  Republic 
then  the  oath  is  valid,  but  if  the  people  are  for  a  constitutional 
monarchy  the  validity  is  consequently  changed.  Now  the 
people  are  tired  of  the  Republic  and  desire  to  have  a  monarchy. 
With  the  change  of  the  form  of  government  the  position  of 
Chief  Executive  no  longer  exists ;  hence  the  oath  becomes  null 
and  void.  .  .  .  The  change  in  the  form  of  the  government  re- 
cently carried  out  was  made  by  the  unanimous  decision  of  the 
officials  and  people  according  to  legal  methods.  The  unanimity 
of  the  will  of  the  people  can  be  seen  through  the  fact  that 
there  was  not  a  single  dissenting  voice.  Even  up  till  this  day 


196        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  telegrams  from  military  and  civil  officials  urging  the  Presi- 
dent to  ascend  the  Throne  reach  Peking  in  great  numbers 
every  day.  The  shouts  of  joy  and  congratulations  are  as  ir- 
resistible as  the  force  of  the  incoming  tide.  How  could  such 
manifestations  take  place  unless  the  change  has  been  made  by 
the  free  choice  of  the  people  themselves."17 

This  justification  offered  for  Yuan's  acceptance  of  the 
Throne  did  not  satisfy  the  Yunnan  leaders  and  they  prepared 
to  defend  the  Republic  by  force.  The  strength  of  the  Yunnan 
movement  was  very  seriously  underrated  both  by  the  Gov- 
ernment and  by  students  of  the  situation  in  the  Far  East. 
Thus  one  authority  wrote :  "It  is  scarcely  to  be  expected  that 
the  rebellion  will  make  great  headway.  In  the  first  place  the 
armed  forces  of  the  nation,  especially  the  better  trained  troops 
of  the  North  are  under  the  absolute  control  of  Yuan — to  whom 
they  are  loyal.  Nearly  all  the  military  governors  in  the  prov- 
inces are  either  old  followers  or  personal  friends  of  Yuan,  and 
the  few  exceptions  are  practical  men  and  essentially  conserva- 
tive in  disposition.  In  the  second  place,  the  principle  of  mon- 
archical government  fairly  represents  the  political  ideal  of  the 
people  as  a  whole.  Third,  even  his  worst  enemies  concede 
that  Yuan  is  the  ablest  man  to  whom  the  nation  can  look  both 
for  reconstruction  within  and  for  defense  against  what,  after 
all,  is  the  greatest  menace  to  its  liberties, — danger  from  with- 
out. ...  If  Yuan's  government  is  overthrown  it  will  be  by 
greater  forces  than  those  moving  the  rebellion  in  Yunnan."18 

And  yet,  in  a  little  more  than  three  months  after  the  out- 
break in  Yunnan  the  revolt  had  spread  over  South  and  Central 

17  Telegram  sent  by  the  Chenshih  Tang  and  the  Headquarters 
of  the  Generalissimo  in  reply  to  the  telegrams  from  Yunnan  op- 
poing   the    establishment    of    the    Monarchy,    National   Re-view 
(China),  Jan.  i,  1916. 
18  Hornbeck,  "Contemporary  Politics  in  Far  East,"  pp.  99-100. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        197 

China;  the  northern  troops  had  been  unable  to  win  any  very 
decisive  victories;  the  men  on  whom  Yuan  had  absolutely  re- 
lied for  support  deserted  his  cause  one  after  the  other,  or  pled 
with  him  to  give  up  the  monarchy ;  and  it  was  pretty  well  es- 
tablished as  a  fact  that  whatever  the  people  thought  of  the  Re- 
public, and  however  willing  they  were  to  submit  to  the  abso- 
lute control  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  they  were  not  willing  to  sanc- 
tion the  restoration  of  the  monarchy,  with  the  succession  pass- 
ing in  the  course  of  time  to  an  incapable  like  Yuan's  eldest 
son,  Yuan  Ko-ting. 

The  Government  felt  with  Yuan  Shih-kai  that  "well  trained 
troops  will  readily  suppress  the  rebels  on  reaching  the  scene. 
A  few  ambitious  leaders  without  popular  support  are  engi- 
neering the  rebellion.  The  voting  shows  that  the  public  favors 
a  monarchy."19 

The  indications  were  that  this  view  of  the  situation  was  the 
correct  one.  No  one  knew  just  what  the  strength  of  the  revo- 
lutionists was,  or  what  support  they  could  expect  from  the 
other  provinces.  Yunnan  itself  is  in  rather  an  inaccessible 
situation,  so  that  it  would  take  a  long  time  to  bring  the  forces 
of  the  North  to  bear  effectively  on  the  province,  and  thus  test 
the  strength  of  the  rebellion.  The  officials  in  the  other  prov- 
inces had  all  supported  the  monarchy  movement  and  there  was 
no  evidence  of  the  fact  that  they  had  changed  their  views,  or 
that  they  could  not  control  the  territory  under  their  jurisdic- 
tion. It  is  not  strange  therefore,  that  the  concensus  of  opin- 
ion predicted  the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  government.  The 
only  dissent  from  the  general  view  as  to  the  lack  of  opposition 
was  expressed  by  the  Japanese  government  when  it  advised  a 
postponement  of  the  change  in  the  form  of  the  State.  The 
communique  issued  by  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  contained 

19  Peking  Gazette,  March  12,  1916. 


198        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  extremely  significant  statement  that:  "Although  it  would 
appear  as  if  there  were  throughout  the  country  no  great  oppo- 
sition to  the  establishment  of  a  monarchy,  careful  observation 
of  the  actual  state  of  affairs  in  China  based  upon  information 
possessed  by  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  shows  that 
it  is  undeniable  that  such  appearances  are  more  superficial  than 
real.  The  undercurrent  of  opposition  is  far  stronger  than 
would  be  imagined  and  a  feeling  of  unrest  is  spreading  to  all 
parts  of  the  country."20  Later  developments  served  to  prove 
the  accuracy  of  the  Japanese  estimate  of  the  strength  of  the 
opposition  to  the  restoration  of  the  monarchical  form  of  gov- 
ernment. 

In  the  latter  part  of  January  Yunnan  was  joined  by  Kuei- 
chow  province,  its  neighbor  to  the  northeast.  Kwangsi  and 
Kuangtung  provinces  followed  suit  a  short  time  later,  declar- 
ing their  independence  of  the  central  authority,  and  it  was  only 
with  difficulty  that  the  Peking  government  maintained  itself  in 
Hunan.  As  far  as  the  actual  military  operations  were  con- 
cerned the  revolutionists  did  not  achieve  any  very  notable  suc- 
cesses. In  fact  it  was  in  the  face  of  military  reverses  that  the 
movement  against  Yuan  Shih-kai  gained  in  strength  by  the 
addition  of  one  province  after  another.  During  the  first  three 
months  of  1916  Peking  could  point  to  the  fact  that  it  was  grad- 
ually pushing  the  rebels  from  territory  that  they  had  occupied 
at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  But  it  was  not  possible  to  cope 
with  the  disaffection  and  dissatisfaction  that  was  invading  one 
province  after  another.  Just  as  the  Manchus  had  been  hur- 
ried in  their  reforms  by  the  revolution  of  1911,  so  the  Em- 
peror-elect tried  to  placate  the  country  by  showing  his  sin- 
cerity in  the  establishment  of  constitutional  government,  the 
necessity  for  which  had  been  emphasized  by  Dr.  Goodnow  in 

20  See  Weale,  'Tight  for  the  Republic." 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        199 

his  memorandum.  The  Legislative  Assembly  had  not  been 
convoked  for  various  reasons,  so  now  it  was  announced  that 
immediate  steps  would  be  taken  to  establish  the  legislature  pro- 
vided for  under  the  Constitutional  Compact.  In  order  that 
delay  should  be  minimized  the  government  suggested  that  the 
members  of  the  Citizen's  Convention  should  be  called  together 
to  sit  as  the  Lifayuan,  since  they  had  been  elected  by  the  peo- 
ple in  almost  the  same  way  that  members  of  the  legislature 
were  to  be  chosen. 

The  Council  of  State  replied  favorably  to  this  suggestion. 
"A  Lifayuan  composed  of  members  elected  by  the  people  ought 
to  have  been  convened  during  the  period  of  the  Constitutional 
Compact.  The  need  of  such  an  organ  is  doubly  urgent  during 
this  time  when  the  Throne  intends  to  start  anew  with  the  peo- 
ple. A  mandate  was  issued  last  year  in  the  twelfth  month 
stating  that  the  legislative  organ  would  be  established  within 
a  year.  The  desire  of  the  people  to  see  an  efficient  government 
at  work  is  more  earnest  than  ever,  and  in  view  of  the  need  to 
respect  the  wish  of  the  people  and  to  reform  the  administra- 
tion, the  delay  must  not  continue.  The  process  of  election  to 
the  Lifayuan,  however,  is  exceedingly  complicated  and  diffi- 
cult, and  it  is  impossible  to  expect  the  same  to  be  carried 
through  in  a  short  space  of  time.  In  these  circumstances  it 
would  be  more  practicable  to  treat  the  final  election  of  the 
Citizen's  Convention — already  carried  through  in  the  provinces 
and  all  the  special  administrative  areas  in  advance  of  the  date 
fixed  last  year. — as  the  final  election  for  the  Lifayuan.  In  pur- 
suance of  this  policy  the  successful  members  of  the  final  elec- 
tion of  the  Citizen's  Convention  shall  be  regarded  as  having 
been  elected  to  the  Lifayuan.  The  single  balloting  of  the 
Special  Central  Electorate  and  the  combined  Electorate  of 
Mongolia,  Tibet  and  Chinghai,  which  have  not  yet  been  com- 


2OO        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

pleted,  shall  be  held  at  an  early  date  for  the  purpose  of  electing 
members  to  the  Lifayuan.  In  this  way  the  legislature  repre- 
senting the  wish  of  the  people  may  be  convoked  within  a  short 
time."21 

This  sop  thrown  to  the  opposition  did  not  serve  to  check  the 
growth  of  the  revolutionary  movement,  but  was  rather  taken 
as  an  indication  of  weakness.  During  the  early  part  of  March,. 
1916,  however,  the  government  forces  made  considerable 
progress  from  the  military  standpoint,  and  it  was  felt  that  this 
offered  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  the  monarchists  a  good  opportunity 
to  "reconsider"  the  question  of  the  form  of  government,  with- 
out appearing  to  have  been  forced  to  do  so  by  the  rebellion. 
The  fact  that  reconsideration  was  felt  to  be  necessary  indi- 
cates that  the  early  impression  of  the  strength  of  the  rebellion 
had  been  revised.  From  this  time  on  Yuan  devoted  himself 
to  preserving  his  authority  in  the  country  with  the  least  pos-' 
sible  loss  of  "face"  to  himself  and  his  supporters. 

During  the  whole  of  the  monarchy  episode  he  had  left  a 
loophole  for  escape  by  his  declaration  that  he  was  acting 
against  his  better  judgment,  and  was  only  giving  in  to  the 
will  of  the  people.  That  was  the  line  he  adopted  in  the  man- 
date issued  on  March  22  cancelling  the  monarchy. 

Yuan  Shih-kai's  "abdication"  edict  states  in  part:  "Since 
the  inauguration  of  the  Republic  troubles  and  disturbances 
have  come  in  rapid  succession,  and  I,  a  man  of  little  virtue, 
have  been  obliged  to  shoulder  the  most  difficult  responsibility. 
Patriots  of  this  country,  who  have  cherished  the  fear  of  im- 
minent dangers,  have  advocated  the  restoration  of  monarchy 
with  the  object  of  averting  quarrels  and  securing  permanent 
peace.  Since  the  time  of  the  second  revolution  our  ears  have 
been  filled  with  their  arguments ;  but  from  time  to  time  I  have 

21  Far  Eastern  Review,  March  1916. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        201 

discouraged  their  movements.  However  since  last  year  the 
circumstances  have  been  greatly  changed  and  I  have  been  un- 
able to  suppress  their  opinion.  They  have  unanimously  said 
that  'unless  a  constitutional  monarchy  be  introduced,  the  ex- 
istence of  the  Chinese  nation  will  never  be  preserved.'  .  .  . 
"As  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  Chinese  nation  is  lodged 
with  the  whole  body  of  the  people  of  the  country,  I  could  not 
raise  any  opposition  when  the  question  was  finally  settled  by 
the  whole  body  of  Citizen's  Representatives.  However  my 
heart  could  not  be  at  ease  if  I  should  ascend  the  Throne  by 
breaking  my  oath  of  inauguration  and  disregarding  principle 
and  faithfulness.  I  showed  my  sincerity  and  modesty  by  re- 
fusing to  accept  the  post  of  honor.  But  the  said  Yuan  in- 
sisted that  the  oath  of  the  Chief  Executive  was  based  upon  the 
position  he  held  at  that  time,  but  that  as  the  condition  changed 
he  should  follow  the  will  of  the  people.  Hence  I  could  not 
make  any  further  excuse  on  account  of  the  grave  responsibil- 
ity forced  upon  me.  However  in  order  to  satisfy  temporarily 
the  public  desires  I  proceeded  with  the  preparatory  works,  and 
no  actual  steps  were  taken.  After  the  outbreak  of  the  trouble 
in  Yunnan  and  Kueichow,  I  promulgated  a  mandate  ordering 
that  the  preparatory  works  should  be  delayed,  and  that  no 
more  petitions  requesting  the  enthronement  should  be  trans- 
mitted to  me.  Then  I  promulgated  another  mandate  hastening 
the  convocation  of  the  Lifayuan  with  the  hope  of  ascertaining 
as  soon  as  possible  the  real  opinion  of  the  people,  and  devising 
some  means  to  relieve  me  of  the  difficulty.  .  . 

"Through  misunderstandings  the  present  trouble  has  arisen. 
My  sincerity  has  not  been  sufficient  to  move  the  heart  of  the 
people,  and  my  understanding  has  not  been  able  to  read  the 
signs  of  the  times.  It  is  the  lack  of  virtue  on  my  part,  and 
therefore  I  have  no  right  to  blame  others.  .  .  . 


2O2        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

"I  hereby  declare  that  I  still  recognise  that  the  memorials 
and  documents  transmitted  to  me  through  the  acting  Lifayuan 
in  connection  with  the  request  for  enthronement  are  inconsis- 
tent with  the  present  condition  of  the  country.  The  bill  passed 
on  the  nth  day  of  the  I2th  month  of  last  year  on  the  recog- 
nition of  monarchy  is  hereby  cancelled,  and  the  State  Depart- 
ment is  hereby  instructed  to  return  to  the  acting  Lifayuan  all 
the  petitions  urging  enthronement  from  the  provinces  and 
special  administrative  areas,  so  that  they  may  be  returned  to 
the  original  petitioners  to  be  destroyed.  All  preparations  for 
the  restoration  of  monarchy  are  hereby  stopped.  Thus  I  hope 
that  by  imitating  the  repentence  and  remorse  of  the  ancients, 
the  love  and  grace  of  heaven  will  be  received.  We  will  cleanse 
our  hearts  and  thoughts,  so  that  trouble  will  be  averted  and  the 
people  will  obtain  peace  and  tranquillity.''2 

The  revolutionists,  up  to  the  cancellation  of  the  monarchy, 
had  been  fighting  for  that  very  end.  But  when  they  had 
achieved  their  original  purpose  they  changed  their  demands  to 
include  the  complete  elimination  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  from  par- 
ticipation in  public  affairs,  and  also  the  punishment  of  the 
leaders  in  the  monarchical  movement.  Instead  of  being  pla- 
cated by  the  cancellation  edict  they  regarded  it  as  a  sign  of 
weakness.  For  that  reason  the  months  following  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Republic  were  taken  up  with  the  agitation  for  the 
removal  of  the  President.  Very  little  fighting  occurred  during 
the  period,  but  several  provinces  declared  independence  and  the 
independence  of  the  other  provinces  was  not  cancelled.  Both 
sides  endeavored  to  find  a  basis  of  compromise  which  would 
serve  to  reunite  the  country.  While  nothing  short  of  the  re- 

22  Far  Eastern  Review,"  March  1916.  The  italics  are  the  auth- 
or's. See  also  translation  given  in  Peking  Gazette,  March  23, 
1916. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        203 

tirement  of  the  President  would  satisfy  one  section  of  the 
South,  another  group  expressed  its  willingness  to  see  the 
President  retain  his  office,  provided  his  authority  in  the  gov- 
ernment was  made  merely  nominal.  This  suggestion  was  ac- 
cepted by  the  President  and  he  proceeded  to  form  a  Cabinet. 

An  edict  promulgated  on  April  21  stated  that  the  failure  of 
the  President  to  bring  about  a  stable  condition  in  the  country 
was  due  to  the  lack  of  a  responsible  ministry.  "Examining 
the  root  of  this  failure  I  find  that  it  has  been  due  to  the  ab- 
sence of  a  Cabinet  and  the  consequent  lack  of  direct  responsi- 
bility. The  fact  that  I  have  merely  assumed  the  appearance  of 
an  unlimited  control  of  all  the  powers  of  the  State  has  been  the 
cause  of  dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of  the  people."2  The 
Secretary  of  State  was  therefore  authorized  to  take  control 
and  organize  a  government  "with  the  Ministers  of  the  Metro- 
politan Ministries  as  members  thereof  who  are  to  be  mutu- 
ally responsible  to  and  for  one  another/'24  This  was  to  be  the 
first  step  in  the  formation  of  a  responsible  Cabinet. 

The  actual  organization  of  the  Cabinet  was  provided  for  in 
a  mandate  issued  simultaneously  with  the  above.  The  Cabinet 
was  to  consist  of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  heads  of  de- 
partments. The  Secretary  of  State  was  to  be  the  head  of  the 
administration,  and  all  laws  and  mandates  were  to  receive  his 
countersignature  before  becoming  effective.  All  affairs  of 
State  were  to  be  decided  by  the  Cabinet  members  meeting  as 
a  body.25 

The  only  question  was  to  whom  the  Cabinet  was  to  consider 
itself  responsible.  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  still  strong  enough  to 
control  any  assembly  elected  under  the  provisions  of  the  Con- 

23  Far  Eastern  Review,  April  1916,  p.  428. 
pp.  428-429. 


25 


Ibid.,  p.  429. 


204        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

stitutional  Compact,  and  it  was  to  be  feared  that  the  members 
of  the  Cabinet,  including  the  Secretary  of  State,  would  act  at 
the  dictation  of  the  President.  The  responsibility  of  the  Cabi- 
net might  mean  no  more  than  it  had  during  the  few  months 
just  preceeding  the  revolution  of  1911  when  the  Manchus 
nominally  conceded  the  principle  of  responsibility  by  creating 
a  figurehead  Cabinet. 

The  question  of  settlement  had  narrowed  down,  then,  in 
May  1916,  to  the  future  of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  The  independent 
provinces  were  almost  unanimous  in  the  demand  for  his  with- 
drawal from  public  life.  The  Military  Commanders  in  the 
Northern  provinces  wished  him  to  retain  office,  although  fa- 
voring a  responsible  Cabinet  government,  such  as  had  been 
established  by  the  edict  of  April  21.  They  pointed  out  that 
the  control  of  the  administration  had  been  transferred  from 
the  President  to  the  Cabinet  under  the  direction  of  Premier 
Tuan  Chi-jui,  and  that  the  Secretary  of  War  had  assumed 
control  of  the  army  so  that  Yuan  was  rendered  powerless. 
They  also  pointed  out  that  if  the  President  were  removed  from 
office  it  might  open  the  way  for  mutinies  of  the  troops,  and 
a  general  looting  of  the  northern  cities,  since  the  soldiers  of 
the  northern  armies  were  more  loyal  to  their  chief  than  to  the 
State.26 

The  balance  of  power  between  these  two  opposed  groups 
was  held  by  the  leaders  in  the  middle  provinces.  The  question 
of  the  day  was  what  position  would  be  assumed  by  Feng  Kuo- 
chang,  Tutuh  of  Kiangsu  province,  whose  influence  was  su- 
preme in  the  lower  Yangtze  region.  He  held  office  under  ap- 
pointment of  the  Peking  government,  and  the  northerners  af- 

26  This  seems  rather  inconsistent  with  the  argument  that  Yuan 
had  been  rendered  powerless  by  the  transfer  of  control  over  the 
army  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  But  political  necessity  frequent- 
ly overrides  consistency  in  Chinese  politics. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        205 

firmed  his  absolute  loyalty  to  Yuan  Shih-kai.  The  South,  on 
the  other  hand,  claimed  that  at  heart  he  was  an  anti-monarch- 
ist and  in  sympathy  with  the  revolt  against  the  overthrow  of 
the  Republic. 

The  first  statement  of  Feng's  position  came  on  April  26. 
In  a  lengthy  memorial  to  the  President  he  discussed  the  situ- 
ation in  the  country.  But  his  statement  left  his  attitude  toward 
the  retention  of  the  President  in  office  still  indeterminate. 

Finally,  his  hand  was  forced  by  the  government  gathering 
together  its  forces  in  the  loyal  provinces  to  secure  a  declara- 
tion of  terms  from  the  independent  provinces.  General  Feng 
Kuo-chang  then  suggested  to  General  Ni  Shih-chung  and  Gen- 
eral Chang  Hsun  that  they  should  meet  to  discuss  their  future 
action.  This  meeting,  held  at  Hsiichowfu,  the  stronghold  of 
Chang  Hsun,  resulted  in  the  despatch  of  a  circular  telegram 
to  the  provinces  asking  them  to  send  delegates  to  Nanking  with 
full  powers  to  discuss  terms  of  peace.  At  the  same  time  eight 
fundamental  questions  were  suggested  for  the  consideration  of 
the  Conference.  These  embraced  the  position  and  future 
status  of  both  the  President  and  the  Vice-President ;  the  ques- 
tion of  the  constitution  of  a  parliament ;  the  revision  in  some 
particulars  of  the  Constitution,  until  a  permanent  constitution 
could  be  adopted ;  the  question  of  the  National  finances,  which 
were  in  a  very  serious  condition;  the  question  of  the  army 
control  and  disposition ;  the  qualifications  and  standing  of  both 
military  and  civil  officials;  the  future  treatment  of  the  advo- 
cates of  monarchy — whether  they  should  be  killed  or  simply 
sent  into  retirement;  and,  finally,  the  question  of  party  mem- 
bers in  Parliament. 

This  whole  programme  was  construed  in  the  South  as  an 
indication  of  General  Feng's  desire  to  substitute  his  own  for 
Yuan  Shih-kai's  control  of  the  country.  The  southern  leaders 


206        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

/responded  by  the  establishment  of  an  independent  government 
/  with  Canton  as  the  capital.    TheVice-President,  then  virtually 
/  a  captive  in  Peking  was  named  as  the  President  of  this  new 
/  government,  and  all  its  acts  were  promulgated  in  his  name. 
This  step  consolidated  the  northern  military  leaders  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  South,  and  it  looked  as  though  a  definite  break 
would  be  made  between  the  two  sections  of  the  country. 

In  spite  of  developments  in  the  North  and  the  South,  the 
promoters  of  the  Conference  at  Nanking,  who  had  volunteered 
their  services  as  mediators  between  the  two  sections,  proceeded 
with  their  activities.  The  first  indications  were  that  they  ex- 
pected to  use  the  Conference  as  an  instrument  for  the  retention 
of  Yuan.  On  May  13  it  was  stated27  that  the  three  Generals 
concerned  had  telegraphed  the  President  to  that  effect,  only 
stipulating  that  he  should  hand  over  all  military,  executive  and 
legislative  power  to  the  Cabinet,  and  assure  the  mediators  per- 
sonally of  his  sincerity  in  giving  up  the  power.  If  he  did  this 
they  declared  their  readiness  to  urge  the  southern  leaders  to 
cancel  the  demand  for  the  retirement  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  from 
political  life. 

When  delegates  finally  assembled  at  Nanking  it  was  found 
that  the  independent  provinces  were  not  represented,  and  they 
refused  to  send  delegates  until  the  President  gave  assurances 
that  he  would  give  up  his  office.  Yuan  at  this  time  stated  that 
he  was  perfectly  willing  to  go  into  retirement,  providing  he 
could  be  convinced  that  trouble  would  not  follow.  "I  assure 
you  that  I  have  not  the  least  desire  to  linger  at  my  post,  nor 
am  I  unwilling  to  yield  power  and  position/'28  But  so  long 
as  the  President  retained  control  of  the  northern  capital,  it 
was  impossible  to  prove  to  him  that  the  troops  would  not 


27  Far  Eastern  Review,  May  1916,  p.  480. 

28  Far  Eastern  Review,  May  1916,  p.  483. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        207 

mutiny  immediately  after  his  controlling  hand  was  removed. 
It  only  remained  to  see  what  action  the  Conference  would 
take,  even  without  the  representation  of  the  independent  prov- 
inces. Meetings  were  held  on  May  19  and  20,  and  it  was  ap- 
parent from  the  first  that  the  delegates  themselves  were  un- 
decided. "Some  were  in  favor  of  retaining  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
other  advocated  Li  Yuan-hung,  while  a  section  desired  an 
election  for  President  as  soon  as  possible.  This  group  was 
willing  to  allow  Yuan  to  retain  his  post  until  a  Parliament 
could  be  called  and  an  election  be  held."29  After  discussion  it 
was  decided  to  inform  the  South  that  the  Conference  favored 
the  retirement  of  the  President,  but  felt  that  definitive  action 
should  be  taken  only  by  a  Conference  representative  of  all  the 
provinces. 

During  May  three  hitherto  loyal  provinces  declared  their  in- 
dependence of  the  Peking  government.  This  fact,  together 
with  the  action  taken  by  the  Nanking  Conference,  made  it  im- 
possible for  the  supporters  of  the  President  to  continue  to  hold 
out.  Provision  was  made  for  his  departure  from  the  country, 
and  the  parliamentarians  prepared  to  reassume  control  of  the 
government.  With  this  in  view  members  of  the  old  Parlia- 
ment assembled  in  Shanghai.  The  Military  Government 
which  had  been  set  up  in  Canton  issued  a  manifesto  declaring 
in  part:  "Since  the  Parliament  is  the  most  important  organ 
provided  for  in  the  Provisional  (Nanking)  Constitution  and 
from  which  all  laws  have  their  origin,  how  shall  we  be  able 
to  reorganize  our  administrative  affairs  if  the  restoration  of 
the  Parliament  is  further  delayed.  We  hereby  notify  the 
members  of  the  National  Assembly  and  call  on  them  speedily 
to  formulate  a  programme  for  the  convocation  and  a  meeting 
place  of  the  Parliament  so  that  all  unsettled  questions  may  be 

29  Far  Eastern  Review,  May  1916,  p.  484. 


2o8        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

settled  without  delay,  and  all  the  organs  called  for  by  law  may 
soon  be  organized."30 

The  members  of  the  Parliament  who  had  assembled  in 
Shanghai  also  issued  a  call  to  all  who  had  held  seats  in  the 
old  Assembly.  "In  consequence  of  Yuan's  rebellion,  the  right- 
eous troops  have  risen  against  him.  The  whole  country  has 
joined  the  movement  like  the  sweeping  wind ;  and  a  settlement 
of  the  general  situation  is  at  hand.  .  .  .  Yuan  continues  to 
show  defiance  behind  the  barricade  of  strong  arms  and  to  make 
use  of  his  bottomless  cunning  and  capacity  for  intrigue.  The 
disturbances  cannot  be  suppressed  unless  the  foundation  of  the 
country  be  at  once  consolidated.  We,  members  of  the  Parlia- 
ment— albeit  we  have  been  intrusted  by  the  people  with  our 
duties — have  not  been  able  to  discharge  the  same  during  the 
last  three  years  owing  to  the  unlawful  action  of  Yuan.  At 
this  time  of  extraordinary  national  crisis,  it  is  our  duty  to 
meet  in  accordance  with  law.  Article  20  of  the  Provisional 
Constitution  provides  that  the  Senate  may  have  full  freedom 
to  call,  hold  or  adjourn  meetings.  Article  28  provides  that 
the  Senate  shall  automatically  dissolve  when  the  National  As- 
sembly is  inaugurated;  and  the  functions  of  the  Senate  shall 
be  fulfilled  by  the  National  Assembly.  It  is  thus  seen  that  the 
National  Assembly  is  empowered  to  call,  hold  and  adjourn 
meetings.  In  order  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  necessities  of 
the  situation,  we  have  been  holding  meetings  in  accordance 
with  this  provision ;  and  over  two  hundred  members  have  now 
reached  Shanghai  for  this  purpose.  We  have  now  the  honor 
to  issue  this  formal  summons  to  all  the  members  of  the  Na- 
tional Assembly,  except  those  who  are  accomplices  in  Yuan's 
rebellion,  to  report  at  Shanghai  not  later  than  June  30.  A 

30  Far  Eastern  Review,  June  1916,  p.  20. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        209 

suitable  place  will  then  be  fixed  for  the  resumption  of  the  ses- 
sions of  Parliament."31 

Since  Peking  had  finally  agreed  that  Yuan  should  retire, 
the  South  gave  up  its  demand  for  his  punishment  equally  with 
the  other  members  of  the  monarchical  party.  The  southern 
leaders  guaranteed  him  a  safe  departure  from  the  country  in 
return  for  his  promise  that  the  Metropolitan  troops  would 
preserve  order  after  he  left.  The  American  legation  also 
promised  asylum  to  the  defeated  autocrat. 

But,  after  all,  the  final  decision  rested  neither  with  the 
North  nor  the  South.  On  June  5  all  the  terms  of  settlement 
had  been  agreed  upon.  But  on  June  6  a  higher  hand  inter- 
vened and  death  claimed  the  right  to  settle  the  dispute.  It 
was  the  unanimous  feeling  throughout  China  that  nothing 
more  opportune  could  have  happened.  So  long  as  he  lived 
Yuan  Shih-kai  would  have  been  able  to  make  his  influence  felt 
in  the  country,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  He  might  have 
been  as  much  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  government  as  Dr. 
Sun  Yat-sen  has  been  since  his  retirement  from  the  presidency 
in  1912  in  favor  of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  It  was  truly  said  that 
"Yuan  Shih-kai,  late  President  of  China,  has  earned  warmer 
expressions  of  gratitude  from  all  classes  of  his  fellow  country- 
men by  his  death  than  by  any  or  all  of  the  acts  of  his  official 
life."32 

After  his  death  the  last  mandate  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  sanc- 
tioned by  him  as  he  was  dying,  was  promulgated.  By  this 
mandate  the  executive  authority  was  transferred  to  the  Vice- 
President,  Li  Yuan-hung,  in  accordance  with  Article  29  of 
the  Constitutional  Compact.  The  mandate  was  as  follows : 

"The  Min  Kuo  has  been  established  for  five  years.     Un- 

31  Far  Eastern  Review,  June  1916,  p.  21. 

32  Far  Eastern  Review,  June  1916,  p.  10. 


2io        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

worthily  have  I,  the  Great  President,  been  entrusted  with  the 
great  task  by  the  citizens.  Owing  to  my  lack  of  virtue  and 
ability  I  have  not  been  able  fully  to  transform  into  deed  what 
I  have  desired  to  accomplish;  and  I  blush  to  say  that  I  have 
not  realized  one  ten-thousandth  part  of  my  original  intention 
to  save  the  country  and  the  people.  I  have,  since  my  assump- 
tion of  the  office,  worked  in  day  and  thought  in  the  night, 
planning  for  the  country.  It  is  true  that  the  consolidation  of 
the  country  is  not  yet  accomplished,  the  hardships  of  the  peo- 
ple not  yet  relieved,  and  innumerable  reforms  are  still  unat- 
tended to.  But  by  the  valuable  services  of  the  civil  officials 
and  the  military  men,  some  semblance  of  peace  and  order  has 
been  maintained  in  the  provinces  and  friendly  relations  with 
the  Powers  upheld  until  now.  While  on  the  one  hand  I  com- 
fort myself  with  such  things  accomplished,  on  the  other  hand 
I  have  much  to  blame  myself  for.  I  was  just  thinking  how  I 
could  retire  into  private  life  and  rest  myself  in  the  forest  and 
near  the  springs  in  fulfillment  of  my  original  desire,  when  ill- 
ness has  suddenly  overtaken  me.  As  the  affairs  of  the  State 
are  of  the  gravest  importance,  the  right  man  must  be  secured 
to  take  over  charge  of  the  same.  In  accordance  with  Article 
29  of  the  Provisional  Constitution  which  states  that  in  case 
the  office  of  the  Great  President  should  be  vacated  for  cer- 
tain reasons,  or  when  the  Great  President  is  incapacitated  from 
doing  his  duties,  the  Vice-President  shall  exercise  power  and 
authority  in  his  stead,  I,  the  Great  President,  declare  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  Provisional  Constitution  that  the  Vice-Presi- 
dent shall  exercise  in  an  acting  capacity,  the  authority  and 
power  of  the  Great  President  of  the  Chung  Hua  Min  Kuo. 

"The  Vice-President  being  a  man  of  courtesy,  good  nature, 
benevolence  and  wisdom,  will  certainly  be  capable  of  greatly 
lessening  the  difficulties  of  the  day  and  place  the  country  on 
the  foundation  of  peace,  and  so  remedy  the  defects  of  me,  the 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        211 

Great  President,  and  satisfy  the  expectations  of  the  people  of 
the  whole  country.  The  civil  and  military  officials  outside  of 
the  capital,  as  well  as  the  troops,  police,  and  scholars  and  peo- 
ple should  doubly  keep  in  mind  the  difficulties  and  perils  of  the 
nation,  and  endeavor  to  maintain  peace  and  order  to  the  best 
of  their  ability,  placing  before  everything  else  the  welfare  of 
the  country.  The  ancients  once  said :  'it  is  only  when  the  liv- 
ing do  try  to  become  strong  that  the  dead  are  not  dead.'  That 
is  also  the  wish  of  me,  the  Great  President/'33 

33  Far  Eastern  Review,  June  1916,  p.  21. 


CHAPTER  IX 

Li  Yuan-hung,  the  new  President  of  the  Republic,  had  be- 
come a  national  idol  since  the  revolution  in  1911.  He  alone 
of  the  prominent  leaders  had  the  trust  of  all  sections  of  the 
country,  and  of  all  classes.  It  was  not  any  great  brilliancy  of 
mind  or  of  achievement  that  made  the  country  welcome  Gen- 
eral Li  to  the  presidency  so  much  as  his  constancy  of  character 
and  honesty  of  purpose.  What  was  needed  in  the  new  head 
of  the  State  was  the  capacity  for  unselfish  and  disinterested 
service.  He  must  be  a  man  who  would  allow  free  play  to  the 
parliamentary  party  and  yet  keep  parliamentary  activity  within 
reasonable  bounds  in  order  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  the  con- 
ditions which  had  paved  the  way  for  the  overthrow  of  Parlia- 
ment by  Yuan  Shih-kai.  On  the  other  hand  it  was  necessary 
for  the  President  to  have  the  support  of  the  military  leaders, 
the  so-called  Pei-yang  party,  and  reconcile  them  to  the  limita- 
tion of  administrative  control  by  legislative  action.  Li  Yuan- 
hung  was  a  military  man,  but  a  firm  believer  in  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  military  from  control  over  the  administration.  He 
was  therefore  not  the  first  choice  of  the  military  men  for  Presi- 
dent. But  he  was  the  one  distinctly  military  leader  who, could 
command  the  support  of  the  South,  and  he  had  a  strong  con- 
stitutional claim  to  the  succession  from  his  position  as  Vice- 
President.  To  have  passed  over  General  Li  and  opened  the 
office  of  President  to  general  competition  would  have  led  to 
the  practical  disruption  of  the  Chinese  State.  There  were  fac- 
tions among  the  military  party  of  the  North,  centering  around 
the  acting  Premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  and  the  Yangtze  Viceroy 

212 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        213 

Feng  Kuo-chang,  and  the  South  was  similarly  divided.  Both 
sides  were  agreed  on  the  proposition  that  only  in  the  person  of 
the  Vice-President  could  the  two  sections  be  held  together. 
So  the  death  of  President  Yuan  brought  General  Li  Yuan- 
hung  into  office  as  a  moderator  between  the  two  sections  of  the 
country. 

That  the  New  President's  task  was  to  be  no  easy  one  be- 
came apparent  from  the  outset.  The  situation  was  essentially 
the  same  as  when  Yuan  Shih-kai  became  President  at  the  time 
of  the  establishment  of  the  Republic.  In  response  to  the  de- 
mand of  the  South  Yuan  had  created  a  Cabinet  during  his  last 
days  in  office.  The  Premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  was  one  of  the 
military  party,  so  that  the  North  controlled  the  executive^ 
branch  of  the  government,  just  as  in  1912.  The  Parliament 
had  reassembled  in  Shanghai,  as  has  been  noted,  but  had  not 
established  itself  yet  as  a  part  of  the  Peking  government.  The 
first  question  that  arose,  naturally,  was  the  exact  status  of 
constitutionalism  in  China.  What  was  to  be  the  distribution 
of  power  between  the  two  branches  of  the  government? 

If  the  Constitutional  Compact  was  to  be  regarded  as  the 
fundamental  law,  the  Shanghai  parliamentarians  had  no  legal 
status  since  they  had  been  elected  under  the  provisions  of  the 
original  (Nanking)  constitution.  Furthermore  any  assembly 
that  should  be  elected  would  have  very  little  power  so  long  as 
the  Constitutional  Compact  remained  in  force. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Nanking  Constitution  should  be 
revived  the  condition  would  be  reversed,  the  executive  being 
subordinated  to  the  Parliament.  Since  the  North  controlled 
the  executive  at  the  time  of  the  downfall  of  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
and  this  control  was  continued  through  the  transfer  of  the 
presidential  powers  to  the  Cabinet,  the  revival  of  the  Nanking 
Constitution  was  demanded  by  the  "independent"  provinces  as 


214        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

one  condition  preliminary  to  their  return  to  allegiance.  Tuan 
Chi-jui  the  Premier  opposed  this  demand  as  long  as  possible 
on  the  ground  that  since  both  constitutions  were  only  pro- 
visional, it  was  advisable  to  continue  under  the  existing  instru- 
ment until  a  permanent  constitution  could  be  framed.  His 
argument  ran  as  follows:  "The  [revised]  Provisional  Con- 
stitution of  the  3rd  year  has  been  in  force  for  some  time  and 
has  been  repeatedly  quoted  as  the  standard  for  administration. 
If  it  be  blotted  out  by  one  single  sentence,  all  the  laws  of  the 
nation  may  be  similarly  shaken.  .  .  .  Others  say  that  the  Pro- 
visional Constitution  of  the  3rd  year  derives  its  origin  from 
the  Provisional  Constitution  Conference  and  the  Provisional 
Constitution  Conference  had  its  origin  in  the  Political  Coun- 
cil, and  since  all  the  members  of  the  Council  were  appointed 
by  the  Government,  they  could  not  be  considered  as  a  legally 
constituted  organ  and  consequently  to  revive  the  Provisional 
Constitution  of  the  ist  year  is  tantamount  merely  to  the  can- 
cellation of  an  old  mandate.  But  this  is  also  impossible.  The 
reason  why  the  people  are  not  satisfied  with  the  Provisional 
Constitution  of  the  3rd  year  is  because  the  organ  which  made 
this  law  had  its  origin  in  a  mandate.  How  then  can  we  toler- 
ate the  idea  of  reviving  the  Provisional  Constitution  of  the 
ist  year?  ...  A  mistake  has  already  been  made  some  time 
ago.  How  can  we  repeat  the  same  mistake  this  time?  I  do 
not  see  why  the  people  want  to  follow  an  example  which  they 
know  to  be  wrong.  If  it  is  to  be  held  that  a  law  can  be  re- 
stored by  a  mandate,  why  then  cannot  it  be  cancelled  by  a 
mandate  also?  A  law  then  can  be  restored  today  and  can- 
celled tomorrow."1 

Before  a  reply  could  be  framed  to  these  arguments  the  gov- 
ernment was  forced  to  an  unconditional  surrender.     Fighting 

1  Far  Eastern  Review,  October,  1916,  pp.  176-177. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        215 

was  reported  as  continuing  in  Kuangtung  province,  and  the 
whole  country  was  disturbed  by  bands  of  marauders  and  in- 
surrectionaries.  So  long  as  the  power  of  the  government  was 
questioned  in  the  provinces  which  had  declared  independence 
it  was  impossible  to  bring  order  out  of  the  existing  chaos.  If 
Tuan  had  been  hoping  that  the  southern  leaders  would  recede 
from  their  advanced  position  as  a  result  of  the  telegram  set- 
ting forth  his  views,  he  wras  immediately  undeceived.  In  the 
midst  of  the  controversy  over  the  constitution,  the  Chief  Com- 
mander of  the  Yangtze  fleet  wired  to  Peking  declaring  his  in- 
dependence of  the  Central  authority.2 

This  new  declaration,  together  with  the  fact  that  none  of 
the  provinces  had  cancelled  their  independence,  forced  Tuan 
Chi-jui  to  reconsider  the  question  of  the  constitution.  On 
June  29  a  mandate  was  issued  providing  for  the  convocation 
of  the  old  Parliament  and  the  revival  of  the  Nanking  Consti- 
tution, "in  order  that  the  will  of  the  people  may  be  satisfied 
and  the  foundation  of  the  country  consolidated."3  The  Pre- 
mier not  only  gave  in  to  this  demand  for  the  reconvocation  of 
Parliament  and  the  revival  of  the  Nanking  Constitution,  but 
met  all  of  the  other  demands  of  the  South  including  the  one 
that  the  monarchist  leaders  should  be  punished. 

Parliament  was  summoned  to  meet  in  Peking  on  August  i, 
and  was  formally  opened  on  that  date,  in  spite  of  the  opposi- 
tion of  some  of  the  members  who  wished  to  transfer  the  seat 
of  government  to  Shanghai.  In  order  to  get  the  constitutional 
machinery  in  operation  again  it  had  been  decided  to  treat  the 
entire  period  from  the  time  of  the  dissolution  of  Parliament 

2  'The  Navy  will  not  obey  the  orders  of  the  Ministry  of  Navy 
in  Peking  until  the  restoration  of  the  Provisional  Constitution 
of  the  ist  year  of  Min  Kuo,  the  reassembly  of  Parliament,  and 
the  formation  of  a  responsible  Cabinet."  Ibid.,  p.  177. 

*Ibid.,  p.  177. 


216        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

in  1913  until  its  meeting  in  1916  as  an  interregnum.*  Thus 
the  members  were  to  serve  their  full  terms  during  the  period 
when  the  Nanking  Constitution  was  in  active  force.  If  this 
view  had  not  been  taken  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  hold 
new  elections  immediately  since  the  term  of  the  members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  and  a  number  of  the  Senators 
had  expired  during  the  dictatorship. 

While  the  Constitutional  Compact  was  in  force  the  Parlia- 
ment had  no  legal  position,  but  when  the  first  Provisional  Con- 
stitution was  revived  the  Cabinet  which  had  been  formed  un- 
der the  authority  of  the  President  was  placed  in  the  same  po- 
sition. The  Premier,  however,  was  confirmed  in  his  position 
by  the  joint  action  of  both  branches  of  the  legislature,  and  the 
Cabinet  nominations  which  he  submitted  were  accepted.  It 
seemed  as  though  an  "era  of  good  feeling"  had  dawned  in 
Peking,  and  that,  by  the  cooperation  of  the  President,  the  Cabi- 
net, and  the  Parliament,  the  necessary  reform  and  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  government  might  be  effected.  The  situation  in 
the  provinces  was  still  unsettled,  but  after  the  inauguration  of 
the  President  and  the  meeting  of  the  Parliament  the  "declara- 
tions of  independence"  had  been  cancelled,  and  where  there 
was  unrest  it  was  due  to  the  presence  of  unattached  soldiery 
preying  on  the  country,  or  to  individual  struggles  for  suprem- 
acy in  the  provincial  government,  as  in  Kuangtung  province. 

This  apparent  harmony  was  however  not  to  last  long.  No 
sooner  had  the  Parliament  reassembled  than  the  Military 
Chiefs  began  to  assume  a  dictatorial  position  toward  the  gov- 
ernment. Among  the  appointments  made  to  Cabinet  positions 
was  that  of  T'ang  Shao-yi  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
The  opposition  to  Parliament  concentrated  its  attack  on  the 

4  The  foreign  "Advisers"  Dr.  Morrison  (British),  Dr.  W.  W. 
Willoughby  (American),  and  Dr.  Ariga  (Japanese),  advised  that 
this  view  of  the  monarchical  period  be  adopted. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        217 

new  Foreign  Minister  before  he  had  even  assumed  office.  In 
September  a  Conference  of  the  military  leaders  was  held  at 
Hsiichow  the  stronghold  of  the  old  Manchu  supporter  Chang 
Hsiin.  This  Conference  claimed  the  right  to  be  consulted  by 
the  government  before  any  steps  of  importance  were  taken  and 
it  demanded  the  resignation  of  T'ang  Shao-yi,  accusing  him 
of  a  desire  to  overthrow  the  Premier.  This  organized  attack 
made  on  T'ang  caused  him  to  delay  at  Tientsin  on  his  way  to 
assume  office,  and  finally  forced  his  resignation.  He  made 
his  resignation  a  protest  against  the  illegal  interference  of  the 
military  in  the  affairs  of  the  government,  intimating  that  some 
of  the  high  officials  in  Peking  were  implicated  in  the  campaign 
against  his  assumption  of  office.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
Premier  took  no  steps  against  the  Hsiichow  Conference,  which 
went  so  far  as  to  organize  a  "Union  of  the  Provinces"  with 
the  avowed  purpose  of  interference  if  Parliament  should  "un- 
der any  pretext  create  disturbance  or  take  up  an  unconciliatory 
attitude  toward  the  provinces."5  This  whole  question  of  dic- 
tation to  the  government  by  such  an  unconstitutional  and 
illegal  body  as  assembled  at  Hsiichow  later  assumed  such  im- 
portance that  it  led  to  a  complete  overturning  of  the  govern- 
ment. For  that  reason  its  more  detailed  consideration  must 
be  postponed.6 

From  the  time  of  the  resignation  of  T'ang  Shao-yi  as  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  relations  of  the  Premier,  Tuan- 
Chi-jui,  with  Parliament  were  strained.  For  a  long  time  it 
proved  impossible  to  fill  the  vacant  position  in  the  Cabinet. 
Lu  Cheng-hsiang  was  first  nominated  by  the  Premier,  and 
then  Wang  Ta-hsieh,  and  both  names  were  rejected  by  Parlia- 

5  Peking  Gazette,  September  22,  1916. 

6  Infra,  ch.  X,  especially  pp.  234-235;  note  p.  234  for  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  Peiyang  military  party  and  its  influence. 


218         Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

ment.  Finally  the  veteran  statesman  Dr.  Wu  T'ing-fang  was 
suggested  and  his  nomination  was  confirmed  by  both  Houses. 
In  spite  of  his  great  age  Dr.  Wu  accepted  the  post  of  Foreign 
Minister  in  order  that  there  might  be  a  head  to  that  Department 
at  a  time  when  many  delicate  negotiations  were  in  progress 
with  foreign  nations.7 

The  confirmation  of  Dr.  Wu  as  Foreign  Minister  did  not 
end  the  conflict  between  the  Cabinet  and  Parliament.  Other 
nominations  to  Cabinet  positions  were  rejected;  the  loan  policy 
of  the  government  was  continually  criticised;  constant  inter- 
pellations were  addressed  to  the  government  concerning  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  country ;  and  there  was  a  growing  tendency 
to  heckle  members  of  the  Cabinet  when  they  were  forced  to 
appear  in  Parliament. 

It  is  hard  to  apportion  the  blame  for  the  strained  relations 
existing  between  the  different  branches  of  the  government. 
Certainly  no  one  branch  was  entirely  responsible.  Parliament 
showed  again  most  of  the  tendencies  which  had  weakened  its 
control  over  the  government  during  the  first  months  of  the 
Republic:  a  disposition  to  talk  and  do  nothing;  to  obstruct  the 
work  of  administration  and  reorganization  needlessly;  and  to 
censure  the  Cabinet  for  acting  on  its  own  initiative  when  it 
was  found  that  no  direction  of  policy  was  forthcoming  from 
Parliament.  Parliament  wished  to  feel  that  it  held  the  con- 
trol, but  refused  to  exert  itself  to  assume  the  responsibilities 
placed  upon  it  as  the  controlling  and  directing  organ. 

On  the  other  hand  the  Premier  was  partly  to  blame  for  the 
opposition  to  his  policies  in  Parliament.  The  Constitution 

7  Discussions  were  going  on  between  France  and  China  con- 
cerning the  attempt  of  the  former  to  extend  her  "concession"  at 
Tientsin,  and  between  Japan  and  China  over  a  fracas  between 
Chinese  and  Japanese  at  Chengchiatun.  Japan  took  the  oppor- 
tunity presented  to  advance  in  another  guise  some  of  her  1915 
Demands. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        219 

provided  a  way  by  which  the  Cabinet  could  assume  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs  in  the  legislative  body — the  Ministers  hav- 
ing the  right  to  appear  and  explain  their  policies  to  the  mem- 
bers of  Parliament.  But  from  the  first  Tuan  Chi-jui  looked 
upon  a  legislature  as  an  unnecessary  evil  in  government. 
Following  the  lead  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  he  tried  to  carry  on  the 
administration  without  consulting  the  wishes  of  the  representa- 
tives, only  appearing  before  them  to  ask  their  consent  for 
work  already  undertaken.  When  a  Cabinet  position  was  to  be 
filled  no  attempt  was  made  to  discover  the  wishes  of  Parlia- 
ment and  then  make  an  acceptable  appointment.  The  nomina- 
tion was  made  first  and  its  acceptability  discovered  later  when 
action  was  taken  in  Parliament.  In  some  cases,  without  doubt, 
an  entirely  unacceptable  candidate  was  brought  forward  with 
the  expectation  that  after  he  had  been  rejected  Parliament 
would  be  willing  to  accept  the  real  candidate  of  the  govern- 
ment. It  is  true  that  the  opinion  of  one  of  the  parties8  was 
usually  ascertained  and  its  support  secured,  but  that  party, 
which  was  really  that  of  the  government,  was  in  the  minority 
in  Parliament  so  that  its  support  meant  little. 

The  differences  between  the  legislative  and  executive 
branches  of  the  government  went  much  deeper  than  any  dis- 
agreement over  specific  issues.  The  conflict  was  a  renewal  of 
the  struggle  which  had  been  waged  since  1911  between  the  old 
Manchu  bureaucracy  which  had  survived  in  the  persons  of 
the^military  leaders  making  up  the  Pei-yang  party,  and  which 
controlled  the  army  of  the  North,  and  Young  China  in  the 
persons  of  foreign  educated  Chinese  and  all  those  who  had 
led  in  the  opposition  to  the  unprogressive  Manchu  government. 
Since  the  leaders  of  the  latter  group  were  almost  all  from 
South  and  Central  China  the  issue  really  lay  between  the  North 

8  The  Chin  Pu  T'ang. 


220        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

and  the  South.  The  northerners,  whatever  else  may  be  said 
of  them,  were  men  of  experience  in  administration,  while  the 
southerners,  although  not  all  young  men,  were  still  theorists 
without  great  practical  experience.  They  were  impatient  of 
the  restraint  imposed  by  the  conservative  old  officials,  and  the 
latter,  accustomed  to  the  subserviency  of  the  young,  found  it 
difficult  to  make  use  of  the  knowledge  and  ability  of  men  who 
knew  how  things  were  done  in  England,  France  and  America, 
and  wished  to  make  of  China  a  political  replica  of  those  coun- 
tries. Mutual  distrust  and  suspicion  also  was  responsible  for 
much  of  the  antagonism  between  the  two  sections.  This  dis- 
trust manifested  itself  in  the  government  through  the  execu- 
tive going  its  own  way  irrespective  of  Parliament,  and  that 
body  constantly  feeling  itself  slighted  and  standing  on  its 
dignity  in  small  matters  as  well  as  more  important  ones.  Pek- 
ing was  a  hotbed  of  intrigue  and  corruption.  Unsubstantiated 
charges  and  countercharges  were  made,  and,  instead  of  both 
sides  meeting  issues  on  their  merits,  calumny  took  the  place 
of  reason  in  discussion. 

One  of  the  few  hopeful  indications  of  the  growing  ability 
of  the  Chinese  to  conduct  parliamentary  proceedings  in  an 
orderly  manner  came  in  connection  with  the  election  of  a 
Vice-President  to  fill  the  place  left  vacant  by  the  elevation  of 
Li  Yuan-hung  to  the  presidency.  The  -members  of  Parlia- 
ment were  by  no  means  unanimously  agreed  that  it  was  nec- 
essary to  elect  a  Vice-President  before  the  expiration  of  the 
presidential  term,  when  both  places  would  have  to  be  filled. 
There  were  several  candidates  for  the  position  and  it  was 
feared,  in  view  of  the  already  strained  relations  between  the 
executive  and  legislative  bodies, — the  military  party  and  the 
advocates  of  civil  government  free  from  outside  interference 
—that  to  proceed  with  an  election  would  be  to  precipitate  a 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        221 

governmental  crisis.  This  was  especially  feared  because  of 
the  suggested  candidacy  of  the  Premier.  The  question  was 
argued  in  an  orderly  manner,  however,  in  the  Assembly,  and 
it  was  finally  determined  not  to  delay  but  to  elect  the  Vice- 
President  to  serve  during  the  unexpired  term.  Tuan  Chi-jui 
announced  several  times  that  he  was  not  to  be  considered  a 
candidate  for  the  office,  but  in  spite  of  his  statements  many 
expected  that  he  would  figure  prominently  in  the  election. 
Aside  from  Tuan,  the  principal  contestants  were  General 
Feng  Kuochang,  the  Viceroy  of  Kiangsu  province,  and  Gen- 
eral Lu  Yungting,  former  Tutuh  of  Kiangsi  province.  Gen- 
eral Lu  was  supported  by  the  extreme  radicals. 

According  to  the  Presidential  Election  Law9  which  also 
regulated  the  election  of  the  Vice-President,  the  election  was 
to  be  by  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament  sitting  as  the  National 
Convention.  Two-thirds  of  the  membership  of  the  Assembly 
was  necessary  to  constitute  a  quorum,  and  election  was  to  be 
by  a  three-fourths  majority.  If  no  decision  was  reached  after 
two  ballots,  however,  the  third  ballot  was  to  be  on  the  two 
candidates  who  secured  the  most  votes  on  the  second  ballot. 
A  majority  vote  was  sufficient  to  elect  on  the  third  ballot. 

The  two  branches  of  the  Assembly  met  on  October  30  in 
joint  session  and  proceeded  to  ballot  for  the  Vice-President. 
The  election  of  General  Feng  Kuo-Chang  seemed  assured 
from  the  outset.  On  the  first  ballot  he  secured  more  than  half 
of  the  total  number  of  votes  cast,  but  not  the  required  three- 
fourths.  The  second  was  equally  indecisive,  but  he  was  elected 
on  the  third  when  the  voting  was  limited  to  the  two  highest 
competitors,  Feng  Kuo-chang  and  Lu  Yung-ting.  On  the 
first  and  second  ballots  a  number  of  scattered  votes  were  cast, 

9  This  section  of  the  permanent  Constitution  had  been  passed 
in  1913  before  the  dissolution  of  Parliament. 


222        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

some  of  the  members  seemingly  regarding  their  work  with 
little  seriousness.10 

On  the  whole  the  result  of  the  election  was  well  received 
throughout  the  country.  The  new  Vice-President  had  close 
connections  with  the  military  party,  but  he  had  refused  to 
identify  himself  with  it  in  its  attempts  to  dictate  the  policy 
of  the  country  since  the  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  While  he 
had  supported  Yuan  in  his  overthrow  of  parliamentary  in- 
stitutions, he  had  partially  redeemed  himself  in  the  eyes  of 
many  of  the  people  by  his  attempted  mediation  between  the 
North  and  the  South  just  before  the  death  of  the  President, 
At  least  he  had  shown  a  certain  political  foresight  in  breaking 
away  from  Yuan  before  his  own  political  career  had  been 
ruined  by  his  connection  with  that  statesman.  Another  vital 
consideration  in  its  bearing  on  the  outcome  of  the  election  was 
the  important  strategic  position  held  by  General  Feng  on  the 
lower  Yangtze.  It  was  much  safer  to  have  him  interested  in 
defending  the  government  than  to  give  a  grievance  which 
might  cause  him  to  use  his  influence  to  stir  up  trouble  in  an 
unsettled  region. 

The  Peking  Gazette  gives  us  an  interesting  comparison  be- 
tween the  election  of  the  Vice-President  and  the  choice  of  a 
President  in  1913.  "Everybody  remarked  on  the  contrast  be- 
tween this  election  and  the  election  for  the  late  President 
Yuan  Shih-kai.  In  1913  the  House  of  Parliament  was  sur- 
rounded by  many  cordons  of  armed  soldiery  and  the  gates 
were  blocked  by  troops  to  prevent  any  of  the  M.P.'s  escaping 
during  the  proceeding.  Looking  over  the  walls  surrounding 
the  House,  one  saw  plainly  the  many  troops  with  fixed  bayo- 
nets peering  into  the  Parliament  building,  for  what  everyone 

10  Among  others,  votes  were  cast  for  K'ang  Yu-wei  and  Gen- 
eral Chang  Hsiin.  See  Peking  Gazette,  Oct.  31,  1916. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        223 

was  free  to  imagine  for  himself.  Yesterday  only  a  handful 
of  soldiers  patrolled  the  streets  to  direct  the  traffic.  With  the 
exception  of  parliamentary  guards  in  full  uniform  and  about 
half  a  dozen  military  police  there  was  nothing  unusual  about 
the  policing  of  the  occasion.  People,  including  the  M.P.'s, 
moved  about  freely  and  the  spectators  were  not  subjected  to 
close  scrutiny  as  if  they  were  assassins.  The  Republic  is  in- 
deed among  us !  In  perfect  harmony  with  this  promising  at- 
mosphere was  the  very  orderly  conduct  of  the  members  of 
Parliament."11 

A  second  and  more  important  task  to  which  the  Parliament 
addressed  itself  was  the  framing  and  adoption  of  a  permanent 
constitution  for  the  Republic.  This  had  been  undertaken  by 
the  first  Parliament  elected,  and  its  task  had  been  almost  com- 
pleted at  the  time  when  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  members  had  been 
driven  from  Peking  by  Yuan  Shih-kai.12  The  President  had 
objected  to  several  provisions  of  this  first  draft  of  the  per- 
manent constitution,  so  that  it  had  been  thrown  into  the  waste- 
paper  basket  when  he  made  himself  the  dictator.  Yuan  Shih- 
kai,  in  his  turn,  had  undertaken  the  work  of  providing  China 
with  a  permanent  constitution,  appointing  a  commission  to 
draw  up  an  instrument  acceptable  to  him,  but  the  monarchy 
movement  prevented  anything  of  value  being  accomplished  by 
this  commission. 

As  soon  as  Parliament  had  assembled  in  Peking  after  the 
collapse  of  the  monarchy  movement  it  took  up  the  work  of 
constitution  framing  at  the  point  reached  in  1913.  The  basis 
of  discussion  was  the  draft  permanent  constitution  presented 
in  that  year.  A  Conference  on  the  Constitution13  was  organ- 

11  Peking  Gazette,  October  31,  1916. 

12  The  draft  of  the  constitution  prepared  by  the  Constitution 
Drafting  Committee  had  been  submitted   for  the  action  of  the 
Conference  on  the  Constitution. 

3  The  two  Houses  acting  in  that  capacity. 


224        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

ized  for  the  consideration  of  the  provisions  of  that  draft  with 
a  view  to  amending  it  rather  than  substituting  an  entirely  new 
instrument.14 

The  fact  that  it  had  already  received  the  tentative  approval 
of  the  members  of  Parliament15  in  its  main  outlines  did  not 
prevent  a  serious  disagreement  as  to  the  final  form  in  \vhich  it 
should  be  cast.  Political  changes  during  1914-15  had  brought 
about  new  party  alignments.  The  events  of  the  same  years 
had  shown  the  necessity  of  adapting  the  fundamental  instru- 
ment of  government  to  conditions  as  they  existed  in  China 
rather  than  merely  incorporating  in  it  the  most  advanced  po- 
litical ideas  of  the  West.  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  the  representa- 
tives of  the  old  mandarinate  had  condemned  the  draft  consti- 
tution of  1913  as  unsuited  to  the  immediate  needs  and  capacity 
of  China  because  of  the  excessive  powers  vested  in  the  Assem- 
bly and  the  consequent  limitations  placed  on  the  executive' 
branch  of  the  government.  The  Constitution  Drafting  Com- 
mittee had  refused  to  hear  the  views  of  the  President  and  the 
men  who  had  been  engaged  in  the  practical  work  of  adminis- 
tration. The  constitution  drawn  up,  for  that  reason,  while 
admirable  in  theory  for  the  government  of  a  democratic  State, 
lacked  the  adaptable  nature  of  an  instrument  which  had  re- 
sulted from  a  compromise  between  new  ideas  and  old  practice. 

The  events  of  the  year  191 3*  had  served  to  discredit  political 
parties  and  party  action  in  China.  The  Kuo  Ming  Tang  had 
been  condemned  for  its  connection  with  the  summer  revolu- 
tion of  that  year,  and  later  many  of  the  Chin  Pu  Tang  sup- 
porters had  fallen  into  disgrace  because  of  their  support  of 

14  This  conference  met  in  the  Temple  of  Heaven,  alternating 
its  sittings  with  that  of  Parliament  as  a  legislative  body. 

15  It  had  been  sanctioned  by  the  drafting  committee  composed 
of  60  members,  30  chosen  by  each  House  of  Parliament. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        225 

Yuan  Shih-kai.  But  where  there  is  room  for  difference  of 
opinion  on  political  issues  party  groupings  will  result. 

The  regrouping  of  the  members  of  Parliament  after  their 
return  to  Peking  came  as  a  result  of  the  differences  over  the 
provisions  of  the  permanent  constitution.  Party  grouping  in 
the  main  followed  the  old  Chin  Pu  Tang  and  Kuo  Ming  Tang 
lines.  On  constitutional  questions  Parliament  was  divided 
into  four  main  groups,  each  consisting  of  several  smaller  ones. 
These  were  i )  the  "Constitution  Discussion  Society"  which 
was  made  up  principally  of  old  Kuo  Ming  Tang  adherents; 
2)  "the  Constitution  Research  Society,"  a  Chin  Pu  Tang 
group;  3)  the  Constitution  Deliberation  Society,  composed  of 
deserters  from  both  the  Kuo  Ming  and  the  Chin  Pu  Tangs; 
and  4)  the  Constitution  Mutual  Discussion  Society"  consist- 
ing of  members  from  Shantung,  Chihli,  Tibet  and  Mongolia, 
who  were  neither  radicals  nor  conservatives,  but  who  merely 
fell  in  line  with  the  majority,  whatever  that  happened  to  be. 

The  strongest  clash  between  the  different  groups  came  over 
the  discussion  of  the  provincial  system.  This  chapter  of  the 
constitution  had  been  omitted  from  the  draft  prepared  in  1913. 
The  issue  concerned  the  relation  of  the  provinces  to  the  Cen- 
tral Government.  One  party16  desired  to  see  the  provincial 
system  practically  freed  from  the  control  of  Peking,  the  prov- 
inces being  in  effect  self-governing  States  united  only  for  the 
regulation  of  their  mutual  interests.  Under  this  de-centralized 
system  the  Governor  of  the  province  would  have  been  an 
elected  official  responsible  partly  to  the  Central  Government 
and  partly  to  the  provincial  assembly. 

The  other  extreme  was  presented  by  those  who  demanded 
that  the  province  should  be  only  an  administrative  area,  the 
officials  being  appointed  by  the  President  and  subject  to  his 

16  The  Kuo  Ming  Tang. 


226        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

direction  and  control.17  Between  these  two  extreme  groups 
were  the  moderates  who  favored  granting  a  large  degree  of 
autonomy  to  the  provinces,  but  giving  the  President  a  restrict- 
ed right  to  appoint  high  provincial  officials. 

Under  the  Manchu  regime  the  Governor  had  been  appointed 
by  the  Emperor  and  no  high  provincial  official  was  allowed 
to  serve  in  his  native  province.  With  the  outbreak  of  the  revo- 
lution the  provincial  governments  were  largely  self-constituted. 
Sometimes  the  Governor  held  office  in  virtue  of  an  election  by 
a  provincial  assembly  or  other  local  organization.  In  most 
cases  however  he  was  simply  a  noted  revolutionary  leader  hold- 
ing office  because  of  that  fact.  A  notable  departure  from  the 
old  Manchu  practice  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  Governors  were 
frequently  natives  of  the  provinces.  After  the  establishment 
of  the  Republic  most  of  these  men  were  confirmed  in  their  po- 
sitions as  Tutuhs  or  military  Governors.18  Later,  attempts 
were  made  to  replace  them  by  civil  Governors.  Yuan  Shih- 
kai  used  his  right  of  appointment  to  fill  these  high  provincial 
posts  with  his  own  friends  and  supporters,  in  some  cases  go- 
ing back  to  the  Manchu  idea  that  no  official  must  serve  in  his 
native  province. 

The  way  in  which  the  former  President  had  made  use  of 
his  right  to  appoint  provincial  officers  to  strengthen  himself 
had  convinced  many  people  that  the  safety  of  the  country  de- 
pended upon  limiting  this  right.  If  the  party  in  control  of 
the  Parliament  had  also  controlled  the  executive  it  is  probable 

17  This  was,  in  effect,  the  position  taken  by  the  Chin  Pu  Tang 
members. 

18  In  addition  to  the  Tutuh,  and  the  civil  Governor  where  one 
had  been  appointed,  there  were,  in  many  of  the  Provinces,  the 
irresponsible  military   chiefs  holding  no  official  position  in  the 
provincial  administrative  system,  but  maintaining  themselves  by 
force  of  arms. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        227 

that  this  fear  of  the  presidential  use  of  the  patronage  would 
not  have  been  so  strong.  As  it  was,  the  executive  could  con- 
trol the  major  part  of  the  country  by  appointing  his  adher- 
ents to  provincial  office.  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  successful 
in  securing  himself  as  dictator  largely  for  that  reason,  and 
while  he  ultimately  failed  to  maintain  himself  it  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  he  went  beyond  the  point  where  his  own  ap- 
pointees would  lend  him  their  support.  Consequently  there 
was  good  reason  for  this  conflict  over  the  manner  of  appoint- 
ment of  the  Governors. 

In  addition  to  the  fear  of  presidential  appointment  there 
was  another  reason  to  be  urged  in  favor  of  the  province  itself 
making  a  choice  of  its  chief  officers.  In  the  past  the  people 
had  been  little  concerned  with  the  personnel  of  the  administra- 
tion. They  seldom  knew  personally  the  officials  over  them 
with  the  exception  of  the  lowest  in  the  scale,  the  district  magis- 
trate, and  he  was  usually  transferred  before  coming  into  inti- 
mate relationship  with  the  people  of  his  district.  At  least  he 
was  not  a  native  of  the  place.  The  result  was  that  the  officials 
did  not  know  the  local  needs  and  customs  as  well  as  if  they 
had  been  natives  of  the  province  or  of  the  district.  If,  under 
the  new  system,  the  right  to  choose  provincial  officials  was 
given  to  the  local  assemblies  they  would  undoubtedly  select 
some  man  well  known  in  the  province,  and  with  an  intimate 
knowledge  of  the  local  customs  and  traditions,  to  serve  as 
Governor  or  in  other  high  office.  This  would  bring  about  a 
more  intimate  relationship  between  the  people  and  the  govern- 
ment and  help  to  pave  the  way  for  a  true  representative  system 
in  the  national  as  well  as  in  the  local  administration.  A  simi- 
lar result  would  follow  from  the  proposal  to  allow  the  local 
assemblies  to  nominate  two  candidates  for  the  position  of  gov- 
ernor, one  of  them  a  native  and  the  other  a  non-resident  of 


228        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  province,  the  President  of  the  Republic  making  a  choice 
between  the  two  men  nominated.  By  giving  the  people  even 
an  indirect  influence  in  determining  their  higher  rulers,  the 
much  vaunted  democracy  of  China  would  be  extended  gradu- 
ally from  a  direction  of  village  affairs  to  a  control  over  the 
entire  provincial  system  and  the  national  administration. 

On  the  other  hand  this  suggested  enlargement  of  provincial 
control  might  easily  lead  to  disruption  of  the  State.  The  ten- 
dency had  always  been  to  put  local  advantage  before  national 
interest,  and  this  had  been  held  in  check  only  partially  by  the 
old  method  of  absolute  appointment  of  officials  by  the  Central 
authority  and  holding  them  responsible  for  the  administra- 
tion of  their  province  or  district.  The  provincial  official,  while 
responsible  to  Peking  for  carrying  out  the  policy  of  the  Central 
government,  had  been  forced,  even  under  the  old  regime,  to 
consider  the  effect  of  that  policy  on  local  opinion.  This  had 
resulted  in  the  lack  of  uniformity  of  administration  in  China 
which  has  already  been  noted.  If  the  Governor  depended  on 
the  provincial  assembly  for  his  election,  or  even  for  confirma- 
tion after  appointment  by  the  central  executive,  the  adminis- 
tration would  tend  more  than  ever  to  consider  local  interests 
and  prejudices  rather  than  national  needs.  The  State,  instead 
of  being  unified,  would  become  a  confederation  of  States.  The 
advocates  of  provincial  autonomy  favored  making  the  coun- 
try a  Federal  Union,  pointing  to  the  United  States  as  the 
model  to  be  followed.  But  there  is  this  important  difference 
between  China  and  the  United  States  to  be  borne  in  mind.  In 
the  United  States  the  necessity  of  establishing  an  intimate 
relationship  between  the  individual  and  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment was  seen  from  the  first,  while  in  China  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment has  never  exercised  a  direct  control  over  the  indi- 
vidual. In  the  collection  of  taxes,  for  example,  national  needs 


'  Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        229 

were  met  by  assessments  on  the  provinces  as  such,  rather  than 
by  levies  on  the  people  directly.  Therefore  any  de-centralized 
system  that  should  be  established  would  be  more  comparable 
to  the  condition  of  the  states  under  the  Articles  of  Confeder- 
ation than  to  the  Federal  Union  formed  in  1789. 

Furthermore,  all  of  the  proposals  for  appointment  by  the 
assemblies,  or  limitation  of  the  presidential  appointing  power, 
meant  an  extension  of  the  elective  system  beyond  the  choice 
of  representatives  to  watch  over  and  control  the  administra- 
tion. This  would  introduce  the  element  of  uncertainty  and 
unrest  into  the  provincial  administration  which  was  feared  in 
national  politics  because  of  the  periodic  election  of  a  Presi- 
dent. It  might  lead  to  conflict  between  rival  contestants  for 
provincial  office,  keeping  the  provinces  in  a  state  of  perpetual 
turmoil.  However,  this  argument  cannot  be  pressed  too  far 
because  the  Chinese  are  much  more  accustomed  to  compromise 
in  such  cases  than  to  carry  the  controversy  to  the  point  of 
open  conflict. 

From  the  international  point  of  view  there  could  be  but 
one  answer  to  the  question  of  the  form  in  which  the  provincial 
system  should  be  cast.  All  past  experience  both  in  China  and 
other  countries  has  been  that  foreign  relations  can  be  most 
satisfactorily  carried  on  under  a  centralized  system  of  ad- 
ministration. Treaty  engagements  made  must  be  uniformly 
carried  out  in  all  parts  of  a  country.  China  has  suffered  re- 
peated humiliation  in  the  past  because  of  the  variation  in  car- 
rying out  treaty  provisions  in  the  several  provinces.  This  in- 
ternational factor  is  one  that  cannot  be  disregarded  in  a  coun- 
try like  China  where  the  Powers  hold  a  peculiarly  favored  po- 
sition. The  future  of  the  State  depends  on  the  ability  of  the 
Central  Government  to  avoid  entanglements  in  foreign  rela- 
tions. If  the  establishment  of  provincial  autonomy  would 


230        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

weaken  the  control  of  Peking  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs, 
then,  even  at  the  expense  of  less  popular  participation  in  the 
government,  the  decision  should  be  in  favor  of  a  centraliza- 
tion of  authority. 

The  discussion  over  the  provincial  system  went  on  without 
a  decision  being  reached.  Several  times  it  seemed  as  though 
an  acceptable  basis  of  agreement  would  be  found  but  all  of 
the  compromises  suggested  failed  to  bring  the  two  extremes 
together.  In  addition  to  the  differences  over  the  appointment 
of  the  officials,  there  was  the  added  question  of  whether  the 
provincial  system  should  be  included  in  the  constitution  or 
should  be  established  by  ordinary  legislative  enactment.  If 
it  became  a  part  of  the  constitutional  law  it  would  be  very 
difficult  to  adjust  it  to  conditions  as  they  changed  from  time 
to  time,  or  to  remedy  any  defects  that  appeared  when  it  was 
put  into  actual  operation.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  was  pro- 
mulgated as  an  ordinary  law  it  could  be  changed  too  easily, 
it  was  felt,  and  for  that  reason  would  be  liable  to  constant  ex- 
perimentation. The  division  on  this  latter  question  was  along 
the  same  party  lines  as  on  the  actual  provisions  of  the  pro- 
vincial system.19 

The  other  important  point  of  difference  that  arose  in  the 
discussions  of  the  Constitutional  Conference  was  whether  Con- 
fucianism should  be  made  the  State  religion.  All  were  agreed 
that  the  doctrines  of  Confucius  should  be  used  as  the  basis  for 
instruction  in  ethics  in  the  schools,  but  many  felt  that  it  was 
unwise  to  insert  a  specific  clause  in  the  constitution  to  that 
effect.  The  old  conservatives  were  supporters  of  the  idea,  but 

19  The  Kuo  Ming  Tang  members  advocated  the  inclusion  of 
the  provincial  system  while  the  Chin  Pu  Tang  and  the  military 
leaders  opposed  it.  The  Chin  Pu  Tang  finally  agreed  to  its  in- 
clusion if  definite  provision  was  made  for  the  appointment  of  the 
Governor  by  the  President. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        231 

after  much  discussion,  and  the  expression  of  opinion  from  the 
provinces,  the  clause  was  omitted  from  the  constitution. 

While  Parliament  was  working  over  the  draft  of  the  per- 
manent constitution  the  usual  spring  housecleaning  in  Chi- 
nese politics  was  approaching.  The  draft  of  the  constitution 
had  been  rushed  through  its  third  reading  by  the  drafting  com- 
mittee in  1913  to  forestall  a  threatened  overturn  of  Parlia- 
ment by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  and  in  the  spring  of  1917  it  was  nec- 
essary to  push  the  permanent  constitution  through  the  second 
reading  for  a  similar  reason.  The  Constitution  as  it  passed  the 
second  reading  in  the  Constitutional  Conference  was  published 
in  July  after  Parliament  had  been  driven  again  from  Peking 
—this  time  by  the  action  of  the  northern  military  leaders.  Very 
few  changes  were  made  in  the  draft  by  the  Conference.  No 
agreement  had  been  reached  on  the  provincial  system,  so  that/ 
it  was  omitted  from  the  Constitution.  The  principal  change 
made  was  in  the  elimination  of  the  chapter  in  the  draft  pro- 
viding for  a  permanent  parliamentary  committee  to  sit  during 
recesses,  keeping  the  government  under  the  supervision  of 
Parliament  during  the  whole  year.  This  was  the  provision 
that  had  been  objected  to  in  particular  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  when 
the  terms  of  the  draft  had  been  made  known.  Aside  from 
that  change  only  a  few  alterations  in  wording  had  been  made. 
Thus  the  wording  of  the  clauses  providing  for  a  responsibility 
of  the  Cabinet  to  Parliament  was  altered  to  make  certain  that; 
there  would  be  no  misunderstanding  of  what  was  meant.21 

The  government  of  the  Republic  of  China,  if  this  perma- 
nent Constitution  as  drawn  up  by  Parliament  becomes  effec- 
tive, will  be  that  known  as  parliamentary  or  responsible  rather 
than  the  American  or  presidential  system.  Entire  control  over 
the  administration  is  vested  in  the  Assembly.  It  is  given 

21  Articles  75  and  81. 


232        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

the  right  to  interpellate  the  Ministers,  and  to  pass  a  vote  of 
want  of  confidence  in  the  Cabinet.  All  legislative  power  is 
concentrated  in  Parliament,  together  with  control  over  na- 
tional finances.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Cabinet  is  given  tlie 
right  to  appear  and  defend  its  policies,  and  to  introduce  legis- 
lation, so  that  it  will  almost  inevitably  tend  to  assume  the  di- 
rection of  the  administration,  instead  of  acting  simply  as  th£ 
creature  of  Parliament.  While  the  Cabinet  is  made  responsible 
to  the  body  representative  of  the  electorate  it  is  safeguarded 
from  subserviency  through  the  power  given  it  to-  dissolve 
Parliament  after  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence,  instead  of  it- 
self giving  up  office.  While  the  executive  power  is  vested 
nominally  in  the  President,  the  Constitution  provides  that  the 
real  direction  shall  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Cabinet.  It  will, 
of  course,  depend  largely  on  the  personality  of  the  incumbent 
of  the  office  what  influence  the  President  will  have  in  the  ad- 
ministration. President  Li  Yuan-hung  was  by  no  means  a 
negligible  factor  in  the  government  during  his  term  of  office, 
although  he  left  the  direction  of  affairs  to  the  Premier.  As 
a  mediator  between  the  various  factions  in  Parliament,  and 
between  Parliament  and  the  Cabinet,  he  filled  a  very  necessary 
place  in  the  machinery.  Form  the  standpoint  of  power,  how- 
ever, the  important  position  was  that  of  Premier  rather  than 
that  of  the  President,  and  this  will  be  increasingly  true  if  the 
permanent  constitution  comes  into  force,  and  the  machinery  of 
government  runs  more  smoothly. 


CHAPTER  X 

In  the  last  chapter  brief  mention  was  made  of  the  continued 
interference  of  the  military  leaders  in  the  conduct  of  the  civil 
government.  After  the  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  the  only  check 
on  the  absolute  power  of  Parliament  lay  in  the  constitution  of 
the  executive.  Li  Yuan-hung,  as  President,  did  not  attempt 
to  assume  the  dominating  position  which  had  been  Yuan's  by 
virtue  of  his  personality  and  ability.  President  Li  accepted 
the  subordinate  position  given  the  President  under  the  Nan- 
king constitution,  and  based  all  of  his  acts  on  a  desire  to  do 
nothing  that  was  not  strictly  constitutional.  The  real  ex- 
ecutive power,  however,  descended  to  the  Premier  acting  at 
the  time  of  Yuan  Shih-kai's  death.  It  was  from  the  Cabinet 
rather  than  the  President  that  active  opposition  to  parliament- 
ary  control  developed.  While  nominally  the  President  was  the 
head  of  the  administration,  the  constitution  provided  that  all 
of  his  acts  must  have  the  countersignature  of  a  Cabinet  Minis- 
ter. So  long  as  the  President  was  the  strongest  man  in  the 
executive  branch,  and  possessed  of  the  most  influence  in  the 
country,  he  could  keep  the  Cabinet  subject  to  his  dictation,  so 
that  the  right  of  countersignature  could  not  be  used  as  a  check 
on  his  actions.  The  Cabinet  formed  in  the  summer  of  1916 
was  not  of  President  Li's  choosing,  however,  but  was  a  legacy 
from  the  preceding  administration.  When  it  received  the 
confirmation  of  Parliament,  the  direction  of  the  administra- 
tion became  vested  in  the  Premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  instead  of 
the  President. 

233 


234        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Tuan  was  recognized  as  one  of  the  strongest  of  the  mili- 
tary leaders,  and  he  came  into  office  under  the  influence  of  the 
same  ideas  that  had  dominated  Yuan  Shih-kai,  his  old  leader. 
It  was  inevitable  that  he  should  rebel  sooner  or  later  against 
parliamentary  interference  in  the  administration  just  as  Yuan 
had  done.  The  only  question  was  whether  he  could  maintain 
himself  in  the  conflict.  In  a  struggle -against  Parliament  Tuan 
Chi-jui  lacked  the  prestige  that  had  been  so  great  a  factor  in 
the  early  successes  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  the  same  contest. 
More  important  still,  he  had  not  succeeded  to  the  position  of 
acknowledged  leader  of  all  factions  of  the  military  and  con- 
servative parties.  He  could  not  be  depended  upon  absolutely 
to  control  his  own  supporters,  and  this  fact  weakened  him 
for  any  possible  struggle  within  the  government  itself.  Know- 
ing that  others  were  desirous  of  supplanting  him  as  the  chief 
Minister  of  State  Tuan  tried  to  maintain  his  hold  on  the  mili- 
tarists with  one  hand  and  on  Parliament  with  the  other.  The 
consequence  was  that,  eventually,  he  lost  control  of  both. 

In  the  autumn  of  1916  the  Military  Governors  of  the  prov- 
inces, following  the  precedent  set  by  the  Vice-President,  Feng 
Kuo-chang,  who  had  tried  to  settle  the  conflict  between  the 
North  and  the  South  by  a  mediating  Conference  ./field  a  Con- 
ference at  Hsuchow  under  the  auspices  of  Chang  Hsun.  Lack- 
ing a  leader  to  whom  they  acknowledged  a  common  allegiance, 
the  Military  party1  attempted  to  formulate  and  enforce  a 
policy  of  opposition  to  parliamentary  control  by  means  of  con- 
ference action.  They  succeeded  in  preventing  T'ang  Shao-yi 

1  The  northern  military  party  (Peiyang  party)  was  not  a  defi- 
nitely organized  group  but  was  made  up  of  those  military  men 
who  actually  controlled  troops  either  under  governmental  author- 
ity or  without  it,  and  the  Tutuhs  of  most  of  the  northern  prov- 
inces. They  thought  in  terms  of  the  old  rather  than  the  new 
'  since  most  of  them  had  been  members  of  the  old  officialdom. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        235 

from  taking  his  place  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
they  formed  a  theoretical  "Union  of  the  Provinces"  which  was 
really  a  union  of  the  Military  Governors  of  several  of  the 
provinces.  Article  two  of  the  Regulations  of  the  Union 
stated :  "The  Union  is  organized  for  the  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing the  desperadoes  from  monopolizing  the  powers  of  the  gov- 
ernment.  If  Parliament  should,  under  any  pretext,  create 
disturbance  or  take  up  an  unconciliatory  attitude  towards  the 
provinces,  the  Union  will  meet  and  consider  a  plan  to  make  a 
unified  fight  (in  a  punitive  sense)  against  Parliament."2 
^Tuan  Chi-jui  was  accused  at  the  time  of  using  this  Con- 
ference to  coerce  his  opponents  in  the  government.  It  might 
be  suspected,  however,  that  he  was  not  in  entire  sympathy 
with  the  movement  towards  a  military  dictation  which  might 
easily  undermine  his  authority  equally  with  that  of  Parliament. 
That  he  did  not  take  action  against  the  Conference  was  prob- 
ably due  in  part  to  his  sympathy  with  its  anti-parliamentary 
bias,  and  in  part  to  a  realization  of  his  inability  to  exercise  a 
control  over  the  Tuchuns. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  nothing  except  words  came  from  this 
first  Hsiichow  Conference,  although  there  was  the  ever  pres- 
ent possibility  of  the  words  leading  to  action.  The  Military 
Chiefs  of  the  North  continued  to  keep  in  communication  with 
each  other  during  the  remainder  of  the  year  but  with  the  pas- 
sage of  time  less  fear  of  their  dictation  was  felt.  They  were 
far  from  united  among  themselves,  several  aspirants  to  the 
leadership  of  the  group  striving  to  make  good  their  respective 
claims.  In  this  disunion  lay  the  greatest  hope  for  a  peaceful 
development  towards  parliamentary  government  in  China. 
The  opening  months  of  1917,  unfortunately,  provided  a  new 

2  Peking  Gazette,  September  22,  1916. 


236        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

issue,  and  one  that  finally  brought  the  struggle  of  the  military 
faction  against  Parliament  to  a  crisis. 

On  the  ninth  of  February  1917,  China  joined  the  United 
States  in  sending  a  note  to  the  German  Government  protesting 
against  the  extension  of  submarine  warfare.  This  step  was 
.followed  by  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  a  month 
later,  when  no  satisfactory  reply  had  been  received.  In  taking 
this  action  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  the  gov- 
ernment worked  in  practical  harmony.  Just  before  it  was 
finally  determined  to  break  off  relations,  it  is  true,  President 
Li  refused  to  sanction  the  decision  which  had  been  reached  by 
the  Cabinet  in  favor  of  such  action.  The  temporary  breach 
between  the  President  and  the  Premier  was  healed  almost  im- 
mediately, however,  and  at  the  same  time  the  question  of  su- 
premacy in  the  executive  was  settled  in  favor  of  the  Premier.8 
When  the  Cabinet  decision  was  submitted  to  Parliament  for 
its  approval  the  House  of  Representatives  sustained  the  con- 
templated action  by  a  vote  of  331  to  87,  and  the  Senate  voted 
to  support  the  government  by  a  majority  of  about  150.  It 
seemed  that  the  possibility  of  war  against  another  State  would 
have  the  effect  of  reconciling  the  various  factions  in  Chinese 
politics,  and  thus  produce  a  beneficial  internal  effect. 

When  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  had  no  effect 
in  bringing  about  a  modification  of  German  policy,  the  gov- 
ernment was  forced  to  contemplate  the  third  step — an  actual 
declaration  of  war.  There  was  considerable  opposition  to  this 

8  Because  of  presidential  opposition  to  his  policy,  (the  Presi- 
dent insisting  upon  his  right  to  declare  war  and  make  peace), 
Tuan  Chi-jui  resigned  and  left  Peking  for  Tientsin.  The  Presi- 
dent and  the  high  officials,  however,  all  urged  him  to  resume 
office,  and  he  finally  consented  to  do  so  after  President  Li  had 
promised  him  a  free  hand  for  his  war  policy.  See  Far  Eastern 
Review,  March  1917,  "China  Breaks  with  Germany,"  for  sum- 
mary of  the  controversy. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        237 

in  many  quarters  on  the  ground  that  China  had  nothing  to 
gain  by  war  with  Germany,  and  had  much  to  lose  by  becoming 
her  active  enemy.  It  was  necessary,  in  order  to  counteract 
this  feeling,  that  the  government  should  be  able  to  show  sub- 
stantial advantage  to  China  from  joining  the  Powers  at  war 
with  the  German  Empire.  To  this  end  negotiations  were  com- 
menced with  the  representatives  of  the  Entente  Powers  at  Pek- 
ing. The  Chinese  desired  that  the  country  should  be  released 
temporarily  from  the  payment  of  the  Boxer  indemnity;  that 
a  revision  of  the  tariff  provisions  should  be  undertaken  in  the 
interests  of  China;  and  that  the  provision  of  the  Boxer  proto- 
col prohibiting  the  movement  of  Chinese  troops  in  the  vicinity 
of  Tientsin,  and  that  permitting  the  maintenance  of  foreign 
troops  in  the  Legation  quarter  of  Peking,  should  be  cancelled. 
The  Chinese  Government,  in  return  for  these  concessions, 
agreed  to  assume  only  two  responsibilities  towards  the  En- 
tente: i)  the  supply  of  primary  materials;  and  2)  assistance 
in  respect  of  labor.4 

Before  he  had  received  a  favorable  reply  from  the  Powers, 
the  Premier  gave  Parliament  to  understand  that  he  was  as- 
sured of  substantial  concessions  along  the  lines  indicated  if 
China  joined  the  Entente.  The  negotiations  dragged  on,  how- 
ever, without  any  decision  being  reached,  and  interest  in  the 
war  issue  declined  throughout  the  country.  As  interest  les- 
sened the  majority  of  the  government  in  Parliament  decreased. 
It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  unanimity  of  the  different  de- 
partments extended  only  to  the  question  of  war  with  Ger- 
many, and  that  opposition  was  steadily  growing  even  to  the 
war  policy  of  the  Cabinet.5 

4  Far  Eastern  Review,  April  1917. 

5  German  influence  was  steadily  at  work  on  Parliament  and  the 
people  trying  to  stir  up  opposition  to  the  war  policy  in  every  pos- 
sible way.    For  instance,  in  Tientsin,  maps  showing  the  extent  of 


238        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

In  order  to  divert  attention  from  the  unsatisfactory  con- 
dition of  the  negotiations,  Premier  Tuan  resorted  to  the  ex- 
pedient of  asking  the  advice  of  the  country.  If  it  could  be 
shown  that  a  unanimous  public  sentiment  favored  war,  he 
would  have  that  to  urge  as  a  reason  for  the  favorable  action 
of  Parliament,  irrespective  of  possible  concessions  from  the 
Powers.  To  aid  in  the  manufacturing  of  this  sentiment  Tuan 
summoned  to  a  conference  some  of  the  Military  Governors.6 

From  the  time  this  conference  met  the  question  of  war  be- 
came more  a  matter  of  internal  politics  than  of  foreign  policy.  / 
The  Military  Governors  assembled  in  Peking  late  in  April,  and 
the  attention  of  the  country  was  immediately  centered  upon 
their  activities.  The  different  views  of  the  conference  were 
set  forth  in  the  Far  Eastern  Review  as  follows:  "The  ma- 
jority of  the  Pekingese  find  the  fact  that  Vice-President  Feng 
Kuo-chang  and  General  Chang  Hsiin  have  instructed  their 
delegates  to  vote  for  war,  much  more  interesting  than  the  per- 
centage of  increase  in  the  Customs  Tariffs  which  the  allies 
may  or  may  not  concede.  The  radical  press  sees  an  ominous 
military  plot  behind  the  calling  of  a  military  conference  and 
airs  the  opinion  that  the  Premier  is  preparing  to  force  war 
upon  a  peace-loving  and  peaceably  inclined  people  by  a  display 
of  military  power  and  cohesion  among  the  big  military  chiefs. 
The  press  which  supports  the  Peiyang  (Military)  party  on  the 
other  hand  heralds  the  gathering  as  an  honest  attempt  to  probe 
the  collective  sentiment  of  the  nation  before  entering  upon  a 

the  German  conquests  since  1914  as  compared  with  the  successes 
of  the  allies,  were  put  up  on  the  walls  of  the  houses.  Sun  Yat- 
sen,  T'ang  Shao-yi  and  their  followers  also  tried  actively  to 
frighten  Parliament  into  opposition  to  the  war  policy. 

6  The  Conference  was  scheduled  to  meet  April  16,  but  did  not 
meet  until  "sometime  after  the  twentieth."  Far  Eastern  Review, 
May  1917. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        239 

campaign  against  the  'common  enemy  of  neutral  nations'  and 
in  support  of  the  abstract  right  of  weak  nations  to  life,  lib- 
erty, and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."7 

The  Conference  decided  unanimously  in  favor  of  war  with- 
out waiting  for  concessions  from  the  Entente.  Further  delay 
was  deprecated  since  China  had  already  "lost  face"  with  the 
Powers  by  her  procrastination.  On  May  i  several  of  the  Tu- 
chuns  called  upon  the  Premier  and  communicated  the  views  of 
the  Conference  to  him.  He,  in  his  turn,  reported  their  de- 
cision to  Parliament  which  immediately  declared  itself  in 
favor  of  war.8  After  the  President  had  given  his  assent  to 
the  policy  it  remained  only  to  secure  the  passage  of  a  declara- 
tion of  war  through  the  Assembly. 

When  the  bill  was  submitted  to  Parliament  it  was  felt  that 
the  government  would  have  a  sufficient  majority  to  insure  its 
passage.  In  spite  of  this  fact  no  attempt  was  made  to  rush  it 
to  a  decision.  The  Cabinet  members  and  the  Military  Chiefs 
occupied  themselves  in  entertaining  the  members  of  Parlia- 
ment, hoping  to  make  the  passage  of  the  bill  doubly  certain. 
It  was  just  at  this  time9  that  a  mob  demonstration  in  favor 
of  war  took  place  outside  the  Parliament  building.  This  un- 
fortunate demonstration  was  blamed  on  the  Premier,  who  was 
accused  of  attempting  to  coerce  Parliament  into  a  support  of 
his  policies.  The  majority  of  the  Cabinet  resigned  in  the 
storm  that  followed,  and  Parliament  refused  to  take  any  ac- 
tion on  the  war  bill  until  a  new  Cabinet  was  constituted.  The 
opposition  press  demanded  the  resignation  of  Tuan  Chi-jui 
and  the  choice  of  a  new  Premier  as  well  as  a  new  Cabinet. 
Tuan  however  held  to  his  position  and  demanded  action  by 

7  Ibid.,  p.  460. 

8  May  7,  1917. 

9  May  10,  1917. 


240        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Parliament  on  the  question  of  war.  The  whole  matter  was 
postponed  by  the  Assembly  on  the  ground  that  there  was  no 
Cabinet  to  carry  out  the  necessary  war  measures  in  case  Par- 
liament passed  the  bill.  This  amounted  to  a  vote  of  want  of 
confidence  in  the  government,  and,  logically,  should  have  been 
followed  by  the  resignation  of  the  Premier. 
^/Anew  phase  of  the  struggle  was  inaugurated  on  May  20, 
when  the  Military  party  came  to  the  aid  of  the  Premier,  de- 
manding the  dissolution  of  Parliament.  Up  to  that  time  the 
issue  had  been  whether  or  not  Parliament  should  declare  war 
on  Germany.  The  Tuchuns,  however,  changed  the  issue,  bas- 
ing their  demand  for  a  dissolution  of  Parliament  on  the  ob- 
jectionable nature  of  certain  provisions  of  the  draft  permanent ' 
constitution.  "What  has  greatly  shocked  us,"  the  Tuchuns 
stated  in  their  petition,  "is  the  passage  of  a  number  of  articles 
of  the  draft  constitution  by  the  Constitution  Conference  at  the 
second  reading  and  those  approved  by  the  committee  meeting 
the  other  day.  Among  these  articles  one  reads  that  \vhen  the 
House  of  Representatives  passes  a  vote  of  lack  of  confidence 
in  the  Cabinet  Ministers,  the  President  shall  either  dismiss  the 
Cabinet  or  dissolve  the  House  of  Representatives,  but  the  said 
House  must  not  be  dissolved  without  the  approval  of  the  Sen- 
ate. Another  states  that  the  President  can  appoint  the  Premier 
without  the  countersignature  of  Cabinet  Ministers.  The  third 
.provides  that  any  resolution  passed  by  both  Houses  of  Parlia- 
ment shall  have  the  same  force  as  law."10  The  petition  then 
went  on  to  lay  down  the  principle  upon  which  parliamentary 
government  is  based,  that  in  case  of  conflict  either  the  Cabinet 
must  resign  or  appeal  to  the  country  in  a  new  election.  The 
check  on  the  absolute  power  of  Parliament,  which  lay  in  the 
right  of  dissolution,  was  lost,  it  was  claimed,  in  the  draft  per- 

10  Translation,  Far  Eastern  Review,  June  1917,  p.  499. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        241 

manent  constitution,  since  the  House  could  be  dissolved  only 
with  the  consent  of  the  Senate,  a  body  constituted  in  much 
the  same  way  as  the  House,  and  with  the  same  interests  to 
defend. 

After  discussing  the  defects  in  the  Constitution  and  com- 
menting on  the  manner  in  which  the  meetings  of  the  Constitu- 
tion Conference  had  been  conducted,  the  petition  stated  that 
the  dissolution  of  Parliament  was  necessary  for  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  country.  "An  examination  of  the  past  experience 
of  other  countries  shows  that  the  making  of  the  constitution 
should  not  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Parliament.  If  China 
wishes  to  have  a  good  constitution  there  is  no  other  method 
except  to  attack  the  problem  at  the  root.  If  the  whole  thing 
be  not  completely  wiped  out,  soon  the  second  reading  will  be 
completed  and  once  the  text  is  settled  the  third  reading  will 
only  result  in  alterations  in  wording.  It  will  then  be  impossi- 
ble to  alter  the  spirit  of  the  law."11 

Instead  of  dissolving  Parliament  at  the  request  of  the  Mili- 
tary party  the  President,  on  May  23,  surprised  the  country  by 
the  dismissal  of  the  Premier.  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang  was  ap- 
pointed acting  Premier12  and  the  name  of  Li  Ching-hsi  was 
submitted  to  Parliament  for  confirmation  as  successor  to  Tuan 
Chi-jui.13  The  approval  of  Parliament  was  given  by  a  large 
majority  in  both  Houses.14 

11  Far  Eastern  Review,  June  1917,  p.  499. 

12  Dr.  Wu  was  then  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


13 


Li  Ching-hsi  was  an  Anhui  man  and  a  nephew  of  the  famous 
Li  Hung-chang.  He  had  held  various  high  positions  under  the 
Manchus,  having  been  Governor  of  the  Yun-kwei  provinces  in 
1909.  Li  was  an  intimate  friend  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  politically 
must  be  classed  as  a  conservative  militarist.  For  chronological 
sketch  of  Li  Ching-hsi's  life  see:  China  Year  Book,  1916,  p.  529. 
14 House  of  Representatives,  388  votes  for  and  56  against; 
Senate,  166  for  and  25  against. 


242        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

After  the  dismissal  of  Tuan  Chi-jui  the  Tuchuns  assembled 
in  conference  at  Hsiichow.  The  Conference  decided  to  oppose 
the  formation  of  a  Cabinet  by  Li  Ching-hsi,  but  intimated  that 
it  would  not  oppose  a  government  headed  by  Wang  Shih- 
chen,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff.  General  Wang,  how- 
ever, refused  to  consider  the  position,  although  Li  agreed  to 
give  way  t9  him.  This  first  move  by  the  Hsiichow  Conference 
was  followed  almost  immediately  by  reports  that  the  Mili- 
tary Governors  of  Fengtien  and  Anhui  provinces  had  declared 
independence  of  the  Central  Government.  Fukien,  Chekiang, 
Chihli,  Shantung,  and  Hupeh,  all  of  them  under  the  control 
of  members  of  the  Peiyang  party  were  reported  as  also  having 
joined  the  revolutionary  movement. 

In  spite  of  the  reported  action  of  the  provinces,  President 
Li  Yuan-hung  reiterated  his  determination  not  to  dissolve  Par- 
liament. "I  cannot  sanction  the  dissolution  of  Parliament.  The 
provisional  Constitution  does  not  provide  for  any  such  drastic 
action,"  he  said  on  May  2i.15  From  that  time  on,  neverthe- 
less, as  the  revolutionary  movement  gained  greater  headway, 
the  President  showed  signs  of  weakening.  While  emphasiz- 
ing his  determination  to  do  nothing  unconstitutional  he  did 
everything  possible  to  conciliate  the  Peiyang  party.  The  Mili- 
tary Chiefs  refused  to  consider  anything  short  of  an  absolute 
dissolution  of  Parliament,  and  the  earlier  reports  of  revolt 
were  confirmed  by  telegrams  declaring  independence. 

If  the  President  had  taken  a  decided  stand  against  the  Tu- 
chuns at  the  outset,  the  situation  might  have  been  saved.  In- 
stead of  ordering  steps  to  be  taken  against  them  he  wasted 
time  attempting  to  conciliate  them  by  considering  every  sug- 
gestion made  for  filling  the  post  of  Prime  Minister.  The  first 
man  he  appointed,  Li  Ching-hsi,  was  a  conservative,  and  a  man 

15  Far  Eastern  Review,  July  1917,  p.  529. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        243 

allied  with  the  Military  party.  He  refused  to  come  to  Peking 
to  assume  office,  or  to  attempt  to  form  a  Cabinet  in  opposition 
to  the  wishes  of  the  revolting  Tuchuns,  showing  clearly  that 
he  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  act  against  them  in  case  of 
necessity. 

Being  unable  to  form  a  government  acceptable  to  both  Par- 
liament and  the  rebellious  Governors,  President  Li  took  a  step 
which,  in  the  light  of  the  past  history  of  the  Republic,  is  al- 
most inexplicable,  unless  it  is  to  be  explained  by  the  assumption 
that  the  President  was  willing  to  do  anything  to  end  the  crisisr 
On  June  i  a  mandate  was  issued  calling  upon  the  notorious 
and  infamous  General  Chang  Hsiin16  to  come  to  Peking  to 
mediate  between  the  Tuchuns  and  Parliament.  General  Chang 
had  been  only  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  Government  since  the 
first  revolution.  He  was  well  known  for  his  desire  to  see  the 
monarchical  regime  restored  under  the  Manchu  Dynasty,  and 
had  no  sympathy  with  democratic  government  under  any 
guise.  The  first  attempts  at  dictation  by  the  Military  party  in 
the  fall  of  1916  had  been  made  under  his  direction  and  at  his 
instigation.  This  was  the  man  who  was  called  upon  by  the 
President  of  the  Republic  of  China  to  mediate  at  a  time  of 
grave  crisis — he  who  had  been  a  practical  outlaw,  maintaining 
himself  by  the  strength  of  his  personal  army  for  almost  eight 

16  Chang  Hsiin,  a  Kiangsi  man,  had  been  raised  to  high  office  by 
the  Empress  Dowager  Tzu  Hsi.  He  had  been  appointed  as  com- 
mander-in-chief  for  the  Manchus  in  Yunnan  and  later  in  Kansu. 
In  1911  he  was  commander-in-chief  of  the  Kiangnan  forces,  with 
headquarters  at  Nanking.  He  remained  faithful  to  the  Manchus 
to  the  very  end.  The  abdication  of  the  Manchus  found  him  oc- 
cupying important  points  along  the  Tientsin-Pukow  railroad, 
where  he  maintained  himself  by  sheer  force.  Yuan  Shih-kai  se- 
cured his  support  for  the  monarchy  movement  by  appointing  him 
Field-Marshal  and  High  Inspector  of  the  Yangtze  provinces.  For 
fuller  description  of  his  life  see:  China  Year  Book,  1916,  pp. 
500-501. 


244        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

years!  It  seems  strange  that  the  President,  who  above  all 
others  in  the  country  had  always  declared  his  faith  in  con- 
stitutionalism and  parliamentarianism  in  China,  should  have 
called  upon  a  virtual  brigand  to  settle  a  constitutional  crisis. 
The  mandate  summoning  General  Chang  Hsiin  to  Peking  de- 
serves reproduction  as  an  interesting  document:  "Chang 
Hsun,  the  Tuchun  of  Anhui,  has,  in  a  telegraphic  message, 
given  his  views  of  the  present  situation  in  words  at  once  earn- 
est and  sincere.  On  account  of  my  lack  of  virtue  and  ability 
as  well  as  the  fact  that  my  prestige  is  insufficient  to  command 
respect,  some  of  the  officers  whose  duty  it  is  to  defend  the 
country,  have  joined  together  in  hostile  demonstration.  Events 
have  turned  out  to  be  against  my  wish  and  I  am  smitten  by 
regret  and  remorse.  Chang  Hsun,  who  is  highly  meritorious 
and  respected  as  well  as  public  spirited  and  patriotic,  is  re- 
quested to  at  once  come  to  Peking  in  order  to  confer  with  us 
regarding  the  affairs  of  the  State.  I  believe  confidently  that 
he  will  be  able  to  save  the  dangerous  situation  by  coping  with 
the  difficulties.  In  earnest  longing  I  wait  for  his  arrival."17 
Chang  Hsiin  accepted  the  task  laid  upon  him,  but  did  not 
go  to  Peking  immediately  as  he  had  been  asked  to  do.  The 
revolting  Tuchuns  had  established  themselves  at  Tientsin  as 
the  headquarters  for  operations  against  Peking.  A  provisional 
military  government  had  been  formed  and  many  prominent 
anti-parliamentarians  were  to  be  found  there.  Tuan  Chi-jui 
himself,  after  his  dismissal  from  office,  had  taken  up  his  resi- 
dence in  Tientsin.  General  Chang,  therefore,  stopped  at  Tient- 
sin to  get  the  views  of  the  leaders  there  before  going  to  Pek- 
ing to  take  up  his  work  of  mediating.  He  arrived  in  Tientsin 
on  June  7,  and  did  not  leave  for  the  capital  until  a  wreek  later. 

17  Far  Eastern  Review,  July  1917,  p.  537.    The  italics  are  the 
author's. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        245 

After  interviewing  Tuan  Chi-jui,  Li  Ching-hsi  and  others, 
General  Chang  showed  what  could  be  expected  of  him  as  a 
mediator.  On  June  8  he  made  the  statement  that  the  whole 
difficulty  was  practically  solved.  "I  have  wired  to  the  Presi- 
dent to  dissolve  Parliament,  and  I  will  go  to  Peking  on  Sun- 
day to  finally  settle  matters"18  were  his  words.  In  other  words 
mediation  and  dictation  were  synonomous  to  him. 

The  wavering  attitude  of  the  President  became  more  pro- 
nounced after  Chang  Hsim's  message  reached  him.  Instead 
of  continuing  to  stand  firmly  on  the  constitution  he  began  to 
seek  middle  ground  between  giving  in  to  the  Militarists  and 
Chang  Hsiin  entirely  by  dissolving  Parliament,  and  defying 
them  to  do  their  worst.  The  southern  provinces  assured  him 
of  their, support,  both  moral  and  military;  but  Yunnan,  Kuei- 
chow,  Kuangtung  and  Kuangsi  looked  very  far  away  when 
compared  with  Chihli,  Shantung  and  the  revolting  provinces. 

The  first  real  intimation  given  the  parliamentarians  that 
President  Li  might  fail  them  came  when  he  suggested  the 
possibility  of  Parliament  dissolving  itself  by  reason  of  a  con- 
tinued lack  of  a  quorum.  While  this  appeared  to  the  President 
as  the  best  way  out  of  the  dilemma,  it  did  not  appeal  with 
great  force  to  the  majority  of  Parliament.  Even  before  the 
President  suggested  this  step,  however,  it  had  occurred  to  the 
members  of  the  Yenchiu-hui  (Chin  Pu  Tang).  That  party 
had  assisted  the  President  to  overthrow  Parliament  in  1913, 
and  it  now  aided  the  revolt  of  the  Tuchuns  by  its  members 
absenting  themselves  from  Parliament.  The  Chin  Pu  Tang 
members  published  a  statement  in  support  of  the  Tuchuns,  ex- 
pressing disapproval  of  certain  articles  of  the  proposed  con- 
stitution. 

»md.,  P.  538. 


246        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

The  six  points  which  "tended  to  create  disturbances  and 
revolutions"  in  the  future  were  laid  down  as  follows:  "i) 
The  system  of  Parliament  has  not  been  improved  and  its  or- 
ganization has  not  been  definitely  fixed;  2)  when  any  decision 
of  the  Houses  is  returned  by  the  government  for  reconsider- 
ation the  ordinary  method  of  voting  will  be  employed  to  make 
a  final  decision;  3)  the  mandate  dismissing  the  Prime  Minister 
does  not  require  the  counter-signature  of  Cabinet  Ministers; 
4)  the  partiality  shown  in  the  provisions  of  the  right  of  Vote 
of  want  of  confidence'  and  that  of  power  to  dissolve  the  House 
of  Representatives;  5)  the  bills  passed  by  the  Houses  shall 
become  the  Laws  of  the  Nation;  and  6)  the  provincial  system 
has  been  hastily  provided  for  in  the  constitution."19 

In  addition  to  refraining  from  attending  the  meetings  of 
the  Constitution  Conference,  and  thus  making  action  on  the 
constitution  impossible,  the  Chin  Pu  Tang  members  consider- 
ed the  advisability  of  resigning  from  Parliament  in  a  body, 
making  it  impossible  for  it  to  function  because  of  a  lack  of  a 
quorum.  This  action  was  considered  as  early  as  May  24. 
If  those  members  resigned  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  a 
formal  dissolution  of  Parliament,  since  many  of  the  Kuo  Ming 
members  were  beginning  to  leave  Peking  in  fear  of  being 
forcibly  detained  and  imprisoned.  Parliament,  however,  re- 
fused to  dissolve  itself  formally  in  order  to  help  the  President 
out  of  a  bad  situation. 

After  Chang  Hsun's  advice,  the  President  became  convinced 
that  he  had  no  alternative  to  the  issuance  of  a  mandate  dis- 
solving Parliament  and  ordering  a  new  election.  It  is  not 
necessary  here  to  discuss  the  play  and  counter  play  of  forces 
working  on  him  before  he  reached  a  final  decision  and  issued 

19  Far  Eastern  Review,  July  1917,  p.  529. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        247 

the  mandate.20  His  continued  vacillation  showed  the  President 
to  be  what,  the  Far  Eastern  Review  well  called  him,  "an  idol 
with  feet  of  clay." 

Having  established  himself  as  the  dictator  to  the  President, 
Chang  Hsiin  left  Tientsin,  arriving  at  Peking  on  June  14  with 
a  large  force  of  his  own  "army."  The  immediate  result  of 
the  dissolution  of  Parliament  was  the  "cancelling  of  inde- 
pendence" by  the  revolting  Tuchuns.  At  the  same  time  it  be- 
came evident  that  the  seat  of  trouble  simply  had  been  trans- 
ferred from  the  North  to  the  South,  which  now  threatened  to 
take  up  arms  in  defense  of  the  constitution  and  Parliament. 

Li  Ching-hsi  consented  to  assume  office  when  Chang  Hsiin 
requested  that  he  do  so,  and  commenced  the  almost  hopeless 
task  of  forming  a  Cabinet.  The  warning  from  the  South 
caused  little  alarm  since  the  military  strength  of  the  Tuchuns 
was  available  to  crush  any  revolt. 

The  Peking  Gazette  summarized  the  gains  from  the  revolt 
of  the  Tuchuns  as  follows:  i)  dissolution  of  Parliament;  2) 
"borrowing"  of  funds  from  government  railways;  3)  "boost- 
ing" of  Chang  Hsiin;  4)  dissolution  of  a  provincial  assembly 
in  Fukien;  5)  formation  of  a  Cabinet  without  the  approval  of 
Parliament  (not  yet  completed)  ;  6)  isolation  of  the  Chief 
Executive;  7)  return  of  monarchist  propagandists  (not  yet 
completed)  ;  8)  destruction  of  the  provisional  Constitution 
and  the  part  of  the  permanent  Constitution  which  has  passed 
the  second  reading;  9)  the  creation  of  a  Council  of  Elder 
Statesmen  (not  yet  completed)  ;  10)  the  creation  of  a  bogus 
legislature  for  the  making  of  a  new  constitution  (not  yet  com- 
pleted) ;  ii )  creation  of  a  new  Parliament  in  violation  of  the 
existing  laws  (not  completed)  ;  12)  wholesale  suppression  of 
democratic  elements  (fairly  complete). 

20  June  13. 


248        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Before  the  new  Premier  had  an  opportunity  to  form  a  gov- 
ernment worthy  of  the  name,  and  before  sentiment  in  the 
South  had  definitely  crystallized  either  for  or  against  the  new 
conditions  in  Peking,  the  world  was  treated  to  what  became 
eventually  an  amusing  spectacle.  It  had  been  known  for  a 
long  time  that  General  Chang  Hsiin  desired  nothing  more 
than  an  opportunity  to  restore  the  Manchus  to  power.  His 
loyalty  to  the  former  rulers  of  China  is  the  one  redeeming 
feature  of  his  entire  career.  At  various  times  since  the  death 
of  Yuan  Shih-kai  it  had  been  rumored  that  he  was  contemp- 
lating action  against  the  Republic.  Thus  for  a  time  the  vari- 
ous conferences  at  Hsuchow  were  reported  as  favoring  Man- 
chu  restoration,  and  when  he  reached  Tientsin  on  his  way  to 
Peking  as  the  "official"  mediator,  it  seemed  certain  that  Gen- 
eral Chang  would  attempt  some  drastic  action  against  the  Re- 
public. He  stated  definitely,  however,  that  he  was  interested 
only  in  the  dissolution  of  Parliament,  and  had  given  up  all 
idea  of  reinstating  the  former  Dynasty.  This  decision  was 
apparently  reached  after  he  had  learned  that  the  Military 
leaders  would  not  support  him  in  any  such  movement. 

The  ease  with  which  he  became  established  as  dictator  in 
Peking,  however,  evidently  caused  him  to  over-rate  his 
strength  and  influence.  Whatever/caused  him  to  change  his 
mind  and  attempt  his  scheme,  tjrtc  fact  is  that  he  did  reach 
the  conclusion  that  the  time  was  ripe  for  the  Restoration. 
On  July  i,  as  the  result  of  a  midnight  resolution,  the  Manchu 
Dynasty  was  declared  restored  to  the  Throne,  Peking  was 
placed  under  control  of  the  military  forces  of  General  Chang, 
and  China  for  a  few  days  became  a  monarchy. 

As  if  by  magic  the  old  'Dragon'  flag  of  the  Manchus  was 
substituted  for  the  flag  of  the  Republic  in  all  parts  of  Peking. 
Edicts  were  issued  by  Chang  Hsiin,  in  the  name  of  the  Emp- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        249 

eror,  notifying  the  people  of  the  change  in  their  allegiance, 
and  preparations  were  made  to  defend  Peking  against  any 
forces  that  the  anti-Manchu  party  might  be  able  to  muster. 
General  Chang  had  his  own  troops  with  him,  and  it  was  upon 
them  that  he  placed  his  chief  reliance.  They  had  gained  a 
bad  name  as  ruffians  and  fighters  without  ever  having  been 
called  upon  to  engage  in  battle  against  regular  troops,  and  it 
was  this  name  that  terrorized  the  people  of  Peking  and  its 
vicinity  when  their  leader  first  came  to  act  as  'mediator'.  The 
appearance  of  his  troops  as  much  as  anything  else,  helped  to 
lend  the  air  of  comic  opera  to  this  restoration  attempted  by 
Chang.  For  example  they  were  all  required  to  retain  the 
queue  as  a  reminder  of  the  good  old  days  of  the  Manchu  su- 
premacy, and  the  different  divisions  wore  various  colored  uni- 
forms, the  most  picturesque  being  a  vivid  blue.  In  addition 
to  their  military  force,  the  Manchu  adherents  seemed  to  rely 
on  a  general  passive  acceptance  of  the  change,  both  by  the  peo- 
ple and  the  Tuchuns,  after  it  had  been  definitely  effected.  But 
in  that  expectation  the  event  proved  that  they  were  grievously 
in  error. 

When  the  fact  of  Chang  Hsiin's  coup  d'etat  became  known 
the  Tuchuns  merely  restated  the  object  of  their  'punitive  ex- 
pedition,' directing  it  against  the  new  monarchy.  Tuan  Chi- 
jui  took  supreme  command  of  the  forces  and  by  the  middle  of 
July  had  made  himself  master  of  the  situation,  defeating 
Chang  Hsiin  and  forcing  him  to  seek  refuge  in  the  Legation 
Quarter  of  the  city.  This  effort  to  dislodge  the  monarchists 
involved  some  little  fighting,  but  it,  again,  was  of  the  comic 
opera  variety.  Foreigners  in  Peking  regarded  it  as  so  little 
dangerous  in  character  as  to  permit  them  to  go  out  on  the  wall 
of  the  city  to  observe  it  as  an  interesting  spectacle.  There  was 
really  much  more  danger  to  spectators  than  to  the  actual  par- 


250        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

ticipants  in  the  fighting.  Chang  Hsiin's  army  exhibited  all 
of  the  weaknesses  of  mercenary  troops  in  the  face  of  actual 
danger^  coming  over  in  large  numbers  to  the  army  of  the  Re- 
public until  the  'Empire'  was  defended  by  only  a  faithful  but 
stupid  few.  Thus  the  would  be  King-maker  learned  when  it 
was  too  late  that  the  conservative  militarists  were  as  dis- 
tinctly anti-monarchical  and  anti-Manchu  as  they  were  op- 
posed to  Parliament. 

One  beneficial  result  of  the  short-lived  monarchical  restora- 
tion was  the  final  elimination  of  Chang  Hsiin  as  a  factor  in 
Chinese  politics.  Another  was  the  temporary  union  of  all 
factions  in  opposition  to  the  Manchus.  The  constitutionalists 
could  not  act  against  the  Tuchuns  when  the  latter  were  fight- 
ing to  uphold  the  Republic  instead  of  to  overthrow  it.  The 
futility  of  a  continued  strife  which  only  opened  the  way  for 
control  by  such  men  as  Chang  Hsiin  must  have  been  apparent 
to  both  sides.  Had  the  struggle  against  the  monarchy  con- 
tinued long  enough  to  allow  of  active  participation  by  the 
South  it  is  entirely  possible  that  the  temporary  sinking  of  dif- 
ferences in  the  face  of  the  common  foe  might  have  resulted  in 
a  permanent  healing  of  the  breach.  The  fighting  was  over, 
however,  before  the  constitutionalists  could  take  part,  and,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  their  cooperation  was  not  sought  by  Tuan 
Chi-jui.  The  overthrow  of  the  monarchy  was  wholly  the 
work  of  the  Peiyang  party,  and  left  it,  in  union  with  the  Chin 
Pu  Tang,  in  substantial  control  of  the  government. 

President  Li  Yuan-hung  had  been  successful  in  gaming  a 
refuge  in  the  Japanese  Legation  when  the  restoration  was  pro- 
claimed, and  from  there  he  requested  the  Vice-President,  Feng 
Kuo-chang,  to  act  in  his  place,  and  also  authorized  Tuan  Chi- 
jui  to  resume  office  as  Premier  and  form  a  Cabinet.21  Later 

21  The  text  of  the  telegrams  may  be  found  in  the  Far  Eastern 
Review  for  August  1917,  pp.  608-609. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        251 

he  announced  his  intention  of  retiring  forever  from  political 
life.  His  last  political  act  was  an  announcement  of  this  inten- 
tion and  a  plea  to  the  country  to  sink  all  differences  and  work 
unitedly  for  the  good  of  China. 

In  order  to  forestall  any  recognition  of  the  monarchy  by 
the  Powers,  Tuan  appointed  an  acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs22  before  he  left  Tientsin  to  take  charge  of  the  Re- 
publican army.  At  the  same  time,  when  the  former  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,23  learned  of  the  coup 
d'etat  undertaken  by  Chang  Hsiin,  he  left  the  North  hurriedly 
and  established  himself  at  Shanghai  as  the  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs.  By  taking  this  action  he,  too,  hoped  to  prevent 
a  recognition  of  the  monarchy.  The  effect  was,  however,  to 
emphasize  again  the  differences  between  the  North  and  the 
South. 

After  the  republican  forces  had  regained  control  of  Peking 
the  Premier  undertook  the  formation  of  a  Cabinet.  Here 
again  was  presented  a  possible  opportunity  of  uniting  the 
constitutionalists  and  the  militarists.  If  recognition  had  been 
given  the  former  equally  with  the  latter  in  the  construction  of 
the  government  harmony  might  have  been  restored.  No  at- 
tempt was  made  in  this  direction,  unfortunately,  and  the  first 
list  of  Cabinet  members  contained  only  militarists  and  mem- 
bers of  the  Chin  Pu  Tang.  This  was  true  also  of  the  Cabinet 
as  it  was  finally  constituted.24  The  Peiyang  party  felt  that 

22  Mr.  Wang  Ta-hsieh. 

23  Dr.  Wu  had  offered  his  resignation  several  times,  but  it  had 
never  been  accepted. 

24 The  Cabinet  as  constituted  by  July  17  was  as  follows:  Pre- 
mier and  Minister  of  War,  Tuan  Chi-jui;  Navy,  Admiral  Liu 
Kuan-hsiung ;  Foreign  Affairs,  Wang  Ta-hsieh ;  Interior,  Tung 
Hua-lung ;  Finance,  Liang  Ch'i  Ch'ao ;  Communications,  Tsao 
Ju-lin ;  Justice,  Lin  Chang-min ;  Commerce,  Chang  Kuo-han ;  Edu- 
cation, .Fan  Yuan-lien.  One  member,  the  Premier,  was  a  member 


252        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

this  was  an  opportunity  not  to  be  lost  for  strengthening  itself 
in  control.  This  was  evidently  also  Tuan's  opinion.  In  justi- 
fication of  his  Cabinet  appointments  the  Premier  said  that  the 
great  source  of  weakness  in  the  past  had  lain  in  coalition  Cabi- 
nets which  could  not  harmoniously  administer  the  govern- 
ment. Now  the  opportunity  was  presented  of  eliminating  the 
southern  party  and  entering  upon  a  harmonious  administra- 
tion, and  this  opportunity  should  not  be  lost.  He  may  have 
been  influenced  also  by  the  recollection  of  the  opposition  al- 
ways shown  him  by  the  South. 

The*  southern  leaders  took  the  constitution  of  the  Cabinet 
as  a  direct  challenge  and  the  old  struggle  was  resumed.  Even 
before  the  shortlived  monarchy,  Kuangtung  province  had 
declared  itself  self-governing,  although  not  independent.  The 
difference  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  still  recognized  Li  Yuan-hung 
as  President  and  the  Parliament  as  being  in  existence.  After 
the  resignation  of  the  President  and  the  succession  of  Feng 
Kuo-chang  to  the  office  as  the  head  of  the  military  government 
which  controlled  the  North,  the  movement  for  separation  of 
the  South  from  the  North  gained  headway.  Many  chronic 
revolutionists  such  as  Sun  Wen  came  to  Canton  and  the  for- 
mation of  a  government  there  was  begun.  Parliament  was 
endeavoring  to  function  from  Shanghai  so  that  for  an  inter- 
val the  country  was  triply  divided.  Finally  the  members  of 
Parliament  in  Shanghai  went  to  Canton,  and  the  permanent 
division  of  the  country  under  two  governments  appeared  im^ 
minent.  The  permanency  of  such  a  division,  however,  de- 
pended on  the  lack  of  ability  of  the  northern  government  to 

of  the  Peiyang  military  party,  and  the  others  were  members  of 
the  Chin  Pu  Tang,  or  more  nearly  in  sympathy  with  it  than  with 
the  constitutionalists  of  the  South.  Some  were  known  for  their 
support  of  the  1915  monarchy  movement. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        253 

bring  the  South  under  its  authority,  or  of  the  southern  gov- 
ernment to  extend  itself  over  the  North.  The  issue  was 
definite. 

-sjThe  government  at  Peking,  headed  by  Tuan  Chi-jui  was 
recognized  by  the  Powers  as  the  legal  government  of  China 
and  was  dealt  with  as- such  when  the  question  of  war  with 
Germany  was  again  revived.  A  proclamation  was  issued  on 
August  14  declaring  a  state  of  war  to  exist  between  China  on 
the  one  hand  and  Germany  and  Austria  on  the  other.  It 
seemed  very  much  as  though  a  country  at  -war  with  itself  was 
only  adding  to  its  burdens  by  undertaking  a  foreign  war.  But 
to  take  such  a  step  meant  getting  the  solid  support  of  the 
Entente  Powers  behind  the  Peking  governmentx^ he  value 
of  this  support  was  recognized  by  the  Canton  government 
which  protested  that  it  alone  had  the  power  to  declare  war^ 
and  make  peace,  since  those  powers  were  vested  in  Parliament 
by  the  constitution,  and  the  Parliament,  so  far  as  it  could  be 
said  to  be  in  existence,  was  in  the  South.  The  constitutional 
issue,  under  the  circumstances,  did  not  appeal  to  the  Powers 
as  a  valid  reason  for  not  working  with  the  most  powerful  ele- 
ment in  the  State,  and  the  one  in  control  of  the  administra- 
tive machinery  of  most  of  the  provinces. 

From  the  time  of  the  overthrow  of  General  Chang  Hsun 
the  internal  history  of  China  has  been  the  story  of  the  strug- 
gle  between  the  North  and  the  South,  first  of  all,  and  in  the 
second  place  between  various  factions  in  the  North.  Feng 
Kuo-chang  succeeded  to  the  office  of  President,  but  he  did  not 
leave  his  post  in  the  Yangtze  valley  to  assume  office  in  Peking 
until  the  latter  part  of  July.  The  experience  of  Li  Yuan- 
hung  who  also  had  left  a  high  provincial  position  to  go  to 


254        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Peking,  served  as  a  warning  to  the  new  President.25  From 
his  position  at  Nanking  as  Viceroy  of  Kiangsu  province  Feng 
Kuo-chang  could  exert  a  great  influence  on  the  country. 
While  there  he  had  his  army  to  aid  him,  and  he  had  control 
of  a  region  of  great  importance  to  both  the  North  and  the 
South.  In  Peking,  separated  from  his  immediate  supporters, 
he  would  be  constantly  in  danger  of  losing  all  direction  of  af- 
fairs. The  South  held  out  every  possible  inducement  for  him 
to  join  the  constitutionalists  in  their  fight  against  Tuan  Chi- 
jui  and  the  northern  Generals,  but  the  North  appeared  the 
stronger  to  him  for  he  finally  went  to  Peking,  accompanied 
by  a  bodyguard,  to  assume  office.  Before  he  would  consent  to 
leave  Nanking,  however,  he  made  sure,  so  far  as  possible,  of 
a  continued  control  of  the  Yangtze.  He  insisted  that  one  of 
his  supporters26  be  made  Viceroy  of  Kiangsu  province,  and 
another  be  appointed  to  fill  the  vacancy  in  Kiangsi.27  One  of 
his  friends  was  already  in  control  of  Hupeh  province,  so  that 
these  appointments  assured  to  President  Feng  continued  con- 
trol of  the  Yangtze  valley. 

Both  the  President  and  the  Premier  aspired  to  the  leader- 
ship of  the  Peiyang  party28  and  their  rival  aspirations  eventu- 

25  While  at  Wuchang  and  supported  by  his  troops  General  Li 
had  exercised  a  much  greater  authority  than  when  in  Peking  and 
separated  from  the  soldiers  loyal  to  him.     After  Yuan  Shih-kai 
persuaded  him  to  come  north,  he  was  practically  a  prisoner  until 
he  succeeded  to  the  presidency,  and  even  then,  as  has  been  seen, 
he  was  only  able  to  make  himself  felt  by  siding  with  one  party 
or  the  other. 

26  Li  Hsun,  Tutuh  of  Kiangsi  province. 

27  Made  by  the  transfer  of  General  Li  Hsun  to  Kiangsu. 

28  The  Peiyang  party,  it  may  be  noted,  was  divided  into  two 
factions,  the  Chihli  faction  of  which  General  Feng  and  his  ad- 
herents had  control,  and  the  Anhui  faction  dominated  by  Gen- 
eral Tuan  Chi-jui.    General  Ni  Ssu-cheng  who  was  leader  in  the 
movement  to  overthrow  Parliament  was  an  Anhui  man. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        255 

ally  led  to  conflict  in  the  government.  This  conflict  developed 
first  over  the  question  of  the  steps  to  be  taken  against  the  con- 
stitutionalists. The  Premier  desired  to  take  active  military  ac- 
tion while  the  President's  policy  was  rather  one  of  conciliation. 
Tuan  had  allied  himself  with  the  Chin  Pu  Tang,  finding  it 
impossible  to  eliminate  from  influence  both  the  political  par- 
ties. He  made  this  alliance  with  the  expectation  that  through 
the  Chin  Pu  Tang  he  would  be  able  to  control  the  Parliament 
which  all  agreed  eventually  must  be  elected.  The  President, 
in  order  to  ha^ye  similar  party  backing,  wished  to  conciliate 
the  South,  in'order  to  control  the  Kuo  Ming  Tang  members 
who  wotffa  certainly  represent  that  section  of  the  country. 
This  fact  helps  to  explain  his  desire  to  conciliate  rather  than 
coerce  the  South. 

It  is  futile  to  attempt  to  give  a  clear  and  coherent  account 
of  Chinese  politics  during  the  last  months  of  1917  and  the 
first  months  of  1918.  The  summaries  of  political  conditions 
in  the  current  weeklies  and  monthlies  rightly  headed  their  ac- 
counts "The  Chinese  Political  Fog,"  "The  Muddle  in  Chinese 
Politics,"  etc.,  etc.  Fighting  went  on  intermittently  between 
the  North  and  the  South  without  either  side  gaining  any  dis- 
tinct advantage.  Tuan  Chi-jui,  as  the  leader  of  one  faction 
of  the  Peiyang  party  insisted  on  strong  measures  being  taken, 
while  the  President  as  the  leader  of  another  faction  nullified 
all  such  action. 

After  he  perceived  that  the  President  would  not  support  him 
in  his  efforts  to  check  the  southern  forces  Premier  Tuan  in- 
sisted on  resigning.  For  a  time  no  one  could  be  persuaded  to 
undertake  the  task  of  forming  a  new  Cabinet.  Finally  Gen- 
eral Wang  Shih-chen  accepted  the  Premiership,  with  the  policy 
of  peace  with  the  South  through  negotiation.  The  peace 
policy  eventually  had  to  be  given  up.  Reports  from  the  South 


256        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

were  not  encouraging,  and  the  Tuchuns  finally  took  matters 
in  their  own  hands,  announcing  that  either  Peking  would 
have  to  give  up  all  idea  of  compromise  with  the  constitutional- 
ists or  they  would  carry  on  the  war  independently  of  the  Cen- 
tral government.  Three  of  their  leaders  were  thereupon 
authorized  to  conduct  the  war,  and  peace  talk  was  at  an  end 
for  a  time.  Matters  went  from  bad  to  worse  in  the  contested 
provinces  as  well  as  at  Peking.  In  the  provinces  desultory 
fighting  continued  simultaneously  with  peace  discussions,  and 
neither  had  any  real  effect.  In  Peking  the  President  had  lost 
control  of  the  Peiyang  party,29  and  its  real  leader,  Tuan  Chi- 
jui,  refused  to  resume  office. 

In  the  latter  part  of  February  1918,  a  definite  agitation  for 
peace  was  begun,  the  Chinese  Chambers  of  Commerce  and  all 
business  interests  supporting  the  movement  with  enthusiasm. 
At  this  time,  however,  the  three  Manchurian  provinces  were 
federated  under  the  leadership  of  General  Chang  Tso-lin. 
who  moved  a  large  force  into  the  metropolitan  province  and 
announced  his  intention  of  going  to  the  aid  of  the  northern 
forces.  This  brought  all  talk  of  peace  to  an  end  in  the  North. 
Juan  Chi-jui  came  back  to  office  as  Premier  with  the  solid 
support  of  the  Northern  Tuchuns,  and  a  vigorous  campaign 
was  undertaken  against  the  South^  For  a  time,  again,  it  looked 
as  though  the  two  sections  would  be  brought  by  force  under 
one  government.  But  the  North  did  not  prove  strong  enough 
to  extend  its  power  to  the  provinces  in  the  far  South,  or  to 
maintain  more  than  a  precarious  hold  on  the  middle  provinces. 

From  the  strictly  constitutional  point  of  view  there  is  but 

29  Li  Hsun  developed  a  policy  and  a  following  of  his  own,  at- 
tempting to  play  the  same  game  that  President  Feng  had  for- 
merly— to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  the  Yangtze  provinces — thus 
holding  the  real  balance  of  power  between  the  North  and  the 
South. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        257 

little  of  interest  to  record.  The  pretence  of  constitutionalism 
and  parliamentarianism  was  maintained  in  the  North.  The 
South,  of  course,  claimed  to  be  struggling  to  preserve  the 
constitutional  regime  in  China.  But  while  the  old  Parliament 
reassembled  at  Canton  nothing  of  a  constructive  nature  was 
done  in  the  South  to  advance  the  course  of  constitutional  de- 
velopment. 

In  the  North,  in  order  to  maintain  the  pretence,  Tuan  Chi- 
jui,  the  Premier  in  the  fall  of  1917,  summoned  an  Assembly 
for  the  purpose  of  framing  an  acceptable  law  for  the  election 
of  a  new  Parliament.  The  Law  was  promulgated  by  the 
President  February  17,  19 18,30  and  under  it  a  Parliament  was 
elected  in  time  to  proceed  to  the  election  of  a  President  in  the 
autumn  of  1918. 

The  new  Parliament  consisted  of  two  chambers,  the  Senate 
and  the  House  of  Representatives.  The  members  of  both 
Houses  were  elected  by  a  system  of  electoral  colleges.  The 
qualifications  for  electors  were  i)  educational;  2)  property, 
shown  either  by  the  payment  of  direct  taxes  or  by  ownership; 
3)  service  as  an  official.  The  qualifications  for  electors  of 
Senators  were  higher  than  for  electors  of  members  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  but  were  of  the  same  nature.  In 
order  that  Parliament  might  be  more  easily  controlled  the 
membership  of  both  Houses  was  reduced,  and  the  representa- 
tion of  the  provinces  reapportioned,  strengthening  the  hold  of 
the  Northern  provinces  and  assuring  a  quorum  for  action  in 
case  the  South  did  not  choose  to  elect  representatives. 

The  first  task  to  which  the  new  Parliament  at  Peking  ad- 
dressed itself  was  the  election  of  a  new  President  of  the  Re- 
public. Previous  to  the  election,  the  Tuchuns,  or  Military 

30  The  text  of  the  law  is  published  in  the  Far  Eastern  Review, 
July  1918,  pp.  296-303. 


258        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Leaders  of  the  North,  met  in  Conference  at  Tientsin  to  con- 
sider the  question  of  the  presidency  and  the  vice-presidency. 
Feng  Kuo-chang  was  a  military  man  and  a  leader  of  one  fac- 
tion of  the  military  group,  but  because  of  the  continued  breach 
with  Tuan  Chi-jui,  the  leader  of  the  other  faction,  it  was  felt 
to  be  inadvisable  to  continue  him  in  the  presidency.  The  one 
man  who  seemed  to  command  the  support  of  both  factions  was 
Hsti  Shih-ch'ang,  a  representative  of  the  old  regime,  but  a 
man  of  administrative  experience  and  of  great  capacity.31  Ac-  „.• 
cordingly  he  was  elected  by  Parliament  on  September  4  as  the 
successor  to  Feng  Kuo-chang.32 

The  position  of  the  new  President  was  a  difficult  one.  No 
one  recognized  more  clearly  than  did  he  the  necessity  for  peace 
and  harmony  in  the  country,  both  because  of  internal  needs 
and  because  of  the  international  situation.  That  the  Powers 
wished  for  an  adjustment  of  the  internal  difficulties  was  em- 
phasized by  President  Wilson  in  his  message  of  congratula- 
tion to  President  Hsu.  "This  is  an  auspicious  moment,"  he 
said,  "as  you  enter  upon  the  duties  of  your  high  office,  for 
the  leaders  in  China  to  lay  aside  their  differences  and  guided 
by  a  spirit  of  patriotism  and  self-sacrifice  to  unite  in  a  deter- 
mination to  bring  about  harmonious  cooperation  among  all 
the  elements  of  your  great  nation  so  that  each  may  contribute 
its  best  effort  for  the  good  of  the  whole  and  enable  your  Re- 
public to  reconstitute  its  national  unity  and  assume  its  rightful 

31  Member  of  the  Grand  Council  from  1905  to  the  Abdication, 
and,  after  the  resignation  of  the  Regent  in  1912,  one  of  the  Grand 
Guardians  of  the  infant  "Emperor." 

During  the  1915  Monarchy  movement  he  had  been  given  the 
title  of  one  of  the  "Four  Friends  of  Sung  Shan"  (Yuan  Shih- 
kai).  He  was  a  "sworn  brother"  of  Yuan  Shih-kai. 

32  After  considerable  squabbling  it  was  found  to  be  impossible 
to  elect  a  Vice-President. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        259 

place  in  the  councils  of  nations."3      The  international  view 
of  the  necessity  for  peace  was  further  emphasized  from  time 

/o  time  by  the  Allied  Ministers  in  Peking. 
But  while  President  Hsu  Shih-ch'ang  realized  the  necessity 
for  peace  he  was  not  unaware  of  the  forces  with  which  he 
would  have  to  contend,  both  in  the  South  and  in  Peking,  in 
his  effort  to  restore  harmony  and  unity  to  China.  A  perma- 
nent peace  for  the  country  depended  and  depends  on  the  aboli- 
tion of  military  government  in  the  provinces.  This  could  be 
accomplished  only  by  the  gradual  elimination  of  those  who  had 
been  ruling  China  since  the  dissolution  of  Parliament  by  Li 
Yuan-hung  in  1917.  This  was  ostensibly  for  what  the  South 
was  fighting.  But  in  actual  fact  the  southern  provinces  were 
just  as  truly  ruled  by  the  military  as  the  northern.  Conse- 
quently there  would  be  an  opposition  in  both  sections  of  the 
country  to  any  settlement  that  meant  the  limitation  of  the 
power  of  the  Tuchuns. 

While  the  President  had  been  raised  to  that  office  by  the 
northern  Tuchuns  he  did  not  by  any  means  command  their 
absolute  allegiance.  Whether  in  or  out  of  office  Tuan  Chi-jui 
remained  always  a  factor  to  be  considered.  In  the  Cabinet 
Tsao  Ju-lin  commanded  considerable  support,  because  of  his 
party  following  and  his  great  natural  abilities.  The  President,, 
then,  had  to  prepare  the  way  in  the  North  before  he  could  un- 
dertake peace  discussions  with  the  South.  He  waited,  watched, 
and  worked  until  November  16  when  a  presidential  mandate 
was  issued  ordering  the  northern  soldiery  to  stop  fighting  and 
return  to  their  original  posts.3*  Following  this  declaration  of 
an  armistice  steps  were  taken  to  bring  abotrt-a  Cuiifci'cnu!  bcr 
tween  the  Military  Government  of  the  Southwest  aniL-the 

83  Far  Eastern  Review,  November  1918,  p.  460. 
34  Far  Eastern  Review,  Dec.  1918,  p.  505. 


260        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Peking  Government  with  a  view  to  discovering  a  basis  for 
peace  and  reunion.  The  absolute  victory  of  the  allies  in  Eu- 
rope as  indicated  by  the  armistice  of  November  1 1  undoubted- 
ly reacted  on  the  military  in  China,  causing  them  to  support 
Hsu  Shih-ch'ang  in  his  peace  move. 

This  idea  of  a  conference  had  been  advocated  by  both  Chi- 
nese and  foreigners  for  a  long  time,  and  several  concrete  sug- 
gestions as  to  a  basis  for  settlement  had  been  advanced.  The 
one  most  worth  consideration  was  that  put  forth  in  an  analysis 
of  the  situation  by  W.  W.  Willoughby,  former  Legal  Adviser 
to  the  President.  In  brief  he  suggested  that  "there  be  consti- 
tuted a  joint  or  Conference  Committee  composed  of  a  small 
number  of  members  from  each  of  the  Canton  and  Peking 
Parliaments,  this  committee  to  agree  upon  the  terms  of  new 
laws  for  the  organization  and  election  of  a  new  National 
Parliament,  these  laws  thus  agreed  upon  to  be  enacted,  with- 
out amendment,  by  both  Parliaments,  and,  under  them,  a  new 
Parliament  could  be  elected,  whereupon  the  Parliaments  now 
sitting  at  Peking  and  Canton  would  go  out  of  existence.  Prior 
to  this  the  Canton  Parliament  might  elect  Hsu  Shih-ch'ang  as 
President  of  the  Republic,  or  after  the  convening  of  the  new 
Parliament  that  body  could  elect  Hsu  to  the  Presidency.  Thus 
would  be  brought  into  existence  a  government  the  constitution- 
ality of  which  neither  side  could  or  would  be  disposed  to 
assail."35 

Such  a  Conference,  to  discuss  the  points  at  issue  and  reach 
a  settlement,  was  finally  constituted  and  assembled  at  Shang- 
hai. It  is  not  necessary,  even  were  there  space,  to  discuss  the 
controversies  between  the  two  sides  prior  to  the  meeting  at 
Shanghai.  Chu  Chi-chien  was  appointed  Chief  delegate  of 

35  Published  in  Far  Eastern  Review,  November  1918,  pp.  433- 
436. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        261 

the  Peking  Government  while  T'ang  Shao-yi  headed  the  dele- 
gation representing  the  Military  Government  of  the  South- 
west. 

The  first  question  taken  up  by  the  Conference  involved  a 
questioning  of  the  sincerity  of  the  North.  T'ang  claimed  that 
the  terms  of  the  second  armistice  agreement  were  being  vio- 
lated by  a  continued  advance  of  the  northern  forces  in  Shensi 
province.  This  question  caused  a  temporary  suspension  of 
the  Conference  until  the  southern  delegation  was  satisfied  that 
the  fighting  had  entirely  stopped. 

At  the  same  time  the  southern  delegation  demanded  that 
the  Peking  Government  discontinue  the  War  Participation 
Board  of  which  Tuan  Chi-jui  was  the  head,  and  disclaim  any 
intention  of  accepting  further  advances  from  Japan  for  the 
services  of  that  Board.36 

But  the  rock  on  which  the  Conference  finally  split,  and  this 
in  spite  of  repeated  advices  from  the  allied  Ministers  not  to 
let  anything  prevent  a  consolidation  of  the  country  under  one 
government,  was  the  demand  of  the  South  that,  as  a  prelimi- 
nary to  peace,  the  mandate  issued  by  Li  Yuan-hung  dissolv- 
ing Parliament  should  be  cancelled.  This  was  the  fifth  of 
eight  points  submitted  to  the  Conference  by  T'ang.  There 
was  agreement  on  the  other  seven.37  When  the  North  refused 
to  give  in  on  this  point  both  delegations  resigned  and  returned, 
the  one  to  the  North,  the  other  to  the  South. 

The  course  of  the  internal  Conference  was  influenced 
greatly  by  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  when  it  announced  its 

36  This  Board  had  been  established  to  direct  such  military  aid 
as  China  might  furnish  her  allies  in  Europe.     A  Japanese  loan 
was  to  finance  such  participation.     Advances  on  the  loan  had 
been  made,  and  Japan  suggested  her  readiness  to  complete  the 
loan.    The  Southern  objection  was  based  on  a  fear  that  the  money 
would  be  used  to  finance  a  resumption  of  internal  warfare. 

37  North  China  Herald  (Weekly  ed),  May  17,  1919,  p.  412. 


262        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

decision  on  the  Shantung  question.  A  widespread  agitation 
sprang  up  throughout  the  country  to  prevent  the  Chinese  rep- 
resentatives from  signing  the  treaty,  and  this  agitation  reacted 
directly  on  the  Government  at  Peking  which  was  held  account- 
able for  the  actions  of  the  members  of  the  Chinese  delegation 
to  Paris.  A  Cabinet  crisis  was  precipitated  which  resulted  in 
the  elimination  of  the  most  strongly  pro- Japanese  member  of 
the  Cabinet,  Tsao  Ju-lin. 

What  the  future  will  bring  forth  it  is  hard  to  say.  The 
anti-Japanese  feeling  in  China  if  it  develops  far  enough  may 
conceivably  make  possible  a  union  of  the  provinces  for  the 
purpose  of  protection  against  external  aggression.  In  all 
parts  of  the  country  there  is  a  continuation  of  the  demand  for 
the  resumption  of  the  Conference  and  a  settlement  of  the  in- 
ternal question.38  If  popular  sentiment  is  sufficiently  aroused 
against  the  militarists  so  that  their  opposition  to  any  solution 
of  the  difficulty  would  be  removed,  peace  would  not  be  long 
delayed,  and  it  would  be  possible  to  recommence  an  orderly 
constitutional  progression. 

38  It  has  been  reconvened  but  up  to  the  present  time,  1920, 
January,  has  not  worked  out  a  plan  of  settlement  acceptable  to 
both  the  North  and  South. 


CHAPTER  XI 

/"From  an  oriental  despotism  to  a  limited  monarchy;  from 
monarchy  to  republicanism  and  back  to  monarchy  for  a  day 
before  the  restoration  of  the  Republic;  from  a  parliamentary 
Republic  to  a  division  into  two  States,  each  ruled  by  a  group 
of  irresponsible  military  chiefs,  with  the  Parliament  a  dummy 
rather  than  a  board  of  control;  such  have  been  the  political 
mutations  in  China  during  the  past  twenty  yearSy/After  trac> 
ing  constitutional  development  in  modern  China,  seemingly 
we  come  back  to  our  starting  point,  semi-irresponsible  gov- 
ernment— certainly  we  do  not  find  such  a  logical  and  ordered 
development  into  a  democratic  State  as  seemed  to  be  indicated 
by  the  events  of  1911-1912. 

That  these  twenty  years  of  development  have  not  been  pro- 
ductive of  good  not  even  the  most  severe  critic  of  China  would 
venture  to  say.  The  education  of  the  people  politically,  while 
it  has  not  proceeded  very  far,  has  been  substantially  begun. 
Valuable  reforms  have  been  instituted  in  legal  procedure  and 
the  administration  of  justice;  there  have  been  the  necessary 
experiments  with  foreign  institutions  so  that  the  process  of 
adapting  them  to  the  peculiar  needs  of  China  is  well  under 
way;  and  in  spite  of  change,  there  has  been  retained  in  the 
political  organization  the  agency  through  which  eventually 
the  democratic  voice  of  China  will  make  itself  heard.  Because 
parliamentary  control  is  for  the  present  lost,  the  value  of  the 
successive  acknowledgments  of  the  necessity  of  a  Parliament 
to  satisfy  the  people  should  not  be  underestimated. 

China  has  always  been  classed  as  a  democratic  country,  and 

263 


264        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

very  properly  so,  by  those  who  have  appreciated  the  control  ex- 
ercised by  the  people  over  the  local  administration,  and  the 
respect  necessarily  shown  by  the  government,  both  central  and 
provincial,  for  local  customs  and  wishes.  The  right  of  revo- 
lution was  recognized  both  in  theory  and  practice,  and  was  a 
powerful  weapon  in  the  hands  of  the  people  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  their  freedom  from  a  too  autocratic  power.  It  was 
this  element  of  democracy  in  China  which  caused  observers  to 
expect  too  much  from  her  in  the  transformation  years  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  revolution.  Proceeding  from  a  local  self- 
government,  it  was  felt  and  predicted  that  China  would  escape 
the  years  of  toil  and  experimentation  incident  usually  to  the 
change  from  autocracy  to  democracy.  That  there  has  been 
much  confusion,  unrest,  and  even  retrogression  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  if  one  stops  to  consider  some  of  the  reasons  of 
a  fundamental  nature  for  the  apparent  failure  of  representa- 
tive democracy  in  China. 

I/  The  necessity  for  a  period  of  preparation  and  readjustment 
was  recognized  more  clearly  by  the  dynastic  rulers  of  China 
than  by  the  revolutionists  who  were  bent  primarily  on  one 
thing,  the  elimination  of  the  Manchus,  and  only  secondarily  on 
the  solution  of  the  problem  of  popular  control  of  the  gov- 
ernment. Because  of  this  recognition  of  unreadiness,  and  of 
course  also  because  of  their  own  necessity,  the  Manchus  strove 
for  a  nine  year  period  of  development  and  gradual  change 
before  the  actual  promulgation  of  a  constitution  and  the  elec- 
tion of  a  Parliament.  What  might  have  been  accomplished  in 
these  nine  years  it  is  of  course  impossible  to  say,  since  the 
revolutionary  ferment  denied  any  breathing  space  to  the  Gov- 
ernment. The  leaders  of  the  revolution  were  of  foreign  edu- 
cation in  many  cases,  or  had  received  the  rudiments  of  a  wes- 
tern education  in  foreign  maintained  schools  in  China.  They 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        265 

felt  themselves  able  to  give  the  people  the  intelligent  direction 
and  guidance  that  would  be  necessary  after  the  transfer  of 
sovereignty  from  the  Emperor  to  the  populace.  Their  belief 
would  seem  to  have  been,  not  in  popular  government  itself, 
but  in  a  government  by  the  qualified  few  in  the  interest  of  the 
unqualified  masses.  Thus  from  the  beginning  there  was  a 
very  extended  limitation  of  the  right  of  the  suffrage,  by  vari- 
ous kinds  of  qualifications.  This  would  certainly  constitute 
a  recognition  of  the  lack  of  preparation  of  the  people  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  government  of  the  country,  even  while  the  doc- 
trine of  popular  sovereignty  was  being  preached. 

The  self-constituted  leaders  of  the  uneducated  masses 
styled  themselves  the  "Young  China"  party.  That  many  of 
them  had  received  a  thorough  education  in  western  univer- 
sities or  in  Japan  is  undeniable.  But  those  who  studied  in  the 
United  States,  England  or  France  were  studying  the  operation 
of  political  institutions  foreign  to  China  in  the  setting  natural 
to  the  institution  and  the  student  naturally  found  it  difficult 
to  visualize  them  in  a  Chinese  environment.  The  tendency 
was  for  him,  the  longer  he  was  absent  from  his  country,  to 
overestimate  its  advancement,  and  to  think  of  China  in  wes- 
tern terms.  Consequently  he  could  not  see  that  what  might 
have  been  of  proven  worth  in  another  country  might  not  be 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  China.  Where  the  student  had  re- 
ceived his  education  in  Japan  he  had  seen  an  imitation  of  Eng- 
lish parliamentary  government  rather  than  incomplete  adap- 
tation to  the  needs  of  the  Oriental  country.  /Furthermore  even 
in  so  close  a  neighbor  as  Japan,  conditio/s  were  very  differ- 
ent from  a  Republican  China.  The  Manchus  were  able  to  and 
did  draw  on  Japanese  experience  in  their  attempt  at  a  solution 
of  the  constitutional  problem;  the  founders  of  the  Republic 
had  different  needs  to  consider.  Thus  a  study  of  constitutional 


266        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

government  in  Japan  would  not  give  the  student  an  adequate 
knowledge  of  the  problems  which  have  to  be  faced  in  a  Re- 
public and  of  the  manner  of  solution  of  these  problems  in 
China,  the  first  Oriental  Republic.  From  the  standpoint  of 
training,  then,  these  new  aspirants  to  leadership  in  China  had 
to  study  in  the  school  of  practical  experience  before  they  could 
hope  to  solve  the  problems  facing  the  country.  In  many  cases 
they  had  no  experience  in  actual  administration  prior  to  the 
revolution.  They  were  theorists  who  found  it  difficult  to  di- 
vorce themselves  from  theory  for  the  sake  of  expediency. 

Many  of  the  old  regime  came  into  the  service  of  the  revo- 
lution after  it  had  manifested  its  strength;  but  because  of  their 
training  in  the  old  school  they  were  able  to  give  only  a  lip- 
service  to  the  new  institutions  and  ideas.  Concerned  only 
with  practical  considerations  of  administration  they  found  it 
difficult  to  work  in  harmony  with  the  "New  China."  But 
since  they  were  the  holders  of  administrative  posts  and  were 
men  of  experience  in  practical  politics  the  revolution  found  it 
necessary  to  avail  itself  of  their  services,  even  though  mis- 
trusting the  sincerity  of  their  professed  belief  in  the  principles 
of  the  revolution.  They  entrenched  themselves  in  the  execu- 
tive and  administrative  services  where  the  ground  was  most 
familiar  to  them,  while  "Young  China"  concentrated  its  efforts 
on  a  control  of  Parliament,  which  it  intended  to  make  the 
supreme  organ  of  government.  This  brought  the  new  into 
the  conflict  with  the  old  regime  that  has  prevented  the  orderly 
operation  of  a  constitutional  government. 

The  essence  of  parliamentary  government  is  that  the  As- 
sembly should  act  as  the  body  representative  of  the  people, 
carrying  out  their  wishes  through  legislative  act.  One  prob- 
lem of  representative  government  is  the  devising  of  ways  in 
which  the  Parliament  shall  truly  speak  for  the  nation  and  not 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        267 

for  itself  alone — the  establishment  of  a  continuing  connection 
between  the  electorate  and  its  agents.  In  order  that  the  peo- 
ple shall  effectively  control  the  government  through  Parlia- 
ment they  must  be  sufficiently  interested  in  national  affairs  to 
follow  the  work  of  the  government  carefully  and  intelligently. 
Because  representative  government  demands  this  political  in- 
terest in  more  than  local  affairs,  John  Stuart  Mill  says  that  in 
many  cases  a  people  prepared  to  carry  on  the  work  of  local 
government  well  may  be  entirely  unfitted  for  the  operation  of 
a  representative  government.  The  history  of  China  during 
the  past  few  years  assuredly  illustrates  the  truth  of  his  state- 
ment. For  generations  the  people  of  China  had  effectively 
controlled  the  local  government.  But  this  very  control  had 
done  much  to  unfit  them  for  the  control  of  the  national  demo- 
cratic government  established  in  1912.  They  were  not  ac- 
customed to  look  beyond  the  provincial  boundaries  even  where 
they  had  looked  that  far  abroad.  They  had  no  thought  for 
national  needs  and  problems.  That  was  left  for  those  who 
made  a  business  of  government, — the  literati  and  bureaucracy. 
Even  in  time  of  war  sentiment  was  localized.  Thus,  while  the 
British  were  hammering  on  the  gates  of  Peking,  they  were 
appealed  to  by  the  Chinese  at  Shanghai  for  aid  against  the 
Taiping  rebels.  Again,  in  time  of  flood*  each  province  looked 
out  for  itself  without  thought  for  the  needs  of  its  neighbors. 
Instances  of  this  lack  of  national  feeling  and  thought  might  be 
endlessly  multiplied.  When  the  people  then  were  expected  to 
supervise  the  work  of  national  government  and  administration 
they  had  no  intelligent  conception  of  the  problems  faced.  The 
years  since  the  revolution  of  1911  have  been  remarkable  for 
the  development  of  a  national  feeling  among  the  people  in  the 
provinces,  a  development  which  will  ultimately  make  possible 
the  successful  operation  of  a  representative  government  in 
China. 


268        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Even  though  the  people  had  been  ready  to  assume  the  direc- 
tion of  the  government  the  organization  of  the  Empire  pre- 
sented a  problem  which  up  to  the  present  time  has  proved  im- 
possible of  solution.  Under  the  Manchu  Dynasty  while  China 
had  been  outwardly  a  unified  State,  actually  there  was  more 
nearly  a  union  of  independent  provinces  in  the  person  of  the 
Emperor.  Practically  each  Governor  or  Viceroy  had  been  the 
ruler  of  his  own  province.  In  many  respects  the  Empire  might 
be  compared  to  the  old  Roman  Empire.  Peking  had  extended 
its  sway  over  the  country  step  by  step,  appointing  its  agent  to 
rule  the  province,  but  leaving  him  to  his  own  devices  so  long 
as  the  tribute  was  paid.  The  national  revenues  were  not  de- 
rived by  a  direct  levy  on  the  individual  so  much  as  by  as- 
sessment which  might  be  collected  according  to  the  wishes  of 
the  inhabitants.  The  Central  control  was  not  manifested  to 
the  people  except  through  an  alien  soldiery  and  an  alien  official- 
dom. This  soldiery  was  for  a  two-fold  purpose:  to  manifest 
the  power  of  the  Emperor  and  to  afford  protection  to  the  peo- 
ple in  return  for  the  contributions  they  made  to  the  Imperial 
treasury.  The  officials,  not  being  indigenous  to  the  locality 
were  regarded  as  the  representatives  of  a  foreign  power,  and 
were  forced  ultimately  to  deal  with  the  people  through  their 
own  representatives.  So  far  as  the  Peking  Government  was 
concerned,  until  the  foreign  impact  of  the  last  century,  if  the 
contributions  came  in  regularly  from  the  provinces,  and  there 
was  no  evidence  of  disaffection  which  might  be  directed  against 
the  Imperial  authority,  the  provincial  authorities  were  the 
rulers  in  their  own  jurisdiction.  The  distribution  of  powers 
territorially  inclined  strongly  toward  the  provinces. 

With  the  presentation  of  the  new  problems  brought  by  the 
presence  of  foreigners  in  the  country,  and  with  the  attempt  to 
introduce  foreign  institutions,  the  Manchus  faced  the  alterna- 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        269 

tive  of  either  making  themselves  the  leaders  of  a  Federal 
Union  of  the  provinces  or  of  uniting  the  government  under  a 
centralized  direction  from  Peking.  In  the  last  years  of  their 
rule  they  made  the  decision  for  centralization  and  began  to 
interfere  more  and  more  in  provincial  affairs.  This  was  espe- 
cially shown  in  the  movement  to  nationalize  railway  construc- 
tion and  operation.  But  this  attempt  to  centralize  was  one 
factor  in  the  ultimate  overthrow  of  the  Dynasty  since  it 
brought  into  opposition  the  "gentry"  in  all  of  the  provinces, 
who  might  otherwise,  through  fear  of  revolutionary  ideas, 
have  been  led  to  align  themselves  with  the  representatives  of 
the  established  order. 

The  Republic,  when  it  faced  the  same  problem,  decided  in 
favor  of  centralization,  just  as  the  Imperial  authorities  had. 
This  decision,  in  its  turn,  made  for  dissension  and  factional 
strife  in  the  new  government,  and  for  opposition  in  the  prov- 
inces to  every  attempt  at  centralization. 

In  addition  to  the  problem  presented  by  the  traditional  in- 
dependence of  the  provinces,  the  Manchu  rule  had  left  the 
Republic  with  another  problem  which  yet  remains  to  be  solved 
before  China  can  expect  peace  and  order.  The  provincial  gov- 
ernments had  been  under  a  double  direction ;  the  civil  adminis- 
tration represented  by  the  Governor,  and  a  coordinate  military 
control.  The  necessity  of  maintaining  an  alien  rule  was  of 
course  responsible  for  the  introduction  of  the  military  element 
in  the  government.  Each  military  governor  had  his  own 
forces  which  were  responsible  to  him  and  for  whose  conduct 
he  was  responsible  to  the  central  authorities.  Thus  instead  of 
there  being  one  national  army  recruited  from  all  over  the  coun- 
try and  paid  from  the  Imperial  treasury  directly,  there  were 
separate  armies  in  the  provinces,  separately  maintained.  So 
long  as  the  commanders  of  these  forces  were  Manchu  they 


270        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

were  held  under  the  direction  of  the  Emperor  because  they 
stood  or  fell  with  him.  With  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution, 
however,  the  control  of  these  forces,  together  with  the  forces 
recruited  for  the  purpose  of  revolution  passed  into  the  hands 
of  Chinese  commanders.  Thus  the  way  was  paved  for  Tu- 
chun  control  in  the  provinces  simultaneously  with  parliamen- 
tary control  in  Peking. 

When  the  military  administration  made  necessary  for  a 
time  by  the  revolution  was  not  immediately  replaced  by  a  su- 
perior civil  administration,  with  a  nationalization  of  the  army, 
the  framework  of  an  extra-legal  government  of  a  very  per- 
nicious character  was  provided.  The  assertion  of  this  extra- 
legal  authority  depended  upon  one  thing,  force,  and  it  had  to 
be  given  consideration  or  be  destroyed.  There  was  no  middle 
ground.  Since  it  was  not  destroyed  at  the  beginning  it  has 
gradually  become  more  and  more  assertive,  with  each  indica- 
tion of  its  strength,  until  finally  it  has  come  to  control  not  only 
the  provincial  governments,  but  the  central  government  itself. 
Conditions  at  Peking  were  responsible  in  part  for  the  ultimate 
triumph  of  the  Tuchunate,  for  there  was  going  on  at  the  capi- 
tal the  struggle  between  Parliament  and  the  executive  for  con- 
trol. The  Tuchuns  naturally  aligned  themselves  with  the 
executive,  and  were  used  by  it  in  its  struggle  with  Parliament, 
only  to  find  that  it  had  invoked  a  force  which  ultimately  over- 
shadowed it. 

Aside  from  the  purely  internal  factors  responsible  for  the 
failure  of  representative  government  in  China,  the  outside 
world,  and  particularly  Japan,  must  bear  a  share  in  the  respon- 
sibility. Properly  used  the  influence  of  the  Powers  might  have 
brought  strife  to  an  end  long  before  this.  Improperly  used  it 
has  made  possible  the  long  continued  civil  war  which  has  been 
raging  intermittently  since  1911. 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        271 

Consider  the  situation  in  1911 !  The  Imperial  treasury  was 
empty,  and  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  deprived  the  Man- 
chu  government  of  great  sources  of  revenue.  An  empty  treas- 
ury meant  that  no  money  was  available  for  soldiers  and  muni- 
tions for  use  in  quelling  the  rebellion,  unless  it  could  be  ob- 
tained by  foreign  loans.  On  the  other  hand  the  revolutionists 
were  equally  in  need  of  funds,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they 
had  the  revenues  of  most  of  the  provinces  south  of  the  Yangtze 
upon  which  to  draw.  Four  alternatives  presented  themselves 
to  the  foreign  governments.  Either  they  could  allow  their 
nationals  to  make  loans  indiscriminately  to  both  sides;  they 
could  restrict  them  to  the  aid  of  the  de  jure  Imperial  govern- 
ment, in  which  case  the  revolution  would  have  been  a  failure 
from  the  outset  because  of  a  lack  of  funds;  the  Powers  might 
have  permitted  their  nationals  to  make  loans  only  to  the  revo- 
lutionary government,  which  would  have  amounted  to  active 
intervention  against  the  established  and  recognized  authori- 
ties; or  aid  might  have  been  denied  to  both  parties  equally. 
To  have  adopted  the  first  course  would  have  meant  the  pro- 
longation of  the  strife  indefinitely.  Aid  to  the  Imperial  gov- 
ernment exclusively  was  objectionable  to  the  Powers  because 
of  the  reactionary  and  the  anti-foreign  disposition  of  that 
government,  a  disposition  that  had  been  modified  since  1900, 
but  only  because  of  necessity.  Aid  to  the  revolutionists  in 
order  to  promote  the  overthrow  of  a  government  with  which 
the  Powers  were  at  peace  would  have  been  undesirable  both 
from  the  standpoint  of  international  law  and  ethics.  The  last 
alternative,  then,  was  the  one  adopted,  a  "watchful  waiting"; 
as  little  active  participation  as  possible  under  the  circumstances, 
with,  however,  a  decided  leaning  toward  the  South  manifest- 
ing itself.  The  result  of  this  policy  was  a  compromise  of  the 
question,  by  the  elimination  of  the  Dynasty  on  terms  favorable 
to  the  Manchus,  and  the  establishment  of  the  Republic,  but 


272        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 


with  the  North,  in  the  person  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  in  control 
the  executive,  while  the  South  controlled  the  legislature. 

After  the  establishment  of  the  new  government  the  Powers 
through  the  Six  Power  Group  prepared  to  finance  it  through 
the  initial  difficult  years  of  its  existence.  There  has  been  much 
criticism  of  the  policy  of  restricting  loans  to  the  Group,  but 
on  the  whole  it  was  the  wisest  thing  to  do  under  the  circum- 
stances. Without  such  restriction  the  entire  resources  of  the 
country  might  have  been  alienated  by  an  indiscriminate  bor- 
rowing on  the  part  of  the  individual  provinces  to  meet  their 
immediate  needs. 

The  outbreak  of  the  great  war  in  Europe  had  an  unfortun- 
ate reaction  on  the  relation  of  the  Powers  to  China  in  that  it 
made  Japan  the  sole  Power  of  the  group  in  a  position  to  make 
advances  to  China  to  meet  her  pressing  needs,  the  United 
States  having  withdrawn  from  the  Consortium  after  the  po- 
litical change  in  this  country  in  1913. 

When  the  monarchy  movement  came  in  1915  the  South  and 
West  immediately  sprang  to  arms  to  defend  the  Republic. 
The  Powers,  however,  continued  to  treat  with  the  Peking  gov- 
ernment as  the  rightful  authority  in  China.  This  continued 
recognition  was  of  substantial  advantage  to  Yuan  since  it  gave 
him  a  source  of  revenue  that  might  otherwise  have  been  de- 
nied. Advances  continued  to  be  made  on  the  loans  contracted, 
and  the  funds  thus  gained  were  used  largely  for  the  purpose 
of  putting  down  the  rebellion.  But  while  Japan,  as  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  Four  Power  Group,  made  advances  to  Yuan 
and  thus  enabled  him  to  maintain  his  hold  on  the  government, 
she  was  accused  of  lending  aid  equally  to  the  South,  both  in 
money  and  munitions. 

This  same  accusation  has  been  brought  against  her  more 
recently  during  the  struggle  between  the  North  and  the  South 


• 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        273 

for  control.  A  vast  number  of  loans,  some  large  and  some 
small,  have  been  made  to  the  Peking  government,  and  the 
South  has  also,  though  to  a  lesser  extent,  looked  to  Japan  for 
material  support.  This  has  made  possible  a  continuation  of 
the  division  between  the  two  sections  for  a  longer  period  of 
time  than  would  have  been  possible  had  the  policy  of  1911 
been  followed.  Count  Okuma,  as  early  as  1905,  said  openly 
that  a  strong,  united  China  constituted  a  menace  to  Japan, 
and,  since  1914  his  countrymen  seem  to  have  followed  him 
in  that  belief,  to  the  extent  of  aiding  both  parties  to  any  quar- 
rel that  arose  in  China,  thus  keeping  that  country  in  a  state 
of  perpetual  turmoil. 

From  this  it  does  not  follow  that  Japan  should  bear  the 
blame  for  the  failure  of  the  Chinese  to  stabilize  conditions  in 
their  country.  Her  policy,  both  in  loaning  money,  and  in  acts 
of  aggression  on  China  have  made  it  much  more  difficult  for 
the  Chinese  to  reconcile  their  quarrels,  but  the  fundamental 
reasons  for  the  failure  of  the  new  form  of  government  set  up 
in  1912  are  to  be  found  in  China  herself. 

With  conditions  as  they  exist  today  where  is  the  ground  for 
hope  in  the  eventual  establishment  of  a  democratic  govern- 
ment in  China?  Can  the  Chinese  be  expected  to  work  out  a 
solution  of  their  problems  for  themselves  ?  How  can  the  other 
Powers  render  the  most  service  in  the  stabilizing  of  condi- 
tions in  China? 

Professor  W.  W.  Willoughby,  former  Legal  Adviser  to  the 
President,  has  suggested  a  plan  for  the  reconciliation  of  the 
two  sections  of  the  country.  In  brief,  it  is  that  the  Confer- 
ence at  Shanghai,  representative  of  both  the  North  and  the 
South,  should  be  empowered  to  draw  up  laws  for  the  election 
of  a  new  Parliament.  These  laws  would  then  have  to  be  ac- 
cepted, without  alteration,  by  both  the  Peking  and  the  Canton 


274        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

Parliaments.  Thus  the  new  Parliament  would  have  an  un- 
questioned title  from  both  contestants  for  power.  Then  the 
Canton  government  should  elect  Mr.  Hsu  Shih-chang,  who  has 
already  received  an  election  in  the  North,  to  the  presidency  of 
the  Republic.  This  would  not  be  asking  too  much  of  the 
South  for  he  commands  the  respect  of  both  sections  of  the 
country.  If  this  should  not  be  done,  then  the  new  Parliament 
could  give  the  necessary  validity  to  his  title.  If  the  election  of 
the  new  Parliament  were  under  the  proper  supervision,  Chi- 
nese if  possible,  foreign  if  desired,  it  should  represent  the 
entire  country,  uniting  in  its  membership  the  various  factions 
that  have  been  at  loggerheads  for  so  long. 

But  that  would  not  entirely  meet  the  needs  of  the  situation. 
It  would  do  no  more  than  restore  the  country  to  its  condition 
in  1912.  There  would  remain  the  problem  of  the  Tuchunate, 
and  the  problem  of  financing  the  new  government  until  it 
could  meet  its  own  needs.  These  two  problems  might  be 
solved  simultaneously.  The  old  Consortium  for  the  purpose 
of  loaning  money  to  China  has  been  revived  at  Paris.  It  pre- 
sents a  means  of  utilizing  the  financial  strength  of  the  Powers 
for  the  purpose  of  setting  a  united  China  on  her  feet  financial- 
ly, just  as  the  Five  Power  Group  was  used  in  the  early  days  of 
the  Republic.  If  a  comprehensive  loan  could  be  made  suffi- 
cient to  provide  for  immediate  administrative  expenses  and  to 
consolidate  all  of  the  foreign  obligations  of  the  Chinese  Re- 
public in  one  international  loan  the  pressing  needs  of  the  gov- 
ernment would  be  taken  care  of,  and  the  danger  of  financial 
control  by  one  Power  obviated,  without  an  indiscriminate 
pledging  of  the  resources  of  the  country.  But  in  order  that 
the  experience  of  the  past  few  years  should  not  be  duplicated, 
any  comprehensive  loan  to  China  should  be  made  under  con- 
ditions that  would  provide  for  the  adequate  supervision  of  the 


Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China        275 

expenditure  of  the  funds  actually  turned  over  to  the  govern- 
ment. A  large  part  of  the  moneys  recently  advanced  to  the 
government  has  been  diverted  to  the  personal  needs  of  the 
official,  either  as  "squeeze,"  or  as  out  and  out  appropriation 
of  public  funds.  The  latter  could  be  prevented  by  parliamen- 
tary auditing  of  accounts,  but  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  think 
that  a  good  deal  of  "squeeze"  might  be  overlooked  and  con- 
doned by  any  Chinese  supervisory  board,  while  it  would  not 
be  under  foreign  supervision.  With  such  an  oversight  of  the 
public  expenditure  the  Powers  would  be  able  to  deprive  the 
military  chiefs  of  the  subsidies  from  the  Central  government 
which  have  enabled  them  to  maintain  their  forces  and  thus 
their  grip  on  the  country,  and  it  would  only  be  a  question  of 
time  until  they  would  be  entirely  eliminated  as  a  factor  in 
Chinese  politics.1 

On  the  surface  this  would  look  like  a  betrayal  of  China  to 
the  exploitation  of  Western  capital.  This  would  not  neces- 
sarily follow,  however,  for  it  could  be  only  a  temporary  ex- 
pedient at  the  best,  to  tide  the  country  over  the  present  emer- 
gency. She  will  have  to  borrow  to  finance  herself  in  any  case, 
and  it  is  obviously  much  better  for  her  to  borrow  from  a 
group  of  Powers  than  from  any  one  Power,  or  from  a  num- 
ber of  States  acting  independently  the  one  of  the  other.  She 
will  need  the  money  not  only  for  administrative  needs  but  for 
industrial  development  as  well,  and  experience  has  shown  that 
only  through  a  supervision  of  expenditure  can  there  be  assur- 
ance that  money  loaned  for  development  projects  will  not  be 
diverted  to  other  needs. 

1  This  would  certainly  follow  if  the  revenue  services  of  China 
were  to  be  put  under  foreign  administration  to  prevent  the  main- 
taining of  these  "personal  armies"  by  the  collection  of  the  taxes, 
thus  not  only  enabling  the  military  men  to  pay  their  troops  but 
depriving  the  Central  Government  of  large  sources  of  income. 


276        Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China 

In  any  case  the  world  cannot  afford  longer  to  ignore  China. 
She  constitutes  a  problem  today  just  as  she  has  for  the  past 
twenty  years,  and  a  problem  that  may  prove  tp  be  the  cause 
of  another  world  war.  The  international  complications  in  the 
Far  East  can  be  adjusted  most  naturally  by  an  honest  attempt 
to  aid  China  in  the  settlement  of  her  internal  difficulties,  and 
this  can  best  be  done,  from  present  indications,  by  some  action 
similar  to  that  outlined  above. 


APPENDIX  ONE 
Nine  Year  Programme  of  Constitutional  Preparation.1 

First  Year,  1908-09. 

a — Organization  of  Provincial  Assemblies. 

b — Issue  of  Local  Administrative  regulations. 

c — Issue  of  census  regulations. 

d — Issue  of  regulations  for  financial  reform. 

e — Establishment  of  a  Bureau  for  the  reform  of  the  Manchu 
system,  particularly  as  regards  the  treatment  of  Ban- 
nermen,  and  the  fusion  of  Manchu  and  Chinese. 

f — Preparation  of  elementary  lesson-books  for  teaching 
reading. 

g — Preparation  of  books  for  general  reading. 

h — Revision  of  the  Penal  code. 

i — Drafting  of  Civil,  Commercial  and  Criminal  laws. 

Second  Year,  1909-10. 

a — Inauguration  of  Provincial  Assemblies. 

b — Issue  of  Regulations  for  the  National  Assembly. 

o — Elections  for  same. 

d — Organization  of  Local  Administrative  Councils. 

e — Taking  of  census  of  whole  Empire. 

f — Investigation  of  Provincial  Budgets. 

g — Reform  of  Metropolitan  Official  system. 

h — Drafting  of  Civil  Service  Examination  regulations,  and 

of  regulations  for  official  salaries, 
i — Issue  of  regulations  for  Judicial  Courts. 
j — Organization  of  Judicial  Courts, 
k — Drafting  of  new  Criminal  Laws. 
1 — Organization  of  Elementary  Schools, 
m- — Inauguration  of  modern  constabulary  system. 

Third  Year,  1910-11. 

a — Inauguration  of  the  National  Assembly. 

1  China  Year  Book  (1912),  pp.  361-63. 

277 


278  Appendix  One 

b — Local  administrative  system  to  be  extended  to  townships. 

c — Report  by  Viceroys  and  Governors  on  census  in  prov- 
inces. 

d — Consideration  of  Provincial  Budgets. 

e — Drafting  of  local  tax  regulations. 

f — Endeavor  to  carry  out  Provincial  Budgets. 

g — Reorganization  of  Provincial  Official  system. 

h — Issue  of  regulations  for  Civil  Service  Examinations. 

i — Establishment  in  all  Capitals  and  Treaty  Ports  of  Judi- 
cial Courts  (Shenpanting). 

j> — Issue  of  new  Criminal  Laws. 

k — Extension  of  primary  education. 

1 — Organization  of  Police  in  hsiens. 

Fourth  Year,  1911-12. 

a — Organization  of  system  for  auditing  government  ac- 
counts. 

b — Investigation  of  the  Budget  for  the  Empire. 

c — Issue  of  Government  tax  regulations. 

d — Enforcement  of  Civil  Service  and  Official  Salaries  regu- 
lations. 

e — Establishment  of  Judicial  Courts  in  Fu's. 

f — Organization  of  elementary  Schools  in  all  townships. 

g — Organization  of  Rural  Police. 

h — Consideration  of  the  revised  Commercial,  Civil  and 
Criminal  Laws. 

i — Extension  of  Local  Government  system  to  townships. 

j — Investigation  of  the  census. 

Fifth  Year,  1912-13. 

a — Local  Government  system  to  be  carried  out  this  year, 
b — Issue  of  new  Metropolitan  and  Provincial  Official  sys- 
tems, 
c — Judicial  Courts  in  all  cities,  towns  and  townships  must 

be  in  working  order  this  year, 
d — Extension  of  elementary  education, 
e — Extension  of  Police  system. 


Appendix  One  279 

Sixth  Year,  1913-14. 

a. — Endeavor  to  carry  out  Budget  for  the  whole  Empire, 
b — Organization  of  Judicial  Courts  to  deal  with  political 

matters, 
c — Complete   organization    of    all    judicial    Courts    in    the 

provinces. 

d — Inauguration  of  Village  Courts. 
e — Enforcement  of  new  Criminal  Laws, 
f — Issue  of  Civil  and  Commercial  Laws, 
g — Police  forces  shall  be  established  this  year  in  all  towns 

and  villages. 

Seventh  Year,  1914-15. 

a — Strict  adherence  to  the  Imperial  Budget, 
b — One  per  cent  of  the  population  should  be  able  to  read 
and  write  in  this  year. 

Eighth  Year,  1915-16. 

a — Budget  for  Imperial  Household. 

b — Abolition  of  all  distinction  between  Manchu  and  Chinese. 

c — Organization  of  a  Statistical  Department. 

d — Enforcement  of  new  Civil  and  Commercial  Laws. 

e — Organization  of   Police   throughout  the  Empire  to  be 

completed, 
f — Two  per  cent  of  the  population  should  be  able  to  read 

and  write  in  this  period. 

Ninth  Year,  1916-17. 

a — Issue  of  Constitutional  Laws. 

b — Issue  of  Imperial  House  Laws. 

c — Issue  of  Parliamentary  Laws. 

d — Issue  of  regulations  for  the  election  of  an  Upper  and 
Lower  House. 

e — Elections  for  the  Upper  and  Lower  Houses. 

f — Preparation  of  Budget  for  the  following  year  for  dis- 
cussion in  Parliament. 

g — Organization  of  a  Privy  Council  and  of  Advisory  Min- 
isters. 


280  Appendix  One 

h — Five  per  cent  of  the  population  should  be  able  to  read 
and  write  in  this  period. 

As  a  result  of  the  agitation  for  an  early  convocation  of  the 
national  Parliament  a  "Revised  Programme  of  Constitutional 
Preparations"  was  issued,  shortening  the  period  of  prepara- 
tion by  three  years.  The  "Revised  Programme"  can  be  found 
in  the  China  Year  Book  (1912)  p.  376. 


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